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ABSTRACT 
Studies of metaphors in teaching and learning have underlined the important role of 
metaphors in reasoning, but have sometimes failed to show the effect of metaphor on 
how scientific concepts are represented, and have sometimes overlooked hidden 
metaphors in their attempts to be explicit about how metaphor functions. 
This study investigates metaphor in the context of teaching environmental science. It 
does not assume any simple correlation between surface linguistic cues and the 
presence or kind of metaphor. Two theoretical approaches have been chosen, 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (M. Halliday) which sees language as a social 
construction of meaning, and Image Schema (M Johnson and G Lakoff) which has 
developed in cognitive science and cognitive linguistics. These two approaches are 
used to discuss examples of metaphors from a number of lessons which have been 
observed and video-recorded, and in a variety of textbooks used as resource materials 
in teaching environmental science. 
The choice of environmental science as the subject matter arises from two of its 
distinct characteristics. One is the fact that ideology triggers and shapes the interests, 
decisions and choices of materials, issues, arguments, reasons, etc. But there is 
nothing like one unique ideology, on the contrary conflicts of different ideologies 
raise differences about what will be selected and how it will be represented. At this 
point there is a special role taken on by metaphor. Metaphors provide the means for 
creating differences and similarities, thus bringing together or keeping apart 
ideologies. Second, the teaching of environmental science does not appear as the 
teaching of science only, bounded from anything else, but is a blend of accounts of 
scientific and commonsense knowledge. Metaphors appear at the overlapping points 
where this blending takes place. 
It is not the purpose of the thesis to question, or to contribute to, the theoretical 
perspectives adopted. Rather, its interest is in how these perspectives provide, each in 
their own way, insights into the nature of the discourse of teaching environmental 
science, and thus to raise questions about its effectiveness. 
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1.1 The issue 
This thesis is about metaphorical aspects of representations of environmental science 
as they are taught in the classroom. There are three areas of concern: environmental 
science, representations and teaching, related in such a way that each has a special 
interest in the other. 
As far as environmental science and representations are concerned, my interest in 
metaphorical representations of environmental science is because of the prominent 
place such representations have in communicating environmental science within the 
context of a scientific research, policy making and representations of environmental 
science to the public. Metaphors are the means in which environmental problems are 
realised and can be possible communicated between people who have different 
interests (scientists, politicians, managers, policy makers, public). 
Among the recent environmental problems which appear often in the media, the 
depletion of the ozone layer is illustrated and talked about as an ozone hole even if 
there is not such a thing but rather a thinning in concentration. As Hannigan (1995, 
p.3,45) has argued, the image of the hole was scientifically constructed to make the 
situation more dramatic and understandable. This metaphor is not just a device to 
motivate interest but is an inseparable part of the way the thinning in concentration of 
ozone is realised by the public and communicated. Also the effects of acid rain were 
dramatised when German environmentalists began to use the term /waldsterben/ 
(forest die back). This term has survived until today and is used now at a global scale 
(e.g. "oaks die back" ). In representations of environmental science visual information 
has a significant role which is sometimes more prominent than the role of language 
(see for example the scepticism about genetically modified foods expressed in an 
image in Appendix 1). 
Contemporary studies of environmental science (see Hannigan 1995), suggest that 
environmental risks and problems can be seen as socially constructed entities, without 
denying their objective reality in terms of independent causal powers of nature but 
acknowledging that the rank ordering of these problems by social actors does not 
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always directly correspond to actual need. Therefore, in the construction of 
environmental problems scientific facts and authority are neither the only necessary 
nor the only sufficient condition. The dramatisation of the problem in symbolic and 
visual terms is an essential part for representing the problem as real and important 
(Hannigan, 1995, p.55). 
Also recent studies in environmental politics argue that what was seen before as 
environmental conflict has now changed into a discursive conflict. It is rather now not 
a question of whether there is an environmental crisis, but how the latter is 
interpreted. This assumption raises to a more prominent level the importance of 
representations of environmental issues and makes more urgent the need for studying 
representations. According to these lines of thinking, groups (e.g. institutions, 
organisations, governments, e.t.c.) which have opposite interests are in conflict with 
each other with the inevitable consequence that they interpret environmental crises in 
ways which underlie their different ideologies. 
As far as media are concerned with representations of environmental issues, the 
organisation of the latter in terms of 'story-lines' is thought of as a common, 
fundamental way of representing them. A 'story-line' provides the framework with 
both ideas, concepts and language within which an issue is seen and discussed (Hajer, 
1995, p.56-57). The idea behind the concept 'story-lines' is that even for an event the 
details of which are not disputed, the event itself can be framed in a number of ways. 
Among these discursive strategies, metaphors, exemplified accounts of science and 
catch-phrases function as sorts of symbolic realisations of the core meaning of the 
frame. For example, the phrase 'spaceship earth' adopted in 60s and 70s mainly after 
the 1969 view of the planet as fragile and finite, from the moon (Hajer, 1995, p.62), 
has been a powerful metaphor which has framed a number of story-lines in the media 
(see Roth, 1978). 
But although the importance of representations in respect of their implications is now 
evident in many studies - specially those which are concerned with the role of media 
and the shaping of environmental politics - there are still rather few attempts in recent 
research in environmental education to study what underlies representations of 
environmental science in the context of teaching. It is rather more likely that explicit 
accounts of metaphors, such as analogies about popular issues of environmental 
problems (e.g. Greenhouse effect), find their way more easily in studies of 
environmental education than covert metaphors which are about fundamental but not 
so popular entities of environmental science (e.g. representations of micro-organisms 
such as decomposers). 
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The interest of the present thesis is in how metaphor works in both covert and overt 
cases of metaphors, an inquiry which brings the analysis to the level of how 
environmental entities are represented. Representations of entities which are re-
constructed in the classroom for the purpose of teaching are of special interest for a 
number of reasons, such as: 
Representations of entities play a crucial role in order to identify, describe 
and justify environmental changes and damage. They provide arguments 
which build up understanding, beliefs, attitudes. 
They are concerned with natural, physical phenomena which take place both 
at the macroscale (e.g. Nitrogen cycle) and microscale ( e.g. the absorption of 
nitrates by plants' roots, photosynthesis). Examples and narratives do a lot 
of work in explaining phenomena at both scales. 
They are constructed on the basis of complex relations between scientific and 
commonsense knowledge. For example students rely on their everyday 
experience of phenomena like raining and water flow in order to explain the 
water cycle but at the same time they need also to develop concepts like 
evaporation or transpiration from the scientific point of view. As a result 
ordinary language is interwoven with scientific language, sometimes 
inextricably. 
They are related with concepts from a variety of disciplines including: 
chemistry, biology, geography, geology, economy, decision making. 
Metaphorical representations of entities have two effects, sometimes simultaneously: 
-they make something strange forcing us to see it in an unusual way 
-they provide the means to see something as familiar 
This double function imposes a delicate balance on meaning where something is 
illuminated because of the use of metaphor and something else is suppressed even 
because of the use of the same metaphor. The fact that this function sometimes takes 
place in a hidden way makes more interesting our effort to dig out how metaphors 
work in the teaching of environmental science. 
From studies of metaphors as they occur in an educational context, it has often been 
claimed that metaphors: 
- may facilitate understanding the abstract by pointing to similarities in 
domains like the students' everyday experience. 
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- may provide visualisation of the abstract 
- may incite students' interest and insofar may have a motivational function. 
But different approaches give different definitions to metaphors. According to the 
comparison view metaphor is an explicit comparison between two things in terms of 
something which is like/as something else. On the contrary both interaction and 
experiential theories are looking for hidden interactions of ideas sometimes below 
what is represented at the linguistic surface. 
In this study, it is taken as given that the experiential accounts of metaphors (image 
schema approach) elaborated by a sociolinguistic point of view (Systemic Functional 
Linguistics) and some aspects of the interaction theories might give the means to 
analyse both implicit and explicit appearances of metaphors. This study also agrees 
with those who do not draw any sharp distinction between metaphors, analogies, and 
similarities. 
As far as various approaches are concerned with the study of metaphor, 
representations and even systems of representations (e.g. images) there are usually 
three different points of view. More often studies take a quantitative stance which 
wants to look at things (e.g. metaphors, representations) marked out as clearly as 
possibly (e.g. words, expressions) and phenomena being as distinct as possible from 
one another (e.g. analogies vs. metaphors, literal vs. metaphorical). The opposite 
view, which is also very popular among studies of metaphor, tends to see things as 
parts of higher structures, such as sociological perspectives, institutions, or cognitive 
structures and puts more emphasis on implications and consequences, but often fails 
to give sufficient exemplified accounts in order to show how implications and 
consequences are grounded (materialised) in 'natural' contexts. There is also a third 
stance - followed in the present thesis - which recently has attracted more attention 
from both cognitive and sociolinguistic studies, looking at how specific phenomena 
such as metaphors belonging in higher structures of meaning organisations (e.g. 
discourses or genres) are worked out in specific situations. The latter view tends to 
exemplify the silent ways in which things are represented, so disagrees with the 
deterministic approach taken by the first approach. 
1.2 The argument 
The present thesis is organised and constructed around four research questions. The 
first question: 
How do image schematic and Systemic Functional Linguistic approaches apply as 
analytic approaches in the context of teaching environmental science? 
defines that two accounts of metaphor both interdisciplinary in their nature but one 
with a more cognitive direction (image schema) and the other with a more 
sociolinguistic perspective (S.F.L) are used here as analytic approaches. The 
challenge that this thesis faces is whether the application of the two approaches can 
show reliable and convincing uses of their analytic tools. As far as the former 
approach is concerned, aspects of it have not yet been applied in the context that we 
are looking at. On the contrary, S.F.L. have been applied by its founder (Halliday et 
al, 1993) and others in the teaching of science and for contents which most of them 
are either environmental science or relevant subjects (e.g. earth science and 
geography). Others also have applied some aspects of S.F.L. in environmental science 
(see for example Schleppegrell, 1997). 
The second question, 
What does the application of the schematic and linguistic analysis in the specific 
context suggests for their semantic forms and their functions: clause types and image 
schemata? 
explores the limitations of the power of the analysis in constraining the units of 
analysis at the level of a single clause or image schema. Both kinds of analysis not 
only work in a way that metaphors do not need to be marked out syntactically as such 
in terms of 'something being something else' or 'being like something else', but show 
that even clause types are determined by interpersonal and textual aspects and a single 
image schema (e.g. container) never or very rarely appears on its own without being 
part of a more complicated structure of meaning relations in which more than one 
image schema is involved. 
The third question, which is raised out of the outcomes of the two previous questions, 
concerns a shift in the direction to which the two analytic approaches are used: 
How are entities of environmental science carried by the linguistic and schematic 
forms? 
or in other words: 
How is the content of environmental science realised linguistically and 
schematically? 
The interest now is not in how aspects of the two approaches can be applied but how 
entities are represented and therefore realised. So instead of looking for applications 
of the two approaches we are looking at entities and how the latter are realised, in 
terms of the two approaches. The change in the direction provides a different 
dimension in looking at metaphors. While in the former, one can see that forms such 
as material processes are semantic forms since they can represent a variety of entities 
(from plant actions up to human actions), the latter dimension exemplifies semantic 
forms and therefore metaphors as well, as choices in how a single entity can be 
represented (plants' actions represented either as a material process or as 
nominalization). The third question is explored in the second part of the linguistic 
analysis (section 6.3) and in the discussion of the metaphorical extensions of each 
image schema. 
The combination of the two dimensions (one reflected in question 1 and the other 
reflected in question 3) leads us to think of metaphor as a relation between semantic 
form and meaning, so metaphor is not defined as a single phenomenon but can have 
many aspects. In other words metaphor is variety in representing based on a choice, 
irrespective of whether this choice is consciously realised as such. Although this very 
simple definition of metaphor is the bottom line where many approaches agree, most 
of them - specially those which are applied in education - restrain metaphor to a very 
constrained spectrum of variety e.g. representations in terms of phrases such as: 'like' 
or 'as', and explicit mappings between different domains of experience. 
At this point a very fundamental question is raised about what metaphor is: If 
variation in representation is accounted as a metaphor then what is not a metaphor? If 
the answer to this question is that what is not metaphor is literal, then what is implied 
is that there are 'true' and 'correct' representations against others. But since in the 
context that we are looking at, that is representations of environmental science for the 
interest of different groups and people and not only for the interest of scientists, there 
are not clear boundaries between what can be seen as the 'only' and 'correct' 
representation against others, and any categorical distinction between what is literal 
and what is metaphorical is difficult to sustain. Furthermore, defining as metaphor 
only 'very unusual' representations which because they are 'unusual' are easily picked 
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up as such, keeps us away from 'regular' representations which because they are 
'regular', often turn out to be invisible or silent. Then ironically, what is 'literal' turns 
out to be hidden and what is 'metaphorical' turns out to be overt. Nevertheless, the 
fact that in the present thesis there is no clear distinction of what is literal from what 
is metaphorical, or in other words that the issue of metaphor is not treated as one of 
definition, does not mean that all kinds of representations are looked at as if they are 
of the same kind. To put it in another way, the present thesis in its refusal to sharply 
divide what is metaphorical from what is literal, nevertheless does not accept that 
since there is not an 'absolute', 'true' representation, then anything goes in 
representations as if all of them are of the same value. 
The last argument brings us inevitably to the next question which is about the value of 
the different ways in which things are represented. In this perspective, the present 
study of metaphor would have been too limited to its scope if it did not ask about the 
effect of metaphor. This is what the fourth question tries to explore: 
What is the effect of the choices and use of certain semantic forms on how contents of 
environmental science are represented? 
Different representations of environmental science do not only have an effect on how 
the nature of entities is represented (ontological implications), (whether an entity is 
represented as being like a thing or a process) but also on what is thought of as a 
better way of making knowledge about specific entities possible (epistemological 
implications), on how power relations between people, institutions and the 
environment are realised (ideological implications) and on what can be thought of as 
better approaches for learning about the environment (learning implications). 
Examples from textbooks and teaching show how these implications co-occur in a 
way that their effect is often not realised by the very people who use these 
representations and are affected by them. 
1.3 Outline 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses basic categories and issues raised in studies about the 
environment. The purpose of this discussion is to show that entities in environmental 
science are defined and therefore represented in different ways depending on how 
they are looked at. Metaphors have an essential role in formulating the different ways 
in which entities are represented. 
Chapter 3 reviews recent research in environmental education in respect to how 
students understand environmental concepts and how the latter are represented to 
them. The review underlines the lack of systematicity of these studies in relation to 
how they interpret their findings. It also raises representations of environmental 
science in teaching as a key issue in how concepts are comprehended by students. 
In chapter 4 metaphor is defined as an issue of representation. A brief discussion of 
early and contemporary approaches to both representation and metaphor and a more 
extensive discussion of early and contemporary approaches to metaphor which is 
included in the Appendix (see Appendix 2) argue that many complexities around 
what metaphor is are due to the fact that metaphor is looked at mostly as an issue of 
definition from very diverse approaches which belong in different domains (e.g. 
philosophy of language or cognitive psychology). Many different views about 
metaphor tend to locate it at the very opposite ends of a number of dimensions. So, 
while some theories believe that metaphor is about words only, others claim that it is 
about cognitive functions. All these different approaches rely to some extent on what 
they count as representation. As stated in chapter 4, it is not the purpose of the present 
thesis to map all these different approaches and resolve the issue of metaphor as one 
of definition, but to provide some exemplified accounts of metaphor as they occur in 
a specific context. In order to do so, two approaches have been adopted and 
implemented in the analysis of metaphors. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present the two 
approaches, these are Systemic Functional Linguistics and Image schemata. Then 
section 4.5 provides the framework in which the two approaches are applied as it has 
been built up in a number of recent studies in science education. 
Chapter 5 presents the way in which the present study has been conducted. 
Chapter 6 is divided into two parts. The first part (section 6.2) deals mainly with the 
first and the second research question so is looking for how aspects of Systemic 
Functional Linguistics can be applied in the context of teaching environmental 
science. In doing so, this long section tackles a number of important issues, such as: 
1. it is argued why metaphors should be seen as parts of constructions of 
entities and not as parts of genres 
2. that words are not just 'words' and why they cannot be the unit of analysis 
in the context that we are looking at 
3. that the study of ideational processes should take into account interpersonal 
aspects and textual cohesion 
4. that even language as a system of representation should not be seen alone 
but in relation to other means of representation (e.g. images) 
Exemplified accounts in dealing with these issues are valued as important here if we 
want to set out as clearly as possible the framework within which aspects of Systemic 
Functional Linguistics can be used for the purpose of the present study. 
Then the second part of the linguistic analysis (section 6.3) moves towards answering 
the third research question. It is argued here that the degree to which entities are 
represented as concrete or abstract (section 6.3.1) has an effect on how entities less 
accessible than commonsense ones are realised in their representations (section 6.3.2) 
and how the relation between the reader and entities of environmental science is 
realised (Appendix 5.1). Also, more or less abstract realisations of entities underlie 
what can be seen as explicit analogies (section 6.3.3). In this second part (section 6.3) 
of the linguistic analysis and in the discussion of chapter 6 (section 6.4) aspects in 
answering the fourth research question are discussed. 
The structure of chapter 7 is very different from the structure of the previous chapter, 
even if the four research questions are dealt with in the same order as in chapter 6. In 
chapter 7 exemplified accounts of how five image schemata (agent structure, path-
link, containment, carrier and cycle) can be seen as being implemented in the teaching 
of environmental science are provided. Each section consists of a discussion of a 
different schema. At the end of each section accounts are provided in answering the 
third and the fourth questions specially in respect to metaphorical extensions of image 
schemata. While four of the image schemata are discussed mainly in terms of their 
linguistic realisations, the cycle is discussed as a multi-modal construction of an 
image schema. Also, how various image schemata (mainly agent structures and 
containments) are implemented in the realisation of the relation between the 'self and 
other entities - described as objectification of the self and personification - can be 
found in an Appendix (Appendix 5.2). Finally, the discussion of chapter 7 is focused 
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on the implications representations of image schemata have on how entities can be 
realised, that is answering the fourth research question. 
In chapter 8 the two analytic approaches are discussed together in an attempt to bring 
together answers to the third and fourth question. The first part of this chapter (section 
8.2.1) deals more with how metaphors function while the second part (section 8.3.1) 
deals more with what metaphor is about. 
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the main results in relation to the four research 
questions and discusses the limitations of the present research and some further 
implications concerning different areas of interest. 
CHAPTER 2 
ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES AND ISSUES RAISED BY 
STUDIES ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent thinking about Environmental Science and its relations with studies from other 
disciplines such as Environmental Sociology are discussed here. The multi-
disciplinary nature of many approaches today in respect to the nature of 
environmental issues and problems which are defined as an amalgam of 
commonsense and scientific reasoning is underlined. 
2.2 The identity and identification of entities 
Ecology deals with all sorts of entities which other sciences like physics and 
chemistry deal with. So for example genes were theoretical entities whose existence 
was postulated in theories before we were able to observe them. Today with the 
available technology genes are not theoretical entities any more even if we cannot say 
that they have the same status as animals and plants, simply because the existence and 
the behaviour of the latter is more accessible to our commonsense knowledge. 
There are also other kinds of entities like biological communities and ecosystems 
which do not have so clear a status as that of experimental entities - that is those 
which have come into existence in test-tube systems - and they are less doubtful, in 
terms of our commonsense understanding, than the theoretical entities. We might 
think of a pond as an entity more accessible to our commonsense knowledge than a 
gene. But for the interest of ecology it is not so easy to say whether a pond is 
identified as a single entity separated from its surroundings, and thus from other 
entities. Therefore and depending on what is the focus of our inquiry such an entity as 
a pond can be treated in some cases as a postulated entity rather than a naturally 
occurring entity. 
The same sort of fuzziness between the categories in which entities are classified can 
also be noticed for the distinction between thing-like entities, process/event-like 
entities and place-like entities. Without doubt some entities can be clearly thought of 
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as being thing-like entities such as all the kinds of plants and animals that surround 
us, and others like the seasons and the day-night cycle are thought of as event-like 
entities. But for entities which are either theoretical like the food web or whose 
meaning is grounded in theories, regardless of whether they are observable or not like 
the cell for example, it is not quite clear whether they belong to one category or 
another. Even cells can be thought of as process-like entities (Capra, 1982). 
There is an essential connection between the definition of an entity and its location. 
Ecologists, like A Brennan (1988, p.7), used to say "what we are and ought to be is 
partly determined by where we are". But locations of entities do not always have the 
meaning of physical, spatial places in which entities are found. The concept of niche 
for example despite the fact that it used to be thought of as the physical location of an 
animal, is often a 'location' with a very metaphorical meaning; it indicates status 
relations among organisms and other categorical relations (Brennan, 1988, p.48). 
Niche is most of all a 'location' in the community/population of organisms and a 
'location' in the food chain. In that way what an organism like a plant is depends on 
where this organism is 'located' in the food chain (Brennan, 1988, p.52). 
The food chain itself is also realised quite often as a place-like entity. Various 
processes and actions of eating, dying, storing food which are involved in a food 
chain become passages and path ways of entities; organisms at different trophic levels 
become links in a food chain, and their living and non living properties are 
distinguished in terms of their location in it (Brennan, 1988, p.52). It should be 
noticed here that an organism's niche can be identified at the same time in more than 
one dimension, like temperature, humidity, the level of the water table, exposure to 
sunlight, etc. Each of these conditions adds a further dimension to our description of 
an organism's niche. As a result at least theoretically each organism can be identified 
as the volume in a n-dimensional hyperspace within which it can be maintained 
(Brennan, 1988, p.49). 
At the same time what an organism is depends on what it does in relation to other 
entities and to the place in which it is located. So it is not so apparent as it might be 
thought whether for example bees are the agents which utilise plants as resources 
or/and bees are resources (pollinators) for plants, with plants therefore seeming to 
have the more active role. We should not underestimate the influence commonsense 
observations have on what sort of properties we attach to entities: bees are mobile 
therefore they are the agents while plants are static therefore they are resources (store-
like) and subject to agents' actions (Brennan, 1988, p.45). 
We can conclude that the identification of any entity apart from its intrinsic properties 
takes into account where the entity can be found, what the entity can do or in other 
words its ecological role and consequently what can happen to it. All these factors 
together constitute a package of properties and behaviours which tells us what an 
entity is. Looking at entities in that way it is inevitable that the identity of each is 
grounded in the relations this entity has with other entities. 
2.3 What is a living and what is a non living entity 
We can think about an entity as living or non living in two ways. Either because an 
entity is identified as so or because of the way the entity is treated; like a living entity 
or like a non living entity. Biologists relatively recently have come to realise that cells 
are not just the building blocks of other organisms but that they are organisms in their 
own right. So now when a living process in which the cell is involved, is mentioned, 
like reproduction, feeding, death this is not defined in terms of processes of other 
living entities but are defined as living properties for the cells themselves (Capra, 
1982, p.102). 
Other entities like viruses which exist on the borderline between living and non living 
matter have provided different definitions of what is living or non living which are 
quite far from our anthropocentric view (of what is living) (Capra, 1982, p.298). In 
this case where an entity is located determines whether it is living or not (Capra, 
1982, p.299). Outside living cells, totally unable to function and multiply a virus 
cannot be called a living organism; inside a cell it forms a living system together with 
a cell, but one of a very special kind. 
Certain theoretical accounts provide different definitions of what can be considered as 
living or non living and also different terminology. For example systems theory talks 
about living systems defined as organisations in the form of multi-levelled structures 
(Capra, 1982, p.26-27). Entities like living organisms, societies and social systems, 
like a family for example and whole ecosystems are then 'living systems' (Capra, 
1982, p.287). What was considered before as a building block of an organism, a cell 
for example, is now defined as a living system. The soil is also understood as a living 
system which consists of organic and inorganic matter (Capra, 1982, p.270-271). 
Finally, an entity can be treated in such a way that makes us think about it as living or 
non living. This is usually the case for entities which are not accessible to everyday 
human understanding, therefore these entities have to be thought of (conceptualised) 
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in terms of something else which is more accessible to commonsense knowledge. For 
example the entire earth was thought to be a 'nurturing mother' in the ancient and 
middle ages (Capra, 1982, p.41). This was what is called today the organic view of 
nature, since it ascribes living properties to the earth's ecosystem as a whole. Earth is 
a source of energy in the same way as a mother who feeds her baby is a source of 
food for it. The personification also implies a relationship of interdependence between 
the earth and its parts and attaches to it a property that only living entities have; earth 
as an entity from which life is brought about. 
In contrast with the ancient view of nature, the scientific revolution of the 17th 
century had as a consequence a very different model of how the world was thought to 
be. The earth as a nurturing mother metaphor was replaced by the world as a machine 
metaphor (Capra, 1982, p.41). The latter objectifies nature and removed from it every 
sort of living property. But later with the appearance of evolutionary theories and the 
systems theory the earth becomes once more alive. The world now is not thought of 
as already created and fully constructed, as the machine like metaphor claims, but as 
an evolving and ever changing system in which complex structures developed from 
simpler forms (Capra, 1982, p.59). 
2.4 What can be considered as an individual, fundamental unit/entity 
Ecology today does not attempt to find any fundamental unit in terms of which all 
ecological descriptions can be given. In fact more than one fundamental unit is used, 
depending on the scale of the analysis and the phenomenon that has to be described 
and explained (Brennan, 1988, p.63). To give some examples, once organisms are 
seen as linked elements of a food web, the web itself becomes a natural unit of study 
rather than the organism itself found in its environment (Brennan, 1988, p.52). 
Studying the concept of the food web further from the point of view of the theory of 
tropho-dynamics and the succession theory we could see ecosystems as dynamic 
wholes which through exchanges of matter and energy increase their complexity, 
maturity and stability. So at the end what becomes a fundamental ecological unit is 
the concept of the ecosystem as a gigantic superorganism in its own right developing 
toward a mature, stable state of complex diversity (Brennan, 1988, p.53). 
The issue whether biological communities and ecosystems can be taken as 
fundamental units, is not so much one of reality but of usefulness. As we have seen 
above, a forest or a pond for example are easily enough identified from a 
commonsense point of view, but it is not always easy to see them as separated from 
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their surroundings and described on their own as having properties of biological 
substance (Brennan, 1988, p.119-120). 
Recently, ecological studies have taken a more individualistic approach to 
communities. So instead of looking at whole ecosystems as huge 'individual 
organisms' they investigate individual living entities, like plants for example for their 
enormous variation in dealing with processes such as defending themselves from an 
invasion of micro-organisms or changing their attractiveness to a herbivore. In this 
way the plant seems more like a population than an individual, for it constitutes a 
variable resource for herbivores and disease organisms (Brennan, 1988, p.54). 
2.5 The relationship between a living entity and its environment 
Many writers like F Capra (1982, p.51) and J Gibson (1979, p.18) stress the fact that 
in ecology the location of an entity at a certain place is very different from how in 
classical physics an entity is located in a three dimensional space. In ecology place 
has not the meaning of (mathematical) space as an empty container independent of 
what happens inside it. The ecological meaning of space is closer to the concept of 
place that we share in our everyday life. An environment and its habitats for example 
are in a dynamic relationship in which one acts on and is acted upon by the other. 
Gibson (1979, p.8) reflects the interdependence between a living entity and its 
environment and the meaning and use of words. So according to him, the words 
animal and environment make an inseparable pair in a way that the use of one word, 
say animal, implies the simultaneous coexistence of the other; environment . And this 
is because one concept determines the existence of the other: no animal could exist 
without an environment surrounding it and equally the environment implies an animal 
to be surrounded. 
The issue of agency concerning the relations between living entities brings with it the 
question of what sort of causal relations occur in nature. The answer depends on the 
view which dominates our way of thinking about nature. The mechanistic model 
translates every causal relation in terms of linear chains of cause-effect relations. On 
the contrary the organic view of nature sees causality in terms of cyclical patterns of 
information flow known as feedback loops (Capra, 1982, p.289). Cycles of life, food 
webs and pollution problems are thought of as circular systems of cause-effect 
relations in which systems of causes rather than single causes are involved. In these 
causal systems correcting, alternative mechanisms prevent or correct failures due to 
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the flexible nature of the living systems in contrast with machines in which a broken 
part of them can stop their function entirely. But circular causality makes living 
systems and the relationships that are involved in them less predictable and less able 
to be controlled: too much effort to remove one cause of pollution can be proved to be 
worthless, on the other hand adding one more cause (pollutant) should not be 
underestimated since it can have a dramatic effect (for example concentrations of 
DDT in secondary consumers) (Chisholm, 1972, p.92). 
2.6 The relationship between a part and a whole 
Issues which give priority either to the part or the whole in the study of environment 
are grounded in the nature of explanation. Mainly two opposite modes of thinking 
determine the nature of explanations in ecology (Brennan, 1988, p.7). The first 
approach, dominant since the scientific revolution began, is the traditional atomistic 
and reductionist mode of explanation. According to this, all aspects of complex 
phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts (Capra, 
1982, p.101). Reductionism has been the outcome of the 'world as a machine 
metaphor' which influenced scientists to treat living organisms as machines and 
sooner or later to tend to believe that living organisms are nothing but machines 
(Capra, 1982, p.47). 
In contrast with the reductionist mode, holistic approaches influenced recently by 
systems theory support the view that the whole, whatever it is (an ecosystem or an 
organism), has properties not reduced to those of its parts. So according to holistic 
explanations, studies in ecology should start by looking at the whole and how the 
parts function in respect to the whole since the latter determines the properties of the 
parts and not the other way round. The nature of the whole is always different from 
the mere sum of its parts and the specific structure of the whole arises from the 
interactions and interdependence of their parts (Capra, 1982, p.287). 
Holistic approaches overemphasise the whole rather than the parts, while 
reductionistic approaches overemphasise the parts rather than the whole (Chisholm, 
1972, p.138). The difference between the two views affects not only our knowledge 
of what the world looks like but also what is counted as the foundation of the 
knowledge itself. This issue is also related with the issue of what can be taken as the 
most fundamental unit in the study of the environment. Holistic modes of thinking 
give priority to ecosystems like forests and communities of populations, while 
reductionist modes give priority to individual organisms like trees and the building 
blocks of individual entities like cells. 
Both the organic and the systems view of life emphasise the interdependence between 
a living system as a whole and its parts. This relation is often expressed in terms of a 
living system as a web. The living system as a web metaphor affects how we think 
both agency and causality in nature. If humans interfere in certain ways with one part 
of a living system, regardless of whether this is an organism or an entire community, 
their interference affects the other parts of the living system as well (Brennan, 1988, 
p.81). 
2.7 Scale relations affect what and how we think about entities 
By taking different perspectives while we are studying the relations between entities 
we notice that in general an entity consists of a unit which is embedded in a larger 
unit and at the same time a smaller unit is embedded in it. This phenomenon, 
described as nesting (Gibson, 1979, p.9) is noticed for all sort of entities: an event like 
decomposition is nested within another event like the carbon cycle. In some cases 
nesting and part-whole relations coincide: leaves are nested within trees and trees are 
nested within forests. The unit which is chosen for describing the environment 
depends on the scale on which the environment has been chosen to be described. In 
that way relations between entities are described in terms of superordinate and 
subordinate relations between units. At the end what counts in the study of the 
relations between entities is not simple agent/patient relations but the whole range of 
interactions between them (Chisholm, 1972, p.4). Take for example the role the 
decomposers have in the cycles of life and in the food webs. Whereas the presence of 
decomposers like mushrooms at a certain place looks as if these living organisms 
compete with other sorts of plants for space and food, the study of the same 
organisms from the microscopic point of view reveals symbiotic relations of 
cooperation and 'solidarity'; the decomposers break down the organic matter like dead 
plants and animals to inorganic matter like carbon and nitrates so making nutrients 
available to other plants, by giving them back to the soil. From the microscopic point 
of view the decomposers, by contributing to the circulation of matter and energy in 
the ecosystems, have an irreplaceable role in sustaining a whole community of 
organisms. To put it rather crudely, in nature the question who is making use of 
whom; the decomposers of the plants or the plants of the decomposers, depending on 
the scale we answer it, can have two contradictory answers. 
Again the issue of spatial and temporal scale affects considerably what sorts of 
relations we see. Looking at the overall living system well-defined regularities and 
behaviour patterns are noticed. The whole system of a living organism like an animal 
seems to be static over short periods of time, but not in long periods of time when 
evolution is involved. If we look at the same system microscopically the relations 
between its parts are not so rigidly determined in the same way that the whole 
organism is determined. Stability consists in maintaining the same overall structure in 
spite of ongoing changes and replacements of its components (Capra, 1982, p.292). 
The dual character of a living system, as Capra (1982, p.292) has pointed out, causes 
some confusion when we think in terms of commonsense knowledge. We are used to 
thinking of stability in terms such as fixed, unvarying, steady but this is not the case 
in systems theory; stability is sustained through dynamic processes. 
2.8 Summary 
The present review of studies which are concerned with ontological issues raised by 
environmental science, shows that different theoretical approaches, which often turn 
out to be different ideologies (e.g. mechanistic vs. organic approaches) have an effect 
on how almost every ontological aspect of environmental science is represented and 
realised. In studies of the environment, powerful metaphors are at work, even if they 
are not always present and realised as such, to mention some: 'life as a web', 'earth as 
a nurturing mother' and 'the world as a machine' metaphors, which influence 
representations of the environment and consequently what and how we think about it. 
Environmental science seems not to be detachable from these 'theory constitutive' 
metaphors and also some commonsense thinking is implemented in what can be seen 
as scientific reasoning about the environment. So, questions about the identification 
of an entity, the relations between entities concerning their actions and locations, as 
well as part-whole and scale relations, can get different answers depending on from 
which point of view they are looked at: 
commonsense vs. ecology 
one theory 	 against 	 another 
an interest 	 vs. 	 other interests 
one paradigm 	 vs. 	 another paradigm. 
To give an example, which will be discussed later looking at how aspects of 
environmental science are represented in teaching, what can be taken for granted in 
commonsense reasoning about the definition of a pond or a forest can be seen as 
problematic concerning their definition and study in science. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RECENT RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The environment and its associated problems is an increasingly important topic for 
science education. Most of the recent science curriculum models have emphasised the 
interrelatedness of science concepts with awareness of environmental problems. Over 
the years schools have tried and tested a number of approaches to introduce 
environmental education in their curriculum. Environmental education is taught either 
as a separate subject or as part of other related subjects, like biology and earth 
science. The latest approaches emphasise the interdisciplinary nature of 
environmental education and suggest that it should not be taught separately from 
other subjects or just as part of them, but that it should be taught in the form of short 
or long term projects in which subjects of science and social sciences are integrated. 
The underlying reason behind these approaches is the belief that environmental issues 
are the primary concern not only of science but of other disciplines as well, like 
sociology and political science. 
Several studies have found that students have difficulties in explaining higher order 
concepts such as food webs and nutrient cycling in terms other than those provided in 
their texts (Brody et al., 1988-89). Most of these studies underline the need to 
investigate students' prior ideas about environmental concepts so that teaching will be 
directed properly to concepts which are difficult to understand. Recently also, an 
increasing number of studies put emphasis on how environmental issues and concepts 
related to them are represented in the media, in textbooks and in teaching. These 
studies argue that the causes of misconceptions lie mostly in the way environmental 
problems and concepts are represented to students and to the public. 
3.2 Research on students' understanding of environmental entities, 
issues and problems 
Looking at the research literature on pupils' misconceptions in environmental science 
it becomes apparent that most of the difficulties in understanding concepts are caused 
by the ontological categories to which pupils relate these concepts. It has been found 
that pupils' reasoning depends heavily on the phenomenological properties of 
observable entities and that if they are called on to express their ideas about 
unobservable entities or entities with which they have little experience, they often do 
so in terms of the entities with which they have more experience. For example, 
children think about plants as organisms which take their food from their environment 
and not as organisms which need to make their food first within them (Leach et al, 
1996a, p.22). So plants are thought of as similar to animals in the way they get their 
food resources. On the other hand, plants are thought of as different to animals in 
respect to respiration. Pupils based on their own experience with breathing and also 
by seeing animals breathing, relate respiration with breathing and therefore think of 
photosynthesis as the opposite process of respiration. As a result, they believe that 
while photosynthesis is for plants respiration is for animals. Even at an older age 
pupils still think of the two processes as opposite so they cannot see how they can 
take place at the same time in plants (Leach et al, 1996a, p.22). 
Pupils also when asked about the 'needs' of plants, show by their responses that they 
think about plants as ontologically 'near' to animals. Plants are thought of needing 
light and air, like animals and people, in order to stay 'alive' and 'healthy' (Wood-
Robinson, 1991, p.131). Even by the age of 16 students have difficulties in 
understanding how unobservable entities like light, and gases like oxygen and carbon 
dioxide are incorporated in the making of plants' food (Leach et al, 1996a, p.23). 
A number of studies have found that pupils conceptualise organisms like plants and 
relations between them in terms of teleological and anthropomorphic reasoning 
(Jungwirth, 1975). It will be argued that these results together with the findings of the 
studies discussed above can be further analysed (interpreted) and suggest that there is 
an underlying basic schematic reasoning which deals like a package with most of the 
concepts related with the life of plants, having also its effects on new knowledge 
students learn about plants. The underlying reasoning is an Agent structure and its 
experiential basis is grounded in human and animal behaviour. 
This sort of agency explains the often contradictory responses of pupils to several 
research tasks of various studies. Take for example the findings of Jungwirth (1975) 
who suggests that students usually interpret literally teachers' and textbooks' language 
on plants growing. Statements such as "cacti grew spines in order to..." are interpreted 
by students as if cacti have control over their structure and act like animal Actors. On 
the other hand, if students are asked to recall animate organisms from a number of 
given entities they are more likely to refer to animals than plants (Leach et al, 1996b, 
p.131). In other words, due to agency experientially grounded in the behaviour of 
animals, the latter are seen as 'more animate' than plants. Furthermore, realisations of 
agency in terms of animals behaviour affect interpretations (readings) of the processes 
of other organisms, in this case plant growth. Young children even seem to believe 
that nature cannot exist without human agency. When they were asked where 
organisms get needs such as food and water, they often mentioned human beings 
(Leach et al, 1996, p.130). Agency as an underlying reasoning pattern organises and 
constrains knowledge about organisms as a package: plants are seen in general as less 
animate than animals, plants cannot respire because respiration is seen as breathing, 
but processes of plants in terms of what they need, how they get their food resources 
and their growth share the same basic schematic reasoning with processes in which 
animals are involved. 
An example of what the entailments of pupils' underlying reasoning about agency can 
be is their understanding of the process of evolution. Studies reviewed by Wood-
Robinson (1994) show that students who have not received any formal instruction on 
the subject of evolution provide explanations which are most often expressed in 
everyday language; 
"When it turned all cold, the foxes fought to keep themselves alive and gradually they 
began to grow thicker coats until they were able to survive properly... yes, they were 
sort of determined to stay alive." 
(12-year old student) 
Notice that adaptation in this extract is explained as the deliberate attempts of foxes to 
keep themselves alive in response to environmental changes (Robinson, 1994, p.43). 
The overemphasised role of agency of an individual organism in the process of 
evolution is in complete contrast with the extract below; 
"Well, possibly there were some foxes with thin coats and some foxes with slightly 
thicker coats, but the foxes with thin coats would have frozen to death and the foxes 
with slightly thicker coats may have survived long enough to make more offspring 
with thick and thin coats, and the thin ones would die out, so the thicker-coated ones 
would survive more so they eventually ended up with very thick coats" 
(12-year old student) 
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Furthermore, initial associations of evolution with a 'strong' sense of agency have as a 
result that other organisms like plants are not mentioned by students in an 
evolutionary context, even if the opportunity to do so was provided (Robinson, 1994, 
p.43). 
Pupils' difficulties in dealing with the existence of the invisible affects their 
understanding of complicated processes and phenomena, like the process of 
photosynthesis and the cycling of matter. As we have seen earlier, children find it 
difficult to conceptualise plant body mass as coming from an invisible atmospheric 
gas and water, rather than a more 'solid' substance such as soil (Leach et al, 1996a, 
p.31). In the case of the role of decay in the cycling of matter, even the majority of 
pupils up to the age of 16 cannot see any need to explain where all the matter goes 
during the process of decay (Leach et al, 1996a, p.29). Younger pupils appeared to 
assume that matter actually disappears during the decay process. Studies also show 
children's confusion about the nature and role of unobservable entities like bacteria 
and decomposers involved in the decay process. Decomposers and bacteria are more 
likely to be referred to as germs and microbes with which agency apparently is more 
strongly associated. The effect of decomposers is related mostly to the bad health of 
humans, animals and plants. The invisible nature of decomposers is probably the most 
important reason which prevents children from thinking about them as living. 
Many authors (Driver et al, 1994, p.90) have suggested that causes of pupils' 
difficulties with several environmental concepts should be sought in whether pupils 
have grasped the underlying ontology of the entities involved in these concepts. 
Young pupils have difficulties in perceiving air as a mixture of gases. The existence 
of air or gas as unseen entities, which is very important in understanding processes 
such as photosynthesis, is only developed later in the school years. The same is also 
evident for the concept of light as existing in space. Young children also cannot see 
matter as being necessarily conserved. When they are asked what happens to matter in 
various cases of transformations, like fire burning or water evaporating their response 
is that matter simply disappears. As has often been underlined by many studies, the 
view that material substances in the world do not just appear or disappear, but that 
matter itself is conserved in these transformations, constitutes a major change in 
students' ontology. So it will be too optimistic to expect them to understand concepts 
like the cycling of matter before they have grasped first the concept of the 
conservation of matter. This is especially significant for living material. The latter is 
thought by young children to be of a different kind from other kinds of material 
substances. Therefore, even if they think that non living material is conserved the 
same is not the case for living material when they think that if an organism dies, it 
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just rots away. Again these difficulties with the ontology of basic underlying concepts 
undermine students' understanding of more sophisticated environmental concepts. 
Another source of obstacles for the comprehension of concepts like food webs is 
thought to be children's reasoning in terms of linear causal chains (Driver et al, 1994, 
p.91). Anderson (1986) has also identified linear causality as a characteristic of 
commonsense reasoning, drawing on the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) who 
have described causality as 'the experiential gestalt of causation'. What all these 
descriptions have in common is that linear causal reasoning has a basic schematic 
underlying explanatory structure of an agent causing an effect as a uni-directional 
linear sequence of events in time. The difficulties start when this linear sequence is 
applied to complicated concepts like the food web (Leach et al, 1996b, p.14.0). It has 
been found that students can more easily think of the consequences of the removal of 
an organism from a lower trophic level on the population size of organisms from 
higher trophic levels, (e.g. effect of removing grass on rabbits) than the other way 
round; for example the effect of the removal of hawks on the population of the 
species at lower levels. 
The significant and silent effects representations of knowledge might have on 
children's understanding have already been mentioned in the studies which put their 
emphasis on the part of the recipient of knowledge, as a further development that 
future research studies should follow. Driver (1996) has pointed out the possible 
effect the teaching of environmental processes in isolation might have on pupils' 
understanding of these processes and she has suggested that a teaching approach 
which starts with the relationships between organisms and life processes may lead to 
more integrated learning and should be included in addition to addressing the 
processes in isolation. Wood-Robinson (1991) has also referred to a number of 
studies which show that even if pupils' misconceptions have been changed after 
teaching, a year later their knowledge often reverts to the same misunderstandings 
they had before teaching. Many authors suggest that in some cases the commonsense 
language that is used in teaching not only does not help students to resolve conceptual 
difficulties but causes more confusion. Barker and Carr (1989) argue that the idea of 
plants 'making food' which should replace the common misconception of plants 
absorbing food, causes further misunderstanding in the way the idea is represented at 
the linguistic level. The concepts of 'making food' and 'food maker' are associated 
with human activities and with a concept of 'eating'. Therefore the concept of 
photosynthesis should be addressed more carefully as a distinct mode of nutrition. 
In conclusion, it should be noticed that children's understanding of environmental 
concepts is not irrelevant to what has been discussed as the basic ontological 
dimensions of environmental science. The review of the former suggests that the main 
difficulties students face in understanding aspects of environmental science fit with 
the most important issues raised from the literature of environmental science (see 
table 1) 
3.3 Studies on representations of knowledge 
Although most of the studies mentioned above acknowledge that many difficulties in 
understanding are likely to be caused by the way knowledge is represented to 
students, it has been mainly the realisation of the different nature of the so called 
second generation of environmental problems which has been the crucial factor 
driving researchers' interest towards the representations of knowledge. The concept 
'second generation problems' is used to characterise most of the modern problems 
such as acid rain, global warming, ozone depletion and toxic contamination which are 
found not locally (like pollution) but at a global scale and are more likely to be 
invisible to the naked eye than problems which are located locally. As a result, the 
public perception of these problems rely on their representations from the scientific 
experts, the media and various environmental groups (Hannigan, 1995, p.24). 
Studies in environmental education (Brody, 1994 and Young et al, 1996) have 
pointed out the implications of second generation problems in teaching. Direct 
experience is not possible for most of the large scale environmental issues. Children 
can see, feel, smell or even taste a local ecological crisis such as pollution, in order to 
be convinced first of all of its existence, but they cannot have any physical experience 
with issues like global warming. The realisation of the latter depends on how they are 
represented in textbooks and in teaching. Plainly, the kind of representation which 
involves little or no physical experience is based on language and images. 
As a result, for second generation problems the study of the representations of 
knowledge and their effects on students' reasoning, came not out of choice as the most 
reasonable and best available way for research. The need for studying students' ideas 
about such issues has been recently reinforced by the excessive media attention to 
them. 
Coincidentally, with the appearance of second generation problems in the literature of 
environmental education, science education has attracted the increased interest of 
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Environmental Science  
The identity and identification of entities 
The identification of any entity apart from its 
intrinsic properties takes into account where 
the entity can be found, what the entity can do 
or in other words its ecological role and 
consequently what can happened to it. All 
these factors together consist a package of 
properties and behaviours which tells us what 
an entity is. Looking at entities in that way it is 
inevitable that the identity of each is grounded 
on the relations this entity has with other 
entities. 
What can be considered as an individual, 
fundamental unit/entity 
Different paradigms in ecology have different 
effects on what is counted as a fundamental 
unit of our knowledge about the environment. 
Ecology today does not attempt to find any 
fundamental unit in terms of which all 
ecological descriptions can be given. In fact 
there are more than one fundamental unit 
which are used, depending on the scale of the 
analysis and the phenomenon that has to be 
described and explained. The issue whether 
biological communities and ecosystems can be 
taken as fundamental units, is not so much one 
of reality but of usefulness. The identification 
of living entities and what is considered as an 
individual ecological unit are highly 
interdependent. 
What is a living and what is a non living 
entity 
We can think about an entity as living or non 
living in two ways. Either because an entity is 
identified as so or because of the way the 
entity is treated; like a living entity or like a 
non living entity. It is also possible that an 
entity which has been treated as having living 
properties to be identified later as a living 
entity. 
The relationship between a living entity and 
its environment 
Many writers stress the fact that in ecology the 
location of an entity at a certain place is very 
different from how in classical physics an 
entity is located in a three dimensional space. 
Many of them reflect the interdependence 
between a living entity and its environment on 
the meaning and use of words. They argue that 
one concept determines the existence of the 
other: no animal could exist without an 
environment surrounding it and equally the 
environment implies an animal to be 
surrounded. 
Students' understanding 
Basic schematic reasoning is underlying 
students thinking about entities. This reasoning 
is organised as packages of knowledge. The 
latter include a number of entities and their 
relations. 
Students' understanding is better for those 
entities which are grounded in physical 
experience. Reasoning about these entities is 
often used as a tool by them in order to think 
about less familiar entities 
Children's ideas on what is animate or 
inanimate often depend on the basic schematic 
reasoning which they use when they are 
thinking about entities. For example plants 
because they are not seen as primary Agents in 
the same way animals are thought to be, they 
are considered as less animate than animals. 
Unobservable entities like germs and microbes 
are often thought as non living entities, 
because they are not associated with animals 
but with the entities which carry them like dust 
and dirt. 
Relations between living entities and their 
environment in children's mind should be 
better seen as part of the packages of their 
Knowledge about these entities. For example 
plants are thought by children as if they absorb 
their food from their surrounding environment 
and not as taking raw material which have to 
be synthesised by the plants. 
The relationship between a part and a 
whole 
Issues which give priority either to the part or 
the whole in the study of environment are 
grounded on the nature of explanation. Mainly 
two opposite modes of thinking determine the 
nature of explanations in ecology. The first 
approach is the traditional atomistic and 
reductionist mode of explanation. According to 
this, all aspects of complex phenomena can be 
understood by reducing them to their 
constituent parts. In contrast with the 
reductionist mode holistic approaches support 
the view that the whole, whatever it is (an 
ecosystem or an organism), has properties not 
reduced to those of its parts. So according to 
holistic explanations, studies in ecology should 
start by looking at the whole and how the parts 
function in respect to the whole since the latter 
determines the properties of the parts and not 
the other way round. 
The relationship between human beings and 
nature, other living and non living entities 
The impacts of different scientific domains on 
our ways of thinking about our relationship 
with nature and with other living organisms 
are various. A central issue is whether any 
value is given to nature and to living entities 
other than human beings. This has a direct 
effect on how nature is treated by humans and 
what sort of agent relationships it is subject to. 
Scale relations affect what and how we 
think about entities 
By taking different perspectives while we are 
studying the relations between entities we 
notice that in general an entity consists of a 
unit which is embedded in a larger unit and at 
the same time a smaller unit is embedded in it. 
Changes of the scale have the effect of looking 
at the relations between entities in a very 
different way. 
The same as above is the case for children's 
reasoning about part-whole relations. For 
example pupils think of roots and leaves as the 
medium through which food is absorbed from 
the surrounding environment into plants body. 
Relations between human beings and other 
organisms are influenced by the fact that most 
of the underlying reasoning about living 
entities seems to be experientially grounded in 
human characteristics. Therefore reasoning 
about other organisms than humans is 
influenced and (depending on the context) 
constrained considerable according to how 
pupils think about human behaviour. 
Scale relations which are not explicitly 
addressed in textbooks are not comprehended 
easily by students. For example, students refer 
to organisms as individuals and not as if they 
represent populations of individuals in cases 
like the food web. 
(Table 1: Environmental Science and students' understanding) 
linguists and discourse analysts. A landmark of this direction has been the work of 
Halliday and Martin (1993) 'Writing Science' in which they use ideas drawn from 
Systemic Functional Linguistics as a theoretical framework and analytical tool in 
order to study representations of science mainly in school textbooks. Most of the 
examples of applying discourse analysis in this work are from the subjects of 
geography, earth science and biology, domains which have always been thought of as 
close relatives to environmental science. Since then, following this new direction 
which emphasises the cognitive and interpersonal dimensions of representations of 
knowledge, a number of studies have attempted to provide a better understanding of 
how environmental concepts are represented in textbooks and in the teaching of 
environmental science. 
These studies either look at the overall thematic organisation of the represented 
concepts, or put special emphasis on the nature of the language in which knowledge 
about the environment is represented. While the latter approach is usually 
characterised by generalised accounts of representations at the level of language and 
by a lack of systematic and specific, exemplified insights in language (see for 
example Stables, 1996), the former group of studies either includes specific 
references to linguistic elements, most often at the level of words as representations of 
concepts and simple verb phrases as the linguistic realisations of processes (see for 
example Sutton, 1992), or it does not make any reference to specific linguistic 
elements at all. 
Both kinds of studies above are divided into those which investigate representations 
of specific environmental concepts, issues and problems, like Acid Rain or the 
Greenhouse Effect, most of them subjects of immediate public and media concern, 
and those studies which examine representations of knowledge not by making any 
reference to specific concepts or problems but by taking into account the current 
environmental agenda of issues as a whole (see for example De Young et al., 1996). 
The former studies which broadly investigate the effect of specific representations on 
students' learning or/and reasoning, do provide some analytical tools like conceptual 
maps or models or some pieces of technical linguistic analysis, but not usually going 
beyond the word or clause level and most often without being able to generalise the 
findings of these analyses. 
A general observation can be made about the main difference between kinds of 
inquiries. Studies on reasoning do not question the nature of the knowledge which is 
represented to students. They take for granted that whatever this knowledge is and is 
about, it is 'correct' and 'true' knowledge which students have to learn in the end 
despite their difficulties in understanding it. A naive realism is implied here which 
accepts that scientific knowledge reflects reality as it is and at the same time 
underestimates the possible 'distortions' representations can impose on knowledge. 
The most 'naive' of these studies do not acknowledge even the role of representations 
implying that there is a direct relation between the recipient of knowledge and 
knowledge itself without anything intervening in this one to one relationship. This 
'naive' realism is most strongly evident in curriculum developers who advocate that 
students' direct physical experience with nature will resolve most of their difficulties 
in understanding nature, as if nature 'speaks by itself. An idea often expressed by 
environmental educators and environmental activists is the slogan "education about 
the environment, in the environment and for the environment". So these studies aim 
is to see what is at 'fault' in the individual if the latter cannot 'read' nature correctly. 
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On the other hand, studies on representations have shifted the 'blame' from the 
individual to the interaction between the recipient of knowledge and knowledge 
representations. While few of these studies are able to locate quite clearly that there 
are two sources of influences and constraints in this interaction; one from the kinds of 
knowledge representations used and the other from reality itself (expressed as a 
'bottom line realism', see Ogborn 1994), many of the studies fail to acknowledge any 
realist accounts to the world, and overemphasise the role of the representations in a 
way which sounds as if 'everything can be achieved by students if better 
representations are implemented in teaching". The latter end up in the same place at 
which 'naive' realist studies on reasoning also arrive. The difference between the two 
is that instead of 'blaming the student', many studies on representations 'blame the 
teacher' and instead of propagating a 'naive' realism about knowledge, come across 
with a 'naive' realism about representations. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion I will argue that studies of pupils' reasoning, even if they have been 
insufficient in interpreting their findings, can make a considerable contribution to our 
understanding of the interaction between students' reasoning and knowledge 
representations. The findings of these studies provide evidence of an underlying basic 
schematic reasoning which is grounded in physical experience and phenomenological 
observations of reality. This underlying reasoning constructs its own ontology and 
ontological categories like packages of entities and processes of reasoning, such as 
the linear causal relations mentioned above. The relatively abstract descriptions one 
can give of such packages may be misleading. There is no suggestion that children's 
reasoning works at such a level of abstraction. Rather, some pattern belonging to 
familiar, well worked out and experientially grounded knowledge, is tried out as a 
match for new and unfamiliar knowledge. Many misunderstandings of students would 
be better seen as the implications and constraints that the use of these packages have 
on entities, like discomfort and confusion in the use of the unobservable entities. 
Furthermore, what can be questioned is whether thinking in terms of 'packages' is 
purely the product of children's reasoning against what is represented to them or 
whether representations of environmental science in textbook material and in the 
classroom sustain and encourage reasoning in that way based on the rather intuitive 
and not explicitly worked out assumption that this is how children think. 
The present thesis explores this question by studying means of representations, called 
metaphors, the presence of which is rarely realised as such in everyday and classroom 
exchanges of meaning. The following chapter discusses both theoretical and empirical 
accounts of the emergence, value and role of implicit means of representations. 
CHAPTER 4 
METAPHOR AS AN ISSUE OF REPRESENTATION 
4.1 Brief account of early and contemporary approaches to metaphor 
In the past there were two main, completely opposite positions about metaphors 
(Ortony, 1979, p.2). The origins of these two positions are found in philosophy and 
specifically in the philosophy of language. One position denied any cognitive value to 
metaphor and claimed that metaphor is wholly emotive, a feature of the language 
only, an ornament, and that its natural place is in literature. If a metaphor is found 
anywhere else outside of literature, as in a scientific text for example, then it must be 
translatable into a literal paraphrase. And this is because it is supposed that only 
literal language that has true value, and its content/meaning can be tested and either 
verified or not. The other position claims that metaphor is not just an ornament and 
parasitic for thinking, but is an essential characteristic of the creativity of language, 
and for all sorts of reasoning, including scientific thinking. This point of view is the 
dominant one today, but various and in some cases very different approaches belong 
to it. These approaches vary in terms of whether they assign any significant cognitive 
function to metaphor, to the extent that metaphor is reducible to a literal paraphrase or 
not, and also on whether they think that metaphor is a linguistic property which has to 
do primarily with words or phrases or whether it is a cognitive function which is 
about concepts and reasoning. 
Two of the main streams which are currently influential are the comparison and the 
interaction view (Ortony et al, 1978, p.922,923). A brief account (a more extended 
theoretical discussion is in Appendix 2) of the similarities and differences of various 
approaches is given below by using examples (some of them already used in various 
studies) of metaphors which are found mainly within the context of everyday 
language and literature. 
To start with let us take an example which has a syntactic structure very popular in 
early accounts about metaphors - very similar to Richards (1936) favourite example: 
"Man is a wolf": 
"David is a pig" 
Most of the studies which belong in the comparison view do not bother whether it 
makes any difference in this decontextualized example of metaphor if categories are 
involved or just members of categories, or how far context is essential in interpreting 
the metaphor. What they say is that the metaphor appears as a comparison between 
two objects or things, in this case between a man and an animal: 'David' and 'pig' 
which both share some properties, like getting what they want by being rude, also 
being dirty and nasty. They assume that this example is a metaphor because of the 
similarity between 'David' and 'pig', treated as it has the syntactic form: 'David is like 
a pig', without looking at in what respect 'David' and 'pig' are both similar and 
different at the same time. They also believe that similarity is the essential meaning of 
the metaphor which (for some of them) can be translated into a literal paraphrase 
focusing on the shared properties, without losing anything of the meaning of the 
metaphor. 
The interaction view approaches the same metaphor functionally rather than 
grammatically so it is not bothered whether it appears with the syntactic form: 'David 
is like a pig' or the 'David is a pig'. According to the interaction view the metaphor is 
not about things or objects identified by single words but it is about systems of 
relationships which are mapped to each other. There is one system of relationships 
about 'David' that is called the primary subject of the metaphor mapped on the system 
of relationships of 'pig' which is the secondary subject of the metaphor. There is some 
problem here with Black's (1979) approach for what is meant as system of 
relationships and how this mapping takes place from one system to the other (see also 
Appendix 2). 
But it is this very idea of mapping which is further developed in many different ways 
by cognitive psychologists and others in cognitive science today like Gentner's (1988) 
approach and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) accounts of metaphor. Roughly speaking 
according to all of them, David and pigs belong in different domains ( called source 
and target domain) and it is a number of relationships within each domain which are 
picked up and mapped onto the relationships of the other domain. Apart from their 
differences these various approaches of the interaction view share a rather dynamic 
perspective, looking at metaphor as a cognitive process rather than the final outcome 
of this process in respect to what the metaphor can afford. 
We should notice that some of the interaction theories have a problem in identifying a 
metaphor whenever one of the two subjects of the metaphor is not present and only a 
single word or phrase appears which is the result of the interaction of two domains or 
subjects. In other words for some of the interaction theories the syntactic form which 
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needs two subjects: both 'David' and 'pig' to be discrete and present in the text even if 
not marked as such, like: 'David is like a pig' is necessary. For others like Richards 
and Lakoff for example the two subjects can be co-present in one word or phrase, 
like: 
"The magic is gone" (where magic is love). 
Another issue which concerns both comparison and interaction approaches is that 
most of the theories work out what metaphor is on very carefully selected examples 
and depending on how they analyse metaphors and in which context, some of them 
are more comfortable with syntactic forms in which nouns and adjectives are involved 
in terms of something being like something else: 
"Janet is a block of ice" 
or in terms of something which has properties that look like the properties of 
something else: 
"Life has a sunrise and a sunset" 
or where the metaphor is sort of hidden in a nominal phrase: 
"the sunset of life" 
"this is a sick relationship" 
or cases in which verb structures are involved, like how something acts: 
"He ran out of ideas" 
"That idea will go a long way" 
Some other approaches to metaphor which cannot be easily categorised under the 
comparison or the interaction view represent metaphor as a communicational act by 
giving accounts of the interaction between the reader and the writer or the speaker and 
the hearer whenever a metaphor occurs (Searle, 1995). So they claim that a metaphor 
might appear without any semantic or syntactic markers, as where the literal 
interpretation of the sentence : 
"Where are your shoes?" 
is a request for information about the location of the hearer's shoes. But, spoken by a 
mother to a child late for school, the question may take the meaning of : 
"Get going" 
while spoken by a nurse to an elderly patient, it may be intended to mean: 
"I offer to get your shoes for you if you tell me where they 
are" 
So in these cases it is the non-linguistic context of the situation which indicates what 
the sentence is being used to do. But even here there is no agreement at all whether 
cases like this should be taken as metaphors or as indirect speech acts. And it is 
actually this sort of hidden or covert metaphor which are the most problematic in 
many sense. Those - usually linguistic - studies which believe that covert metaphors 
like : 
"Where are your shoes?" 
"the sunset of life" 
"he ran out of ideas " 
are not just indirect speech acts but have a special place in our reasoning, are those 
who tend to believe that almost all language and its changes are grounded in 
metaphors. On the other hand, those - usually empirical - studies which reduce the 
study of metaphors to those which are indicated in an explicit way, the so called overt 
metaphors, have very little to say either on how these metaphors occur naturally in 
context and how they are placed in the system of the language as a whole. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the positions on metaphor which are common to 
Systemic Functional Linguistics, and the image schema approach of Lakoff and 
Johnson will be adopted. They are: 
1. Metaphors are not necessarily marked out syntactically. An immediate 
consequence is that metaphors are not only or primarily about words or 
concepts only. 
2. Context is essential in seeing how metaphor works and what is about. 
Metaphors always appear in context, therefore it will be a very artificial 
approach if a metaphor is taken out of its context and discussed as if it exists 
by itself. 
3. In the study of metaphor emphasis should be put both on how metaphor 
works (often described as 'mapping' or 'model' and in the present study as ' 
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discursive property') and what is about, that is what the metaphor affords, 
what sort of meaning relations it makes possible for those who communicate 
using it. 
4. In relation to the latter what is at the heart of a metaphor both as a 
'process' and a 'product' is a relation between form and meaning, that is how 
something is represented and what is the effect on its meaning because of the 
way it is represented. Therefore, metaphor is about representations and 
realisations of meaning relations. 
The last point above brings metaphor into the realm of representations. Metaphor is 
seen as a means of representing meaning and knowledge. 
4.2 Brief account of early and contemporary approaches to 
representation 
As well as the concept of metaphor, the notion of representation is studied in 
philosophy, linguistics and psychology, since it is linked with such important 
questions as how we think, how knowledge make sense to us, how it can be possible, 
how it can be stored or be activated. 
In cognitive psychology, representations are distinguished between external and 
internal representations (Eysenck et al, 1995, p.204). While the former are supposed 
to be 'real' entities found outside of us in the 'world' the latter are seen as mental 
entities found in our minds. The first immediate implication of this distinction is that 
one has to think about the two kinds of representations as being two different realms 
of experience. Consequently, the relation between the two kinds of representations 
has mainly been seen as a 'translation' of one system of representation into another 
(Lakoff, 1987). The question which has been raised is how entities which belong in 
our surrounding world, can be translated into entities which are only found in the 
mind and vice versa. 
Another important distinction is between picture or image-like and language-like 
external representations. There is a parallel distinction in mental representations. The 
latter, even if they are about symbols which denote or refer to something outside 
themselves so that resemblance between them and external representations is not 
required, are also divided between image or model-like - called analogical -
representations and language-like - called propositional - representations. 
Traditionally, studies have thought of analogical representations as being more like 
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the encodings of picture-like external representations, while propositional 
representations have been thought of as the encodings of language-like 
representations. But recently, studies have shown that some concrete words evoke 
images more readily than other words, so words can be stored as images and not 
necessarily as propositions (Eysenck et al, 1995, p.211-212). Therefore one kind of 
encoding should not be seen as excluding another kind of encoding. 
Picture-like and language-like representations have also often been linked with what 
has been thought of as concrete and abstract. In particular, a pictorial representation 
either external or internal is thought of as closer to what it represents because it is 
'concrete' in the sense that it is strongly associated with the visual modality. On the 
other hand a linguistic representation is thought of as more abstract because of the 
distance between its modality and the thing it represents (Eysenck et al, 1995, p.206). 
But as has been illustrated above one needs to be careful with generalisations about 
systems of representations. 
Finally, traditionally a distinction has been made between 'objects' and the 'relations' 
between things. Research on the organisation of concepts of 'object' has been marked 
by several theoretical stances such as the defining-attributive view and prototype 
theories (see for example Rosch, 1978). One tradition treats concepts on a similarity-
based approach in which concept formation is based on the similarities between 
entities. Another tradition is primarily concerned with relational concepts. According 
to the latter, most of our knowledge is structured in complex ways, such as thinking in 
terms of events (Eysenck et al, 1995, p.234). The structures that encode this 
knowledge, which are called schemata, involve many different entities connected by 
many diverse relations (see for example Schank, 1972). 
The concrete vs. abstract debate has also been continued within the two research 
traditions illustrated above. So some of the prototype theories reject the idea that 
abstractions underlie our concepts, and argue that individual entities lie at the heart of 
our concepts (Eysenck et al, 1995, p.242). Certain schemata theories on the other 
hand such as script theories are often blamed for not having a sufficient abstract set 
of structures so that their rigid structures are too inflexible to be applied to different 
situations and in a different context (Eysenck et al, 1995, p.266). 
The present study challenges the view which wants to see (either external or internal) 
representations as either concrete or abstract. One can ask in what respect a picture is 
more concrete than a piece of text. Both image and language - as will be illustrated in 
the analysis - can be more abstract or more concrete in respect to how they represent 
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something in different ways. The question of whether a representation is either 
abstract or concrete should be seen as one of degree always in relation to what is 
represented, to whom and in which context (see section 6.3.1). 
An assumed split between form and meaning, often described in terms of a purely 
arbitrary relation between word and meaning, is still reflected strongly in linguistics 
since Saussure, even if it has been challenged recently by Halliday (1985) and more 
recently by Kress (1993). Still many studies in psychology often take for granted the 
arbitrary relation between meaning and words in their probes of internal 
representations, stating that they are looking for concepts and are not interested in 
their linguistic or imagistic representations. 
Concerning the definition of metaphor, those studies which accept the arbitrary split 
between form and meaning and realise metaphor at the level of words only, inevitably 
see metaphor either as an incorrect choice of words or as an ornament without 
affecting in any way the meaning of what is supposed to be expressed. 
Recent interaction accounts which see metaphor as a mental model or mapping carry 
some of the troubles which the dichotomies discussed above imposed on them. So for 
example while some studies are focused on images (various schema or script theories) 
others are primarily about concepts. The fact that the latter (like the Gentner and 
Gentner approach, 1983) often leave out of their accounts the issue of the nature of 
external representations implies the dichotomy between the two realms of experience 
and raises the old problem of the hypothetical translation of one system to the other. 
The two approaches (Image Schema and Systemic Functional Linguistics) that are 
followed in the present study have made a considerable effort to break the old 
dichotomy between form and meaning. To give an example from Systemic Functional 
Linguistics, a material process is a clause which has the semantic function that one 
participant does something and this action can affect another participant. From the 
Image Schema point of view an image schema such as a containment relation imposes 
a relation of boundary and closure between entities. Notice that both approaches are 
primarily concerned about relational entities which are at the same time the units of 
analysis. Single entities are neither thought of as words or concepts in these two 
approaches, but grammatically are called 'participants', or from the Image Schema 
point of view are called 'entities'. 
4.3 Metaphor as a discursive phenomenon 
The view from Systemic Functional Grammar 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Systemic Functional Grammar has provided a new insight into metaphors. Metaphors 
are no longer seen as being primarily about words at the linguistic surface. But this 
does not mean that language takes a second place leaving the analysis of metaphors at 
the level of concept relations only. 
4.3.2 A brief account of relevant aspects of Systemic Functional 
Linguistics 
According to Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG), language is a system of 
meanings, accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be realised. It is 
functional in the sense that it is not intended to be a formal description of language 
which uses examples of actual uses of language in order to end up with some general 
categories of a linguistic theory (compare Saussure), but is designed to account for 
how language is used in making meaning (Halliday, 1985, p.xiii). The object of its 
inquiry is to study how meanings are expressed, following a top to bottom approach 
(from meaning to linguistic forms) (Halliday, 1985, p.xiv). 
SFG does not give priority to grammar over syntax. It puts the two together as 
'lexicogrammar' (Halliday, 1985, p.xiv). It aims to make it possible to analyse 
discourses either spoken or written in the context of ethnographic, literary, 
educational, pedagogical and other studies. In the context of education, Systemic 
Functional Linguistics is appropriate for looking at classroom communication and 
analysing the language of textbooks (Halliday, 1985, p.xv), both being interests of 
this thesis. But it should be emphasised that Halliday believes that discourse analysis 
without any analysis at the level of lexicogrammar is simply a 'running commentary 
on a text' (Halliday, 1985, p.xvii). Although text is defined as a semantic unit and not 
a grammatical one, meanings are realised through wordings. Therefore, without a 
theory of wordings any attempt to make explicit the interpretation of the text will be 
inadequate. 
SFG is functional in that it constructs all the units of language such as sentences, 
clauses, words as organic configurations of functions. Each is interpreted as 
functional with respect to the whole. SFG is systemic in regarding meaning as choice. 
That is, language or any other semiotic system, is interpreted as networks of 
interlocking options, arranged as systems starting with the most general features and 
proceeding to more and more delicate levels (Halliday, 1985, p.xiv). The point is to 
ensure that very general semiotic features are ultimately connected to specific 
wordings. For example, to choose to mean 'action' as opposed to, say, 'being', is a 
high level choice. In SFG this gets connected to actual possible wordings, for 
example, in types of verb phrase (e.g. material processes). Examples of these 
relationships used in analysis of texts are in chapter 6. 
At the most general functional level, Halliday identifies three fundamental 
components or metafunctions: the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual 
(Halliday, 1985, p.xiii). The textual has to do with the way in which information is 
distributed across clauses and sentences in a text. The interpersonal metafunction is 
concerned with the interaction between the writer/speaker and the reader/hearer as an 
exchange of messages between them. The ideational metafunction is the expression of 
experience, that is, our experience of the world that lies about us, and also inside us, 
the world of our imagination. Putting the three together, in an act of discourse we 
have something to say (ideational), in a relationship between people (interpersonal), 
which is constructed to have an appropriate continuity and coherence (textual). 
4.3.3 Some specific aspects of Systemic Functional Linguistics which 
are important in the present research 
One essential aspect of SFG in the present research is the analysis of processes. The 
basic semantic framework for the analysis of representations of processes is very 
simple. It consists of the process itself, the participant in the process, such as animals, 
people, things and the circumstances associated with the process like locations in time 
and place. These provide the frame of reference for interpreting our experience of 
what goes on. The concepts of process, participant and circumstance are semantic 
categories which explain in the most general way how phenomena (both physical and 
pragmatic/social) of the real world are represented as linguistic structures (Halliday, 
1985, p.102). 
Three of the most frequent ways to represent processes are : 
the process of doing or Material process 
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the process of sensing or Mental process and 
the process of being or Relational process. 
Material processes express what some entity 'does', or what could be done to some 
entity, or how it is brought into being, and are all treated grammatically as types of 
Action. The participants are two; the Actor who/which is doing something and the 
Goal (not necessarily present in every process) who/which receives the actor's action. 
In this kind of process participants are not required to be human beings, but anything 
which is realised as a phenomenon of our experience and could be either a thing-like 
or process-like entity, such as action, event, quality, state or relation (Halliday, 1985, 
p.104). The example below is analysable as a Material process because it represents a 
process in which one participant does something to another participant: 
This makes a black sticky substance called humus. 
Transitive material process 
ACTOR PROCESS GOAL 
1 
anaphora 	 nominal group 	 substitution 
l 	 1 	 . 
I 	
I 	 I 	 I 	
1 	 1  
This makes a black sticky substance called humus 
The analysis can be represented economically in a table, as follows: 
This makes a 	 black 	 sticky 
substance 
called humus 
anaphora nominal group substitution 
ACTOR PROCESS GOAL 
In tables such as the one above, each linguistic constituent is separated from others 
because of its distinctive function. Without changing the places the linguistic 
constituents have in the clause, those which function as participants are separated 
from those which function as processes or circumstances. 
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Ato\ 
Turning now to relational processes, their central meaning is that 'something is'. They 
are distinguished into two modes. In the Attributive mode, an attribute is ascribed to 
some entity; either as a quality or as a possession. The participants are the Attribute 
and the Carrier. The second is the Identifying mode where one entity is used to 
identify another (it is reversible in contrast with the attributive mode). The 
participants are the Identified and Identifier (Halliday, 1985, p.112). 
Finally, mental processes are clauses which express feeling, thinking and seeing. The 
two participants in the mental process are the Sensor and the Phenomenon. The 
sensor is the conscious being that is feeling, thinking or seeing. The phenomenon is 
what is 'sensed'-felt, thought or seen (Halliday, 1985, p.111). 
4.3.4 Grammatical metaphor 
Halliday's idea of 'grammatical' metaphor rests on distinguishing more or less 'natural' 
realisations of processes in wording (Halliday, 1985, p.321). The grammatical 







process 	 participant 




This forms the 'natural' set of choices. However, in a case such as: 
This repeated uptake and release is part of the carbon cycle. 
the noun phrase This repeated uptake and release which we expect to be a participant 
is actually a process acting grammatically as a participant. This Halliday calls 
'grammatical metaphor'. This kind of grammatical metaphor is also called 
nominalization and has attracted most of the interest in the later work of Halliday and 
Martin (1993) in the context of teaching and writing science. 
The use of grammatical metaphor does not have an effect on language only. Because 
of the interrelation between form and meaning, how something is being talked about 
has an effect on how it is thought of and therefore how it is treated and how we are 
engaged with it. So a nominalized action can be thought of and treated not as an 
action but as a thing which can have properties and be a participant, and, like all other 
thing-like entities, be involved in other actions (Halliday et al, 1993, p.15). There are 
also several other effects associated with nominalizations. One is that although we 
know that there was an actor and an affected, the specific identities of both have been 
lost. We can only guess their identity. Our attention is directed to the nominalized 
process and directed away from how it is accomplished. So the focus of attention has 
been altered by the speaker or writer away from what has happened to what it is 
(Kress et al, 1993, p.21). 
This view about metaphors is consistent in that it studies metaphors in a framework of 
a linguistic theory which combines coherently context, grammatical form (linguistic 
surface) and meaning (semantics) (Halliday et al, 1993, p.31). Metaphor is not seen as 
an isolated change which occurs either at the level of wording (linguistic surface) or 
at the level of meaning (often described as concept replacement). Even metaphors that 
appear at first sight to be variation in the use of words only, according to Halliday, 
should be studied at the level of the functional use of words and the differences that it 
makes at every level of realisation (Halliday, 1985, p.320). To give an example 
mentioned before, the phrase "Bill is a pig" is not a metaphor only because of the 
selection of words, but also because an entity (man) is identified in terms of another 
entity instead of representing it as having certain attributes that are shared by another 
entity (pig). And for metaphors like: "he ran out of ideas" and "the idea will go a long 
way " the meaning of not having ideas is expressed in terms of a material process 
rather than a possessive attributive process (such as 'he hasn't got any ideas'). 
In chapter 6 the contribution of Halliday and Martin to studying the language of 
science, together with some other related studies will be discussed. The analysis given 
there will discuss examples of grammatical metaphor taken from a variety of 
environmental textbooks together with their possible effects on meaning. 
4.3.5 Criticism of 'grammatical metaphor' and of Systemic 
Functional Linguistics 
Halliday has been criticised that at the bottom level of the lexicogrammar, relations 
between content and expression are represented - following the Saussurean idea of the 
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arbitrariness of the sign - as arbitrary (Halliday, 1985, p.xviii). Kress (1993) in his 
paper "Against arbitrariness", insists that the motivated production of a sign, well 
represented in children's first drawings - should not be underestimated. For Kress 
every sign whether linguistic or not is a semiotic entity in respect to the medium used 
to bring it into being, the process behind its production and the motivation of its 
producer. 
Drawing from the argument against arbitrariness Kress (1993) questions the value of 
Halliday's distinction between congruent and incongruent language. This distinction 
is the outcome of a one to one correspondence between form and meaning imposed 
by the system of realisations. An action for example which, according to Halliday, is 
realised at the semiotic level as a material process, which is in turn naturally realised 
at the level of the lexicogrammar as a verb phrase, seems to provide a naive 
referential interpretation of the relation between language and world. Halliday 
reduces the significance of this argument by claiming that incongruence is the most 
dominant feature of adult language. Therefore what counts in discourse analysis is 
why certain choices both at the semiotic and lexicogrammatic level are made in order 
to realise certain meaning relations and the effect these choices have on the 
construction of new meanings. This is also the point of view which is adopted in this 
thesis. We are not asking whether the realisations of meaning are 'congruent' or not 
but what the effects on meaning of choosing one realisation instead of another can be. 
Another issue which has attracted criticism from discourse analysts is the concept of 
context. Halliday speaks of a text as being 'in' some register (defined as the 
configuration of semantic resources that the member of a culture typically associates 
with a specific situation) while critical linguists argue that several registers 
(discourses) may be found 'in' the same text, a phenomenon often called 'discourse 
coalition' in studies of environmental sociology (Hajer, 1995, p.13). In this study a 
broad view of context is adopted. Environmental science cannot be seen as a single 
discourse well defined and separated from other discourses such as political rhetoric 
or biology. It is constructed on the basis of complex relations between scientific and 
commonsense knowledge and understanding, drawing concepts from a variety of 
disciplines such as chemistry, biology, geography, geology, economy and decision 
making. 
Finally, an argument has been made that a detailed analysis at the level of the clause 
is not always a safe way to characterise particular entities and the processes in which 
they are involved. For example we cannot say that material processes are determined 
by their transitivity pattern at the surface linguistic form, with other components 
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providing only optional extras. Analysing clauses such as: their bodies decay, even if 
they appear at the linguistic surface as intransitive material process, one cannot be 
sure by simply relying on the ideational metafunction whether the one participant 
involved in the process is Actor or Goal. The participant bodies might be the Goal 
and the Actor might be missing or bodies might be the Actor and the Goal at the 
same time. In this case if we really want to know the relationship between the entity 
body and the process decay we need to take account of thematic options. Indeed, 
body is a participant functioning as theme in several other processes in the text above 
and below the particular clause. Halliday has recognised the confusion such kinds of 
clauses can generate in their interpretation and introduced a new functional 
participant called Medium. This is the participant through which the process is 
realised irrespective of whether it is the agent of the process or the patient. 
Others like Kress and Hodge (1993) elaborate further the relation between meaning 
and surface form in their accounts of the construction of the discourse. They regard 
language as consisting of a related set of categories and processes. The latter are 
represented as sets of models which describe the interrelation of objects and events 
(Kress et al, 1993, p.8). 
As has been emphasised above the object of this thesis is neither to deal with 
problems that arise in the theory of Systemic Functional Linguistics, nor to compare 
this theory with other linguistic theories as tools to study environmental science. 
Some concepts of Halliday's Grammar, especially those to do with ideational 
processes, are used as one possible set of tools to study language used in teaching 
Environmental Science. Doing so provides a limited test of their value as tools in this 
restricted kind of domain. The tools from SFG proved, for this purpose, more 
effective for analysing written text-book material than they did for spoken classroom 
language, for which an image-schema approach was used. 
4.4 Metaphor as a cognitive phenomenon 
The view from the image schema approach of Lakoff and Johnson 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Debates over metaphor appear either as a matter of definition or as an empirical 
question. In the first case approaches look for the right and most effective definition 
while in the latter they look for those sets of empirical questions which can lead to 
empirical investigations. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) set the issue of metaphor as an 
empirical question which is looking for conceptual categorisations. 
They are both against the traditional assumption which makes a sharp distinction 
between literal and figurative language. Lakoff in particular, refers to Reddy's work 
which shows that metaphor is not a kind of figurative language as the traditional 
approach supposes, but is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary way of 
conceptualizing the world (Lakoff, 1993, p.204). For Lakoff and Johnson even poetic 
metaphor is primarily about concepts rather than mere words. 
Instead of the classical distinction between literal and figurative language, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) set up another distinction between concrete concepts which make 
sense via our immediate contact with the world and those which are abstract and 
emotional and are comprehended through metaphors. Non metaphorical concepts are 
those that emerge directly from our everyday bodily and social experience and are 
defined in their own terms. On the other hand, metaphorical concepts are those which 
are understood and structured not merely on their own terms, but rather in terms of 
other concepts. At this point we should notice the shift from metaphor as primarily a 
linguistic phenomenon and the implied distinction between literal and figurative 
language, to metaphor as primarily a cognitive phenomenon and the implied 
distinction between metaphorical and non metaphorical concepts. We also notice that 
what is defined as concrete and what is defined as abstract according to Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) is not the outcome of already given categories but is the outcome of 
our involvement with the world, both physical and social. 
4.4.2 A brief account of relevant aspects of experiential realism 
Lakoff's and Johnson's ideas about the different kinds of concepts and how these 
differences emerge are grounded in what they call experiential realism. Experiential 
realism stands against the objectivist tradition. Objectivism claims that the world is 
made up of objects which have properties independent of any people or other beings 
who experience them. In other words human beings and the world are seen as two 
separate realities and if the latter is fixed and stable, as objectivism claims, then the 
difficulty is to see how the beliefs of the former change. Language, according to 
objectivist accounts, expresses the concepts and categories which we use to 
understand objects, their properties and relations, thus the words which are used must 
fit directly to reality. To achieve this aim, the meaning of words needs to be clear and 
precise without any kind of figurative speech such as metaphors. (Lakoff, 1987, 
p.165) Many, among them Lakoff and Johnson, believe that this is a naive view. 
Experientialism answers the questions which objectivism leaves unanswered by 
approaching concept distinctions and meaning in a different way. Lakoff and Johnson 
attempt to characterise meaning in terms "of the nature and experience of the 
organisms doing the thinking". (Lakoff, 1987, p.266) With this definition priority is 
given not to meaning itself but to the process of meaning making. So meaning is 
thought of as a never ending 'process' rather than as a 'thing', as objectivism claims. 
Nevertheless there are constraints imposed on this process of meaning making (not 
everything is possible) by reality itself. At this point experientialism shares with 
objectivism a commitment to the existence of the real world and a recognition that 
reality places constraints on concepts. 
Furthermore, experientialism goes beyond mere rationality, by breaking down the 
classical cognitive/emotive dichotomy which says that to be objective is to be rational 
and not to give in to emotions. This is because experientialism recognises the crucial 
role of metaphorical thought in uniting reason and imagination. According to it, 
reason involves categorisation, entailment and inference. Imagination, in one of its 
many aspects, involves seeing one kind of thing in terms of another (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980, p.193). 
The main claims of experiential realism can be summarised in the following 
principles: 	 a) The core of our conceptual systems is directly grounded in 
perception, bodily movement and experience of a physical and social 
character. 
b) Metaphors, metonymies and images are based in the majority of 
cases on bodily experience. They play a crucial role in thought because 
of their imaginative capacity, that allows the conceptualisation of 
abstract concepts which are not directly grounded in experience. So 
abstract concepts are also embodied - indirectly - since the metaphors, 
metonymies and images are based on our everyday concrete 
experience. 
c) Both abstract and concrete concepts have an overall structure that 
goes beyond that of the mere summation of some concepts which have 
been put together because of some general rules. 
d) Finally, every conceptual structure which has the above properties 
can be described as a cognitive model. The latter can be of four types 
(propositional, image schematic, metonymic and metaphoric) and are 
mainly mental models, that is, consist of imagined real entities. 
4.4.3 Basic-level and image-schematic structures 
So far we have seen that according to Lakoff and Johnson metaphor is not primarily 
about words but is about concepts, and instead of looking at what is metaphorical and 
what is literal we should rather look at what makes a concept abstract or concrete. In 
their accounts metaphor is thought of as a cognitive device which fills the gap that the 
distinction between the abstract and the concrete creates. So metaphor brings the 
abstract closer to the concrete by mapping aspects of the latter onto the former. 
In their view of metaphor Lakoff and Johnson have also been influenced by the 
findings of Rosch's studies. These studies show that some categories, called 'basic 
level' categories which are neither concrete nor abstract are the best understood and 
the most frequently used by people. A well known example of Rosch's (1978) 
findings is that people are accustomed to think about chairs not in terms of specific 
categories such as arm chairs, nor also in terms of the very general category of 
furniture, but in terms of the concept 'chair' as a prototypical member of the category 
of chairs. 
Rosch's findings have influenced Lakoff and Johnson to think about metaphorical 
projection as an essential process which is driven from a realm located between the 
abstract and the concrete. This is the realm of our preconceptual bodily experiences 
(Lakoff, 1987, p.267 ) which consists of two kinds of structures: 
Basic-level structures which have to do with basic-level categories and basic-
level concepts and 
Image-schematic structures which are relatively simply structures that 
constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience. 
Concrete concepts are directly understood within the level of basic level and image 
schematic structures, because of our bodily experience and immediate contact with 
these concepts. Knowledge about the concrete, due to the recurrent pattern of our 
experience, is organised in structures such as image-schematic and basic-level 
structures. Aspects of the latter, without being disengaged from their embodied 
realisation, are metaphorically projected onto abstract and superordinate concepts 
which belong in the abstract domain. Thus many abstract concepts are realised in 
terms of basic-level concepts and image schematic structures. 
It should be noticed at this point that according to Rosch and others, most of 
commonsense reasoning takes place at this intermediate level of basic-level 
categories. In everyday life it is more likely that we are thinking in terms of chairs 
rather than furniture or specific instances of chairs such as dining chairs. Novices and 
experts too when they have to resolve problems which are beyond their specific 
domain also think in terms of basic level categories, often by using knowledge about 
specific categorical relations and concrete or theoretical entities and working it out at 
the level of basic level categories. 
To give an example, the concept of causation often appears to have a directly 
emergent core that is elaborated metaphorically. It is understood as having some 
properties (Lakoff and Johnson count twelve of them) which characterise the 
'prototype' of causation and "they recur together over and over in action after action as 
we go through our daily lives". (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.71) They emerge from 
our direct manipulation of objects very early in life. The important features in this 
cluster of interactional properties are the existence of an Agent which does something 
and a Patient that undergoes a change to a new state. The action of the Agent and the 
change in the physical state of the Patient constitute a single event. In prototypical 
causation the Agent comes in contact with the Patient and what the Agent does 
precedes, at least to some extent, the change in the Patient. Indirect causation is not 
prototypical since there is no such overlap in time and space as has just been 
described. However, indirect cases of causation can emerge from direct prototypical 
causation through metaphorical projection. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.72) 
4.4.4 The nature and function of image schemata 
In the context of cognitive science, schemata are taken as "higher - level complex 
knowledge structures" which function as "ideational scaffolding" in the organisation 
and interpretation of experience. Many investigators who worked on the idea of 
schemata as knowledge structures, make an implicit assumption that schemata are 
stable knowledge structures. They are seen as stored in long term memory as discrete 
and relatively static sets of information ready to be retrieved whenever appropriate 
(Ortony et al, 1988, p.76). Others have proposed that schemata are unstructured 
property lists which are used for drawing similarities between things or events 
(Ortony et al, 1988, p.193). 
The most common view of a schema is as a structured cluster of concepts which 
involves generic knowledge and may be used to represent events, sequences of 
events, percepts, situations, relations and even objects. Following mainly that view 
Lakoff and Johnson have developed further what they call image schemata. 
Image schemata should be thought of as belonging in a mental space and as being 
abstract analogs of physical processes such as spatial manipulation and movement. 
For example we can rotate the concrete image of an object in mental space in the 
same way as we can rotate an object in physical space using our hands and eyes. 
Johnson illustrates the notion of an "abstract analog" using an example which is given 
by Anderson. Anderson (Anderson, 1980, Ch.3) suggests the length of a line as an 
analog for a person's weight. The length of a line would vary with the weight, but 
there is no detailed correlation between a line and a weight. 
Typical image schemata will have parts and relations. Parts are usually a set of 
entities such as people, events, states of affairs, sources, goals. The relations might 
include causal relations, temporal sequences, part-whole patterns. In most cases a 
schema has a small number of parts standing in simple relations. Parts and relations 
are organised into unified wholes called gestalt structures (Johnson, 1987, p.28,41). 
Schematic structures connect up aspects of our experience and lead to inferences in 
our conceptual system. Image schemata are used to think with. They are dynamic, 
flexible, widely usable and adaptable patterns because they integrate a vast range of 
different experience that manifest the same recurring structures (Johnson, 1987, p.2). 
4.4.5 Types of image schemata 
There are several kinds of image schemata. Some of the most pervasive in our 
everyday experience and most often used in the present thesis are discussed below: 
Containers 
For much of the time we consciously or not consider containers such as rooms which 
we move in and out of, and we manipulate objects by placing them in containers. The 
recurrent structure in all of these cases which is metaphorically projected on abstract 
processes and concepts is the in-out orientation of physical boundedness. Whenever 
something is contained in something else it is kept separated from other things which 
are not in the container. The separation between things which are contained and those 
which are not makes them different. For example in textbooks of environmental 
science we read: 
the carbon dioxide gets into the atmosphere 
energy is trapped by green plants 
The structural elements of the container schema are: 
the interior, that is the thing which is contained 
the exterior, that is everything which is located outside of the container 
and the boundary which defines what is outside and what is contained. 
Agent structures 
Frequently we do things to the objects around us, for example by moving them from 
one place to another, or we might want to change the physical state of an object. 
Various kinds of agent structures are often found in lessons and textbooks of 
environmental science, such as: 
plants are eaten by animals 
trees take carbon dioxide in 
Path-link 
Two entities can be connected together by a link. In this case there is a spatial 
contiguity and closeness of the linked objects. Linkages might be not only physical 
and spatial but also temporal and causal connections between two objects or events. 
They can also be a path which connects two ends, the source and the goal. The source 
is the starting point, the goal is the end point, and the direction toward the destination 
(the goal) is the path. If you go from the source to the destination along the path, then 
you must pass through each intermediate point on the path. We can impose 
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directionality on a path, that is, we move along a path from point A toward point B. 
Paths can have temporal dimensions mapped onto them as well as linkages. 
Cycles 
Cycles begin with some initial state, proceed through a sequence of connected events 
and end where they began, to start anew the recurring cyclic pattern. The cycle 
represents the return to the original state. It moves in one direction from start to finish 
in a forward-moving sequence of temporally related events. In many cases cycles 
constitute temporal boundaries for our activities, and these tend to be rigid, e.g. day-
night cycle. Cycles also are multiple, overlapping and sequential. Our temporal 
existence is defined by the distinctive set of cyclical patterns in which we find 
ourselves embedded, such as the day-night cycle. Such cycles may be differentiated 
temporally or functionally. There is a difference between 'natural' and 'conventional' 
cycles. Zerubavel (1985) argues that conventional cycles seldom have any natural 
basis; however, they can become so pervasive that they come to define the character 
of our experience. 
Carriers 
The structural elements of the carrier schema involve at least two entities, the one 
which carries and the one which is carried. What the carrier schema underlines is that 
an entity is transposed not because of its action, but because of the agency of another 
entity. Usually, but not necessarily, carriers presuppose the containment schema in 
which the entity which is carried is found within the container, and an agent structure, 
even if in respect to the latter it is not always apparent due to which entity's action 
something is carried away (e.g. prevailing winds and the stream of a river). 
There are also other image schemata which are found in the context of teaching 
environmental science but they are not the primary focus of the present study. To 
mention two of them: 
Part-Whole 
We experience our bodies as Wholes with parts. Many objects around us have a part-
whole structure. When a plant is eaten by an animal it becomes part of it. A basic 
entailment is that if A is a part of B, then B is not a part of A. 
Balance 
In our daily lives we are constantly experiencing symmetries and asymmetries of 
forces relative to axes and points of various kinds. Despite the different 
manifestations of balance, there is a single image schema present in all such 
experiences: a symmetrical relation of force vectors relative to an axis. It is because 
of this shared Balance schema that so many different experiences of paired, reversal 
and opposite relations are named by the same word 'balance'. To give few examples: 
push vs. pull 
in 	 vs. 	 out 
take vs. give 
rise 	 vs. 	 fall 
In these cases there are two processes which balance one another. The underlying 
principle which corresponds to our experience of balance is symmetry. Symmetry 
means that A balancing B implies and is implied by B balancing A. The entailment of 
the balance schema is that each action or process countervails the effect of the other. 
An example of analysing a lesson from the point of view of the image schema 
approach using a notation which represents image schemata is given in Appendix 3. 
4.4.6 Some implications of the image schematic approach 
According to Lakoff and Johnson, basic-level and image schematic concepts are 
directly meaningful because they are embodied in our everyday physical and social 
experience. A sentence is also directly understood if it is associated with basic-level 
and image schematic concepts. Because of the distinction between direct and indirect 
understanding, truths are divided into central and non-central truths. Central truths are 
characterised in terms of directly understood concepts such as basic-level and image-
schematic concepts. More interesting are the non-central truths because their 
comprehension involves indirect understanding through higher-level categories, 
metaphoric and metonymic understanding, abstractions, etc. (Lakoff, 1987, p.296) 
Knowledge, like truth, depends on understanding, so we have also central and non-
central knowledge. Central knowledge is based on our basic-level understanding of 
experience. What we perceive at the basic level of our perception and manipulation 
with objects is taken as real and known. Scientific knowledge and scientific 
understanding to a large degree depends on the technological extension of basic-level 
perception and manipulation. For example microscopes turn things that previously 
could not be seen into basic level perception and they do so in a consistent and 
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reliable manner. As a result, scientific knowledge based on human understanding can 
be secure. For example the technological extension of our basic-level perception and 
manipulation makes our understanding of organisms as being made up of cells 
unchallenged. As Lakoff points it out, "it is stable and remains so because of the 
large number of observations of cell structure made through microscopes and the 
large number of manipulations of cell structure brought about through various 
technological extensions of our basic-level capacities". (Lakoff, 1987, p.299) 
An investigation of the role of metaphor as the bridge between non-central truths 
related with non-central knowledge and central truths related with central knowledge, 
will show the power of metaphors to define reality. Metaphor focuses only on 
particular aspects of our directly understood experience and uses these aspects to 
highlight knowledge which is not understood. And because these aspects of directly 
understood knowledge which are used by metaphor are taken as true so the abstract 
entailments which are highlighted by them through metaphorical projection are taken 
as true too. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.157) 
4.4.7 Conclusion 
Both the Image Schema and the Systemic Functional Grammar approach take a step 
beyond the split between form and meaning that both objectivism and relativism 
impose on the process of making knowledge and understanding. Objectivism has 
developed a naive realism in which linguistic forms and concrete images are direct 
references to objects and things found in the world (Lakoff, 1987, p.340). Any 
metaphor which is seen at the level of objects and things can only be an explicit 
analogy between them which shows in what ways they resemble each other without 
violating their nature and the fixed relations that they have in the world. Metaphor is 
then seen at the level of symbols of objects and things, being able to be a word 
replacement which apart from entertaining us has no other function since the relation 
between an object or a concept and its symbol is also fixed and cannot be changed. 
Relativism on the other hand claims that the criteria of associating a symbol with an 
object or a an idea are different between different cultures (even between different 
people) and change from time to time (Lakoff et al, 1980, p.188). Imagination and its 
main mechanism metaphor is not constrained in imposing new meanings on new 
symbols mainly because both are the products of the subjective human effort of 
understanding and creating new meanings without the external reality imposing any 
constraints on that endeavour. Metaphors are essential for both processes of 
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understanding and creating new meanings but according to objectivist opponents of 
relativism its value in handling these processes is minimised since they are not 
governed by any rule or algorithm. 
According to both objectivist and relativist accounts of form and meaning, any 
`object' of inquiry can be either a symbol or an idea (or an object) this symbol 
represents, but there is no place for an entity to be both or to have properties from 
both form and meaning. Opposing this idea, Systemic Functional Linguistics and the 
Image Schema approach both provide detailed accounts of what can be in the middle 
between form and meaning. Semantic forms and image schematic structures can be 
realised by grammatical forms, rich images and concrete objects but at the same time 
realising and representing sets of meaning functions (like containment and agency) 
that are imposed on set of meanings (like the behaviour of cells and decomposers). 
These kind of forms, which we will call semantic forms, have a multi-modal 
property. Various sets of meanings which come from different domains (e.g. biology, 
social actions) are realised by the same kind of semantic forms (e.g. containment 
schema or material process). For example agent structures (either schematically or 
linguistically) represent human actions, processes in which invisible entities are 
involved, and corporations' actions. 
The present study provides examples from the teaching of environmental science; 
how certain sets of meanings are realised either schematically or linguistically, in 
other words how sets of meanings are 'materialised' in terms of semantic forms. For 
example, what does it mean for the thing-like entities and the process-like entities 
which are involved in the set of meanings which is about 'life processes'; the choice 
and use of certain types of participants, processes and circumstances. In other words, 
how are meanings shaped by semantic forms and to what extent? Therefore, what is 
investigated is the effects of the choices and uses of various semantic forms on 
meaning. A process-like entity or a thing-like entity (like an unobservable one: 
decomposers) can be represented in a way that resembles another process-like entity 
or thing-like entity (like an observable one: an animal) so that the two processes or 
things become ontologically closer. 
4.5 Metaphor as a 'tool' for constructing and transforming entities at 
the ontological level 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The way in which metaphor is seen and studied in this thesis is inspired by the 
outcomes of three projects in science education, conducted in the Institute of 
Education, University of London. 
4.5.2 Structuring metaphors and analogies 
The purpose of the project Children and Teachers Talking Science (CHATTS) was to 
understand the processes by which primary teachers in the course of several 
discussion activities constructed sense and meaning for themselves concerning 
scientific ideas presented to them on videotape and in text (Hann et al, 1992(5), p.1). 
One of the main outcomes which is of special interest for the present thesis, is how 
individuals deal with information which is unfamiliar to them. Evidence from 
transcriptions of discussions between teachers suggest that when they are called on to 
explain an unfamiliar phenomenon which is represented to them, they first look for 
the properties of the entities involved. By getting a rough idea of the nature of the 
entities, individuals construct a structuring metaphor which helps them to imagine 
what the entities are like and what they can do (Hann et al, 1992(6), p.52). When they 
have managed to envisage an idea or an image of the nature of entities, then they can 
point to explicit analogies which will be the realisations of their structuring metaphor. 
To give an example, when they are faced with the phenomenon of the ozone layer 
which protects the earth from the sun's rays the initial structuring metaphor can be to 
think of filters which let some things through and not others (Hann et al, 1992(6), 
p.53). From there, specific analogies emerge, such as: 
"The ozone layer is like a giant colander above our heads." 
After the first concrete realisations of a structuring metaphor appear, teachers' 
discussions turn to explore the similarities between the possible analogues and the 
phenomenon which is to be explained. In this process some exemplified analogies can 
be rejected as not suitable to capture the structuring metaphor. Also in the light of 
new information the structuring metaphor itself can be either rejected or modified in 
order to fit the phenomenon better (Hann et al, 1992(6), p.54). 
Another outcome of the CHATTS project which is of special interest, is that analogy 
is not only an isolated heuristic tool which assists explanations but is an essential tool 
which is inherent in the act of explaining and part of the content of the explanation 
(Hann et al, 1992(6), p.54). Even if its role is not always apparent it can be found 
throughout an explanation, from the way an explanation is explored up to the process 
of stopping an explanation. It is important to underline the function the analogy seems 
to serve, that is, to change the level of the phenomenon to bring it nearer to the 
everyday scale, making it seem more real and tangible (Hann et al, 1992(6), p.59). 
This property of making the unfamiliar familiar and the unobservable observable, 
attached to the role and function of the image schema, is one of the most important 
themes in the present thesis. 
4.5.3 Metaphors and models 
An essential part of the project Commonsense Understanding of Science aimed to 
investigate the deep level of ontological similarity and difference on which metaphor 
and analogical reasoning depend (Ogborn et al, 1994(2), p.2). Among the various 
studies of this project, in a series of interviews teachers were asked to use metaphors 
to make some sense of scientific phenomena and ideas. It is mainly the results of 
these interviews which are of interest in respect to the role of the metaphor in people's 
understanding of science. 
In this recent work what has been thought of in the CHATTS project as a structuring 
metaphor is now described as a model. The latter is identified as the metaphorical 
complex of ideas which guides people how to think about entities (Ogborn et al, 
1994(3), p.4). Models, often described as metaphorical models, are not envisaged as 
being used explicitly, and indeed people might not even be aware of the presence and 
use of such models in their patterns of reasoning (Ogborn et al, 1994(3), p.3). 
One of the most important outcomes from the study is that by adopting a 
metaphorical model, people can be driven to certain sort of inferences based on the 
properties of that model. If another model is adopted instead, they will end up with 
different inferences. But there will be also the possibility that two metaphorical 
models are activated on a complementary basis and that leads to a kind of mixing of 
metaphors as a way to resolve the differences or even contradictions that the use of 
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the two metaphorical models implies. This complex of metaphors arises for example 
when people are called on to think about the role of genes and their relation to DNA. 
Thinking about genes as a thing-like entity which can serve the role of the Agent and 
at the same time as a sequence of instructions, has as a result that different metaphors 
are combined, contrasted or juxtaposed in the processes of thinking (Ogborn et al, 
1994(3), p.11). 
The results above suggest that in the process of thinking, metaphor does not appear as 
a single event or process. It rather appears as a complex of metaphors which should 
not be seen separately from its inferences. The latter are part of the metaphorical 
complex and are not simply an outcome of the metaphorical process. These findings 
are also in accordance with the finding of the same project that in the actual process 
of thinking metaphorically, the comprehension of metaphor cannot usefully be 
studied apart from its production (Ogborn et al, 1994(3), p.11). This view which gives 
equal importance both to the metaphorical process and the product or outcome of this 
process puts metaphor on a new plane, different from the way it has generally been 
studied previously. 
The project Commonsense Understanding of Science underlines that how we think 
about entities relies on the context within which these entities are found. To give an 
example the entity 'body' can be thought of as a localised entity, but in the context of 
a body being affected by virus in the metaphor "A virus is an invisible intruder", 
'body' is thought of as a container: 
"Because our bodies try to fight it when it enters us." 
When people are faced with entities such as 'virus' and 'gravity' of which they do not 
have immediate experience they often accept the metaphors in which these entities are 
found as identities: 
"A virus is an invisible intruder." 
"Gravity is an invisible pull." 
From the way they elaborate these metaphors it becomes evident that they 
acknowledge them as identities not because they do not bother to think more about 
the relation between the two entities in each sentence (e.g. 'virus' and 'intruder') but 
because they think that the two entities share the same ontology (Ogborn et al, 
1994(2), p.13). 'Pulls' and 'intruders' offer an imaginable, reliable and tangible way to 
think about the otherwise unthinkable, the unobservable entities 'gravity' and 'virus' 
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So the metaphors here are not simply a case of seeing a similarity or making a 
comparison between two entities, but of thinking about them as what they are. 'Virus' 
and 'gravity' are seen as specific kinds of Agents in the same way 'intruders' and 'pull' 
act. 
These results are also consistent with the CHATTS project which suggested that 
individuals in the process of understanding scientific concepts, start from constructing 
structuring metaphors and then search for examples in terms of explicit analogies 
which best realise their structuring metaphors. 
4.5.4 Explanations and the construction of entities 
The project "Explaining Science in the Classroom" looked at how explanations are 
constructed in the science classroom. A number of lessons were observed, video-
taped and analysed for this purpose. The main outcome of this project has been to 
provide a language which offers a way of thinking about what explanations are, when 
and why they are felt to be needed, what constructing an explanation involves, how 
explanations transform knowledge, and different styles in which explaining can be 
done (Ogborn et al, 1996, p.8). 
The view which is adopted in this project is that explanation should not be seen at the 
linguistic surface marked out by specific linguistic forms (Ogborn et al, 1996, 
p.138,139). Scientific explanation is defined as a story about how a set of entities can 
produce the phenomenon to be explained. This story is based on what things are and 
what they can do or what can be done to them (Ogborn et al, 1996 p.9). Explanations 
seen as stories can hardly ever appear as isolated single events. They are found inside 
and fit alongside one another to form larger patterns which are themselves 
explanations (Ogborn et al, 1996, p.17). 
Like stories, explanations take their meaning within a context, which involves talking 
about what the entities are and in what ways they act in order to bring about a certain 
outcome or effect. The intention of the adoption of the concept 'entities' is to include 
not only concrete things and objects but scientific concepts, processes and ideas such 
as energy, photosynthesis and evaporation (Ogborn et al, 1996, p.38). The 
construction of entities is an inseparable part of the explanation and can be also 
considered as an explanation itself. To give an example, entities such as teeth have to 
be constructed anew as parts of the digestive system: 
David: 	 Your teeth are part of your digestive system, your teeth take the food, 
smash it up into tiny bits, bite it off, smash it, make it into tiny bits. 
Here teeth are presented like machinery instead of the intentional action of chewing 
and their associations with emotions and feelings (smiling). Teeth are being given a 
new meaning and the teacher can be seen as constructing a new entity. In the context 
of the digestive system, constructing teeth anew is part of explaining how digestion 
takes place (Ogborn et al, 1996, p.39). 
The construction of entities means that knowledge is transformed. New meanings are 
given to entities and replace or coexist with old meanings. In the example above as it 
is seen within its classroom context, eating becomes digestion. Analogy and metaphor 
are valuable tools in re-working knowledge, transforming entities and constructing 
new meanings. An example of an analogy or explicit metaphor used in a lesson is the 
representation of the eye as a camera (Ogborn et al, 1996, p.74). It should be noticed 
here that re-working of knowledge is thought of as a two way process very similar to 
Black's interaction view about metaphors: the eye is being re-worked to be like a 
camera and a camera is being re-worked to be like the eye. Also other examples of 
metaphors and analogies picked up from classroom observations of several lessons 
are discussed in a way which shows analogy and metaphor as tools of reasoning 
which works out what the entities are at the ontological level. 
Another contribution of this project to the concept of metaphor is the suggestions that 
most of the work of the construction and transformation of entities in the classroom is 
undertaken by hidden metaphors, also called covert metaphors (Ogborn et al, 1996, 
p.74.). Unlike explicit (overt) metaphors which are concentrated on 'terms', on words, 
there are metaphorical ways of talking about things, and even if they are not identified 
easily at the linguistic surface as a direct relation between linguistic form and 
meaning, they build up images about what these things are. In the following extract 
taken from one of the lessons which was observed and video-recorded during this 
project: 
Teacher: 	 It's got a coating like rust - it's oxidised, OK? It's got a coating 
on the surface where it's reacted with the air... Look at that. 
There you can see a very very bright silver surface that is 
practically going very grey. The air is reacting with it very fast 
indeed. 
it is the way entities are discussed in terms of what is happening to them and what 
reacts with what, which builds up an image of the phenomenon of oxidisation. From 
this image inferences can be drawn about how somebody can speed up the 
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phenomenon or prevent it, for example by covering the surface to prevent the coating 
(Ogborn et al, 1996, p.76). 
In this thesis the position that is adopted is that metaphors in science education as 
well as in environmental education are about the construction of entities. Constructing 
entities involves a lot of transformation of entities especially in the context of 
environmental education since entities such as the human body are taken from their 
everyday context and become scientific entities. So metaphors serve the role of seeing 
familiar things in unusual ways but also of explaining what these things are in ways 
which can be accessible to commonsense understanding. The latter is due to the fact 
that - as the three projects discussed above have shown - the metaphorical work takes 
place at the ontological level. This is the level of what entities are made of, what they 
can do and what can be done to them. This level of talking is metaphorical in a way 
that an image of what the entities are is built up without necessarily drawing explicit 
similarities or differences with other entities. In most cases these similarities and the 
presence of the analogues are silent and are hidden in the way things are talked about 
and in the sorts of images which are constructed. Metaphors seen in this way are 
neither too concrete nor too abstract, but they are rather seen as complete packages of 
images which make people able to envisage a phenomenon as a whole and draw 
inferences about it. 
4.5.5 Summary - Conclusion 
The present chapter is important because it outlines the theoretical framework 
drawing on recent thinking from linguistics and cognitive science which will be used 
in the thesis. 
The outcomes of the three projects discussed in this chapter summarised as: 
1. Metaphors can and do create new imaginative ways of thinking 
about things. 
2. The creation of prototype histories (like packages) provides a way to 
remove problems in thinking about an unfamiliar phenomenon and 
makes it seem obvious (e.g. CFCs destroying the ozone layer 
understood as the unproblematic prototype histories 'eating' or 'burning 
away'). 
3. The fact that very often analogy and metaphor work in a hidden way 
under the linguistic surface, particularly in the choice of verb phrases. 
4. The importance of action since it emerges as a common theme, 
essential in commonsense reasoning about several phenomena. 
(action as a structuring metaphor, a metaphorical model or a prototype 
history and in the present study action described as the underlying 
image schema in representing and realising several phenomena). 
5. The fact that the underlying patterns of reasoning, models, or 
categories are flexible and simple if they are seen at a deep ontological 
level, something which is in accordance with the findings of the 
present thesis: several phenomena are realised and represented in 
flexible and simple ways by few image schemata and ideational 
processes 
will be the issues which will be explored and discussed extensively in the analysis of 
the present thesis. 
CHAPTER 5 
FIELDWORK 
5.1 Data collection 
Many researchers believe in the importance of classroom interaction, recorded as talk, 
as data for the study of teaching and learning (Edwards et al, 1987, p.51). Then the 
question of which sort of approach is appropriate for data collection depends on 
decisions about what are to count as data and to what those data are thought to be 
relevant, grounded in specific research interests and theoretical positions (Edwards et 
al, 1987, p.54). 
5.1.1 Observations 
Because of the absence of any rigid coding of metaphors before the observations, in 
this study there was no use of any schedule during the observations. Furthermore this 
study starts from the view that metaphors are the outcome of participants' (teachers 
and students) interaction in the classroom, which depend heavily on many factors in 
ways which are influenced by the structure of the teaching itself. Given also that the 
language of teachers and students, and other behaviours associated with language is 
of crucial interest and importance for this enquiry, it was thought that any attempt to 
analyse and code metaphorical aspects of language in the real time of the observation 
would be impossible. So lessons were video-taped and tape recorded. 
The creation of an audio-visual record gives us the benefit that it can be replayed after 
the event, as many times as necessary to make sense of that event. It gives also the 
opportunity to return to the original recording every time we want to check details in 
the transcript, which is itself selective and is not an identical representation of the 
recorded event. The videotaped classroom lessons are referred to in the rest of the 
thesis as 'lessons'. 
Classroom observations were conducted so as to achieve: 
- a variety of different topics located in the environmental science discourse, which 
are: 
Acid Rain, 
Carbon and Nitrogen Cycle, 
Respiration and Photosynthesis 
Sewage and Waste Treatment, 
Green House Effect and Ozone layer 
- some examples of the same topic taught by different teachers in different schools : 
such as "Cycles of life and Acid Rain", and 
- at least one series of lessons which covers the teaching from the beginning until the 
end of an environmental unit with one group of students following the same teacher. 
This unit includes topics and classroom activities such as: 
Different sort of environments around the world (two lessons) 
Sewage and waste treatment 
Organising a provisional agenda for some main environmental issues 
Making posters which display the main environmental problems (two lessons) 
Classroom debate on issues related with transportation in a big city 
Environmental changes caused either by nature or by people 
Acid Rain and its effects in the social, historical and natural environment, 
included a demonstration by teacher and some experimental work by students 
(two lessons) 
To obtain these data the fieldwork was carried out in two distinct phases. The first 
phase involved classroom observation of one series of lessons in a Secondary school 
for girls located in outer north-west London. The second phase involved observations 
of lessons in two secondary schools, one having been used for the first phase, and the 
other a secondary school in Milton Keynes. To protect the anonymity of the schools, 
teachers and pupils, fictitious names have been used for the teachers, while the 
abbreviation: S has been used in the transcripts to signify when a student is talking. 
The school in north-west London is called School A and the school in the Milton 
Keynes area is called school B. The table below shows the number of lessons 
observed in the two schools, the duration of each lesson and the date when it was 
observed, the topics of the lessons, the age range of the students in each lesson and 
who was the teacher who taught each lesson: 


















Acid Rain & 
Carbon cycle 
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Y R.9 David 
(Table: 2 Schools in which observations were conducted) 
In School A the textbook: Oxford Science Programme, is used as the primary 
resource of written material. In the second school (School B) the project : Salter's 
Science , is used as Activity papers (work sheets) in the classroom. In order to build 
as complete a record as possible, copies of all reading materials used in the 
classrooms were collected, together with any piece of writing done on the blackboard 
in connection with the classroom work. 
Most social scientists today believe that the presence of observers and their recording 
devices in the classroom are likely to be obtrusive, in that participants who know that 
they are being observed may well talk more, or talk less, or just talk differently 
(Edward et al, 1994, p.77). On this point we should say that in School A the 
researcher's and equipment's presence became, over time, familiar to teachers and 
students, because in the same school with the same teachers and groups of students 
quite a lot of classroom observations had taken place before - in the same way as in 
this study - for the purposes of the research project: 'Explanations in the science 
classroom'. In addition, the fact that a whole sequence of lessons had been video 
recorded in the same school, following the same group of students with the same 
teacher, for the purpose of this study, reduces any distortion over time in this specific 
classroom. 
School B had been used quite frequently as a resource for educational research data. 
From the discussions which I had with the teachers before and after the video 
recordings of their lessons about their usual everyday classrooms' activities, I felt that 
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the recorded lessons were no less typical as examples of teaching and learning than 
those that took place normally in my absence. 
5.1.2 Textbooks 
Another source of data used in this study is environmental science textbooks. Both 
classroom observations and environmental science textbooks are irreplaceable in the 
analysis, given that they correspond to the written and spoken functions of the 
teaching of environmental science which interact with each other. Textbooks are 
written in order to be elaborated in the classroom by the teacher and the students. 
Textbooks were selected for analysis taking account of their variety and of the age 
range to which they are addressed. Topics on environmental science were collected 
from three series of science textbooks widely used in schools. One is Active Science 
in which issues about the environment are discussed in the unit under the title Earth 
Science. In the Nuffield Science series for the secondary school, environmental topics 
are part of Biology and in Oxford Science Programme there is a special unit for 
Environmental Science. These series of textbooks, because of the way they are 
written, impose different approaches to environmental education. To give an example 
the Oxford Science Programme and to a greater extent Active Science rely on 
students' activities more than on providing information. Therefore these textbooks 
promote the idea - even if it is not a distinct characteristic of their environmental 
topics - that learning about the environment is mainly the outcome of experimenting 
and acting within the environment. On the other hand Nuffield Science puts more 
emphasis on how students will construct their thinking from the way information is 
presented in an interesting and challenging way. 
Another important aspect of textbooks is the way their contents are organised. In most 
textbooks, the contents are more or less available in a way that suits the demands of 
the classroom curriculum. That means that a chapter of each unit can be a subject of 
one lesson and the order of the chapters might correspond to the order of the lessons. 
Other textbooks which are not explicitly linked with the school curriculum have a 
narrative form and look like story-telling books. In the latter (World in Danger : 
Earth and Air Ecology) there are few or no suggested practical activities and each 
chapter can be seen as a thematic unit which tells an interesting story about the 
environment. 
5.1.3 Conducting classroom observations 
Data collection followed the same procedure for each of the two schools: 
An initial contact was necessary with the head teachers of the science departments in 
order to obtain permission for carrying on research work in their schools. The aim of 
the study, and the method used for data collection was explained to them, asking for 
classes which were taught topics on environmental science. It was made clear that 
neither teachers' nor students' performance would be evaluated or assessed in any 
way. Then teachers from the two schools who taught topics related with 
environmental science were asked by the head teachers if they would be willing to be 
observed and video recorded during their classroom teaching. 
There was a discussion with members of staff who had agreed to be observed, 
explaining what the study was looking for and how. Teachers were asked to follow 
their everyday teaching without providing anything outside the range of their normal 
classroom work . They were asked whether they would be able to carry with them the 
tape recorder with the microphone, given the fact that the video camera's microphone 
has very limited ability to record their speech, because of the ambient sound. 
The next step was video and audio recording of environmental science lessons. One 
video camera and one tape recorder were used for each lesson. The video camera was 
set up on a tripod in order to achieve the best quality of picture, placed at one of the 
two back corners of the classroom behind the students. In a few cases the video 
camera was focused on a group of students when the teacher was moving around the 
groups of students and talking with them. Most of the time the video camera was 
focused on the teacher. Recordings lasted for the whole duration of each lesson except 
where this was impossible, as for example when students were too noisy during their 
group work, making it impossible to record either the teacher or the students. At the 
same time or at the end of each lesson notes were made about the specific context of 
each classroom. 
Data were viewed as soon as they were available in order to assess their recorded 
quality so as to improve recording techniques and avoid mistakes during the next 
observations. At this stage some first attempts were made to see what sort of 
information these data might provide about teaching of environmental science. 
As soon as the first audio tapes were ready the process of transcribing them was 
begun. Transcriptions were made by a person who is a native English speaker. Efforts 
were made to transcribe as many recorded lessons as the quality of the tapes permits. 
Lessons which contained little teacher's talk in a very noisy classroom environment 
were eliminated. Ten lessons out of twelve were transcribed from the recorded series 
of lessons under the subject: 'Earth in Balance' from School A. The remaining three 
double lessons have been transcribed except for the two double lessons under the 
topic: 'Waste not, want not', from School B of which only very few parts were able to 
be recorded. The transcriber was given instructions about the conventions to be 
followed for the format of the transcriptions. 
Finally, the video tapes were reviewed in order to check the quality of the transcripts. 
After the end of that stage the further study of complete transcripts had began for data 
analysis. 
5.2 Transcribing tape recorded lessons 
As has often been pointed out, any transcript is not and can never be the spoken 
language itself. There are details of intonation, pitch, hesitations, false starts, errors, 
and periods of silent thought which usually excluded from the transcript. Even if we 
attempt to include every spoken word in a transcript, decisions have to be made about 
the features of the spoken discourse which are not normally part of any writing 
system. 
Decisions on what to include in the transcript depend on the researcher's interest. In 
the present study we are not dealing specifically with the linguistic technicalities of 
teachers' talk so details of the spoken language are not relevant in the analysis. On the 
other hand there is a special interest on how language facilitates teachers' teaching 
practices and how meaning is structured through a continuing piece of talk. As a 
result conventions about the spoken language were kept to a minimum so as to 
achieve transcripts which are comprehensible without being too complicated to read. 
The conventions of lay-out and notation which are common in conversational analysis 
were employed for the construction of the transcripts. At the top of the first page of 
every transcript a brief commentary gives information about the teachers' name, the 
age range of the group of students, the date when the recording took place, the topic 
which was taught and the name of the school. Each transcript indicates the class of 
speaker at the left margin of the page with (T) for the teacher and (S) for the students. 
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Given the fact that the main interest is on teacher's explaining, students are not 
identified individually either with names or with numbers and their gender is not 
identified in School B (School A is a school for girls only). Each (S) indicates a single 
student-speaker. In order to distinguish the individual speaker from those talking at 
the same time, contextual information is given in parenthesis. Talk enclosed by a 
single slash (/) means an overlap of teachers and students talking. The class of 
speaker is indicated in the same way as is described above in each enclosed segment. 
This convention gives additional, contextual information which enables the reader to 
appreciate the nature of the communication between teacher and student. 
Line-numbering at the left margin of the page, makes reference to the transcript easier 
during the phase of data analysis. The traditional punctuation is elaborated with 
details of pausing. A double square bracket ([]) is used to mark a pause that is 
noticeable, while dots (....) are used to indicate speech about which the transcriber is 
uncertain. In the same way dots enclosed by parentheses ((...)) identifies spoken 
language which is totally unable to be transcribed. Contextual information which is 
accessible from the audio tapes, is given in parentheses with words written in italics. 
More information about the context of the communication between teacher and 
students, like facial expressions of approvement or dissaprovement, gestures, 
movements of teacher and students during the lesson, different sort of activities like 
writing on the blackboard, working in groups and etc., is available from the video 
tapes. An example of a piece of transcript with some of the most basic conventions is 
given below: 
T: 	 Al right, let's just do one thing at a time Mitch, animals 
breathe out carbon dioxide? / S.... / T ..Mitch, that's 
enough....[ ] Why do they breathe out carbon dioxide, 
where does the carbon dioxide come from? 
S 
T: 	 No, no the trees are going to do something else in a 
minute, we'll look at that. Where does this carbon 
dioxide coming from that we are breathing out? 
S: 	 the greenhouse effect... / T: We've got little green 
houses inside us? / S: (laughter).... / 
5.3 Summary of the contents of recorded lessons 
In this section summaries of the lessons which are most often used for the analysis are 
provided. These are most of the lessons which belong in the sequence of lessons 
under the title: 'Earth in Balance' and the double lesson about the Acid Rain and the 
Carbon Cycle. 
Sequence of lessons covering a variety of topics under the heading: 'Earth in 
Balance' 
In the first lesson of this series, the teacher introduced the new topic as similar to 
other topics of geography lessons. He asked students to call on everything they knew 
about environmental damage, following the first double page of the new topic called: 
'Looking at the Environment' from the science textbook: 'Oxford Science 
Programme'. After a short discussion which contrasted the effects people's activity 
had on the environment when they lived in caves and the effect of people's activity on 
the environment today, the teacher moved on to discuss with the students the extent to 
which each one of us has an effect on the environment. That pushed the discussion on 
to the things people need to survive and on how people's activities to get what they 
need today has an effect on their environment and other surrounding environments. 
The second lesson began by the teacher calling on the students to elaborate the 
textbook's questions which raised an interesting discussion during the previous lesson. 
A lot of effort was made to identify different sorts of environment by giving instances 
of them. Then the discussion turned on how one environment might have an effect on 
another. From time to time students were asked to copy in their exercise books 
something the teacher wrote on the blackboard, a paragraph or few sentences from the 
textbook and to answer specific questions from the textbook. 
The next lesson started with a discussion about changes caused by human agency and 
changes caused by nature itself. Then the lesson focused on another sort of written 
material. This time a copy of a work sheet was given to the students showing a map 
of a marshland area and its surrounding environment. Questions were round a dispute 
between the council which planned to use the area as a landfill site for waste disposal 
and a group of people who were concerned about effects this decision will have on 
the surrounding environment. Teacher and students tended during the whole lesson to 
expand the subject of their discussion about polluted lands and seas outside of the 
context of the imaginary activity of the work sheet. 
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The fourth lesson continued with work on the activities suggested by the work sheet 
used during the last lesson. This time students answered questions, based on 
information provided by an extract from a newspaper about the decrease of sites with 
peat in Britain. The teacher went on to discuss with students the effect on the 
environment of burning peat or other resources of energy, like petrol, and on 
alternative resources of energy people must use in the near future. 
The first section of the next lesson was spent by teachers and students trying to make 
an agenda of the most important issues which are related with the pollution globally 
today. From a list of issues which contained things like: traffic chaos, asthma, crashes 
of tankers, the accumulation of nuclear weapons, extinction of whales and sewage 
works; the teacher shifted the discussion to the Green House Effect and the damaging 
of the ozone layer. Chemical substances and changes relevant to the two issues were 
explained by the teacher, always trying to ground his explanations in what students 
already knew about them. References to pages from the textbook: 'Oxford Science 
Programme' were made whenever it was thought necessary. 
The following two lessons were devoted to students' activities to make posters to 
address the main issues related to pollution. Students were divided into large groups 
and materials were provided to them in order to make the posters. If they wished they 
could have a look at textbook materials as sources of information. The teacher moved 
between the groups of pupils having interesting discussions with each of them about 
the nature of the issues represented in the posters, suggesting steps to follow in the 
poster making activity and more materials which might be included in the posters. 
Students were informed from the beginning of the eighth lesson that they could have 
the promised debate on one of the issues which was discussed last time. Before they 
started some time was spent reminding themselves what were the main arguments 
around the issues discussed in the last lesson. The students then chose traffic 
problems as a theme for the debate and they were divided into two groups: 
environmentalists who suggested public transportation as a solution to pollution and 
traffic chaos and those who are not ready yet to leave their cars and use alternative 
transportation. The debate was quite tense at some points causing the teacher to 
interfere in order to calm down some students and suggest ways of looking at things 
differently in a broader context. 
School A, Lesson on Acid Rain and Carbon Cycle 
During the first section of the lesson the teacher got students to recall the definition of 
concepts like weathering, pollutants and their ideas on how to design an experiment 
showing the effect of dilute acid on different sort of materials. The discussion went on 
to details about planning experiments and how to report results. The second section of 
the lesson was devoted to the Carbon Cycle. The cycle was built on bit by bit by the 
teacher who used students knowledge about substances and processes that they knew 
from previous lessons. The Carbon Cycle was represented on the blackboard as a 
conceptual chart in a form of a cycle of the processes and entities which take place in 
it. At the end the teacher's explanations moved forwards and backwards through the 
constructed conceptual chart. 
5.4 Methodological approach 
This study starts from the expectation that metaphors will be widespread in the 
teaching of environmental science, without any simple correlation between surface 
linguistic cues and either the presence or type of metaphor. 
The unit of analysis varies in scale, always however being a bounded unit of 
communication recognisable as such to a hearer/reader. The smallest can be a clause 
while the largest is the extent of a chapter or a section of a chapter. The objective of 
this study is to provide examples of representations of entities according to the 
categories of the image schemata and the different types of ideational processes, also 
taking into account interpersonal and textual elements. 
The raw data from pieces of textbooks and transcriptions of classroom observations 
are primarily in the form of text. Visual representations in the form of maps, 
diagrams, drawings, charts as well as context elements from the video recorded 
lessons are also considered. The material is unstructured and difficult to deal with. 
The coding of the different kind of image schematic structures as it is provided 
mainly by Johnson (1987) as well as the description of the different types of 
ideational processes provide a framework for an analysis. Having this framework as a 
basis, attempts have been made to : 
a) highlight the occurrence of each various semantic forms (both linguistic and 
schematic), by giving page and line, 
b) relate these semantic forms as specifically as possible to the contexts in 
which they occur (e.g. topic, what is the 'given' and what is the 'new' in the 
teaching) 
c) relate semantic forms of the same kind (either linguistic or schematic) to 
each other, constructing their complexes by representing them where 
appropriate. 
CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSING METAPHOR AS A LINGUISTIC 
PHENOMENON 
6.1 Introduction 
The present chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section aspects of 
Systemic Functional Linguistics are applied in analysing mainly textbook material. 
Emphasis is put on how semantic forms of ideational processes such as material 
processes can be identified in various texts. As this section is progressively 
developed, the need for taking into account the text structure and the interpersonal 
aspects of the exchanges of meaning in analysing ideational processes is underlined. 
The last part of this section deals with the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor and 
some first thoughts about the implications of the use of grammatical metaphors are 
discussed. 
The second section studies how the construction of specific sets of entities is realised 
in textbooks. In doing so, the unit of analysis is not constrained at the clause level but 
constitutes larger pieces of text such as chapters or units of chapters. Both covert and 
overt metaphorical accounts of representations of entities are identified at the level of 
functions of semantic forms. 
Finally, in the third section some possible ontological, epistemological, learning and 
ideological implications of the way entities are represented are discussed. 
6.2 Systemic Functional Linguistic approach 
6.2.1 Linguistic realisations of meaning and context 
Halliday and Martin are opposed to the traditional view of language as a passive 
reflection of some pre-existing conceptual structure. According to them - as shown in 
section 4.3 - language does not merely reflect what the world is and how it is 
structured but it is actively engaged in bringing such structures into being. The latter 
are structures of language as well (Halliday et al, 1993. p.8). In particular human 
experience and scientific language are interdependent, construing each other by 
constructing systems of meaning in terms of organised knowledge. 
A piece of scientific language, a scientific note for example, is a semiotic thing. The 
things that we do to it, like reading it or writing it on a page, are acts of meaning. At 
the same time this piece of text is an instance of language in use which takes place in 
a specific social practice. In this case we talk about the social context of the scientific 
practice. Halliday and Martin expand their general accounts about the dynamic 
interrelation between social context and language to the relationship between science 
as institution and scientific language. They do so because they assert that a given text, 
a scientific note, provides only a very partial perspective on the social practice of 
science. A detailed linguistic analysis at this level does not provide a meaningful 
interpretation of the discourse of science. In order to do the latter the institutional 
perspective has to be treated as more abstract because it generalises across a vast 
range of actual texts and an even larger range of potential verbalisations. Thus in 
science too there are two distinct levels of abstraction or semiotic planes (as they call 
them) which are interrelated dynamically. 
From there what applies to language as a semiotic system applies also to scientific 
language in particular. Our engagement with the physical, biological and social 
resources provided in the science context produces semiosis or in other words 
meaning making. Semiosis enacted in this way involves three complementary modes 
of meaning: FIELD (the social action), TENOR (the role structure), and MODE (the 
symbolic organisation). The first (FIELD) "is building up a world of action in which 
physical and biological entities act, by themselves, or on other things; construing a 
world of semiotic activity in which typically conscious entities negotiate meaning and 
constructing a world of relationships among entities" (Halliday et al, 1993, p.27). The 
second (TENOR) is the mode of social relations drawing on interpersonal resources 
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such as giving or offering information. And the third (MODE) is the way the text is 
organised into a coherent whole. 
In order to give some account of how grammatical metaphors appear in the spoken 
and written mode of the discourse of teaching environmental science I will restrict my 
analysis to the level of the ideational metafunction. As we saw above (in the 
discussion of Systemic Functional Linguistics) processes which have to do with 
actions are realised at the clause level in terms of material processes, processes which 
involve human observations and reasoning are realised in terms of mental processes 
and those which have to do with attributing and defining are realised as relational 
processes. 
6.2.2 Ideational metafunction and genres 
Martin (1989) found in his study of geography texts that the main grammatical 
resources used to realise taxonomic relationships are relational processes and nominal 
groups. He also found that the most frequent ways which are used by textbooks to 
define technical terms are through identifying relational processes. Relational 
processes are the linguistic realisations of the first introduction of technical terms and 
their classifications and taxonomies. He comes to the conclusion that definitions, 
classifications and taxonomies constitute at the level of the more abstract semiotic 
plane one of the major genres found in science textbooks, called reports. Textbooks 
are seen basically as large 'reports' made up of a series of smaller ones. Both 
attributive and identifying relational processes are constitutive in realisations of 
'reports'. On the other hand explanation is a genre found only when the smaller 
'reports' focus on processes. 'Explanation' as a genre is supposed to be different from 
'reports' mainly because it has a higher percentage of action verbs organised in logical 
sequences. In other words material processes constitute the linguistic realisations of 
'explanations'. So according to Martin and Halliday: 
1. There is a procedural difference between 'reports' and 
'explanations'. 'Reports' precede 'explanations'. 
2. 'Reports' are found more often and more extensively than 
'explanations' which are located in small 'reports'. 
3. Both 'explanations' and 'reports' are clearly distinguished genres 
without being mixed. 
4. They are defined on the basis of clearly distinct operations: 
processes for 'explanations', versus descriptions and classifications for 
'reports'. 
84 
5. Their operations are realised linguistically in clearly distinct 
ideational processes: relational processes for 'reports', versus material 
processes for 'explanations'. 
6.2.3 Identifying ideational processes in texts and 
transcripts 
6.2.3.1 Processes and what they represent in textbooks 
Looking at various examples of environmental science textbooks we notice that 
material processes realise at the linguistic level not only explanations but 
introductions of terms, definitions and classifications as well. As soon as a new 
phenomenon or technical term appears even for the first time the very few relational 
processes in terms of something is... or is a kind of... or something has..., give place to 
whole sequences of material processes in terms of what something can do, what has 
happened to it and what is it made of. This finding is not surprising since 
environmental science is a discourse which shows how people make use of their own 
environment through their actions. 
For example in the four paragraphs under the title: 'Caring for the soil' we notice the 
large number of material processes. This little section (Appendix 4.1) which is 
covered in a double page is taken from a resource book: 'World in danger-Earth' 
addressed to primary school students. It does not contain any classification of 
different kinds of environments according to their definitions and attributes. It talks 
about three different kinds of soil: terraced hillsides, the soil which is used for 
growing crops and the soil which is found in patches of cleared forests. These three 
different types of soil are defined in terms of what people can do to them, like: 
(1) They [people] clear a patch of ground by cutting down the trees and burning them. 
They clear a patch of ground by cutting...them 
ACTOR PROCESS GOAL CIRCUMSTANCE 
of manner 
in relation to what is the effect of specific natural phenomena which occur in the areas 
where these soils are found: 
(2) 	 Heavy rains can easily wash the soil away. 
Heavy rain can easily wash the soil away 
ACTOR PROCESS GOAL CIRCUMSTANCE 
of place 
The three different kinds of soil are defined through sequences of material processes. 
In these processes all sorts of ACTORS can be found acting on different kinds of 
GOALS, like living things (e.g. plants like crops), non living things (e.g. soil) and 
also systems of living things and non living things (e.g. tropical forest). Human 
beings grow crops and living things like animals fertilise the soil. But also natural 
phenomena like heavy rains and non living things like chemical substances 
(e.g.water) have an effect on the soil. It seems that for the specific piece of text 
material processes are the best available linguistic resource to illustrate what sort of 
power human beings and natural phenomena have (to do things) and the effect of their 
power on different environments. 
Looking at another section in the same textbook we can replicate the same findings. 
'Explanations' are not necessarily about processes which are realised at the level of the 
clause as material processes. Moreover there is not any rigid sequence in which 
'reports' and 'explanations' are to be found. Even if we assume that 'reports' are 
indicated by various forms of relational clauses, what appears to be the case is that 
relational processes can be found in any place in the section and not only either at the 
beginning or the end. 
In the first page of the section Soil cycles (Appendix 4.2) living organisms like 
woodlice, millipedes and beetles are classified as specific kinds of animals called 
decomposers. These animals are both identified and classified as decomposers 
because of what they can do to non-living organisms. In a piece of text, which is less 
than a paragraph, and which is not a clear sequence of distinct, relational processes 
which precede distinct, material processes, appears a complex of embedded clauses 
which refer to one other: 
Soil cycles 
A group of small animals and plants help to break down nature's rubbish into smaller 
parts. These are the decomposers. Animals such as woodlice, millipedes and beetles 
are decomposers. 
In this example the deictic anaphoric element These of the second sentence makes 
reference to the group of small animals and plants which could do certain things: 
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break down the waste products of other living organisms. In other words decomposers 
are classified first of all as living organisms in a nominal group: A group of small 
animals and plants, without the assistance of any relational clause. The relation of 
this group already classified as subcategory of living organisms, with its 
superordinate category of all living organisms, is represented as a material process. 
The latter describes what the entities of the subcategory can do to the waste products 
of the superordinate category. Then given what a decomposer is because of what it 
can do, some specific animals are classified, in terms of an identified relational 
process, as instances of the subcategory of decomposers: 
(3) 
	




IDENTIFIED PROCESS IDENTIFIER 
Following the complex of clauses backwards we find classifications as a movement 
of sub-inclusions to super-inclusions, or in other words as a shift from specific to 
more general taxonomies. Woodlice, millipedes and beetles are animal decomposers 
which are a group of small animals and plants. 
6.2.3.2 Processes and what they represent in transcripts 
Looking at transcripts, we notice that new meanings are built up on what is already 
given. What has to be recalled for the construction of new meanings depends on many 
interrelated factors, like the nature of the topic and whether this topic is being 
introduced for the first time or if it is being further developed for a better 
understanding. For example it is one thing to develop the idea of recycling on what 
students already know from the media and from everyday domestic practices that they 
have possibly come through and it is another thing to introduce the Carbon Cycle. 
For the latter to be taught a lot of thing-like and process-like entities need to be 
introduced and elaborated before, like carbon dioxide, oxygen, atmosphere, 
respiration, photosynthesis e.t.c. All these entities, represented linguistically as 
participants, processes and circumstances, have to find their place in order to 
reconstruct the phenomenon in question. This is what teacher's questions do (you can 
see the complete transcript of this lesson in Appendix 3.3). They do something more 
than just recalling information from the past: they re-arrange those pieces of 
knowledge which are given in order to build up new meanings: 
Where's the atmosphere? 
How does carbon dioxide get into the atmosphere? 
Where does the carbon dioxide come from? 
What is it doing in our lungs? 
What's the connection between respiration and photosynthesis? 
In this way the given pieces of knowledge are elaborated with more properties, they 
are involved in a number of new processes under various circumstances - some of 
them introduced for the first time: carbon dioxide is not only found in the atmosphere, 
but also in animals' lungs. They breath it out as a waste product. Plants use it in order 
to make their own food. But these new properties and behaviours of the entities do 
not violate properties and behaviours that have been established earlier for the same 
entities. Carbon dioxide still remains a gas and behaves like a gas whether or not is 
circulated through processes like respiration. Also entities which are introduced for 
the first time, like chlorophyll, have predictable properties and behaviours consistent 
with the existence (with properties and behaviours) of other entities. 
Thing-like and process-like entities have to be recalled by their proper scientific 
names. Teachers usually ask students to name a whole process by using the proper 
nominalization for it: 
T 	 What word, did we give to the act of trying to preserve environments or trying 
to preserve living things within those environments? Somebody else because 
you've both had your hands up a couple of times I think. Have you answered a 
question yet anybody else first of all? 11 shs, go on then. 
S 	 Conservation. 
or they ask students to unpack a nominalization and give the processes which are 
described by it: 
T 	 So, what is weathering, what do we mean by weathering? Natalie / S:...effect 
of the wind and rain... / T: Right, not, not necessarily wear it away but / S: 
.... / T: damage it and loosen it so that perhaps the surface looks crumbly. 
Right, so that's damage, [ .1 to the surface of rocks or buildings, stone brought 
about by things like wind and rain and frost, the different weather conditions, 
which is why it's called weathering. 
In the same way as in textbooks, definitions of terms are realised linguistically not 
only as relational processes but as material processes as well. This is the case for 
defining nominalizations like weathering and conservation above, but also for terms 
which appear as nouns or nominal groups with a classifierAthing structure; a 
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substantial part of their definition is what these entities can do and what can happen to 
them or what you can do with them. For example a student's definition of 'peat' and 
'peat bog', which is given at the level of what they look like, is not considered as 
enough by the teacher who elaborates the student's answer with a series of material 
processes. The latter are the linguistic realisations of how a 'peat bog' is formed, how 
'peat' is stored and how it is used: 
T 	 Yep in Wales as well, now then sh sh sh 1] a peat bog is formed over, a peat 
bog is formed over many many years. As the vegetation that is growing there 
dies ok more vegetation grows to take it's place and a great big layer of dead 
vegetation of dead plant material builds up ok. It starts to rot to a certain 
extent but because it's also water logged ok it doesn't rot away completely. 1] 
As it does sort of tend to decay and as this layer builds up it forms what we 
know as peat. In a lot of areas people go out and they cut the peat. Ok, in ....if 
you put it in a sack and allow it to dry you can put it on a fire and burn it, it 
burns like wood or coal on a fire. 
In another lesson knowledge about 'silage' is considered not only in terms of 
definitions and attributes which describe what 'silage' looks like, but also how 'silage' 
is formed, how it is stored, why it is used and how. What people do with 'silage' and 
how they use it as well as its properties and behaviours are thought to be important 
pieces of knowledge for explaining its contribution to pollution: 
T 	 How many of you have heard just of interest of something called silage. 
S 	 I've stayed on a farm. 
T 	 Right what is silage do you know? 
S 	 Oh I don't know , it's smelly anyway. 
T 	 It is very smelly. It's grass ok all silage is 
S 	 They feed it to animals. 
T 	 They feed it to animals great yes what they will do is to try and get some feed 
for the animals over the colder months of the year over the winter and so on 
when they might be indoors. They cut the grass and the grass is put into what 
is called a silage clump it's basically just a great big pile. They drive tractors 
up and down it to actually compress and squash the grass down ok and if the 
conditions are correct, Mahela, then that silage is preserved put plastic bags 
over it to stop air great big plastic sheets over to stop air getting in. You 
might see tyres on top of the plastic sheets to keep the plastic down. And the 
grass will be preserved in there. Come the winter all they have do is go in 
with a sort of fork thing on the front of a tractor and you can lift great 
wadges out and use it as a feed for cattle. If you were to get some grass lets 
imagine you've got a handful of grass and you sort of twisted it round like this 
what would drip out of it. 
T 	 What actually happens is when the grass is squashed by the tractors going up 
and down it, ok, all of this green liquid all of this juice gets forced out 0 it's 
only shssh, it's only recent laws that have made farmers install tanks to collect 
all of this ok. Sometimes though it still gets into rivers LI the juice from grass 
is more toxic in the river than virtually anything else. If you think about a 
small town n the juice getting in from one silage tank from one pile of silage 
into a river is potentially much more harmful to that river than the pollution 
that can be produced by an entire town. And the reason is that once the juice 
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from grass from silage gets into the river in large quantities it uses up all the 
oxygen in the river. LI So that any of the life in there that depends on oxygen 
can't survive ok, so that is one very important pollutant from a farm. 
Living things which are found in rivers and depend on oxygen are in danger if the 
green substance from silage gets into the river in large amounts because this 
substance uses up all the oxygen in the river. The explanation of why the green 
substance which is washed out from silage tanks into a river is more harmful than the 
pollution that can be produced by an entire town demands a cast of participants like: 
farm animals, grass, silage clump, silage, tractors, farmers, the juice which forced out 
from grass, and etc. which behave in a such a way that affects the existence and the 
behaviour of other participants: rivers, oxygen, living things in rivers, and etc. 
6.2.3.3 Discussion 
The examples of ideational processes in textbooks and transcripts above show that 
knowledge about entities (e.g. definitions) can be realised in many different ways at 
the linguistic level (either as identifying processes or as a sequence of material 
processes). Looking at the prominent place of material processes in these examples 
one can notice that material processes realise meaning relations between entities such 
as what the entities can do, what can happen to them and what they are made of. The 
latter three dimensions as we have seen above in section 4.5 have been used as the 
analytical framework in which representations of constructions of entities are 
grounded. 
As it has been emphasised (Ogborn, 1996), construction of entities in teaching 
science cannot be seen as located in 'reports' as distinct from 'explanations'. On the 
contrary, it is argued that construction of entities is an essential part of explanations. 
This is due to the definition of scientific explanation, discussed in section 4.5.4, as 
necessarily involving the process of constructing and transforming entities and 
defined as stories. Therefore, in contrast with what Martin claims, descriptions, 
definitions and classifications of entities should be rather seen as parts of 
explanations. 
In sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2, an attempt has been made to exemplify the argument 
that in the teaching of environmental science realisations of definitions are not 
necessarily in terms of relational processes. Relational processes are mixed up with 
material processes in a way that one can hardly see that they realise two clearly 
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distinguished genres found in a relation in which reports are the larger parts and 
precede explanations. Furthermore, the argument discussed in the last paragraph, that 
definitions and descriptions of entities should be thought of as explanations 
themselves since they are about constructions and transformations of entities, leads us 
in this part of the analysis not to talking about genres, but to looking at the various 
ways constructions of entities are realised linguistically. 
6.2.4 Processes, Participants And Circumstances 
6.2.4.1 Grammatical constituents which function as Actors 
and Goals 
As we can see in the examples given previously, ACTORS do not need to be only 
agents which are living things, like human beings, animals and plants, but can be any 
sort of entities like substances the juice which is forced out from grass, water, 
machines, like tractors, natural phenomena heavy rain, even systems of living and 
non-living things grass, forest. In the same way GOALS can be living things like 
rice, crops, materials such as wood, substances like oxygen and also systems of living 
and non-living things like soil, rivers. 
Sometimes the same entity participates in various ways in more than one process, so 
it can be found in more than one clause. And this is because entities usually do not do 
one thing only or do not have just one property. It is the choices in the text which 
highlight certain behaviours and attributes of the entities and hide others. So for 
example in the section Caring for the soil certain kinds of human behaviour, like the 
slash and burn type of agriculture, have been selected in order to represent the effect 
of people's actions on their surrounding environment. Quite often the same entity 
appears as ACTOR in one clause and as GOAL in another clause in the same text. 
Looking at texts which are addressed to older students, like Nuffield Physics 
(Appendix 4.3), we notice again the same thing. The same entity carbon dioxide 
appears as both ACTOR and GOAL even in the same sentence: 
(4) 	 This carbon dioxide will enter the atmosphere and may be taken in by plants 
once again during photosynthesis. 
This carbon dioxide will enter the atmosphere 




of place ACTOR 
It is more often in texts addressed to late secondary school students that we find 
choices in the text which represent entities as ACTORS in relation to other entities 
and then as GOALS in another process in relation to the same entities. Cases in which 
each of the two participants in the same clause are at the same time both ACTOR and 
GOAL are extremely rare. The latter happens in reciprocal material processes with 
verb structures like: oxygen reacts with food releasing energy. 
But what is usually the case is the consistent appearance of representations of entities. 
Entities do not exchange roles with each other. That is, some entities are found more 
often as GOALS than others, and these are very frequently the same entities even in 
very different text structures. In particular substance-like entities like Carbon dioxide, 
Nitrogen and Oxygen are found more often as GOALS even in very different 
structures, like passive verb structures without ACTORS and active structures of 
transitive, material processes. On the other hand living organisms like plants, animals 
and human beings are found more often as ACTORS. 
It is not unusual to think about living organisms as the entities which interact with 
their surrounding world by doing things. For example people cut down and burn trees, 
grow crops, and if they are not happy with what they have got they move from place 
to place in order to find better means for their lives. Animals too eat other animals 
and/or plants and all of them intervene in various ways in their surroundings. Even 
unobservable creatures like microbes are also represented as living organisms which 
are thought of as interacting with other living or non-living organisms in similar ways 
as observable living things do. Observable non-living things are also participants in 
the same environment. The main difference between living and non-living things is 
that the former acting on the latter is realised linguistically in a consistent way by 
material processes of various forms in which ACTORS are usually living organisms. 
What is difficult to make sense of from the point of view of commonsense 
understanding (see chapter 3) is how the invisible world of non-living entities like 
gases is involved in the interaction between the environment and its habitats. One 
way of thinking about the unobservable non-living entities is as if they are 
participants in the same world which is also shared by living organisms. Then the 
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unobservable non-living things are treated in the same way as the observable non-
living things are treated. So in the same way as the observable non-living things 
appear as GOALS, the unobservable non-living things appear as GOALS too. In other 
words choices at the linguistic level make us think about the unobservable world -
either living or non-living - in the same way as the observable world. This property of 
'making the unobservable observable' due to the way things are represented will be 
discussed in more detail later in section 6.3.2. At this point it should be noticed that 
association of agency with the nature of entities, as described above is a characteristic 
of texts which are addressed to young students and not so often for those who are in 
their last years of the secondary school. As we will see later in section 6.3.1, in the 
latter case processes are neutralised in terms of ACTORS' actions, and GOALS tend 
to be fused with processes in what are realised linguistically as nominalized 
processes. 
Quite often entities are represented as nominal groups (see clause (2) in section 
6.2.3.1), like heavy rains, chemical fertilisers, tropical forests, e.t.c. Most of them 
have a classifierAthing structure that means that the first term of the group called 
Premodifier: the classifier heavy, chemical, tropical is an attribute that classifies the 
Head - which usually appears as a noun rains, fertilisers, forests. In these cases the 
classifier indicates a particular subclass of the entity which appears as a category 
either of things, like fertiliser, or of phenomena, like rain, or of systems of living and 
non-living things, like forest. 
Entities also are found as nominal groups which have an epithetAthing structure like 
great danger and good flat land. Epithets indicate some quality of the entities which 
vary in degree. Even if the epithet good indicates a temporal property while the 
classifier flat indicates a permanent one it is not always easy to say whether a 
property is classifier or epithet. For example we cannot say with a degree of certainty 
whether the property flat classifies a specific sub-category of the Head land or 
whether it is just a property of the land. 
Numerative elements appear quite often in nominal groups. In non-technical texts like 
the section Caring for the soil (Appendix 4.1) most of the numeratives are inexact, 
like some countries, more and more people, not enough forest, too many people , 
hundreds of years . 
In other cases an entity is realised as a nominal group which is a prepositional phrase. 
For prepositional phrases like a patch of ground (see clause (1)), a patch of forest the 
second noun called Postmodifier classifies the first noun in various ways, it tells us 
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what kind of patch we are talking about. And the first noun the Head imposes a part-
whole relation to the entity: we do not talk of the 'whole ground' or 'forest' but only of 
a part of them. The nominal group here stresses the similarities rather than the 
differences: that the 'patch of forest' has most of the main properties the 'whole forest' 
has. But in the case of the 'tropical forest' which has a classifierAthing structure the 
nominal group stresses differences rather than similarities between entities by 
defining and at the same time classifying the entity: the 'tropical forest' is a type of 
forest, which means that it shares many properties with the general category 'forest' 
but has some special properties which make it different from other forests or types of 
forests. 
Combinations of grammatical forms in nominal groups can represent specialisations 
and abstractions of knowledge. They specify as far as needed the entities and their 
roles in processes, leaving out those properties and roles which are thought irrelevant. 
For example from the beginning of the section Caring for the soil we know roughly 
what the chapter is going to be about and what is not going to be about. And this is 
due to the nominal group little good, flat land. The group which appears in an 
existential process gives us an idea of what the page will talk about, namely, the 
agriculture of small areas of land, like terraced hillsides and patches of cleared forest. 
From the participants which appear in the first two or three clauses, what we do not 
expect to read about is things like life in the air or pollution of large cities. Also in 
another page under the title Soil cycles in the same book the participant A group of 
small animals and plants and its role in nature which is addressed in the first clause, 
makes clear that this page is going to talk of what are later called decomposers and 
microscopic bacteria (see clause (3)), and is not about wild animals in jungles. 
The two nominal groups little good, flat land and A group of small animals and plants 
do their best to specify as early as possible the entities that will have the main role in 
the text. And they do that in a simple way because they consist of words familiar to 
young students, despite having a rather complex structure. The linguistic constituents 
of both groups are not technical terms but vernacular terms. The first, little good, flat 
land has an indefinite numerative^epithetAclassifierAthing structure. The second, A 
group of small animals and plants consists of a nominal group with a deicticAthing 
structure A group which is the Head of the Postmodifier prepositional phrase of small 
animals and plants. The Postmodifier is the part of the group which comes after the 
Head and defines the category in which the Head is a subset. The prepositional phrase 
itself is a nominal group which has an epithetAthing 1 Athing2 structure. 
The nominal group little good, flat land defines a category of a system of living and 
non-living things. The other A group of small animals and plants defines a category 
of living things. Both categories are neither generic nor specific. They avoid being 
generic because of the number of classifiers and epithets which specify the entities 
that the text is talking about. Neither are they specific because of the lack of technical 
terms and any reference to specific members of the categories. Specific members of 
the categories and membership relations appear later when a series of material 
processes establishes the identity and the things that the members of the categories 
can do. So for example in the text Soil cycles after knowing what this group of small 
animals and plants can do, namely help to break down nature's rubbish into smaller 
parts , we are told that this group is called decomposers and at the same time we are 
informed about some specific members of the category, like woodlice, millipedes and 
beetles. In a similar way in the text Caring for the soil after knowing how people's 
actions make use of little good, flat land specific members of this kind of land are 
named, such as terraced hillsides and patches of cleared forests, and membership 
relations within the entities of the same category are highlighted. 
Nominal groups such as the ones we discuss here do what relational processes can do. 
Relational processes define and attach attributes to participants. If we look for an 
alternative way, in terms of the grammatical forms and not the lexical choices, to say 
what the nominal groups above are talking about, the most suitable way is to choose 
relational processes. It is very likely that epithets can be represented as attributes 
while classifiers can be broken into identifying processes. So the nominal group A 
group of small animals and plants might be given as A group which consists of 
animals and plants that are small. But for most of the simpler nominal groups more 
informational elements are needed in order to change the groups into processes. These 
elements are not found as linguistic constituents in the group but are hidden in its 
technical terms. For example if we unpack the nominal group tropical forest we need 
information about the nature of the tropical forest which is carried by the technical 
term tropical used as classifier. 
The nominal groups discussed so far consist of nouns and adjectives. Verbs also are 
found in nominal groups which function as classifiers burnt trees, flooded paddy 
fields. In these cases the entities, which are represented as nominal groups, are the 
outcome of actions like burning and flooding which causes a change to the already 
existing in the text entities trees and fields. If we go back to the material processes 
from which these nominal groups come from we will notice that trees and fields are 
the GOALS of the material processes. 
We also notice that quite often combinations of classifierAthing structures and 
prepositional phrases appear, like the patch of cleared forest, which make very fine 
distinctions between entities and allow them to take part in different processes either 
as ACTORS or as GOALS because of the variety of attributes attached to them. So in 
the example above the nominal group the patch of cleared forest appears as an 
ACTOR in the process of growing back: 
(5) In the meantime the patch of cleared forest grows back. 
but the nominal groups a patch of ground and a patch of forest appear as GOALS in 
the process of clearing out: 
(1) 	 They [people] clear a patch of ground by cutting.... 
(6) They [people] then move on to clear another patch of forest. 
Finally, we notice that nominalized processes can be placed in nominal groups instead 
of their verb forms, like the internal transport of chemical, by the decay of dead 
plants and animals. The latter as a whole is an ACTOR in the material process 
(7) Carbon dioxide is also released by the decay of dead plants and animals... 
The the decay is the Head of the nominal group while the prepositional phrase of 
dead plants and animals is the Postmodifier which has a classifierAthinglAthing2 
structure. What is interesting again here is that the ACTOR is itself the outcome of 
another action or rather sequence of actions which are carried on by the nominal 
group. 
In this section linguistic realisations of entities in terms of their grammatical 
constituents have been discussed at the level of functions these entities have in 
ideational processes. Examples of representations of entities in texts have shown that 
entities can have more than one linguistic function such as being ACTOR and GOAL. 
These are the linguistic realisations of what entities can do and what can happen to 
them. These functions are consistent with the behaviour and properties of entities. 
Both observable and unobservable non-living entities are more likely to be 
represented as GOALS in relation to living either observable or unobservable entities. 
The latter are more likely to be thought of as ACTORS. But as has been illustrated in 
this section this simple association between a linguistic function and a property or 
behaviour of an entity is not the case in texts which are addressed to older students. 
Furthermore, representations of entities in terms of nominalized processes make less 
clear to the reader or hearer the present and nature of function at the linguistic level 
and therefore the behaviour of entities is not addressed explicitly. 
Nominal groups are more than the linguistic realisations of properties in terms of 
adjectives. They can accomplish a number of delicate functions such as addressing 
part-whole relations, classifications and categorical relations. Also nominalized 
processes as parts of nominal groups can realise actions from which the nominal 
referred to them have evolved. As a result complicated structures of nominal groups 
carry a lot of information quite often implied by the function of the grammatical 
constituents. This explains why so often teachers insist that students should be able to 
recall what long nominal groups mean, especially when the knowledge carried in 
these grammatical constituents has been elaborated in many lessons before. 
6.2.4.2 Grammatical constituents function as circumstances 
Circumstances in the same way as ACTORS and GOALS consist of either one word, 
like the word Today in the clause (Appendix 4.1): 
(8) Today, more and more people without any work are moving from the towns ... 
or a nominal group. In most cases the nominal group has the form of a prepositional 
phrase, like on hillsides in the clause: 
(9) People have to grow their crops on hillsides 
Circumstances are the linguistic realisations of locations in place, like on hillsides 
above, of locations in time, representing when something has happened, like Today 
in the first clause above, or the duration of a process. There are also circumstances of 
purpose like the prepositional phrase for rice growing in the clause: 
(10) The water changes the soil making it just right for rice growing. 
and circumstances which are the linguistic realisations of how something has 
happened like the adverbial easily in clause (2) 
All of them have an important role in the text structure. They say where and when 
things are located, where and when actions are happened, how things happen, what 
causes certain behaviours and what are the purposes of certain actions. 
Looking at the section Caring for the soil (Appendix 4.1) in the textbook Earth in 
Danger we have found that the circumstances of place are not of the same kind but 
that they vary in the degree of defining places at different scales. For example in the 
beginning of the second paragraph the circumstance In other countries defines a very 
broad category of places in which certain behaviours of entities like people, heavy 
rains, water are noticed. The two circumstances of the second clause in the same 
paragraph under water and in these flooded paddy fields without naming any 
particular place define in a very specific way the kind of places where rice is planted. 
In doing that containment relations are applied which mean that one location of place 
is found within another. The location under water is placed within the location in 
these flooded paddy fields which is also contained in the location In other countries. 
What we also notice here is that one circumstantial element In other countries locates 
in place thing-like and process-like entities which are found in more than one clause. 
Participants, processes and various circumstances in the first three clauses of the 
second paragraph are located within this group of countries which are different from 
those mentioned in the first paragraph of the text under the circumstantial element In 
some countries. 
In a similar way circumstances of locations in time provide a variable like feature 
which categorises sequences of participants and processes into different groups. The 
circumstance Today is pointing at the different behaviours of people between now 
and in the past For hundreds of years. Circumstances of time also can relate two 
material processes which belong in two separated clauses, like the circumstantial 
element In the meantime which indicates that when the process move on to clear had 
taken place something else happened: the process grows back. In addition, time 
circumstances can indicate the period of time in which something happens, like how 
people live for hundreds of years or for how long an entity has a certain property, 
like the entity soil being rich for two or three years. 
Looking at the functions of the various circumstances in clauses we notice that each 
circumstance cannot be seen separately from the functions of the other linguistic 
constituents in the clause. We also notice that circumstantial elements function close 
either to thing-like entities, like locating them in place or to a process-like entities, 
like indicating where something has happened. In most cases it is relational and 
existential processes in which circumstances are found closer to a certain thing-like 
entity rather than closer to the process-like entity, like the circumstance In some 
countries in relation to little good, flat land in the existential process: 
(11) In some countries there is little good, flat land. 
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On the other hand material processes rather than their participants alone are more 
likely to be related with circumstantial elements. So for example in the clause: 
(9) 	 People have to grow their crops on hillsides 
if we look for the circumstantial element on hillsides we are not going to ask where 
crops are found but where people have to grow their crops. It is the act of growing 
crops which is located on hillsides rather than the crops themselves. 
It is clearer to see whether a circumstance is related closer to a thing-like entity or a 
process-like entity if we look at the interpersonal dimension of texts and transcripts. 
For example in the beginning of the lesson about the Carbon cycle (Appendix 3.3) the 
teacher wrote 'Carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere' at the top of the whiteboard and 
at the same time asked the students where the atmosphere is. The specific question: 
(12) Where's the atmosphere? 
asks for a circumstance of place All around us which locates atmosphere . Students' 
answers were followed by another teacher's question, this time seeking for a 
circumstance of manner: 
(13) How does carbon dioxide get into the atmosphere? 
But now the question implies that the atmosphere is not the only place in which 
carbon dioxide is found. In other words carbon dioxide was removed from 
somewhere else. The place from where it is removed is not questioned yet. The 
interest so far is in how this gas gets into the atmosphere. In this case the 
circumstance in question is related with a material process in which the atmosphere is 
involved and it is not related only with the entity atmosphere alone. The answer to 
that is a material process: 
(14) We breathe it out. 
and is not needed to be a circumstantial element, like by breathing it out or by plants' 
and animals' respiration. The answer above contains a circumstantial element of 
location in place out which draws the distinction between inside and outside. 
Knowing from what had followed before that question that the outside is the 
atmosphere all around us what is left unspecified is the inside from which carbon 
dioxide comes from. This is where teacher's next question is pointed: 
(15) Where does the carbon dioxide come from? 
Circumstances are very closely related either to thing-like entities or process-like 
entities or both. And even if questions have a specific type, of how something has 
happened for example, seeking a circumstance of manner, it does not mean that this is 
what has to follow as an answer. Circumstances also are not constrained semantically 
by the clause boundaries. 'Atmosphere' is located all around us or in other words 
outside of us and carbon dioxide is getting into the atmosphere during the process of 
breathing. From there a semantic relation between participants, processes and 
circumstances has been built up beyond the clause level and without the need of 
conjunctions. Atmosphere becomes the location within which another entity is found, 
that is carbon dioxide. So whether carbon dioxide is in the atmosphere, it is at the 
same time all around us. The latter relation between us and the carbon dioxide 
without being addressed to the students is taken as given when the teacher asks where 
the carbon dioxide comes from. 
Looking at more technical texts which are addressed to older students we also notice a 
considerable number of all kinds of circumstances. But the organisation of the text as 
a whole has an effect on what kind of circumstances are chosen. For example the 
section The Carbon Cycle (Appendix 4.4) from the textbook Environmental Science 
is structured around the figure of the carbon cycle placed in the beginning of its first 
page (the whole section is one and a half pages). 
As expected because of this choice most of the circumstances that are found in the 
text are locations in place. These sorts of circumstances do not merely trace out the 
locations where carbon dioxide is found, saying for example that carbon dioxide is 
found in the atmosphere, in the green parts of plants in animals blood and lungs, e.t.c. 
but are closely related to material processes which are the linguistic realisations of 
how carbon dioxide is transferred from one place to another and what does it do or 
what has happened to it. As a result these circumstances of locations in place are not 
of the same kind but they vary according to the process they are related with. For 
example a circumstance of place can be the linguistic realisation of something which 
is inside something else, like the compound carbon dioxide in the atmosphere: 
(16) The carbon might be thought of as beginning as part of the compound carbon 
dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere.  
or of something which is getting into something else because of its action, or is taken 
into something else, like carbon dioxide which is taken into plants: 
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(17) This gas is taken in through the leaves of green plants and... 
or the other way round, something is getting out of something else because of its 
action or it is released into somewhere else because of its container action, like carbon 
found in decomposers is released as carbon dioxide in the atmosphere: 
(18) These organisms [decomposers] will use the carbohydrates present in the 
material as an energy source (by respiration) and so carbon will be released as 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  
or a circumstance is the passage through which an entity passes in order to get 
somewhere else, like plants that are eaten get through the digestive system of animals: 
(19) Plants that are eaten will pass through the digestive system of a herbivore.  
or a circumstance can be the place where a participant remains inactive in relation to 
other participants for a considerable amount of time, like for example when 
carbohydrates are stored as fat in the body of animals: 
(20) From here it [carbohydrate] may be used to provide energy (by respiration) or 
it may be stored in the body after being converted to fat. 
or finally a circumstance can be the place where an entity is active and either being 
changed or changes another entity, like for example the carbon dioxide in water: 
(21) The carbon dioxide may dissolve in water and produce bicarbonate ions which 
are available to aquatic plants. 
The carbon cycle, presented in another textbook called Air Ecology under the 
heading A cycle of gases (Appendix 4.5) is structured in a very different way than in 
the textbook that we have discussed above. It not only differs from the contents and 
the diagram of A cycle of gases , due to how this textbook is used as a whole, but also 
due to the author's intentions and to what has followed in the chapters before this 
page. The circumstances which are chosen here are oriented to the context in which 
this text is placed, the story of the earth. As a result circumstances of locations in time 
are of special interest, like: 
(22) Over 3,000 million years ago... 
...about 2,700 million years ago... 
Over millions of years... 
And conjunctions between clauses which represent how the carbon dioxide gets from 
one place to the other are in terms of locations in time, like: 
(23) Green plants also do this when there is no light. 
What textbooks of various sorts either technical or not, and also classroom talk have 
in common is that the same linguistic constituents exchange roles in different clauses. 
Plants for example in one clause can be the places in which carbon dioxide is taken in 
and stored or used in a number of different ways, but in other clauses plants can be 
the participants, which do things (ACTOR), like making glucose. Animals also can be 
treated as a circumstances of place in some clauses but in other clauses animals are 
either the entities which do things or something is happened to them. As we have also 
noticed in the beginning of this chapter the fact that circumstances can be any kind of 
nominal group or prepositional phrase in the same way as for example ACTORS and 
GOALS appear, opens up all possibilities for the function of participant and the 
function of circumstance to exchange roles with each other in clauses. In the same 
way as a process-like entity can be represented as a nominalized process, as we have 
seen in the last section, a location in time can be represented as a nominalized process 
or as a nominalization that is the linguistic realisation of a process-like entity. So for 
example we notice circumstances like: 
(24) Oxygen is essential for all animal life, including ourselves, in the process  
called respiration (breathing). 
in the section A cycle of gases from the textbook Air Ecology and also: 
(25) The oxidation of carbohydrate during respiration  will end in the carbon 
entering the atmospheric stage of the cycle again as carbon dioxide. 
In these cases a process-like entity represented as a nominalization respiration is 
thought of as an event within which another event oxidation is located. Even if 
nominalized processes are made for the purpose of treating an event or a process as a 
thing-like entity, this is not the case here since the function of the nominalized 
circumstance serves the role of the location in time and not a location in place. 
6.2.4.3 Transitivity 
Both transitive and intransitive material processes are found in the two sections 
Caring for the soil and Soil cycles from the textbook: 'World in danger-Earth' 
(Appendix 4.1 and 4.2). In clauses like: 
The water changes the soil ... 
from example (10),water is the entity which brought about the change and soil is the 
entity to which the process is extended. In other words the process extends beyond the 
ACTOR water, to another entity soil which is the GOAL of the material process: 
The water changes the soil 
ACTOR PROCESS GOAL 
 
As we can see in this example the ACTOR is not an animate entity or a human being 
not even a living thing, but a substance. We notice that in many cases substances like 
the one above or natural phenomena such as heavy rain or even systems of living and 
non-living things e.g. forest have the function of ACTOR. In the same way GOALS 
can be living things such as plants rice, crops, materials such as wood and also 
systems of living and non-living things like soil. There is a question here whether 
there is a grammatical metaphor or not. Does the role ACTOR requires that the 
nominal that takes the role has the semantic feature of animate and human or does the 
nominal acquire that function by virtue of being an ACTOR? According to Halliday 
(1994, p.111) material processes should not necessarily be concrete, physical events 
but they can be abstract doings and happenings. Therefore, ACTORS do not need to 
be only animate agents even if the more abstract the process becomes to be the more 
difficult it turns to be to identify a participant as an ACTOR and distinguish it from 
the GOAL. Nevertheless this issue will be elaborated later in this chapter and when 
the conceptual demands of choices at the linguistic level and what sort of thinking the 
latter afford will be discussed in section 6.3.1. 
ACTORS are not necessarily found only in the first place of the clauses and GOALS 
are not necessarily placed only in the end. As for other kinds of ideational processes 
participants can be found in any place in the clause. It is quite often the case that 
clauses start with circumstantial elements of time or place and participants follow 
afterwards: 
existential: 
material process with: 
a) a circumstance of time 
in the first place: 
b) a circumstance of place 
in the first place: 
(11) In some countries there is little good, flat land 
(8) Today  more and more people without any work are 
moving from the towns and cities to live in the forest. 
(26) In other countries  the heavy rains are used for 
growing crops such as rice 
Also ACTORS do not need to precede GOALS. In passive material structures the 
GOAL is always placed before the ACTOR, like the clause below which is taken 
from the Nuffield Physics textbook: 
(27) Carbon is used over and over again by living organisms. 
Carbon is used over and over again by living organisms 
GOAL PROCESS CIRCUMSTANCE ACTOR 
Quite often passive material structures are without ACTORS at all, like in clause (26) 
and in: 
(28) Rice is planted under water... 
Rice is planted under water... 
GOAL PROCESS PLACE 
CIRCUMSTANCE 
In these cases - which will be discussed extensively in section 6.3.1 - agency, 
particularly human agency, is absent due to the passive structure of the process. But 
as Halliday has pointed out, in passive material structures without ACTORS we can 
still ask by whom the process takes place, in other words such structures leave a 
potential place for ACTORS which have been omitted. 'Planting' is a verb which 
expects a living human subject. 
On the contrary, active material structures in most of the cases have ACTORS but 
they can either have GOALS or not. In intransitive material processes, ACTORS' 
action is not extended to another entity: 
(29) The forest cannot grow back so fast ... 
The forest cannot grow back so fast 
ACTOR PROCESS CIRCUMSTANCE 
(rate) 
Even if both transitive and intransitive material processes are found, most of the 
clauses are transitive in texts addressed to early secondary students. In the two cases 
of intransitive processes in the section Caring for the soil (Appendix 4.1) one has to 
do with movement: 
(8) Today, more and more people without any work are moving from the towns 
and cities to live in the forest. 
Today... people are moving from... 
CIRCUMSTANCE ACTOR PROCESS EMBEDDED 
CLAUSE 
and the other one is the verb structure of growing: 
(5) 	 In the meantime the patch of cleared forest grows back. 








in contrast with the same verb structure which is used in transitive material processes: 
(9) People have to grow their crops on hillsides. 
People have to grow their crops on hillsides 
ACTOR PROCESS GOAL PLACE 
CIRCUMSTANCE 
As discussed previously, verb structures like these can be transformed into nominal 
groups, like in example (26): 
In other countries the heavy rains are used for growing crops such as rice... Some 
farmers in Europe use a natural or organic system for growing crops... 
In these cases of grammatical metaphor an event-like entity such as clause (9), is 
packed into a nominal group growing crops and is treated like a thing-like entity. 
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Nominalized processes (as mentioned above for clause (7)) are often treated as thing-
like entities in texts which are addressed usually to late secondary students: 
Carbon dioxide is also released by the decay of dead plants and animals and by the 
burning of fossil fuels like coal and oil. 
In this case the action of releasing carbon dioxide is due to ACTORS which are 
nominal groups: 	 the decay of dead plants and animals 
the burning of fossil fuels 
Deciding whether an entity functions as an ACTOR or as a GOAL in intransitive 
material processes, is not always easy. For the material processes presented above: 
(29) The forest cannot grow back so fast ... and 
(8) 	 Today, more and more people without any work are moving from the towns 
and cities to live in the forest. 
we cannot say just by looking at the language whether the forest grows by itself or 
because of the action of another entity which is external to the forest. In the same way 
we cannot say whether or not people move by themselves or because of the agency of 
other entities external to them. Processes of this kind, like growing up and moving, 
appear in various texts addressed to the whole range of ages. Following Halliday's 
(1994, p.162) point the question at issue with these kinds of processes is: is the 
process brought about by itself or from outside? From that point of view we do not 
just see the relation between a process-like entity and a thing-like entity as one of 
extension - as has been pointed above - but also as one of causation. What we are 
looking for is how a thing-like entity is engaged in a process or an event. Is the 
process grow back brought about by the entity forest, or by some other entity? At this 
point we will stick with Halliday's approach which investigates such cases as the one 
above at a more abstract level. This abstract level of analysis without making any 
distinction between different kinds of ideational processes, assumes that each process 
has associated with it one entity which is the key figure in that process. This entity is 
the "one through the process is actualised, and without which there would be no 
process at all" - in Halliday's terms. This function is called MEDIUM and represents 
the entity through which the process comes into existence. In our examples the 
MEDIUMs are the forest and more and more people. The MEDIUM represents the 
entity which participates directly in the process or event: 
the forest grows back 
...people are moving 
MEDIUM PROCESS 
We will come back later to this kind of process for which it is not easy to decide 
whether their one participant is an ACTOR or not. We will also introduce some other 
categories of material process which differ from those which are about actions. At the 
moment we should also notice that in the spoken mode as well there appear clauses in 
various contexts which are recognised only at this basic level of 
MEDIUM/PROCESS structure: 
T 	 Yep in Wales as well, now then sh sh sh LI a peat bog is formed over, a peat 
bog is formed over many many years. As the vegetation that is growing there dies ok 
more vegetation grows to take it's place and a great big layer of dead vegetation of 
dead plant material builds up ok. It starts to rot to a certain extent but because it's 
also water logged ok it doesn't rot away completely. 
the vegetation dies 
more vegetation grows 
a great...materials builds up 
it [vegetation] doesn't rot away 
MEDIUM PROCESS 
6.2.5 Part-whole and part-part relations between material 
processes 
Sequences of material processes are present not only as part-part relations, where one 
clause precedes the other, as in the clause complex presented earlier (Appendix 4.3): 
(4) 	 This carbon dioxide will enter the atmosphere and may be taken in by plants 
once again during photosynthesis. 
This carbon dioxide will enter the atmosphere 




of place ACTOR 
but are also present as part-whole relations where for example one clause is 
embedded in another. Embedded clauses, referred to by anaphoric elements, can 
contain more than one process and they constitute a participant (usually an ACTOR) 
for the process in which they are embedded: 
(8) 	 Today, more and more people without any work are moving from the towns 
and cities to live in the forest. 
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(30) This puts the land in great danger because there are just too many people and 
not enough forest. 
[Today... 
forest] 












The sentence Today, ... forest. referred to by the deictic anaphoric element This, is 
embedded into the next sentence This puts ... forest. The deictic This is the ACTOR 
of the abstract process which puts the land in great danger. The material process is 
abstract because literally there is not any entity which is placed somewhere else: it is 
as if the land is placed in a situation that makes it vulnerable. In this new situation 
things can happen that have an effect to the land. The ACTOR also is not a concrete 
entity but is abstract as well in a sense that it is people's actions which put the land at 
risk. At the end what is the outcome of this part-whole relation between clauses is that 
the abstract material process puts the land in great danger does not connect literally 
one thing-like entity with another but a whole range of processes people are moving 
from the towns and cities to live in the forest with a participant the land, which even 
if it appears linguistically as a single entity is a system of living and non-living 
entities. 
Part-whole relations between clauses are one of the textual realisations of how an 
explanation is constructed. In these cases, like the one that we have seen above, a 
phenomenon might be explained as an outcome of a series of actions in which 
specific entities are involved. At the ideational level this series of actions is realised 
as sequences of material processes. We should notice here that scaffolding of 
explanations appears to be only partial if we look them in a short piece of text, 
because they are usually built up continuously at various places in a textbook. Going 
back to our example above we could still ask why the gathering of many people puts 
the forest at risk, if we just stop at the two sentences presented in the table of the 
previous paragraph. People's actions and the effect of them on their surrounding 
environment are discussed in the paragraphs before in the section Caring for the soil . 
Depending on what is given and what is new in relation to the didactic choices of the 
writer/s of the textbook, an explanation might be found at the level of how something 
has happened and might be developed later at the level of why something has 
happened. For example this is the case for the explanation which is built up in the 
following piece of text from the section Caring for the soil (Appendix 4.1): 
Some farmers in Europe use a natural or organic system for growing crops. They use 
animals such as pigs to eat the remains of the old crop. The pigs add their dung. This 
fertilizes the soil... 
Natural fertilisation is explained at the level of how it has happened and not at the 
level of why people are using organic systems for growing crops. At the textual level 
the explanation is constructed as an exemplification of what might be meant by a 
natural system of growing crops. The example is carried on by a series of embedded 
clauses. Probably because the piece of text is short, there is no need for conjunctions 
between the clauses. The latter are connected to each other by anaphoric elements. 
The two anaphoric elements are of two kinds: the they of the second sentence is an 
anaphora to the ACTOR farmers and the deictic this of the last sentence is an 
anaphora to the whole previous clause: The pigs add their dung. Again what is 
interesting here is that a whole embedded clause referred to by the deictic this 
becomes an ACTOR in a transitive, material process: This fertilizes the soil. 
Embedded clauses such as the one above may be found also in cases of cause-effect 
relations. A whole clause may be embedded as a deictic anaphora in another clause. 
The embedded process and the clause in which it is embedded are causally related 
even if both clauses are not realised linguistically as causal clauses. In the same 
chapter we notice: 
People living in tropical forests find ways to live off the land. They clear a patch of 
ground by cutting down the trees and burning them. This makes the soil rich for two 
or three years. 
People's actions have an effect on the soil. The soil is made rich for two or three 
years. This cause-effect relation is realised as a material process This makes the soil 
rich for two or three years in which the ACTOR is a material process itself: They 
clear a patch of ground and a series of nominalized processes: by cutting down the 
trees and burning them. 
Sequences of material processes which are not accompanied by circumstantial 
elements of time confuse the reader whether the two or more events take place at the 
same time or one follows the other. Conjunctive elements like and can receive two 
different interpretations: that the two events are going together or that the one has to 
precede the other in a sequence. The confusion becomes worse when one of the 
participants is the same for both processes. If there is only one ACTOR which is the 
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agent of two material processes, like in the case below, we cannot say for sure 
whether the same ACTOR microscopic life does two jobs rots down dead animals 
and makes carbon dioxide at the same time or one after the other: 
(31) Microscopic life rots down dead animals and makes carbon dioxide gas. 
Microscopic life rots down dead animals 
makes carbon dioxide gas 
ACTOR PROCESSES GOALS 
With abstract ACTORS, like microscopic life, which represent a whole cluster of 
instances, thus concrete entities, and appear as categories of entities, it is hard to say 
whether the same entities are involved in both processes at the same time or different 
instances of the same category do different things at different times. 
Part-whole relations between clauses described as embedded clauses are the linguistic 
realisations of sets of relations between entities. These sets of relations get more 
complicated when the entities involved not only are represented as simple thing-like 
entities - even if they are entire material processes - referred to by anaphoric elements 
and nominalized processes, but function in the same way simple entities do, that is 
like ACTORS and GOALS. As a result, the comprehension of material processes 
such as This fertilizes the soil... and This makes the soil rich for two or three years... 
even if it seems at the first place that they have an easily comprehended structure of 
material process in terms of 'A does something to B', demands the implementation of 
knowledge about the entities involved which is not present in the material process 
itself. 
6.2.6 Material processes as they interact with other systems of 
representations. 
Almost all material processes of a very technical text The Carbon Cycle (Appendix 
4.4) addressed to late secondary students use verbal groups in the passive voice. Even 
mental processes are in passive voice, like: 
(32) This is represented diagrammatically in fig. 3.16. 
(16) 	 The carbon might be thought of as beginning as part of the compound 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
Passive structures of material processes, as we have also seen earlier, may have 
ACTORS, like: 
(33) The carbohydrates may be used by the plant as a source of energy for 
its life processes. 
(34) In this case, the carbohydrate will be oxidized by a process known as 
respiration. 
ACTORS can be either entities, like living organisms plant or nominalizations like 
respiration. The latter is a case of highly abstracted process (cases like these will be 
discussed later in more detail in section 6.3.1) in which agency is suppressed 
significantly for two reasons: the process itself is realised linguistically as an indirect 
action because of the passive form, and the agent is a nominalized process. As a result 
in the material process (34) above, a whole process respiration is the participant 
(ACTOR) of another process oxidized. The latter is also part of the process described 
in the previous clause, because of the deictic anaphoric element In this case. The 
same nominalization respiration is a direct ACTOR in the following example in 
which GOALS are classified into two categories those which are waste products like 
carbon dioxide, water and those which will be used by the plant like energy: 
(35) This process releases energy - and carbon dioxide and water as waste 
products. 
But most of the passive material structures are without ACTORS which are taken as 
self-evident, constructed earlier in the text. So for example for processes like: 
(17) 	 This gas is taken in through the leaves of green plants and is converted 
into carbohydrates, ... 
(19) 	 Plants that are eaten will pass through the digestive system of a 
herbivore. 
(36) Much of the carbohydrate will be absorbed into the animal's blood 
system. 
ACTORS have been noticed before in the text which talks about the flow of energy in 
living systems (Appendix 4.6). But this does not deny the fact that the choice of not 
making any reference to ACTORS again, is an option which suppresses agency and 
puts more emphasis on the outcome of various processes or in other words the effect 
of these processes on GOALS. So instead of active structures in which animals eat 
plants and absorb carbohydrate into their blood system, a sequence of part-whole 
relations of passive structures shows what has happened to both living and non living 
organisms. This is one of the main differences between the text the Carbon Cycle 
(Appendix 4.4) and the texts that have been discussed in sections above (Appendix 
4.1 and 4.2). In these texts non living, unobservable entities like carbon and carbon 
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dioxide are represented linguistically as GOALS. On the contrary living organisms 
both observable like animals, plants and unobservable like decomposers are 
represented in most cases as ACTORS involved either in active or passive structures. 
But in this text choices at the level of linguistic realisation make other sorts of 
classifications. And this is due to the context in which this text is placed: every thing-
like entity is seen as a source of energy and process-like entities show this flow of 
energy from one thing to another. 
Looking a few pages before the section The Carbon Cycle, we notice that it is part of 
a chapter under the heading Natural Systems (see Appendix 4.6). This section begins 
by representing the various processes involved during the flow of energy in living 
systems. This is where we will find why both living and non-living participants are 
taken as GOALS. In order to represent the flow of energy from one participant to 
another this chapter makes use of three systems of representations: verbal texts, 
diagrams, and chemical equations. For the purpose of our analysis at this stage we 
will look at the first two of them: texts and diagrams. 
What we notice from the direction of vectors of the three diagrams (Appendix 4.6) is 
that they do not represent what one participant does to another participant but what 
goes from one participant to another. If the direction of the vectors were the other way 
round, pointing for example from secondary consumers to primary consumers, then 
active material structures would have been chosen in the text, like 'the fox eats the 
rabbit', instead of passive material structures. But this sort of convention does not 
show anything about the flow of energy. If both kinds of vectors' directions were used 
in order to represent both direct agency and flow of energy, then this device would 
have been rather confusing, given the fact that there should have been two kinds of 
diagrams which contradict each other because of the directionality of their vectors. 
Otherwise, another kind of diagram would have been devised in order to represent 
both processes, but this might have been thought too complicated. 
The convention that is finally chosen represents two processes at the same time: 
energy is transferred from one entity to another and at the same time one entity is 
eaten by another. The latter have to be realised linguistically in the text as a form of 
passive material structure, like something is eaten/taken by something else, otherwise 
diagrams and text will contradict one another. So what we are trying to point out is 
that choices at the clause level are not only inherently constrained, but in some cases 
it is the interaction between different systems of representation which leads to choices 
of certain options. 
We cannot pass unnoticed the fact that the chapter Natural Systems establishes 
processes as things from its very first pages. There are mainly two places where we 
can find large amounts of grammatical metaphor. In the first the text deals explicitly 
with grammatical processes, given that things which are represented linguistically as 
nouns movement, transport, communication, production, removal are called: "life 
processes". In the second, processes that have been represented as passive material 
structures in the text, like is egested, is excreted appear later as nominalizations 
excretion, egestion. These grammatical metaphors are needed for the description of 
more complicated processes in which the nominalized processes participate in various 
ways, either as ACTORS or GOALS or circumstances. Take for example the process 
photosynthesis in the clause complex: 
(37) Sugars are the most commonly made (synthesised) material formed by 
photosynthesis and the simple of these is glucose. 
in which it is the ACTOR of the clause Sugars... formed by photosynthesis. 
Photosynthesis treated linguistically like a thing, is a nominalized process which is 
also located somewhere, like things do: 
(38) This is a process [photosynthesis]that occurs in the green parts of 
plants. 
6.2.7 Material processes of doing, moving and transforming 
Another difference between the text The Carbon Cycle (Appendix 4.4) and other texts 
represented above (Appendix 4.1 and 4.2) is that in the former the entity carbon is 
transformed into other entities by going through various material processes in relation 
with circumstances of different places. So for example carbon in the atmosphere is 
only found as a part of the compound carbon dioxide and is never found in 
carbohydrate molecules. Carbon in living organisms, dead organisms, and non living 
things is always found in carbohydrate molecules. 
A variety of material processes represent how carbon is transformed from being in 
carbohydrates to being a part of the compound carbon dioxide and vice versa when 
carbon is transferred from one place to another. In particular when carbon is taken 
into plants from the atmosphere it is converted into carbohydrates. In plants it can be 
used in different ways like being an energy store or being used in building plant cell 
walls e.t.c. If the plant is eaten by an animal then much of the carbohydrates are 
absorbed and they are either stored as fat or egested as waste e.t.c. But either in plants 
or in animals the part of the carbohydrates which is oxidized during respiration is 
released into the atmosphere as part of the compound carbon dioxide. 
Thus entities are involved in an interactive system of relationships in which one has 
an effect on the other. Linguistically, options in representing one of them constrain 
options for the representations of the rest of them. A specific process demands 
specific choices for the participants involved and also specific circumstances. But this 
does not mean that options are hierarchically ordered. Clause complexes in terms of 
embedded participants and processes, indicate that options are not sequential but 
emerge as a whole in an interactive system of relationships. As a consequence 
processes, participants and circumstances cannot be seen separately but each 
characterises the existence of the other constructing as a whole a package of options 
which determine options at the ideational level. 
Halliday (1994) has developed some more specific categories of participant functions 
along the lines of the participant functions which are directly involved in material 
processes: the one that does, mental processes: the one that senses, existential 
processes: the one that exists, e.t.c. These categories of participant functions represent 
semantically a close relationship between the process and its participants. For 
example the 'beneficiary' function in material processes is for the participant to whom 
goods are given. In the clause "gave the parcel to John", John is the RECIPIENT that 
is the participant which receives goods (Halliday, 1994, p.145). In the text The 
Carbon Cycle that we are looking at we could say that 'energy' is treated like a thing 
which is released out of a process and is taken as a 'good' by RECIPIENTS such as 
plants, animals and human beings. 'Carbon dioxide' is also treated like a GOAL which 
is either given ('released') or taken between different RECIPIENTS. 
Notice also that not all material processes are of the same kind. Some processes are in 
terms of doing, where one entity does something to another one, like: 
(39) The carbohydrate that is not absorbed from the digestive system will be 
egested as waste. 
In that case even if we don't know the ACTOR, we know what has happened to 
carbohydrate which is not absorbed: it is egested. Some other processes are material 
processes in which one entity acts in a way that transforms another entity, like for 
example in the clause: 
(17) 	 This gas is taken in through the leaves of green plants and is converted 
into carbohydrates, ... 
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the process converted shows that the entity gas is not the same as it was before the 
process in which it is involved. The entity (gas) has been transformed into another 
entity (carbohydrates) even if the text does not specify the nature and the extent of 
this transformation. On the contrary if we take the process is taken in alone, which 
precedes the one in which gas is transformed, it seems that nothing has happened to 
the gas in terms of action. The entity is transposed through a medium, which appears 
as circumstance of place, without being able to say if it is transposed by itself or by 
another agent. Looking at both processes in a clause complex above, in which one 
entity is represented as GOAL and two material processes are joined together with the 
part-part conjunctive element and, we come out with the difficulty of deciding 
whether the two processes take place at the same time or one precedes the other in a 
sequential order. 
We are faced quite often with the problem of deciding whether two clauses have to be 
taken together or analysed separately in such condensed and technical texts. To take 
another example, we cannot decide whether we could consider the process will pass 
as a process which shows just transposition or whether transformation is involved at 
the same time in the clause complex: 
(19) 	 1 Plants that are eaten will pass through the digestive system of a 
herbivore. 
In other cases one and the same process may have two interpretations at the same 
time. For example the process release in the clause complex: 
(35) 	 This process releases energy - and carbon dioxide and water as waste 
products. 
seems to involve two sort of actions at the same time: the entity carbon is transformed 
somehow from being part of carbohydrates in plants to be part of the compound 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Contextual information which is formed in another 
system of representation, like the chemical equation following this clause complex, 
facilitates significantly our effort to identify the process which otherwise remains 
obscure just from its linguistic realisation. 
These findings suggest that linguistic categories such as material processes are very 
general indications of semantic functions and should always be considered in close 
relation with knowledge implemented in the grammatical constituents of participants 
and circumstances. The three linguistic realisations of the ideational metafunction 
(process, participant and circumstance) have to be seen as the interactive elements of 
a whole package. It is also the clause complex which is found at various scales at the 
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textual level which indicates the difficulty of identifying the function of a process or a 
participant by just looking at the clause level. Moreover the fact that the text as a 
whole interacts with other systems of representations, like diagrams, suggests that 
contextual information which comes from various systems of representations cannot 
be neglected because it is conflated with the text. 
6.2.8 Grammatical metaphor 
6.2.8.1 Defining Grammatical metaphor 
As we saw previously processes are not always represented as verb structures but 
quite often are represented as nominal groups. These nominal groups (Appendix 4.3) 
might have either a simple form consisting of one noun only, like the nouns growth 
and reproduction in the clause: 
(40) Some of the carbon that the decomposer has eaten will be used in growth or 
reproduction by that organism. 
or a classifierAthing structure like the nominal groups repeated uptake and repeated 
release in the clause: 
(41) This repeated uptake and release is part of the carbon cycle. 
or a more complicated structure which consists of a head the decay a postmodifier, 
prepositional phrase of dead animals and plants and a classifier dead, like the noun 
phrase the decay of dead animals and plants in the clause: 
(42) Carbon dioxide is also released by the decay of dead plants and animals and 
by the burning of fossil fuels like coal and oil. 
In a scientific text grammatical metaphors are most often nominalizations (Halliday, 
1994, p.352). Nominalization is a process (itself) which characterises the historical 
development of scientific language in which processes become nouns and are treated 
as nouns. In textbooks and lessons what is happening is rather the other way round: 
nominalizations for didactic purposes are usually unpacked into processes, but 
nevertheless they are still treated as such whenever they are thought to be given or 
whenever a process or a series of processes has to be recalled by name. In the present 
thesis grammatical metaphors are not only thought to be nominalizations as they are 
defined in the historical development of scientific language, but any kind of 
grammatical transformation, thus the unpacking of nominalizations as well. 
6.2.8.2 Grammatical and lexical metaphor 
The definition of grammatical metaphor makes it clear that metaphors can be 
considered to be something more than a mere replacement of a lexical selection or 
wording (Halliday, 1994, p.341). In most of the examples of the grammatical 
metaphors above, in only a few cases is lexical transformation involved. These are the 
cases of the nominalizations photosynthesis and respiration as they are elaborated in 
the classroom. But even for these cases grammatical transformation is involved at the 
same time with the lexical replacement. For example respiration is not just replaced 
by other wordings like breathing, but grammatical transformation is involved at the 
same time; animals which breath in oxygen and breath out carbon dioxide, by 
releasing energy at the same time: 
T: 	 : No, the oxygen I just breathed in is probably still 
going round in my blood stream and the carbon dioxide 
I'm breathing out is from some oxygen I breathed in a 
little while ago. Right, OK, so the animals breathe out 
carbon dioxide during the process that we call res / S: 
res... / T: Respiration [ 1 good and that's the process 
where we release energy from the food that we've eaten 
by breathing in the oxygen, the oxygen goes all round 
our bodies in the blood stream. 
Nominalizations do not always need to be accompanied by lexical replacement. For 
example there is no lexical replacement involved in the metaphor burning in the 
clause below: 
(42) Carbon dioxide is also released by the decay of dead plants and animals and 
by the burning of fossil fuels like coal and oil. 
On the other hand for processes which appear as nouns or nominal groups lexical 
replacement is very rare. Here process-like entities such as: plants grow and carbon 
dioxide is released, are represented not as processes but as thing-like entities. 
6.2.8.3 
	 Two examples of text structures 
Grammatical metaphor in the overall text structure 
Comparing the two sections Soil cycles and A cycle of gases from two different 
textbooks (Appendix 4.2 and 4.5), we notice that the latter is more condensed in terms 
of the number of the embedded processes which follow one another and the number 
of nominalizations and nominalized processes. Two of the most condensed 
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paragraphs are ones which elaborate the nominalizations: photosynthesis and 
respiration. In the second paragraph a sequence of anaphoric elements which make 
reference either to thing-like or process-like entities, constitutes a complicated 
structure of embedded clauses. This complicated sequence ends up with the 
nominalization: photosynthesis. On the other hand the third paragraph introduces the 
nominalization: respiration and its substitute term: breathing in parenthesis, in the 
beginning so what follows is an elaboration which unpacks the nominalization. 
The diagram of the Carbon cycle which is placed at the bottom of the section A cycle 
of gases is also different from the picture-like diagram of the section: Soil cycles. 
Linguistic elements of the former are names of thing-like entities: plants, animals, 
carbon dioxide, fossil fuels and process-like entities. But in contrast with a picture-
like diagram, processes are represented as thing-like entities too, that is 
nominalizations: respiration, burning, photosynthesis and nominalized processes: 
decay. Few circumstantial elements accompany either things or nominalized 
processes, like for example: CARBON DIOXIDE in air and water. 
Texts also become more condensed without necessarily getting grammatically more 
complicated in another way: the more highly organised the structure of the textbook is 
- as it happens with those which are thought to be suitable for the late secondary 
students - the larger the amount of knowledge treated as 'given', which appears in a 
number of earlier sections. Things are not re-explained. In particular, for phenomena 
like the cycles of life which demand quite a lot of given knowledge in order to 
represent them as a whole, highly organised texts contain many nominalizations often 
left unpacked because they are considered as given. The extensive use of grammatical 
metaphor adds to the degree the text is condensed; there are more processes with at 
least one participant which is a nominalization or nominalized process rather than 
processes in which participants are single thing-like entities. 
6.2.8.4 Some possible implications of the use of the 
Grammatical metaphor 
In the examples discussed in this section (6.2.8) as in many other examples discussed 
in earlier sections, an action can be represented as a thing and functions at the 
linguistic level as a thing in relation to other processes and things. Grammatical 
metaphor breaks the typical ways of saying things, in terms of choices which can be 
about the selection of process type, the participants and the sequences of group/phrase 
clauses. The interest of this thesis is in the effect the way of talking - referred to as a 
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metaphorical way of talking - has on representations of entities in specific contexts, of 
the teaching of environmental science. 
The effect of grammatical metaphor on both text and meaning is that an action can be 
suppressed but the text becomes more 'economic'(in grammatical terms) and the 
action can now be in a role that it couldn't play before, like being a participant, 
classified with properties and connected with other nominalized processes. New 
possibilities for meaning relations are opened up (e.g. one process acting on another). 
An effect of grammatical metaphor on reasoning as noticed in classroom 
observations, is the larger cognitive effort which is demanded from students. Extra 
(mental) work is needed from students to trace the presence of ACTORS which 
appeared often long before the nominalized processes in which they are involved and 
are now absent. The cognitive demand of memorising knowledge in a flexible way so 
that associations with new knowledge can be possible, is increased with the presence 
of grammatical metaphor. But probably the most important demand grammatical 
metaphor imposes on reasoning is 'reading (a text) behind the lines'. An entity 
represented as a thing and also represented acting as a thing is not a thing but a 
process. The hearer or reader is called on to 'unpack' the nominalized process and then 
carry on to comprehend a new meaning by treating it as a 'package' of knowledge, 
that is a concept-like entity, and not as its linguistic realisation implies, as a thing-like 
entity. 
An indication at the interpersonal level of the more cognitive demands the presence of 
grammatical metaphor presupposes from the hearer/reader, is that as already stated, 
texts which contain a large number of grammatical metaphors are addressed to older 
students. Also classroom observations have shown that the presence of grammatical 
metaphor fails to pass unnoticed by teachers. The latter are very persistent either in 
asking students to unpack nominalized processes or to get students used to their 
presence and role by calling on students to name processes correctly by their 
nominalized grammatical form. 
6.2.9 Conclusion 
The analysis shows that aspects of the interpersonal dimension of teaching 
environmental science are inseparable from aspects of the ideational dimension. For 
example, texts which are addressed to older students are more likely to contain 
nominalized processes and nominalizations than those which are addressed to 
younger students. Aspects of the ideational and interpersonal dimension are also 
related with aspects of the textual dimension. In addition to the previous example, the 
extensive use of nominalized processes is accompanied with a textual cohesion which 
is characterised by embeddedness. These findings are not in contrast with what 
Halliday (1994) asserts, namely that for any linguistic element choices in one of the 
three metafunctions affect choices in the other two. They are also in accordance with 
what Lee (1992, p.11) has argued that there is an interpersonal aspect in grammatical 
choices such as passivisation. But in the specific context that we are looking at one 
should ask further the extent to which choices in one dimension bring with them 
conscious decisions (at any level, e.g. national curriculum, educators and academics, 
publishers and textbooks' authors, schools' policies and teachers) about choices in the 
rest. 
6.3 Metaphorical representations of entities 
6.3.1 Suppressed agency - Abstracted material processes 
6.3.1.1. Active and passive structures of material processes 
Both linguistic elements and texts in the section Soil cycles (Appendix 4.2) consist of 
material processes in which the two gases: Carbon dioxide and Nitrogen appear 
always as GOALS. By contrast participants like living organisms and their specific 
categories like plants, animals, decomposers and bacteria always appear as ACTORS: 
(1) Plants can use these chemicals to grow. 
(2) Bacteria turn nitrogen into chemicals. 
(3) Microscopic life rots down dead animals and makes carbon 
dioxide gas. 
(4) Plants re-use this carbon to grow. 
It is also interesting to notice that gases appear as GOALS in passive structures of 
material processes: 
(5) It [nitrogen] gets changed into useful chemicals by 
lightning, bacteria and some plants. 
(6) Carbon is returned to the soil by decomposers and to the air 
as carbon dioxide. 
Both active and passive structures of material processes above in which gases are 
involved are transitive and they all have ACTORS. But this is not the case for all 
textbook material even for the same topic. Looking at the same topic in another 
textbook called Air Ecology (Appendix 4.5) gases like Carbon dioxide and Nitrogen 
are again always realised linguistically as GOALS in either active or passive material 
processes. The variety of ACTORS includes not only subcategories of living things, 
but superordinate categories, like systems of living things: oceans and also 
nominalizations like: swirling, burning, decay. But there are some passive material 
processes which do not have ACTORS: 
(7) This is called photosynthesis and is very important since 
oxygen is released as a result. 
In this case we do not know if the processes packed under the nominalization: 
photosynthesis are the ACTORS which release oxygen or if these processes are not 
ACTORS but are involved as circumstances in the process which releases oxygen, or 
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if the ACTOR is the same as the ACTOR of the processes which precede the 
nominalization, that is the plant, or if the oxygen itself is both ACTOR and GOAL. 
In another case it seems that the ACTOR of the passive structure is reduced to a 
causal circumstance: 
(8) Over millions of years the amount of oxygen in the 
atmosphere steadily built up because of the green plants. 
or the ACTOR might be implied from what follows. For example in the sentence 
below: 
(9) This is when oxygen is taken into the body and carbon 
dioxide is released in return. 
one can not say if oxygen is taken into the animal by itself or because of the animal's 
action. It is the following sentence which makes reference to the whole processes 
above with the anaphoric element this and the additive elaboration of the conjunctive 
element also which implies that in the same way as green plants are the ACTORS of 
all these processes packed under the anaphoric element this, animals must be the 
ACTORS for the same processes too: 
(10) Green plants also do this when there is no light. 
Finally in cases like the one below, ACTORS simply can not be identified: 
(11) ...carbon dioxide is passed between the air, plants, animals and 
the oceans. 
Analysing the text What happens to carbon during decomposition? (Appendix 4.3) 
from one of the Nuffield Physics textbooks appropriate for students who are in Years 
9 we notice the amount of nominalization the text contains and its highly organised 
text structure. Phenomena like photosynthesis, respiration, reproduction, 
decomposition have been constructed in earlier sections and it appears to be assumed 
that there is no need to go back and recall their meaning. Furthermore these 
phenomena are seen in a new context of meanings, that is to say, what happens to 
Carbon during decomposition. So the processes represented as nominalizations are 
both left unpacked and are involved in other processes as circumstances, like: 
(12) Carbon enters an organism either as carbon dioxide during 
photosynthesis or in its food. 
or are placed within nominalized processes which are represented as nominal groups: 
(13) There are three ways in which [carbon] can leave the body of an 
organism (see figures 15.12 and 15.13): 
(14) a by being released as carbon dioxide - a waste product of 
respiration... 
Carbon and carbon dioxide are found as ACTORS only in intransitive material 
process. But even in cases such as (12) and: 
(15) This carbon dioxide will enter the atmosphere and may be 
taken in by plants once again during photosynthesis. 
apart from the fact that carbon as an ACTOR does not act on something else, we do 
not know just from the linguistic realisations of the processes if carbon is the agent 
which moves itself or the affected which is moved. The same sort of ambiguity has 
been described in section 6.2.4.3 in terms of a MEDIUM/PROCESS structure. The 
latter can be seen quite clearly when carbon leaves the body of an organism: 
(16) There are three ways in which it can leave the body of an 
organism (see figures 15.12 and 15.13): 
The intransitive material process in which carbon is linguistically supposed to be an 
ACTOR is transformed into three processes in which neither carbon or carbon 
dioxide appears as an ACTOR again. On the contrary in the first two processes both 
carbon and carbon dioxide are GOALS in passive material structures without 
ACTORS: 
(14) 	 a by being released as carbon dioxide - a waste product of 
respiration. 
(17) b by being released as a waste product like urea which also 
contains nitrogen 
The third one is the nominalized process of how carbon enters decomposers: 
(18) c by entering the decomposer which feeds on the body of the organism 
after it has died 
It is also interesting to see that at the end of this text the dominant passive material 
structures in which carbon is either released or has been taken in, now themselves 
become nouns: 
(19) 	 This repeated uptake and release is part of the carbon cycle. 
Again this is a case of grammatical metaphor which is unfolded from example (12) up 
to (18) and results in a nominalized form in clause (19); material processes like take, 
release which are developed in the text are transformed into nouns uptake, release. 
It is also interesting to point at a level of abstraction reflected in language that was not 
found in the texts (e.g. 'Soil cycles') discussed above. The diagram of the carbon cycle 
which is at the bottom half of the page (Appendix 4.3) is different from the diagrams 
of the texts that have been previously analysed. Participants are pictured without 
being named, except carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and litter and dead organisms 
below the ground. Processes represented as vectors between participants are 
accompanied by linguistic elements which are not material processes as in the text 
Soil cycles but either nominalizations such as decomposition, like those which are in 
the diagram of the text A cycle of gases or nominal groups composed by a noun and a 
nominalization. The latter has a Classifier^Thing structure where the Thing is a 
nominalization and the Classifier represents the agent of the nominalized processes 
plant respiration, root respiration, animal respiration. This is probably due to the fact 
that processes are not represented as such (look for example in text Soil cycles) but as 
nominalizations, and participants like plants, animals, decomposers and roots are not 
named (as in text A cycle of gases) but just pictured. As a result in order to distinguish 
processes which are nominalized under the same nominalization respiration, named 
participants in front of it classify the different kinds of respiration. 
6.3.1.2 Linguistic realisations of abstraction 
As illustrated above, moving from texts which are addressed to young students to 
texts which are addressed to older students, we find more often passive material 
structures instead of active material structures. This is a step towards to more indirect 
material processes. Even if grammatically the same material process can appear either 
passive or active without changing the participants such as in clauses (2) and (5), 
passive structures put at the first place the GOAL (e.g. nitrogen), in contrast with 
active structures which put at the first place the ACTOR (e.g. bacteria). If the GOAL 
is placed first then this is the THEME of the text, and therefore the entity which the 
clause is talking about - a grammatical phenomenon called thematization (Fowler et 
al, 1979, p.208). So if GOALS are the THEMES in a text then the emphasis is put on 
those entities to which something has happened. On the other hand if the THEMES 
are ACTORS then the emphasis is put on what the ACTORS can do to other entities, 
thus actions. As underlined in section 6.2.4.1, the entities which most often appear as 
GOALS are observable or unobservable and non-living, while it is observable or 
unobservable living entities which appear as ACTORS. 
Active structures are more experiential, they force us to look at the world through 
what the ACTORS do. Passive structures force us to look at the world through 
GOALS, in other words they seem as if they report actions which have happened and 
are now finished. So passive structures are indirect because they represent actions in 
some distance by giving first the effect of these actions rather than what causes them. 
Furthermore, it is the passive structure that permits clauses without ACTORS. In such 
structures we know that something has happened to a participant but must recover for 
ourselves what causes this action. Passive structures without ACTORS are a step 
forward to more abstracted forms of representing knowledge. Actions are reduced 
significantly and processes become more nominalized as in cases from example (12) 
up to (18). From there the next step to more abstracted processes is when the process 
is transformed into a nominalized process (19). As has been discussed above, in these 
cases the process is packed into a nominal group which usually has a classifierAthing 
structure which is involved as a participant in other processes. In other cases the 
whole process is nominalized under a noun. More complicated text structures in terms 
of embedded clauses (see section 6.2.5) contain processes within processes, in other 
words processes within various levels of abstracted forms of process. Thus we can 
notice different levels of abstraction which are realised linguistically by different 
forms of abstracted processes. Starting from the more direct actions to processes 
which involve less direct actions one can see realisations of abstracted actions such 
as: 
-active verb structures of material process: either transitive or intransitive 
-passive verb structures of material processes with both: ACTORS & GOALS 
-passive verb structures of material processes without ACTORS 
-nominalized processes and nominal groups 
-nominalizations 
We should also notice that the more abstracted the process is the more information is 
carried by circumstances, such as circumstances of place, time, and cause. It seems 
that in more technical texts, in terms of the grammatical structure, circumstances take 
a central role while processes are reduced to the role of participants. 
The relation between abstraction and patterns of grammar in science textbooks has 
been studied recently in a number of studies for different purposes. Martin (1989) in 
his study of Geography textbooks has discussed the differences between everyday 
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language and scientific texts looking at the grammatical differences. According to 
Martin, a scientific text is characterised by what he calls 'the grammar of abstraction'. 
Abstraction is not only attributed to the choices of words which represent concepts 
and categories of things instead of material entities only, but also to the grammar of 
the text. The latter codes reality as a set of relationships between things rather than 
processes (Martin, 1989, p.40). This is realised from the foreground of relational 
clauses at the expense of material ones and at the same time from the foreground of 
the nominal groups at the expense of clause complexes (Martin, 1989, p.43). 
Schleppegrell (1997) has shown the possible ideological and learning implications of 
the lack of explicit Actors in teaching materials. Schleppegrell has identified three 
ways in which the presence of the Actor can be omitted. One is by the use of ergative-
verbs. These are what has been described above as a grammatical structure of a 
MEDIUM/PROCESS in which it is not clear whether the only participant through 
which the process is (actualised) conceived is an ACTOR or a GOAL. 
Nominalizations and nominalized processes are another way of excluding ACTORS 
from the representation of processes. And finally, the use of generic and 
indeterminate agents such as 'people', 'human' and 'we' has the effect that even if 
grammatically ACTORS are present they are neither specified nor named. 
The ideological consequences of the choices of the three types of grammatical 
structures above is that the role of specific actors and institutions is suppressed in 
representations of environmental issues such as the result from loss of habitat, 
upsetting ecological relationships and reducing the ecosystem's ability to perform 
services like food control, water purification and nutrient recycling, is the loss of 
homes for animals. The use of non-human agents results in the disengagement of any 
human responsibility with the processes and causes of environmental problems 
(Chenhansa, 1998, p.56). Kress (1989, p.57) also has shown that both the retreat into 
an institutional impersonality and the retreat into individual invisibility have a 
powerful ideological effect (called 'mystification') due to the fact that sources of 
power or authority are difficult to detect and therefore difficult or impossible to 
challenge. 
The learning implications of such grammatical choices are striking. Students' 
responses to textbook materials have shown that concrete agents instead of abstract 
agents and nominalized processes are more likely to be picked up and elaborated. 
Furthermore, students attribute explicit agency to texts more frequently than the 
frequency with which agency is present in these texts (Schleppegrell, 1997,p.59). 
Vande Kopple (1994) points out that nominalizations are characterised by the absence 
of modality and tense. A grammatical form which realises 'things', obscures the time 
at which an action takes place and due to the disappearances of modality things are 
represented disengaged from any personal involvement or human judgement. 
Vande Kopple (1992, p.343) also stresses the epistemological consequences on the 
'nature' of the represented knowledge because of the use of nominalized processes. 
The latter represent processes as already having happened in the past instead of 
placing the reader within the process of the actual happening. As a result, processes 
which are realised as 'things' are reported as a rigid body of knowledge, such as 'facts', 
which are not supposed to be argued about but should be taken for granted. In that 
way knowledge is made less negotiable. 
As Vande Kopple (1994, p.552) has pointed out, nominalizations and long nominal 
groups reflect certain choices of expression in science. These are preference for 
precision, reporting in a form that facilitates comparisons and replication of 
experiments. These choices for expression adopted in textbook materials may not 
necessarily be in accordance with the way students think and learn. 
6.3.2 How different living organisms are treated 
6.3.2.1 Making entities alike 
Nominalized processes and nominalizations because of their property of packaging 
information in a relatively short grammatical form, are often used as the subheadings 
which classify the differences and similarities between plants and animals. Each 
subheading can be elaborated with material processes. The material processes in 
which subheadings such as feeding, respiration, excretion, growth, movement, 
reproduction, e.t.a. from the unit Living Organisms (Appendix 4.7) in the textbook 
Active Science, are unpacked are all active material processes in which animals and 
plants are the ACTORS. What is stressed by the repeated use of material process in 
which animals and plants are the participants which act, is that both of them either in 
the same or in a different way do things. They are involved in processes in which 
they are MEDIUMS. These processes represent changes that occur in the entities 
themselves (like growing) and changes in the spatial relations between them and their 
surrounding environment (movements): 
(1) Animals and plants may grow bigger. 
(2) Animals and plants are able to move, ... 
Plants and animals have also GOALS, most of which are observable: 
(3) Animals take in food (4) Plants take in materials to make their food. 
(5) Animals and plants can produce others of their own kind. 
Here, the GOALS food and materials are the affected participants which are 
transferred into the ACTORS plants and animals from the environment which 
surrounds them, because of their action. In the third sentence above others are the 
entities which are brought into being because again of actions of plants and animals. 
GOALS also can be materials which are the outcomes of processes in which animals 
and plants are the ACTORS: 
(6) Animals and plants produce waste materials which they 
must get rid of it some way. Human beings do so in 
breathing out, sweating, and using the lavatory 
Plants and animals have, among other things that they can, the ability to act in a way 
that mixes up both observable and unobservable entities : 
(7) Usually, they get the energy they need by combining their 
food with oxygen. 
Their living properties are stressed in processes like the one in the sentence above the 
energy they need which represents them as having needs in the same way that 
entities, like human beings with intentional properties, do. The same effect is also 
produced by the processes search for and may seek in the sentence below: 
(8) A plant may search for water or light, an animal may seek 
warmth. 
Plants are the 'makers' in processes which represent how they make their own food. 
These processes are part of a sequence of various kind of processes in which plants 
are the entities which transpose other entities into themselves, they are the containers 
in which these entities are found and the makers of other entities that are useful for 
the plant's survival and as such have to be stored in it (section: 'Eating sunshine, or 
eating plants?' see Appendix 4.7). 
The nominalized processes and nominalizations which represent the various processes 
in which plants and animals are involved, are also used as 'slots', 'stores' of 
information which is readily to be recalled any time it is needed. Their availability or 
not gives access to information, recalled by questions (the same is found in 
transcripts): 
(9) 1. What are the seven features common to all living organisms? (10) 4. What is respiration? 
Notice also that GOALS and PROCESSES are those participants which are most 
often called for by questions, probably due to the fact that for the specific section: 
Living organisms emphasis is put on the doer and the actions in which those entities 
which do things are involved: 
(11) 2. What substance makes plants green? How do plants use it? 
(12) 3. What substances do plants take in to make their food? 
(13) 6. What gases do you breath in and out? 
Nominalizations are processes that can be located as such in place but at the same 
time they can be circumstances of locations in time. So for example respiration is a 
process which takes place in the tiny cells which make up the bodies of plants and 
animals, but as a circumstance is a location in time during which other processes are 
located: energy is released and carbon dioxide and water are formed: 
(14) They [animals] breathe in oxygen so that respiration can take place in 
the tiny cells which make up their bodies. 
The subheading Eating sunshine, or eating plants stresses the differences between 
plants and animals feeding by using the same verb structure for entities like sunshine 
and plants which are very different. What is counted as food for plants is different 
from what is counted as food for animals due to the different nature of plants and 
animals and to the different nature of processes in which plants and animals are 
involved. Plants build their own food by taking in materials, some of which are 
unobservable, and by using energy from sunlight. By contrast, animals cannot make 
their own food but feed on living organisms, so they take in materials not raw but 
already processed through other organisms. Nevertheless, paradoxically the choice of 
the same lexical unit for two very different kind of GOALS, says that, even in a 
different way, both plants and animals eat. 
Notice, that even if in some cases differences between plants and animals are 
addressed explicitly, the grammatical structures that are used for representing them, 
result in underlying, silent and pervasive similarities. Some of them, such as 
attributing intentional properties to plants, are also reported in studies which are 
concerned with students' concepts about plants and animals (see chapter 3). 
6.3.2.2 Constructing the invisible 
6.3.2.2.1. Making the unobservable observable 
Lexical metaphors are often used for making the unfamiliar unobservable world of 
cells familiar. Looking at the unit Living cells (Appendix 4.8) we notice that cells 
have a membrane called 'skin': 
(15) A thin skin called a membrane surrounds each cell. 
the substance contained within the cell looks 'like a jelly': 
(16) Within it are the jelly-like cytoplasm and nucleus 
and cytoplasm is identified as the 'chemical factory' of the cell: 
(17) This [cytoplasm] is the chemical factory of the cell. Here, 
new substances are built up from materials taken into the cell and 
energy is released and stored. 
These lexical metaphors are not the same, not only because they draw similarities 
from different domains, like the biology of animals and human beings and the domain 
of industrial production, but also because the unobservable entities are comprehended 
as having similarities with observable entities which are of a different nature (thing-
like and process-like entities). For example the lexical metaphor of a skin-like 
membrane addresses the similarity between entities which are thought to be as 
boundaries of different sort of containers. 'Chemical factory' is used as a lexical 
metaphor which highlights cytoplasm as the location in which various processes take 
place. But nevertheless, all these lexical metaphors achieve the same effect: they 
make the invisible visible by making use of concrete visible examples of things and 
processes. These similarities show how things and processes look in terms of the 
visible world in which human beings belong and on which they act. So similarities 
addressed by lexical metaphors afford a set of relationships between unfamiliar 
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entities which can be easily comprehended because they are grounded in sets of 
relationships from everyday life. 
At this point the different effects of the use of grammatical and lexical metaphors 
should be noticed. Lexical metaphors such as the one described above make salient as 
clearly as possibly the functions of the participants (e.g. ACTOR or GOAL) and the 
kind of processes in which participants are involved (e.g. relational or material and if 
the latter of what kind). Keeping participants and processes present in the text, 
together with the similarities addressed by the lexical metaphors, both have the effect 
of representing entities as 'visible' and as 'accessible' to the reader as possible. On the 
contrary grammatical metaphors such as nominalizations and nominalized processes 
abstract processes and consequently hide the role of entities and the actual nature of 
processes, as has been illustrated previously. One can say (with some degree of 
exaggeration) that while grammatical metaphors make ACTORS and their role 
invisible lexical metaphors make them visible. 
The construction of the invisible can be seen as building up a 'story' (see section 4.5) 
by creating a cast of participants, a number of roles these participants have and a 
number of spatial relations between them. The cast of participants: cell, membrane, 
cytoplasm and nucleus have a variety of roles realised linguistically in terms of 
identifying and material processes which are not very different from those for entities 
found in the observable world: Cell membrane is the boundary which defines in/out 
relations because of its nature: being like a "skin" and because of its role: it is also the 
participant which controls the flow of substances in and out of the cell, like animals 
for example which decide what to eat and plants which take in water and nitrates from 
the soil. Cytoplasm is the place within the cell where a number of processes take 
place. During these processes new entities are created by the reaction between entities 
which enter the cell and those which are already there. These processes again are 
similar to those described under the nominalizations respiration and excretion in 
which animals and plants are the agents. Finally the nucleus found in the cytoplasm, 
is the entity which controls all the processes which take place in the cell. This is 
presented rather like the 'brain' of the cell which takes all the necessary decisions for 
keeping the cell live. 
It should be noticed here that the shift from the visible to the invisible is a continuum 
rather than a switch off/on relation, reflected in the spatial relations between the 
entities and their behaviours. So for example, the chosen grammatical forms which 
represent spatial relations provide a smooth shift from the visible world of plants and 
animals to the invisible world of cells where observable and unobservable entities are 
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connected to each other: Cells are the things which are located in plants and animals. 
Plants and animals are also made of cells which are the places in which other things 
are located: cytoplasm, nucleus etc. This continuity between the visible and the 
invisible world involves both place-like and location-like relations realised as 
circumstances of locations in place. The observable entities plants and animals are the 
places in which unobservable entities: the cells are located. The cells are also places 
in which thing-like entities (e.g. cytoplasm) and process-like entities (e.g. chemical 
reactions) can be located. 
However the interaction between observable and unobservable entities is gradually 
constructed in the text, by introducing cells as the smallest living units from which 
animals and plants are made up. The size of this kind of living unit is given from the 
point of view of where the visible meets the invisible: how many cells would fit on 
the head of a pin. Diagrams of cells, a photograph taken by microscope, and the 
mention of cells which have a size that is accessible to human vision (chicken's egg as 
one single cell) give an idea of what these unobservable living units 'look like'. 
What is interesting here is that the observable is represented as acting directly on the 
unobservable. The ontological gap between them is bridged by the grammatical 
structures. So even if there is a textual effort of highlighting the invisible entities by 
using illustrations such as diagrams, pictures and models, and addressing part-whole 
relations between entities; the grammar does most of the work of representing 
processes as smooth and unproblematic interactions between the observable and the 
unobservable. 
6.3.2.2.2 Making the invisible living 
The already constructed similarity between plants and animals in terms of their 
participation in various processes which are alike for both, like feeding, growth, 
respiration, movement, etc. shifts towards the construction of the unobservable world 
of cells as 'living' entities. This is addressed both explicitly and implicitly in the text 
Living cells. It is addressed explicitly because cells are defined as living units and 
represented as the places where living and growing processes are located. At the same 
time it is the grammatical forms of processes which make the cell play the role of a 
living thing. Cells and parts of them are involved in material processes in such a way 
that they are represented as the ACTORS which do all the job for plants and animals: 
(18) This thin skin controls the flow of all ... 
(19) The nucleus controls all the chemical ... 
(20) Thread-like chromosomes ... store the chemical instructions..." 
(21) Cell walls hold plants cells together and give plants much of 
their strength. 
In these examples choices of words which represent processes, like controls and 
store and the grammar of material processes which consist of the doer and the 
affected, work together in order to attach living properties to the unobservable parts 
(cells) of the observable entities (plants and animals). 
Processes that define entities as living are: their ability to act on both what is 
contained within them and what is located in their nearby surroundings in a way that 
makes them the agents which take in or out other entities; their ability to process the 
entities of which they are made, in other words the fact that they can build 
themselves, and some sort of specialisation in terms of having parts which do certain 
jobs. 
Finally, it is important to say that living entities are represented as acting not by 
accident but as following some kind of instructions which co-ordinate all actions as a 
whole in a way that controls the entire life of the living entities. The degree to which 
this sort of programme-like agency is represented as determinate or indeterminate has 
an effect on whether it is represented nearer to everyday life sort of ordering where 
there is some ground for choosing, executing and controlling programme-like actions 
or is represented closer to a biological view of 'automatic programme-like ordering, 
where there is a little choice of alternative actions within a programme. The view that 
is promoted in the specific text Living cells seems to be rather contradictory. While 
relations between entities and sequences of processes seem to leave little choice for 
entities to alter processes, stress on agency in terms of what entities such as cells and 
parts of them can or cannot do gives the impression that despite co-ordination of 
actions, agents are powerful enough in executing their actions. 
Looking at the next topic 8.3 Cells and more cells (Appendix 4.9) we can replicate 
the same findings: lexical metaphors and grammar work side by side constructing 
living unobservable entities in the same way as living observable entities have been 
constructed earlier. For example, an amoeba is a single-celled living entity which has 
many of the properties multi-celled observable living organisms have: 
(22) The single-celled amoeba lives in ponds and damp soil and 
feeds on microscopic plants... 
(23) 	 The amoeba reproduces itself by a process called binary 
fission. The nucleus of the cell divides in two and the 
cytoplasm then separates to form two new cells. These 
daughter cells are copies of the original parent cell. 
Later also in the same topic we notice that cells are the ACTORS which build new 
molecules by rearranging the atoms of incoming material. 
Information-like entities, that is the chemical building instructions of the cells have an 
important place alongside the thing-like entities in the process of building new cells. 
These chemical instructions have the same material origins as thing-like entities: they 
are stored in each nucleus in coded form by molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid. It 
cannot be left unnoticed that when the text talks about chemical building instructions, 
the agency is shifted to molecules. DNA molecules are the ACTORS which are now 
responsible for the storage of the chemical building instructions in each nucleus. It is 
also the same ACTOR which produces exact copies of itself before a cell divides. 
Again, agency which is brought down to the microcosmic scale raises the question 
whether it is the same with agency as usually understood in relation to human beings 
and observable living entities. 
6.3.3 Using an analogy to highlight a system of relationships 
Complexes of participants and processes bound together 
and becoming a single entity 
Three entities will be discussed which are highlighted in textbooks as complexes of 
participants and processes all bound together as a single entity. These are the structure 
of living things, the blood system and the distribution of organisms in a habitat. They 
are all constructed on the basis of an analogy. 
In the topic Living things of the textbook Nuffield Science for Key Stage 3, Science 
Year 9, the structure of living organisms is presented as similar with the structure of a 
building. The text, which is addressed to the reader in the second person, suggests 
thinking about an organism as a building, built of bricks. In fact the analogy is 
constructed from the first paragraph of the first topic Living things (Appendix 4.10) 
which belongs in a series of sections under the topic What is life? It emerges from the 
things you are expected to see when you look at a very thin piece of plant material 
under a microscope. In order to make sense of this first encounter with the invisible 
world what is suggested in the text is that what you see in the microscope is 
something like you have seen before, a wall built from bricks. This is how 'tissue' is 
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introduced and the entities from which tissue is made, the things which look like the 
building blocks of the wall, are the 'cells' . 
But from this point the analogy of how you should "see" something that you have 
never seen before is turned to an analogy of how you should "think" about it. The 
'building block' analogy helps to resolve the contradictory idea that if all organisms 
are made of cells then how can it be possible to have such differences in the 
appearance of organisms. There are two suggested solutions, both driven from the 
'building block' analogy, which resolve the contradiction between what something 
looks like and what is it made of. There are 'various types of bricks' which are used in 
the construction of buildings, and also bricks are arranged in different ways making 
different kinds of buildings, like shops and houses. Finally, a further step is taken 
carried by the same analogy. Different arrangements of bricks make various spaces, 
like bedrooms, kitchen and lounge connected with corridors, which have different 
functions. So in a way an entity (organ) functions in a certain way because of the 
spatial arrangements of the unobservable entities of which it is made. 
Looking back at the organism constructed as a whole by the 'building block analogy' 
we notice that it appears as an inextricable whole-part complex of entities which are 
involved in various processes. The analogy is unfolded in two steps, starting from 
what the unobservable parts of the organism as a whole look like, going to how both 
the observable and unobservable have to be thought about. And of course the first 
step is realised linguistically in terms of mental processes of seeing, while the latter is 
realised in terms of mental processes of thinking. 
The blood system in the same textbook (topic All together, now ! see Appendix 4.11) 
is also constructed on the basis of an analogy. But this analogy functions in terms of 
how you should 'think' about the blood system rather than of how you should 'see' its 
components. This role is addressed early on in the text which defines the blood 
system as a transport system. The definition is elaborated extensively to almost every 
part of the blood system, which is likened to certain components of the London 
Underground system, not because they look alike (similar) but because they function 
in the same way. For example the route the blood follows is made up of tubes. These 
tubes are not like the tubes the underground train runs through but have the same 
function as the railway lines have between stations: they carry 'the chemical 
passengers' round all the way through the body. The analogy is further extended to 
cover even some very specific parts and functions of the blood system. 
The analogy of the blood system as a transport system is realised linguistically by the 
same kind of material processes which represent what the entities can do in respect to 
each system. Trains have a route to follow in the same way as the blood has a route to 
follow through arteries, veins and capillaries. Passengers get on and off the trains not 
at any point of the route the train follows but at special places, the stations. In the 
same way food and gas molecules are moved from place to place by the blood 
system. What is interesting here is that the analogy between how the participants of 
the two systems behave works so efficiently that lexical metaphors take on the job of 
addressing the similarities between the two systems. After the first similarities have 
been established between what entities of the two systems can do in terms of material 
processes, new entities appear as the outcome of these processes. Food and gas 
molecules now become the chemical 'passengers' which leave and board the 
bloodstream. Lexical metaphors like these have a very dramatic effect. Entities like 
food and gas molecules re-created and are now thought about in a way that they could 
not been imagined before. In other words the part-entities of the blood system are 
now re-built with respect to the analogy between the two systems as a whole. When 
the text talks about specific aspects of the blood system by making use of entities like 
the 'chemical passengers of the body' it leaves no other choice to the reader than to 
think about the function of the blood system and its components in a certain way. 
The third analogy from the textbook Nuffield Co-Ordinated Science (Appendix 4.12), 
is between the patchy distribution of organisms in a habitat and the distribution of 
people in a school during a working day. In the same way as the analogies discussed 
above it facilitates students' reasoning: if an organism lives in a particular habitat why 
it is not found all over the habitat, all the time? Again it is not the similarity between 
the appearance of entities that counts for the analogy but the behaviours of entities in 
respect to the whole in which they belong. As a result the analogy comes out as a 
similarity between two systems of relations rather than as a similarity between two 
entities or between two specific kinds of behaviours in which the two entities are 
engaged. The similarities between the two systems of relationships are realised 
linguistically in terms of material processes which represent entities' actions and 
circumstances of locations in place which show where the entities are found when 
they behave in a certain way. 
Considering the three analogies together we notice that they provide an easily 
accessible way to recall the ideas. For example to think about the structure of the 
organism as a building is something that can be easily remembered and whenever it is 
recalled one can work out all the complex system of relationships which it carries. In 
this way the analogies become tools for learning, that is they do not only shape 
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together as a whole different entities and the relations between them but they also 
offer a way in which the entities and their relations can be remembered and recalled 
as a whole system of relationships. 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Why metaphors as parts of constructions of entities and not as 
parts of genres? 
Material processes realise not only explanations, but introductions of terms, 
definitions and classifications as well. Examples from textbook materials show that 
entities are introduced or classified in terms of material processes and not necessarily 
in terms of relational processes or processes of being. This finding indicates that the 
presence or not of certain kind of linguistic processes is not a 'reliable' indicator of 
whether there is an explanation or description or classification. As a result, genres 
such as 'explanations' and 'reports' cannot be seen as clearly distinguished because 
they are not necessarily realised in different ways. On the contrary, examples from 
textbooks and transcripts indicate that explanations presuppose knowledge about the 
entities which are participants in them. But representations of this knowledge cannot 
be seen as reports - that is separately from the genre of explanation - due to the fact 
that they are realised more often in terms of material processes which show what the 
entities can or cannot do, what can happen to them and what they are made of. 
Therefore, what is accounted as the framework of study in the present thesis is not an 
analysis of metaphors based on genres but on the different ways in which 
constructions of entities are realised linguistically. 
6.4.2 Why linguistic representations of entities are not just words 
a) participants 
Representations of entities in nominal groups can draw some very fine distinctions 
between entities belonging in different categories. So nominal groups can be seen as 
doing the same job relational processes are doing; defining and attaching attributes to 
entities. At this point it should be noticed that nominal groups cannot be simply 
translated into relational processes in order to elaborate what sort of classifications or 
categories are implied by the group itself. In many cases additional information is 
needed about the entities which is not present in the linguistic constituents of the 
group. This finding shows again that linguistic elements - nominal groups in this case 
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- should not be thought of as realising sets of meaning, such as categories and 
classifications, in a direct and transparent way. Quite often nominal groups for 
example carry information which is not explicitly present in their grammatical 
constituents. 
b) circumstances 
Examples of circumstances in clauses show that circumstances are not just an 
additional, optional element in the representation of entities. The fact that they are 
closely related to thing-like or process-like entities indicates that they play an 
essential role in the structure of ideational processes. Furthermore, circumstances are 
often the focus of ideational processes, like in questions for example where they 
become the object of the inquiry. The reasons for choosing specific circumstantial 
elements and their semantic function should be looked for in the thematic 
organisation of the entire text and not at the ideational level only. Therefore in the 
same way as participants, the meaning of circumstances can be silent if they are 
considered isolated from the process or the participant or the thematic organisation of 
the text which brought them into being. Finally, the fact that both participants and 
circumstances are realised by the same grammatical constituents permits them to 
exchange functions in texts. 
c) processes 
The study of transitivity in representations of environmental science demonstrates 
that semantic forms such as transitive or intransitive material processes do not 
determine meaning in a way that cannot be expressed otherwise. In many cases the 
presence or absence of a transitivity pattern does not say much about the way in 
which entities are involved in processes. Therefore, the study of transitivity alone 
should be better not constrained at the clause level. In that way priority should be 
given not to the semantic forms themselves, but to how entities are involved in 
transitivity patterns in the text and what this involvement implies for entities' 
realisations - something that is done in the second part of the linguistic analysis. 
6.4.3 Material process as part of the textual metafunction 
The last argument above brings us inevitably to the study of the textual cohesion of 
environmental texts. The study of textual cohesion illustrates how knowledge is 
implemented in the construction of complicated sets of relations between entities 
without this knowledge being present at any single clause. Important pieces of 
knowledge for the construction of an explanation need to be traced back by their 
references - usually in the form of anaphoric elements and nominalized processes. 
Also the flexible nature of semantic forms, mentioned above, such as a material 
process, means that entities can exchange roles, that they can be traced under 
different semantic functions, making it almost impossible for the reader or hearer to 
reveal their role by looking at their present linguistic realisation only, such as a 
specific clause or nominal group. 
6.4.4 Material process as part of a multi-modal construction of 
meaning 
The question of textual cohesion (or relations between clauses) will be only partially 
approached if other systems of representations such as images which interact with 
language are ignored. An example of a whole unit of a textbook (see section 6.2.6) 
illustrates that how processes appear in the last section of the unit depend on how 
entities are introduced in earlier sections. Linguistic realisations of entities in the 
latter represent choices of how these entities should be classified and taken into 
account (flow of energy between living organisms) in the construction of new 
meanings (food webs). Choices of linguistic representations of entities are in 
accordance with their visual representations. In this case the direction of vectors in the 
diagram of the food web is in accordance with entities' linguistic realisations, that is 
as passive material structures. As a result, it is the interaction between different 
systems of representation which leads to choices of certain options (either about the 
semantic forms or the images through which entities are realised and represented). 
6.4.5 Does it matter if something is represented as a thing or as a 
process? 
In the present thesis the term grammatical metaphor refers most often to the 
grammatical phenomenon of treating a process like a thing and realising it 
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linguistically as a thing by the use of a nominal group or nominalization. The choice 
of using nominalized processes in a text has ontological, as well as educational 
(learning) implications. At the ontological level, process-like entities are represented 
and realised as thing-like entities, so all the things one can do with thing-like entities 
one can now do with process-like entities, such as itemise them and therefore quantify 
them, classify and put them into categories. The learning implications of grammatical 
metaphors seem to mean extra work for the student since the latter needs to unpack 
the processes which are hidden in the nominalized processes in order to comprehend 
in what respect they are treated as 'things' rather than processes. 
6.4.6 Is something represented linguistically either as concrete or 
abstract or is its representation a matter of a degree? 
Starting with grammatical metaphors we realise that there is not only one way and 
one degree to which processes are abstracted. Agency is abstracted according to the 
degree to which passivity is used to represent processes. In that way representations 
of processes as such and in terms of thing-like entities are seen as the two opposite 
ends of realising them and anything between them varies to the degree processes are 
represented as being abstracted from agency. Passivity as a means of suppressing 
agency in environmental texts and in representations of science which have a public 
interest has only recently attracted a number of studies. 
Some further implications of the use of abstracted material processes are discussed at 
the end of the section 6.3.1, from different points of view. What is striking here is that 
a way of representing grammatically knowledge can have simultaneously 
epistemological, ideological and educational (in respect to learning) consequences . 
6.4.7 How language can bring entities together representing them as 
similar 
In section 6.3.2, representations of entities mainly in one kind of textbook (Active 
Science) in terms of transitive or intransitive patterns are studied to the extent they 
represent entities as alike or different. It is noticed that one way of representing 
entities as similar is by representing them as sharing the same kind of material 
processes. In that way entities which are generally thought of as less 'active' (e.g. 
plants) than others (e.g. animals) can be represented as equally active. 
Special interest is given to representations of entities which are less accessible to 
commonsense understanding. The reality of the latter is constructed in relation to 
more accessible entities mainly in two ways; again by representing both realms of 
entities as sharing the same kind of transitive or intransitive patterns and by bringing 
both kinds of entities as interacting participants in the same grammatical processes. In 
the case of the latter it is the unbroken continuity between the two realms of 
knowledge and understanding, reflected in their participation in the same grammatical 
structures, which builds up in an unproblematic way the reality of the less accessible. 
6.4.8 Grammatical structures work out analogies below the 
linguistic surface 
In section 6.3.3, three examples of explicit analogies were discussed. Analogies can 
be focused either on what an entity looks like or how it should be thought of. While 
the first explores entities in respect to whether they are alike or not the latter explores 
the extent to which different sets of entities, belonging to entirely different realms of 
experience function in the same way or not. In both cases what is achieved is that an 
entity can be understood because familiar knowledge is integrated into the effort to 
conceptualise it. 
Explicit sets of analogies are studied here as discursive constructions rather than 
models or mappings because attention is paid to the discursive elements which 
brought them into being. The final product of the analogy is one entity in which two 
totally different realms of experience (one less accessible and another more 
accessible) are bound into one. In respect to the latter what is of special interest is that 
the analogy has a learning value since it can afford exploring more aspects of 
'likeness' from either realm and it can be easily recalled since two realms of 
experience are implemented in its construction. 
CHAPTER 7 
METAPHOR AS A COGNITIVE PHENOMENON 
IMAGE SCHEMA APPROACH 
7.1 Introduction 
The two most frequent categories of image schematic structures in the context of 
teaching environmental science, are: the Containment schema and the Agent-structure 
schema. But there is not anything like a simple image schema, isolated and easily 
identified in the discourse of teaching (both in textbooks and classroom observations). 
And this is because entities participate in more than one image schemata, in a number 
of different ways. Image schemata which are found at the clause textual scale are 
simpler and easier to represent than those which are found in a piece of text like a 
paragraph for example. In the same way those which are found in the beginning of a 
lesson or in the beginning of a textbook unit are often simpler and more easily 
identified than those which are found at the end. 
Metaphors are usually the outcome of multiple constructions of image schemata. 
These are sequences and complexes of image schemata in which two or more 
schemata interact. That means that at least two image schemata are found as 
inseparable, because each participant carries with it functional roles as an element in 
two different image schemata. The ways in which entities are involved in one schema 
entails the way in which entities are involved in other schemata. 
Therefore, the analysis has taken into account the schematic structures which precede 
or follow or go alongside the specific image schema which is the object of inquiry. 
For example, containers act on the entities that are contained or on entities that are 
found outside, so they function as agents at the same time. Also other agents can 
possible act on the container. 
The fact that there are different structures of image schemata, has driven us to divide 
them roughly into two categories. These are smaller and larger schematic structures. 
The latter are made by the former having them as parts. To give an example, carriers 
can be represented as made up by containers and agents. Cycles also can be 
represented as made up of a system of sequences of agent structures and containers. 
The task of analysing everything in terms of image schematic structures does not stop 
anywhere. The aim of the present thesis is to provide some examples of choices of 
image schematic structures used in representing entities and to discuss what sort of 
meaning relations these choices impose on the represented entities (with a special 
interest in metaphorical extensions of image schemata). Also, the analysis includes a 
representation of a multi-modal construction of an image schema (a life cycle), 
looking at the relation between texts and images in its textbook and classroom 
representations. 
7.2 Agent structures 
7.2.1 Identifying an agent structure as an image schema 
An agent structure is an image schema in which one entity, the Agent does something 
to another, the Affected. Everyday examples of agent structures start from the relation 
between man and the material world. We are accustomed of thinking ourselves as 
Agents which move objects from one place to another, create things and change or 
transform them into something else. Things of the material world are commonly 
thought as the objects of our action; if the latter does not succeed then we talk in 
terms of the constraints objects impose on action. 
Since what an entity can do and what can happen to it in relation to where it is located 
defines its nature, as argued in chapter 2 and section 4.5, agency is important in 
identifying and defining an entity. It is noticed both in textbooks and in classroom 
observations that the way an entity is involved in agent structures makes it seem like 
or unlike other entities. This is not only due to the type of agent structure but to the 
degree of agency as well. In the linguistic analysis the degree of agency is described 
in terms of suppressed or stressed action realised linguistically as passive or 
nominalized material process on one hand and direct material process on the other 
(see section 6.3.1), and the kind of agency is described as agent structures of 
transferring, transforming and bringing something into being (see section 6.2.7). In 
this part the focus is on schematic realisations of agent structures and their 
metaphorical extensions, and the effect they both have on meaning constructions. 
7.2.2 Suppressed vs. stressed agent structures 
As illustrated in the linguistic part of the analysis (section 6.3.2.1) a lot of work in 
textbooks is devoted to representing plants - which are usually thought to be static 
since they do not move - as entities which do things in very much the same way as 
animals. The underlying reason for doing this is to put plants and animals into the 
same category: living things. In some textbooks this effort is made explicit by 
suggesting thinking about properties like competition in terms of plants as well as in 
terms of animals: 
You may often observe animals competing directly and actively with each other: for 
example, two puppies scrapping over a bone or two small children fighting over a toy. 
It may surprise you to learn that some plants can compete 'actively'. They may do this 
by releasing a chemical that will deter competitors - or even kill them. 
(Nuffield, Co-Ordinated Science, Biology, p.164) 
Notice in the extract above that the concept of competition is expanded to characterise 
behaviours which have the same effect. An animal which is engaged in a fighting 
with an other animal is represented as having the same purpose as the plant which 
releases chemicals: both of them are trying to obtain vital resources (like food, water, 
territory) for their survival: 
If the presence of other plants reduces the amount of an essential resource that a plant 
requires then the plants are competing against each other. 
(Nuffield, Co-Ordinated Science, Biology, p.163) 
But, the concept of competition applied to plant behaviour is extended beyond its 
everyday meaning of bodily involvement. The power of action of plants previously 
thought to be inactive is stressed by representing them as sharing the same agency 
with living entities that are primarily thought of as active. Like the concept of 
competition, other concepts such as the ability of movement can be extended 
metaphorically to cases of plants growing and expanding their territory leaving little 
place for their competitors. 
These cases of metaphorical elaboration of meaning relations are not different to what 
Black (1962) describes as an interaction theory of metaphor (see section 2.3.2 in 
Appendix 2). Plants seen as one of the subjects of the metaphor turn out to be more 
alive than they were thought to be, and concepts such as competition and movement 
include now cases in which bodily involvement is neither a necessary nor the only 
part of their meaning. 
Metaphorical extensions such as the one described construct new meaning relations. 
Plants are represented quite generally as acting on their environment - not just in 
specific cases but generically: 
...plants can help to create their own environment and their own soil... These things 
will all affect what other plants can grow alongside them. 
(Nuffield Science for Key stage 3, Year 9, p.17) 
Plants' power of action now means that: plants change their own environment, 
something that only humans are commonly thought of as capable of doing. 
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It is not only the degree of action of living entities that can be suppressed or stressed 
accordingly. Non-living entities too are represented as Agents involved in actions in 
the same way as living entities. Water for example is represented as an agent which 
'harms' rocks rather than causing rock's erosion: 
Water can also attack some rocks chemically. Rain dissolves some of the carbon 
dioxide produced by plants and animals. This forms a very weak acid which attacks 
rocks such as chalk and limestone. 
(Nuffield Science for key stage 3, Year 9, p.13) 
Other conditions like changes in temperature are represented as causes which can 
have effects similar to those which Agents like wind and water have: 
Changes in temperature can cause rocks to expand and contract. This repeated 
movement can cause the surface to break off in layers. The rock surface can look 
rather like an onion peeling. 
(Nuffield Science for key stage 3, Year 9, p.13) 
Finally, due to the intensive use of agent structures in which it is involved, an entity 
can be treated like a thing, that is taken from one place to another, gained or lost and 
stored. This is the case with how energy is treated in the extract of the same textbook 
below: 
If you investigate any energy-using task you will find that the energy used has to be 
obtained from something else. The energy gained by one thing is lost by another. 
(Nuffield Science for key stage 3, Year 9, p.30) 
It is interesting to notice how often energy is treated like a thing in relation to 
observable living or non-living entities. So the repeated use of agency in different 
contexts has the effect of reinforcing representations of energy as a real thing-like 
entity. 
7.2.3 Unobservable agents act on observable entities and have 
observable effects 
Invisible Agents are given a real status in a number of different ways depending on 
whether there is any access to them or not. So for example the action of ultra violet 
rays is traced by their effects. A number of stories brought up by the teacher in the 
classroom gives evidence of the effect the UV rays have on people and therefore their 
existence. 
(1) 
T: 	 Ozone is a gas that is actually very like oxygen it's a form that almost you can 
think of as oxygen okay? But whereas oxygen is 02 it has two atoms of 
oxygen in each molecule, ozone has three atoms of oxygen. A lot of you have 
probably heard of skin cancer. Okay. Rolf Harris how many of you have heard 
of Rolf Harris? 
Sl: 
S2: B000 
T: 	 Okay it's that very dubious song called tie my kangaroo down sport 
S: Ha Ha 
T: Right 
S2: His didgereedoo 
S3:  
T: 	 and his didgereedoo and so on 
S: and animal hospital 
S2: turtles 
S3 	 ... 
T: Right. Shhh Shh Rolf Harris was diagnosed a while ago as having skin cancer 
S: Wohh ... had that 
T: yes 
S.. 
T: 	 and I think up to now his treatment for it has luckily been successful okay? 
He puts his skin cancer down to when he was a child in Australia and he spent 
all his time running around playing on the beach with only a pair of shorts on. 
S. 
T: 	 What is it that the sun gives off if you are exposed to too much of it can cause 
skin cancer? 
S I : 	 ... 
S2: sun burn 
S3: the sun, sun 
S4: UV 
S5: the sun, the sun 
T: 	 UV. A... is that what you were going to say? Good. Ultra violet rays 
S. 
T: 	 Neither Shhh. If you were going on a beach you can slap sun lotion and all 
sorts of things 
S. 
T: 	 on your body to try and prevent all of the sun's UV getting through to your 
skin. 
But we've already got something that to some extent does that for us and it is 
the ozone layer okay? 
(Looking at the Environment, Lesson:5) 
In this extract the sun is represented as an Agent which gives off ultra violet rays. 
Skin cancer is caused by the unobservable Agent UV rays. The latter are represented 
as getting through the skin and as being prevented by things like sun lotion. The 
ozone layer is another unobservable entity which stops UV rays. In this extract from 
the way things are talked about it seems that it does not make any difference whether 
an entity is observable or unobservable but what is represented as important is the 
roles the entity fulfils in relation to other entities. 
Acid rain is another Agent which is known by its effects. A classroom demonstration 
which shows the effect of diluted acid on marble chips gives evidence of the action of 
acids. Again as in the previous example the event of weathering together with the 
Agent which is responsible for it; namely sulphuric acid, are at a scale not easily 
accessible to the student. Stories which make reference to 'killed forests' and seriously 
damaged buildings and monuments, also give real existence both to the Agent and its 
effect and at the same time make the link between what has been demonstrated in the 
classroom and what happens in the world on a daily basis: 
(2) 
T 	 Ah well get it written down, make sure you have written down this time. 0 
Right I think what I'll do because some of you aren't working very hard girls 
0 and I would appreciate it if you would listen now please 0 and I suggest 
you don't pull a face like that either 0 I'm going to ask you to have a go at a 
conclusion. 0 I'm going to ask you to have a go at a conclusion, think about 
what it was we were trying to set out to show. 0 Has what we have done 
demonstrated that in any way whatsoever. Has the simple experiment that we 
have done actually demonstrated to you what it was we set out for it to show. 
Has it demonstrated in any to you what may actually happen to a building? If 
so how. Sorry? 
S 
T 	 According to this chart yes, because when we tested that with Ph paper with 
the universal indicator paper it was PH2 according to this chart here and in 
some extreme cases acid rain might even be up to PH1 so if you had used that 
type stone to make a building out of think of it as a type of marble. SO if you 
had built a building out of a rain and you had been unlucky enough to get that 
strength of acid rain then that's what would happen to your building. 
The latest generation of environmental problems such as the one mentioned in the 
extract above involve a complex interaction of entities which belong into different 
realms of experience. Linguistic representations of these problems go beyond the 
level of simple structures of material processes and reveal higher structures of textual 
organisation such as stories and demonstrations. 
7.3 A path-link schema made up of agent structures 
7.3.1 Constructing a path-link schema 
As it is represented, a process need not only be a single agent structure which consists 
of an Agent and a Patient which is affected in some way by the Agent's action. A 
process can be represented as being carried on from one agent structure to another 
leading to a purpose or a conclusion or an effect of some kind. From that point of 
view a process as a whole is realised not in terms of a single agent structure but in 
terms of a sequence of various agent structures which follow one another. These 
structures are realised linguistically as embedded clauses. Instead of a single clause 
the appropriate linguistic unit is rather the clause's place among other clauses 
described also as textual cohesion (see section 6.2.5). For example what the teacher 
describes as a slash and burn type of agriculture is not realised by a single agent 
structure but by a sequence of agent structures which starts from farmers' actions and 
ends up with the minerals released from the ash, going back into the soil. 
A single agent structure has a very different meaning if it is considered as part of a 
sequence of agent structures. Going back to the example above, the actions of farmers 
who cut down and burn trees have a different meaning if they are looked as a part of 
the slash and burn agriculture and not as a part of a process in which charcoal is 
formed. This is addressed explicitly by a teacher who is trying to make students aware 
of the fact that constructing a sequence of actions in a certain way leads to a certain 
effect: 
(3) 
T 	 If you burn them in a very special way, don't all shout out please 0 if you 
burn them in a very special way then you might get charcoal. But if you just 
let them burn naturally you know you put a match in there and let them burn 
away what are you going to be left with? 
(Looking at the Environment, 2nd Lesson, p.8) 
Notice that in this example the outcome of the sequence of agent structures is that the 
nature of an entity (trees and woods) is completely changed and the entity is 
transformed into something else (ashes). The way the example is talked about, even if 
it refers to any farmer who acts in this way, is represented as if it is a specific instance 
of a type of farming. This effect is obtained by the use of the second person by the 
teacher and his preference to use instances of categories of things and processes such 
as you put a match rather than their generic names burning. As a result, relations 
between entities are worked out at a level of a concrete instances which stands for the 
general phenomenon of farming that has to be explained. 
In the same way as single agent structures, sequences of agent structures can be 
provided by the teacher in the form of a generalised phenomenon. An example of a 
generalised process which consists of more than one agent structure is when the 
teacher is dictating a passage that the students write in their books: 
(4)  
T 	 In a second. Lets continue please we've had a bit of a break there, can you 
continue by saying 0 just a new sentence L .1 the earth's [] population 0 Helen 
I don't what to know about what you saw last night 0 the earth's population, 
is now so large 0 that we demand 11 more and more LI goods [] to be made 
0 which uses up LI resources 0 faster 0 than before OK 0 Last sentence LI 
the result 0 is that I. i the earth's 0 surface 0 has been changed LI ...no one's 
asking questions. 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.10) 
This sequence of agent structures which identifies relations between quantities of 
entities is the outcome of classroom talk about the need for resources in everyday life. 
In another case the teacher provides an instance in order to support the idea that 
people are not always able to avoid pollution even if they move away from an area 
which is next to a source of pollution and therefore pollution should be thought of as 
an unwanted quantity of an entity which is spreading from one place to another. The 
process of how people, metaphorically speaking, dump some unwanted stuff in others' 
people places consists of agent structures of transferring entities: 
(5)  
T 	 We're not actually, we're not actually LI putting stuff in lorries and taking it 
up there and dumping it, but when our factories kick out all of this poisonous 
smoke that goes up into the atmosphere where does it get blown to? 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.4) 
and of bringing entities into being and causing a change in other entities: 
T 	 It gets blown over Scandinavia. When it rains in Scandinavia some of these 
gases like sulphur dioxide dissolve in the rain to form a weak acid sulphurous 
acid. When it rains it produces acid rains it kills the trees it makes the lakes 
become acidic it affects the life in the lakes and so on. 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.4) 
7.3.2 Narratives in the context of teaching environmental science 
The last example discussed above has many things in common with the narrative 
mode of spoken discourse. As we have seen in section 4.5.4, the entities here can be 
seen as characters in a story. One of the most commonly used modes of representation 
both in textbooks and lessons is the form of narrative. A narrative is a discrete unit of 
the written or spoken mode with a clear beginning and end. Natural phenomena and 
events of everyday life are introduced as stories and reported as stories. Teacher's 
questions like: 
Rolf Harris how many of you have heard of Rolf Harris?... 
Have you heard of oestrogen?... 
signal his intention to tell a story to students. Similarly if the source from which the 
story comes from is set up first, it indicates that a story will follow: 
There was a thing on the radio yesterday... 
I watched a programme about... 
Time references signal also that an event will be reported as a story: 
And in fact when I think of the times when I've been there there's been days, 
you know those sort of pedalo things... 
In 1858 it says... 
Entities in narratives are represented as participants in a story having roles suitable to 
their properties and behaviours. Take for example teacher's talk about the effect the 
UV rays have on people which is represented in terms of a biographic narrative (see 
example (1) in the previous section). Material entities such as skin and beach as well 
as people Rolf Harris, you, your body and unobservable entities like oxygen, UV rays 
and ozone layer are participants in the same story. What has to be noticed here is that 
all these entities are treated as equal in the way they participate in the story regardless 
of whether they are living or non living, observable or unobservable. 
Like other narratives found in other discourses in the teaching of environmental 
science too, narratives at the end may suggest how they should be understood and 
why. This is a stage often described in the literature as 'evaluation', which shows the 
significance and the meaning of the actions and how these actions should be 
interpreted and weighed by the listener. In the example above the teacher at the end 
generalises the outcome of the story by placing students in the same situation as R 
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Harris, so bringing the story to a level of a potential outcome for any sort of event 
which shares the same features with the story just told. 
A narrative as a mode of either spoken or written language implies participation. If 
one narrative has been told, others may be anticipated, triggered off by the first. A 
second narrative usually acknowledges the first and gives the strongest possible 
endorsement to the first. Narratives which are students' responses to teacher's story 
tend to identify with the sort of characters and the actions in which the characters are 
involved. Narratives also can be instances which exemplify an argument or the other 
way round they can provide an instance which is later generalised. 
In order to see better how one narrative triggers another or elaborates an argument let 
us take as an example talk between teacher and students which has already been 
mentioned briefly (see example (5)) at the end of the previous section (7.3.1), from 
the point of view of the path-link schema. In the first lesson which opens up a series 
of lessons about the environment the teacher starts the lesson by calling on students to 
think about the most important things that are absolutely essential for humans' 
survival. The teacher's argument is that any threat to one of these things would affect 
people's survival. Air is one of the things that is reported by many students. 
Therefore, according to the teacher's argument, pollution of the air affects seriously 
people's lives. 
The teacher at this point opens up a discussion by asserting that people do not really 
have a choice about what they breathe in. Then most of the class argues against that, 
arguing that people can move from one place to another if they want to avoid air 
pollution. It is at this point that the teacher intends to take the argument further and 
tackle the moral issue that people's actions in one place might have an effect on 
people's lives in other places. This shift of the discussion at the same time takes a turn 
from the general accounts of air pollution to an instance which is a counter example 
to what most of the students believe (that one has a choice in avoiding pollution). 
This instance which is reported by the teacher as a story is about the damage the 
industrial activity of western European countries cause on natural environments, like 
the Scandinavian forests and lakes. The main participants of the stories and their 
behaviours are not just reported by the teacher but are carefully constructed in relation 
to the direction of the argument he is trying to highlight: 
(5) 
T 	 What if 0 we'll come back to that in a second but one interesting point 
Scandinavia, where is Scandinavia what countries does Scandinavia include? 
S 	 Africa. 
T 	 If you, we don't need to draw this but if this is, I'm not doing a very good 
drawing here but 0 if that's Britain and Ireland 0 ok now then 0 which 
direction is our prevailing wind from our most common wind direction. 
S 	 South east. 
T 	 Not quite. 
S 	 Ok west. 
S 	 North. 
T 	 West is closer which side of the country geography, which side of the country 
tends to get more rain? 
S 	 West. 
T 	 It's actually the west side of the country ok shshsh 0 if a lot of that is a result 
of air moving over seas gathering moisture and so on that would suggest that 
the prevailing wind comes from the east or the west which one? 
S 	 West. 
T 	 The west blowing in the moist air off the Atlantic itself ok, in fact 0 girls down 
there will you concentrate please 0 in fact it's more from the south west than 
directly from the west ok, sorry the arrow is barely on there is it. So the wind 
blows across the country in roughly that direction ok you don't need to draw 
this. If you look at here on an atlas 0 you'll see the Scandinavian counties. 
Ok. You'll see Sweden Norway and so on 0 shs hs sh 0 Sweden Norway 
Finland and so on are actually countries that have 0 compared to us very few 
people. There aren't the great densities of heavy industries and things that 
we've got. A lot of it is just natural wilderness unspoilt 0 what is happening 
so you might like so you might think getting back to your point that you could 
move up there countryside nothing around too .. you could live miles away 
from any cities anybody else but what is happening to a lot of the lakes in 
Scandinavia? What's happening to them 0 
S 
S 	 People are dumping stuff in them. 
T 	 Not quite 0 we 0 we are dumping stuff in those lakes. 
S 	 Oh dear. 
S 	 What we're doing is trying ...somewhere else we're not 
T 	 We're not actually, we're not actually 0 putting stuff in lorries and taking it 
up there and dumping it, but when our factories kick out all of this poisonous 
smoke that goes up into the atmosphere where does it get blown to? 
S 	 Scandinavia. 
T 	 It gets blown over Scandinavia. When it rains in Scandinavia some of these 
gases like sulphur dioxide dissolve in the rain to form a weak acid sulphurous 
acid. When it rains it produces acid rains it kills the trees it makes the lakes 
become acidic it affects the life in the lakes and so on. 
S 	 And the poor little animals die. 
T 	 Ok 0 so in lots of ways we're passing our problems onto other countries. 
[Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.3-4] 
The story does two things at the same time; it particularises what was talked about as 
air pollution, by making reference to specific circumstances, participants and 
processes and also elaborates the process of how pollution is carried at a distance. We 
should also notice that all the work the teacher has done in constructing the entities 
that play an essential role in the story like the direction to which prevailing winds 
blow and the spatial orientation of countries around Scandinavia gives the status of a 
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real event to the narrative. The story's evaluation teaches students two things: that 
moving away from a source of pollution does not guarantee immunity and the moral 
effect an action might have if it is carried out at a distance away from its source 
(agent). The latter is captured by the analogy between the concepts 'pollution' and 
'problem' which results in the effect that passing pollution to someone else equates to 
passing problems. 
As soon as the evaluation emerges from the story, the teacher provides one more 
example of pollution at a distance. This time the source is a programme in a radio 
broadcast watched by the teacher yesterday. Notice here the role of media as sources 
of multi-modal constructions of meaning, in this case narratives. It is one more real 
instance of an example of how pollution can possibly pass from one country to 
another. The example at the same time expands the ways of polluting, composing to a 
case of litter pollution: 
T 	 Ok 0 so in lots of ways we're passing our problems onto other countries. 
There was a thing on the radio yesterday. They'd been going up and down the 
west coast of Scotland 0 if you've walked; up and down the west coast of 
Scotland it's quite remote it's quite isolated. Beautiful Mrs ...will vouch for 
that it's lovely. One of the best places you can go to to ...as well 0 they have 
been one moment, they've been picking litter up off the beaches there. Guess 
where something like a quarter of that litter has come from? 
S 	 Us. 
S 	 England. 
S 	 No different countries. 
S 	 Ireland. 
T 	 If you go further towards the west where do you come to? Across the sea 
S 	 France. 
T 	 No that's the other way this way. 
S 	 America. 
T 	 America. 0 ok and they reckon that something like a quarter of the pollution 
on the beaches litter being washed up on the beaches had come from America 
ok. So no where is absolutely immune from pollution from litter damage to 
the environment and so on ...0 ok you've both got your hands up I'll let you 
both have your say and then we need to push on. 
[Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.4-5] 
The two instances above of passing pollution are multiple examples of the same 
image schemata construction; path-link structures of agent structures and carriers -
discussed later in the analysis - represented as narratives. We also notice that because 
the two examples are not equal in the effect they have in teaching. While the first is 
an exemplified argument the second is an elaboration and expansion of the first 
towards more generality. The two stories trigger students participation which is 
realised by narratives coming out from the repertoire of their personal life experience: 
S: 	 Like my nan she lived in the countryside and they've got those like big 
...chimney things where all the pollution goes out, so I don't know where she 
gets that from. 
T 	 Ok power station. Also some of you might have been, sorry here I am waffling 
away again some of you might have been out and seen the big, the fields that 
are full of yellow flowers. Does any know what that plants called? 
S 	 No. 
S 	 Buttercup. 
T 	 It's actually called [I shsh H it's actually called oil seed rape. Now then [I 
shsh n come on 1.1 a lot of the cooking oil and stuff that you use comes that oil 
seed rape now then a lot of people in the countryside with allergies have 
horrible summers with hey fever and things like that because of the extra 
pollen so in a way ....some form of pollution. Pollen in the atmosphere in the 
countryside that wouldn't otherwise be there. It's there as a result of things 
that we have done. 
[Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.5] 
It is not accidental that the examples of narratives above have a path-link structure. 
Representations of entities in terms of path-link schemata provide sets of meaning as 
packages in a way that one entity or a relation between two entities brings with it 
other entities or relations as well. An image schema of this kind is often recalled by 
the final effect of the sequence of agent structures which is realised linguistically by a 
nominalized process or nominalization. The final effect brings with it the agent 
structures that make it happen, a phenomenon often called 'nesting' in environmental 
science. 
This is also how narratives are structured. Stories have a plot, therefore entities are 
participants in the plot. The story is usually recalled by its outcome or the final effect 
participants' actions have. For example the story in the extract above is recalled as 'the 
devastation of Scandinavian forests'. 'Packaging' (or 'nesting') of many process-like 
and thing-like entities under one event-like entity is realised more vividly in those 
cases of path-link schemata which are represented as stories. 
7.3.3 Constructing a narrative/ path-link schema 
7.3.3.1 Story's plot and participants 
Quite often participants/entities, taken as given either because of the preceding text or 
because they are assumed to be commonsense knowledge, are inserted in the 
sequence of the agent structure without being elaborated at all. In the same way 
participants/entities and their behaviours which the teacher plans to elaborate 
extensively in later lessons are also just inserted into the sequence. So for example 
participants like sulphur dioxide and acid rain are just inserted in the story by the 
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teacher, without further elaboration in order for the link to be made between the 
phenomenon of the poisonous smoke which is carried away from its source by the 
prevailing winds and the effect on forests and lakes. A few lessons later the focus of 
the classroom's activities will be on substances like sulphur dioxide and the effect 
these substances have on various materials. 
Sequences of agent structures seem to be suited to the job of explaining how an 
agency is extended in time or in place. Between the source of the poisonous smoke 
and its effect, the killing of trees and living organisms in lakes, there are agent 
structures which describe how the poisonous smoke is carried away from its source, 
and comes down to the entities that it affects. In this case the fact that the source of 
the pollution and the affected area are not apparently in contact or in any containment 
relationship presupposes a number of intermediate agent structures which fill the 
distance between initial cause and final effect. 
A sequence of agent structures can be traced from beginning to end, or backwards. 
The direction which is followed depends on what is taken as new and what is taken as 
given in the specific situation. What is taken as new, that is the thing that has to be 
explained and also the focal element of the classroom discourse in the specific 
situation, appears at the end of the sequence. In the case of the damaged forests in 
Scandinavia what needs to be explained is how an unspoilt place of natural wilderness 
is affected by pollution even if there is no heavy industry next to it. The explanation is 
unfolded from the beginning to the end following the journey of the entity poisonous 
smoke. If the same sequence of agent structures was followed backwards then the 
explanation would have started from the damaged forests looking backwards to the 
initial cause of the damage. 
In another case, when the teacher asks the students whether they know what slash and 
burn agriculture is, the issue in question is what people get from cutting down and 
burning trees. So the whole sequence of agent structures follows one by one all the 
steps which lead to the desired effect: the enrichment of soil with minerals: 
(3) 
T 	 Can anyone explain to me slash and burn agriculture? Then if you've done 
that before. 
S 	 You slash it down and you burn it. 
T 	 Is that what you, is that what you were going to say? 
S 	 Yes. 
T 	 Would you like to elaborate on that a little bit? 
S 	 No. 
T 	 What do you slash down? 
All 	 The trees. 
T 	 The trees, why do you burn them? 
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S 	 Because you .... 
S 	 ...to make charcoal. 
T 	 OK you might be able to use you might be able to get charcoal from it. Any 
other reasons for burning the trees after you've cut them down? 
S 	 ..paper. 
T 	 Well possibly you would do something else with them if you were wanting 
paper from them but yes good point. 
S 	 Would it be to clear them out. 
T 	 One of perhaps 11 one of perhaps the most obvious uses would be simply to 
get them out of the way to clear the land after they've been chopped down. 
What are you going to be left with after they've burnt? 
S 
S 	 Charcoal. 
T 	 If you burn them in a very special way, don't all shout out please n if you 
burn them in a very special way then you might get charcoal. But if you just 
let them burn naturally you know you put a match in there and let them burn 
away what are you going to be left with? 
S Ash 
T 	 Ash ash, now then, shshs, listen n come on please LI shsh I'm waiting [] when 
we're ready come on please n the ash contains lots of minerals so if the ash 
goes back into the soil it may actually help to enrich the soil 17 OK although 
there are a lot of problems with slash and burn agriculture but that's going 
into the geographical side which we don't really want to do at the moment, 
OK 
(Looking at the Environment, 2nd Lesson, p.7,8) 
Whatever route is followed on a path made by a sequence of agent structures, you 
cannot move to the next agent structure unless you pass the one that follows before or 
after it. This is why the sequence is like a path or a plot of a story from a starting 
point to an end point. Looking at the two examples mentioned above we notice that 
what is realised as a destination for the path of agent structures which represents how 
pollution affects places at a distance is the effect of acid rain on forests and lakes and 
what is realised as a destination for the path of agent structures which describes the 
slash and burn type of agriculture is the enrichment of soil with minerals. 
7.3.3.2 Intentionality and causality in path-link schema 
Temporality in a story 
In some cases the path imposes a time sequence: one action follows another in time. 
In the first place some poisonous smoke is the unwanted product of heavy industry, 
then the pollution is carried away from its source by the act of the prevailing winds 
and finally the polluted stuff comes down on the earth's surface in the form of acid 
rain. Obviously acid rain in Scandinavia is formed after and not before gases like 
sulphur dioxide are released in the atmosphere. 
Time sequence and causality go together in cases where the sequence itself is an 
explanatory chain of cause-effect relations. The latter has the structure of an initial 
cause which has an effect and then the effect itself becomes the cause of another 
effect and so on. An example of such cause-effect chains, mentioned also earlier is: 
(4) 
T 	 And has been [] ... many places ok 	 I want you to do this, I'll be straight 
down to see you. So sh sh the earth's 1. .1 now I want to give you some 
homework as well so don't put things away. So the earth's population is now 
so large that we demand more and more goods to be made which uses up 
resources faster than before. The result is that the earth's surface has been 
changed and has been badly damaged in many places. We could have said 
badly damaged in many ways as well. LI The homework quickly as I say, 
don't put things away because I want to give you homework... 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.10) 
Each agent structure is a cause in respect to what follows and an effect in respect to 
what came before. The earth's surface has been changed because resources are used 
faster than before. The latter is due to the need for more goods to be made. More 
goods are demanded because the earth's population is now larger than before. If each 
cause has to precede its effect then this specific case of sequence of agents structures 
(as explanatory chains of cause effect relations) imposes a time sequence as well. It 
was first the fact that earth's population has increased that resulted in changes at the 
earth's surface and not the other way round. 
Notice here that the way in which the whole event is represented is a matter of choice. 
Temporality is the option that is followed instead of other ways like for example 
representing the processes hierarchically or as one evolving from the other. Again this 
is a feature narratives have. The plot of any story makes its intermediate steps seem 
unique in a way that if a participant or an action is removed then the story does not 
make sense or is interrupted. Representing the entire phenomenon as a narrative of 
escalating action has the effect that the path-link structure is seen as if driven by a 
plan or a goal that has to be achieved. 
Depending on whether the sequence has a cause-effect structure or is a sequence of 
various agent structures which are related not only causally (but also temporally or 
spatially etc.) the beginning point of the path can be the initial cause or the source of 
the sequence and the end can be the final effect or the goal. But there are very few 
clear cut cases of both types of sequences. Most of the sequences are mixtures of 
cause-effect relations and agent structures of various kinds. In such cases the starting 
point of the sequence is used as both the initial cause and as the source of the agent 
structures, and the end of the sequence is used as both the final effect and as the goal 
of the path. So for example the action of the farmer who chops down the trees and lets 
159 
them burn naturally, is the source of a sequence of agent structures and the initial 
cause of a cause-effect relations which end up with the effect all these agent structures 
- like the transformation of wood into ash and the release of minerals from the ash 
which go back into the soil - have on the soil. As a result, intentionality and causality 
are mixed together in a way that the sequence as a whole becomes a single entity, 
described by a single word or phrase slash and burn agriculture . 
7.3.4 Suppressed agency in path-link schema 
Agency can be suppressed significantly in the path-link schema if one action follows 
another without any Agent or cause being involved. This can be realised linguistically 
as a clause without an ACTOR or a clause which has a passive material structure (see 
also section 6.3.1). It can also be realised linguistically in terms of clauses which have 
the structure of a MEDIUM/PROCESS. The use of the MEDIUM function leaves us 
in doubt whether the participant is the Affected or the Agent (see section 6.2.4.3). 
Agency between the agent structures is carried by conjunctions like 'because', 'so', 'as 
a result' ,which impose cause-effect relations between them. In this kind of cause-
effect relation a single agent structure can be the cause of another which is the effect. 
Looking for example at how teacher and students discuss the effect the Greenhouse 
Effect might have on our lives: 
(7) 
T: 	 What what effects might, if the greenhouse effect is really taking place as 
some people suspect, how might our lives be different in the near future, 
relatively near future? What might actually happen? 
S: (...) 
T: Okay, go on and look for (...) erm, (..) 
S: No, it's al right (..) 
T: Okay, I know you don't have to. Right, (...) 
S. 	 (.—) 
T: Okay 
S: (.—) 
T: Okay good, if you think about the amount of water that is present as ice at the 
polar ice caps. If the climate warms up just a few degrees the ice will melt. 
S: Oo. 
T: Okay, as a result the level of the sea will increase, low lying islands, low lying 
areas of coast will become flooded. Can you think of any low lying areas in 
this country that might risk being flooded. Have 
(Looking at the Environment, 5th Lesson, p.3) 
we notice that even if agency within clauses is obscured since we do not know 
whether the only participant of the process is Actor or Goal or has both roles at the 
same time: 
If the climate warms up just a few degrees 
the ice will melt. 
Okay, as a result the level of the sea will increase, 
low lying areas of coast will become flooded. 
agency between clauses is emphatically realised by causal conjunctions between 
clauses, like 'if x then y', 'as a result...'. In that way clauses follow one another in a 
cause-effect relation: the warming up of the climate causes the melting of the polar 
ice caps and the melting of ice causes the increase of the sea level etc. One 
phenomenon triggers another. 
As has been illustrated in chapter 6, conjunction between clauses is one of the ways in 
which relations between agent structures are realised linguistically. But this does not 
mean that this is the only way in which relations within a sequence of agent structures 
can be constructed. Questions addressed by the teacher to the students can carry the 
agency or cause-effect relation from one agent structure to another. This is for 
example how a sequence of agent structures concerning changes in the natural 
environment is built up in the next extract. The teacher keeps asking questions in such 
a way that an exemplified sequence of agent structures is constructed which is used to 
challenge the commonsense assumption that keeping something unchanged 
necessarily means that the natural environment is conserved: 
(8) 
T 	 Conservation is that what you were going to say as well, you were all going to 
say that were you? OK. So if we are going to try and preserve environment if 
we're going to try and stop animals becoming extinct plants becoming extinct 
then we can talk about conservation. OK. now then lets imagine that you go 
off into a lovely part of the countryside but you find that a farmer out there 
and they don't do it as much now for various reasons but you find that a 
fanner out there is about to rip out all the hedges, chop down all the trees in 
the wood to make a bigger field. 1] Is that fanner conserving the countryside 
by doing that? 
Few No. 
T 	 So the farmer is changing the appearance of the countryside is he or she? 
S 	 Yes. 
S 	 Make more 
T 	 Was the way the countryside was before the farmer chopped down the trees 
and hedges the way it has always been or was that a result of change that had 
taken place earlier? 
S 	 No it's a change. 
T 	 OK if we were to go back a long long time what might all have the countryside 
have looked like in Britain? 
S 	 Green. 
T 	 Green but green with grass or green with something else? 
S 	 Green with grass and daisies. 
S 	 Trees 
T 	 OK there were a lot of trees. most of the countryside was forested OK. So one 
of the things that we have to be quite careful about when we're talking about 
conservation is what is it we're trying to conserve? Because most of the places 
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that you might go to that you think oh these are lovely they're not like they 
were 50 years ago. They're not like they were 100 years ago. So you're 
seeing something as it is today and you're thinking oh this is lovely we've got 
to conserve it. But do you see what I'm trying to say. That that in itself is 
different to what it looked like a few years before that a few years before that. 
It's a res- what you are looking at today is something that has changed 
anyway over 100s or possibly thousands of years so why do you want to just 
conserve it in its present state. But if it's gone through 100s of changes 
anyway to get to that state. 
S 	 ...change anymore. 
T 	 Why not let it keep on changing. What is to say that the next change that it 
will undergo will necessarily be a bad change. 
(Looking at the Environment, 3rd Lesson, p.2,3) 
Questions like: 
Is that farmer conserving the countryside by doing that? 
So the farmer is changing the appearance of the countryside is he or she? 
Was the way the countryside was before the farmer chopped down the trees 
and hedges the way it has always been or was that a result of change that had 
taken place earlier. 
OK if we were to go back a long long time what might all have the 
countryside have looked like in Britain? 
construct both backwards and forwards a sequence of agent structures which 
represent the natural environment as being always under change even if human 
agency is not always involved. We could say that in this case it is human agency 
which is suppressed. Human agency and change are disconnected so as not to say that 
every change necessarily needs some sort of human agency in order to occur. At the 
same time keeping something the same, does not necessarily mean that no agency is 
involved. So if the countryside is changing anyway then trying to conserve it in its 
current state demands some agency as well. Finally agency is further suppressed by 
being disconnected from any kind of intentionality. All these changes which occur 
either naturally or because some sort of human agency is involved do not mean that 
they lead to a final nature's intended state: 
T 	 OK good so there might be some examples. But I think the thing that is quite 
dangerous to do is to assume that because something is going to be changed, 
it's necessarily going to be a bad change. Because nothing out there is as 
nature intended it OK although you could argue that we're part of nature but 
if it wasn't for human beings then every part of the countryside we look at 
would be different. We've changed everything already. We've changed 
everything already so why try to conserve it in it's current state. 
(Looking at the Environment, 3rd Lesson, p.4) 
In other words what we have here is a long term process realised as an open-ended 
path-link schema of a sequence of agent structures extended in time. In this path-link 
162 
schema agency is not necessarily presupposed in order for the process to be carried 
on. It is rather unlikely for any initial cause or starting point to be traced back 
whenever there is an attempt to follow the path of agent structures backwards. It is 
unlikely too that any destination or end point will be found if the path is followed 
forwards. On the other hand it is certain that some agency is needed if any attempt is 
made to rest at any intermediate point on the path. 
Notice that in cases like some of those above, human intervention is represented as 
the 'initiator' of a process which triggers a cause-effect relation. Therefore, people are 
thought of as the primary, responsible agents of what follows in a sequence of agent 
structure, or in other words the protagonists of the stories. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
in section 6.3.1.2 the lexical choices for representing the 'initiators', such as the use of 
the indeterminate you or the generalised farmers have the ideological implication that 
agency is attributed to a level at which specific agents cannot be identified. Also in 
the case of acid rain, the indeterminate, generic our as a classifier of the agent 
factories obscures the nature of the agent by keeping us from looking for its identity. 
In that sense agency is suppressed in the way agents are represented. Furthermore, 
agency is suppressed by the fact that stories or sequences of agent structures are 
recalled not by their primary agents, but by their effects in a nominalized form. So the 
example of acid rain is remembered by its effect the devastation of Scandinavian 
forests and the actions of the farmer has become a type of agriculture slash and burn 
type of agriculture. 
7.3.5 Blockage of agent structures involved in path-link schemata 
Agency can take the form of active blockage of a process, that is, of counter-agency: 
(9) 
S 	 ...I watched a programme about ...and people went round testing the streams 
where they pumped out more chemicals and everything and fish were like 
changing from female to male and male to female and having both ... 
T 	 Yeah that's interesting that's worth talking about. One of the things is that for 
most of these products if they're toxic it's illegal to put them out but if you 
have a huge company that products millions of pounds of profit each year then 
quite often if these companies get taken to court they might get fined £20,000 
n it's peanuts it's like you and me giving 10p away. It doesn't really bother 
them it doesn't really bother them. It's cheaper for them just to keep on 
getting prosecuted than to install all the equipment that's needed to dispose of 
that waste properly. 
S 	 Somebody said that...illegal robbery is illegal and people still do it. 
T 	 People still do that yep there are always going to be people anyway who try to 
get away with things. 
(Looking at the Environment, 3rd Lesson, p.9) 
Counter-agency can be traced as a path-link schema of agent structures which has the 
opposite direction to another path-link schema of agent structures. The two path-link 
schemata can have the same starting point but then one is heading against the other. 
That is the case of the causal link which produces the Greenhouse Effect but at the 
same time a possible 'correcting mechanism': the increasing number of plants like 
algae, is heading towards the opposite effect, a decrease of the amounts of the carbon 
dioxide: 
(10) 
T: 	 Algae formed the basis for a whole load of food chains. So animals will come 
along and eat the algae. As a result bigger animals will eat the animals that 
ate the algae and so on. Some people think the greenhouse effect won't 
actually really take place and that any changes that we have seen in the 
temperature of late are just changes that would have taken place anyway. 
Some people say we haven't been recording the temperature long enough to 
actually to be able to detect any overall patterns. They think that because 
there are so much algae around that if the carbon dioxide levels increase 
slightly, what will happen to the amount of algae? 
S: It would 
T: It would increase it, it would use up the extra carbon dioxide. That might be 
quite a good thing, if there is more algae then what will the algae be able to 
support more of 
S: 	 Animals 
S: Animals 
T: Animals that eat the algae and so on, okay? So some people say they think 
that the greenhouse effect isn't really going to happen. If levels of carbon 
dioxide do increase then the earth has if you like self correcting mechanisms 
that will bring it back down again. Okay? And there is some dispute as to 
whether or not the greenhouse effect is a real thing that is actually happening. 
Right, shhh. Why is, why is it called the greenhouse effect? 
(Looking at the Environment, 5th Lesson, p.5) 
So competitive sequences of agent structures can appear not only in cases where 
human agency is involved almost exclusively (laws and institutions against 
companies' interests) but also in cases where agency of other living organisms plays 
an important part. 
Besides active blockage, we also find passive blockage. An entity is represented as 
like an obstacle in a path which either delays or prevents the process from reaching 
the goal (or destination). This is the case with narratives when the plot has an 
unexpected twist because of the action of a character against the flow of the events. 
The entity itself can be a part of a sequence of agent structures. So the passive 
blockage is the single thing-like entity where two sequences of agent structures meet 
each other in an opposite direction. This is not the same as the correcting mechanism 
above of the GHE, which is presented as if it is intended for the purpose of being 
opposite to the effect the GHE has. Examples of passive blockage are the ozone layer 
which allows only part of the UV rays to reach the surface of the earth: 
(11) 
T: 	 Anybody like to tell me okay I'm just hesitating because you've answered tons 
of questions and I'm just seeing if there's someone else here 
S. 
T: 	 Ozone layer. If you're lying on a beach in a hot sunny country 
S. 
T: 	 why is it nice to know that there is an ozone layer up there. What does it do? 
S1: Ohh I know sir 
S2:  
Si: 
	 Sir sir maybe it's erm like if there wasn't any ozone it would be like sun and 
there wouldn't be anything like c.. erm a lot of shade. 'Cos it blocks all the 
shade and then ... see the sun. 
T: 	 Right 
S: Like you wouldn't get burnt and if the ozone wasn't there then the sun you .... 
burn 
T: You are 
S: burn afterwards ... 
T: virtually there. Did you want to add something? 
S: Is it a layer of gas? 
T: ... layer of gas 
S: 	 .... fair 
(Looking at the Environment, 5th Lesson, p.11,12) 
and the algae at the sea surface which block the Sun's light and oxygen to reach the 
organisms in the sea: 
(12) 
T: ...So, in no time at all these plants are all flourishing very well but in not time at all 
so do the algae. And they're growing like mad on the surface of the water, and in no 
time at all they form a blanket over 
S: over the land 
T: the whole pond. And immediately that cuts out the sunlight. No sun? 
S: No photosynthesis 
T: No photosynthesis. The plants down here cannot make food. 
S: They don't .... oxygen 
T: They die, because they've died they don't? 
S: Make oxygen 
T: make oxygen to put back into the water. 
S I .. .... 
S: ....chain reaction 
T: No oxygen being put into the water means the fish 
S: die 
T: would die. Also added to this, because the amount of dead stuff at the bottom will 
now increase very quickly, so will? 
S: Nitrates 
S2: Nitrates 
T: The bacteria 
S: .... nitrate ...? 
T: Because now there's a lot of food for the bacteria. The bacteria are living things 
so what will the bacteria 
T: use up? 
S: ... erm 
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S2: Oxygen 
T.• They will use up the oxygen. They will produce? 
Ss: Carbon dioxide 
(Lesson: Nitrogen cycle, p.4) 
In the first example, a possible story is invented by the teacher in order to show the 
effects of a general and rather abstract phenomenon (the depletion of ozone layer) 
which is found at a global scale. The indeterminate you allows the student to consider 
him/herself part of the story. In the second, an environmental accident which is seen 
as 'innocent', the accidental leak of fertilisers near the pond, is developed in a 
dramatic way discussed in more detail in Appendix 5.2. The purpose of inventing a 
story in this case, is not only to show possible effects of specific kind of 
environmental accidents, but also to apply knowledge about entities and study their 
interrelationships in a specific context. 
7.3.6 Implications of the use of stories 
In this section examples of teaching in terms of path-link sequences of agent 
structures have been discussed as being similar to stories, narratives. A path-link 
schema has a structure like a story's plot. The schema like a story can be treated as a 
single event-like entity, realised linguistically in terms of a nominalized process slash 
and burn type of agriculture or nominalization the devastation of Scandinavian 
forests. Similarly to stories, the structure of the schema can be elaborated with more 
entities and relations, being expanded to a more complicated and sophisticated 
structure (like in example (12)) or reduced to a very basic form (like example (11) in 
relation to example (1)). Therefore, stories and schemata are flexible ways of 
representing environmental science, affording choices about what should be 
represented. 
A rich source of stories is the recent environmental literature about environmental 
accidents and catastrophes as well as scenarios of possible disasters. Stories which are 
invented by the teacher are presented as having dramatic consequences and involve 
the hearer (student) in the crucial role of the agent (see example (3)) or the affected 
(see example (11)). The dramatisation of stories does not only attract the attention of 
the hearer, but makes more convincing the reality of agents and effects. 
The value of stories as learning tools, in the context of environmental science, to 
engage the hearer/reader and keep his/her interest, is the same as what has been 
recognised as their interpersonal value in studies of narratives in general (Riessman, 
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1993). An indication that this learning value is effective in the examples mentioned in 
this section, is students' responses to teacher's stories with stories which come from 
what they have heard or experienced in their own lives. This has also been another 
property which characterises a narrative; one narrative triggers other counter or 
reinforcing narratives. 
The effect of using these kinds of stories is to represent their account as the 'only', 
'true' versions of what is happening. This has epistemological implications, in respect 
to what students might think about the methodology of science. As Hajer (1995, p.62) 
has pointed out, representations of environmental problems in terms of stories - or 
what is called in environmental sociology as 'story-lines' - impose 'discursive closure'. 
Complex research work accompanied with all the usual uncertainties and 
conditionalities is erased in its translation to a plot or story-line. 
Note that in most of the examples of narratives discussed above there are no disputes 
included in the narratives as to whether phenomena 'really are' the way they are 
represented. Probably the only exception is the GHE for which two conflicting 
possible outcomes are represented by the teacher. It is only here that the scientific 
community is represented as not always being in harmony in what it thinks about 
nature. Arguments within the scientific community are represented as counter 
sequences of agent structures (see example (10)). But even here nothing is mentioned 
about how scientists have found a way to explain and represent environmental 
problems, such as GHE and the depletion of ozone layer. 
One of the most important aspect of the stories discussed here is that the relation 
between the hearer and the story is like the relation between a direct observer of 
nature and nature. Teacher and students seem to take the role of direct observers of 
nature, reporting 'authentic' events extracted from nature. The degree to which for 
example agency is used has an effect on how much what is said looks like a narrative 
or not. Therefore, how entities are treated in terms of agency structures has a direct 
impact on whether they are represented as participants in plots which take place in 
nature or as the objects of scientific inquiry. As Myers (1990, p.153) has pointed out, 
representations in terms of material processes (and not in terms of nominalizations 
and nominalized processes) give the impression that the order of 'phrases' corresponds 
with the temporal or/and causal order of what is happening in reality. So accounts of 
knowledge about the environment become a narrative of nature. This sort of 
representation in relation to what has been said above for the specific examples of 
teaching promotes an objective account of what is happening since the information is 
there, in the stories, but the connection to scientific activity is lost (Myers, 1990, 
p.148). 
At this point we can distinguish two kinds of narratives. Most of the examples (see 
examples (3), (5), (8), (9) and (12)) of narratives discussed in the present section are 
timeless (verb structures in present tense, no reference to a specific time). Such 
representations suggest that what they describe happens in more or less the same way 
if similar conditions apply. So for example, in every case in which there is a heavy 
industrial activity somewhere accompanied by the appropriate weather conditions, it 
is expected that nearby areas will be affected from some sort of pollution. These kind 
of narratives are abstracted from reality and treated as objects of science. So it is not 
accidental that it is such timeless narratives which are represented as if they are the 
phenomena to be explained themselves. 
The other kind of narratives are those which have specific time references (e.g. In 
1858...) using past tense. These sorts of narratives are closer to how stories are 
exchanged between people in everyday life and they are like observations to the 
extent to which they suggest to the hearer to 'see' things as if they took place in 'real' 
time. While these narratives endorse the reality of what is reported by making 
reference to specific time and place circumstances, the previous narratives rest their 
objective effect on the fact that they are reported as 'objects of science', abstracted and 
generalised. Notice also that in many cases students' personal accounts start with 
narratives which have specific time or/and place references and are followed by 
teacher's timeless unfolding of events (see example about allergies caused by pollen 
and example (9)), or teachers end up with a narrative which is a blend of specific 
time/place circumstances and a timeless plot (see examples (8) and (12)). The 
combined effect of the two features of the latter is that they constitute generalised and 
abstracted accounts of events which occur in a specific context. 
In conclusion, examples of stories in this section show that they are discussed in the 
classroom as if they reflect exactly what happens in the real world. Teacher and 
students tell stories, as if they were opening a window and watching what is going on 
in the world. As a result, what is happening in nature is represented as being a 
narrative itself, particularly when the story which is supposed to stand as an example 
of the phenomenon to be explained is taken as the phenomenon itself, that is the 
object of inquiry. In this way environmental science turns to be a narrative of nature 
and learning is transformed into 'reading' nature itself and revealing its plot abstracted 
and generalised to some extent from the specific context in which it is looked. 
7.4 Containment relations 
7.4.1 Introduction 
Representations in terms of containment schemata are some of the most fundamental 
in the discourse of teaching environmental science. Pollution is often described as an 
agent which either 'escapes' from containers and spreads into others or has to be kept 
contained and if possibly destroyed for the 'safety' of other entities. Containers 
impose closure and separation so they also affect the conditions for an action to 
happen or not. In the following section a whole spectrum of containers is discussed. 
Some of them are represented in the classroom as man made and others as natural. 
Some have physical boundaries whilst others they are represented in a way that 
boundaries are metaphorically imposed. A container shows either where or how 
something - another entity - can be found or gives a strong sense of a 'within' 
relation. 
7.4.2 Highlighting aspects of containment relations 
7.4.2.1 Closure 
Under the containment schema - defined as an entity found within another entity (see 
section 4.4.5) - a large number of containment relationships which vary in scale can 
be represented, such as being in a pond or a forest and also being in an organism or a 
cell, in the same way as a large number of our everyday experiences are grounded in 
containment relationships found at any scale, like being in a box or in a room or in a 
building. 
Containment most of all imposes relations of closure. Entities which are contained 
have little or no chance to get out. A good example of this sort of containment 
relation is a teacher's example of the pollution of the Mediterranean sea: 
(13) 
T: 	 Think of a sea that's pretty much land locked, land all the way round 
...English Channel. Most of you have probably been there at some stage 0 
S 	 Mediterranean. 
T 	 Mediterranean. Because there are countries all round the Mediterranean it's 
pretty much land locked if you have a look at a map it's just that little channel 
at the bottom of Gibraltar North African that the sea can come in and out 
through most of the stuff that's pumped into the Mediterranean stays there. 
And in fact when I think of the times when I've been there there's been days, 
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you know those sort of pedalo things when I was younger I'd go out on a 
pedalo and you'd look down in the water and you would see everything 
floating in the water. Basically all the stuff that people put down the toilets is 
there floating in the water. Ok disgusting. 
(Looking at the Environment, 3rd Lesson, p.6) 
The land locked Mediterranean sea is represented as a container where there is a 
continuing massive input of pollutants and a very limited output of them. Pollution is 
represented as a concentration of unwanted entities which have no way out of their 
container. This aspect of the containment relationship is stressed by the teacher's 
effort to illustrate vividly what is going on in the container by sharing his personal 
insight with students. The story-like instance brings the scale that such a container 
entails to an accessible and therefore manageable level. 
The containment relation can also be used for representing theoretical entities and 
relations which are taken from scientific knowledge. This is the case with the same 
teacher's explanation of the Greenhouse Effect in another lesson: 
(14) 
T: 	 If you are in a greenhouse. Heat from the sun can actually get through the 
glass into the greenhouse, but once it is in the greenhouse something happens 
to it. Okay. Which when we get into GCSE and we've actually covered the 
theory on it we can actually explain a little bit more easily, okay. But 
something happens to it, that's all you really need to know at the moment. 
Which means that it cannot get out again so once it's in there it's trapped. It 
just keeps reflecting around inside the greenhouse like that, it is trapped 
inside. 
S: Unless you open the door. 
T: Unless you open the door and some of it can get out. But the glass can trap 
that heat so it can't escape again. A little bit will but not much of it. If you're 
standing outside and heat is coming down from the sun, you will get a small 
amount of it, you will if you're standing there absorb a small amount of it. 
What will happen to the rest of it? 
S: (...) go 
T: It will go. It will just reflect off in all sorts of directions. Some of it will go 
back out into space again. Go up through the atmosphere and back out into 
space. 
S: It won't because of the greenhouse effect. 
T: Ah, good, good. Now then. I think we've said this before. We've mentioned 
carbon dioxide. How many of you when you've been out in the country, have 
walked along behind a cow and as they've walked along they go phhhh, 
phhhh, phhhh. 
S: Well believe it or not I don't actually stand behind cows. 
T: Ha, ha. Very wise. Very wise. Okay, now then. Gases like carbon dioxide go 
up into the atmosphere, animals like cows when they let off produce a gas 
called methane. That goes up into the atmosphere, okay. And there are a 
number of other gases which go up into the atmosphere will actually act like a 
big pane of glass. They allow the heat from the sun to come in but will 
allow it to go only so far and they will reflect it back down again, so they 
actually trap the heat in around the earth. Heat that otherwise would have 
been reflected back out into space again is trapped and reflected back down to 
the earth surface so we actually absorbing trapping much more of the sun's 
heat than we otherwise would be doing. 
(Looking at the Environment, 5th Lesson, p.6,7) 
In this extract the atmosphere round the earth is represented as forming a container 
which has a very special property; entities can get into it but there is no way to get out 
of it. The difference is that in this case there is no observable entity to form physical 
boundaries. The analogy between the phenomenon of the Greenhouse Effect and the 
Greenhouse creates some special properties for what is represented as a container. 
Reflection caused by glass in Greenhouses replaces the lack of physical boundaries up 
into the atmosphere it [heat] is trapped inside. ..it can't escape. Notice here that a 
physical entity heat not so often realised as a thing-like entity in everyday life, is 
engaged in relations of agent structures which are used for thing-like entities. Heat is 
here represented behaving like a thing. 
Containment represents other types of closed-ness as well. Take for example the 
teaching of the Carbon cycle which requires the construction of a large number of 
complicated relations (later discussed as a cycle) between agent structures and 
containers. In this context the in/out orientation that entities can have in relation to 
various kinds of containers is emphasised. Carbon dioxide is represented as getting 
out of the human body and getting into the atmosphere, while oxygen follows the 
other way round. The direction in which the chemicals are heading in this journey 
from one container to another is highlighted as important by the teacher. Furthermore, 
the entire idea of the cycle is grounded in what is transferred and from where (to 
where): 
(15) 
T: 	 Where's the atmosphere? 
S 	 All around us / 
T: 	 All around us, OK [ j How does carbon dioxide get into the 
atmosphere? 
S 	 We breathe it out / 
T: 	 We breathe it out. Just us? / 
S: Animals / 
T: OK animals / 
S. 	 and trees take it in and plants... / 
T: 	 Alright, let's just do one thing at a time Mitch, animals breathe out 
carbon dioxide? / S.... /T ..Mitch, that's enough....[ .1 Why do they 
breathe out carbon dioxide, where does the carbon dioxide come 
from? 
S.. 
T: 	 No, no the trees are going to do something else in a minute, we'll look 
at that. Where does this carbon dioxide coming from that we are 
breathing out? 
(Lesson: Carbon cycle, p.9,10) 
As we can see in this extract it is considered as important by the teacher that the 
students will grasp firmly the idea of where something comes from and where it goes. 
These relations will be modified later to the extent that they are not represented as 
discrete entities which are getting in and out of containers but as continuous entities 
and therefore the question is how much of an entity is transferred and where, in 
relation to other entities. So now containers, like lungs and the atmosphere, are 
represented in terms of balanced and regulated inputs and outputs of quantities 
entities: 
T: 	 We breathe out more than we breathe in. We're adding to the carbon dioxide 
in the air every time we breathe out. 
(Lesson: Carbon Cycle, p.10) 
7.4.2.2 Separation 
Containment relations also represent separation. Containers either separate or bring 
together entities. Entities like dirty water or pollutants which affect other entities 
have to be contained. Settlement tanks used at sewage works are an example of 
containment relations which represent separation: 
(16) 
T: 	 Has anybody any idea what might be meant by a settlement tank? 
S 
T 	 Ok if you get something like sand, lets imagine you put sand in with water and 
shook it up, the sand would be distributed throughout the water but when you 
leave it settle because the sand particles are quite heavy they'll fall out to the 
bottom. Ok and there are other things in that sewage which if you leave it in 
these big tanks will settle out to the bottom there. IN the bottom of the 
settlement tanks you get a lot of sludge. The sludge is all this stuff that's 
settled out that's sunk to the bottom ok. On top of that you get the liquid 
which is getting to be more and more like water it says that that liquid then 
goes off to what is called an aeration tank. In the aeration tank there are 
microbes bacteria and so on. Any pollutants that are left in that water the 
microbes will feed on ok and get rid of them. As those microbes feed they 
produce carbon dioxide that carbon dioxide is released into the air in the 
same way as we when we break down our food our ...carbon dioxide those of 
you who are still writing I hope that you're following this as well and are not 
going to ask about it in a moment. So carbon dioxide is given off 0 However 
although the ;microbes might have fed on the pollutants there will still be 
things in there ok so again it goes off to a settlement tank in that settlement 
tank any of the bits that are still in there will have a chance to settle out and 
then the water will be returned to a river. In the second settlement tank some 
more sludge will be formed that sludge will go off to something which is 
called a sludge digester. 0 Ok a sludge digester again there are microbes in 
there different sorts of microbes that will feed on that sludge and they will 
produce a gas called methane. 
(Looking at the Environment, 11th Lesson, p.5) 
Dirty water is passed through a number of containers. In each of them certain entities 
are brought together in order to interact with each other and others are kept apart 
avoiding as much as possible any interaction. Therefore, each tank is represented as a 
container which provides the conditions for certain sorts of agency to take place while 
preventing other kinds of agents from action. The system of containers here is man 
made and its role is to prevent the release of man-made pollutants industries into 
natural containers, like rivers and ponds. In that way human intervention is 
represented in terms of man made systems of containers which interact with systems 
of containers given by nature. Thus a container becomes a tool for exercising control 
on entities. This control depends on what the desirable outcome will be, and is 
represented in terms of bringing together or bringing apart or removing entities from 
containers. 
But in cases where no care is taken whether pollutants like rubbish get in contact 
with water, pollution carried by carriers like river is likely to get into containers like 
pond. As a result living entities fish which are found in them are affected. The latter 
are containers by themselves which now carry pollution even further to other living 
organisms, like human beings. The conclusion of the next story is that if pollution 
cannot be kept separated from entities with which interact, then it will be inevitable 
that pollution will spread and affect various entities since the latter consists of a 
system of containers and carriers: 
(17) 
T 	 It is likely that the water from the stream possibly comes from the marsh and it 
might run into the pond ok. 11 It might be the other way round we'll have to a 
bit, a more careful look and have a think about that but it is possible that is 
running from the marsh down into the pond. So if rubbish is burnt, buried in 
the marshy area. Depending upon what sort of rubbish it is pollution might 
get into that water. That water would go down in to the pond. It's got a use 
of the pond though it says it's used largely for fishing and sailing. Again 
depending upon what sort of pollution it is what 
S 
T 	 The fish might die. 
S 	 ...pollute the fish so that it makes humans sick when they eat them. 
T 	 That is quite possible, even if the fish didn't die they might not be good to eat. 
What might happen if you were to fall out of your boat into the pond and it 
was polluted. 
S 	 You'd die. 
S 	 you could get... 
S 
T 	 Right came up as a rash. You could get poisoned as a result. 
(Looking at the Environment, 3rd Lesson, p.5) 
Also the lack of separation can be represented in terms of insufficient boundaries 
which cannot keep an agent within a container. This is the case of landfill sites which 
cause various problems to their surrounding environment: 
(18) 
T: 	 Well there actually some landfill sites round here I know I've driven past them 
I'm just trying to remember where they are. If you go past the landfill site, 
you tend round the outsides of it to see little posts with wire mesh fencing 
around. 
S 	 There's one in Ealing. 
T 	 There's one in Ealing is there. 
S 	 By the Ealing hospital and they could use them for the parks if they didn't put 
all rubbish underneath. 
T 	 Ok what you also tend to find, excuse me, is when the wind is blowing and 
things like that the rubbish that's in there that hasn't been buried blows 
around and it sticks to the wire mesh fence so it looks really unpleasant as you 
go round it ok. 
(Looking at the Environment, 3rd Lesson, p.7) 
In all the examples above we notice that containment relations are prerequisite for the 
occurrence or not of agent structures. Since agency can never take place at a distance, 
entities which participate in it have to be kept together. This is what containers do. 
But for entities to be brought together carriers are the entities which link containers, 
as we will see in the next section. 
Containment relations work out in a silent way representations of the nature of 
entities and their relations. The entities one expect to find in one container, say 
sewage, are different from the entities which are expected to be found in another 
container such as a forest. So different kinds of containers create different 
expectations about the entities in them. 
Taking one step further we notice that containment relations in this context work in 
the same way as the ontological metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). 
According to the latter, containers impose boundaries on entities such as physical 
phenomena making them discrete from others. This is also applied to entities such as 
processes and life experiences which are metaphorically viewed as thing-like entities, 
discussed later as metaphorical extensions of containment relations. At this point it is 
noticed that it is a matter of choice in making meaning in a specific context where the 
boundaries are set in representing entities as discrete from others. Constructing the 
ontology of containing entities is an inseparable part of building up relations between 
entities or in other words in doing science. To give an example, if the atmosphere 
round the earth is not seen as a container then the GHE simply cannot be explained. 
Finally, the example of the Carbon cycle above shows that defining a container opens 
up the possibility for acts of quantification. That is, both the contained entity can be 
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counted as a quantity and the container itself can be seen as having a quantifiable 
volume. 
7.4.3 Containing the invisible 
Containers like sewage tanks or ponds and fish are at a level which is accessible to 
commonsense knowledge. But as we have seen above containment relations like the 
Greenhouse Effect which are at the scale of the very large and unobservable demand 
more explanation of how containment can be obtained and can work. These 
explanations are often in terms of entities taken from our everyday world (e.g. 'pane 
of glass') which provide good examples of separation. In the same way at the scale of 
the very small and unobservable separation is again realised in terms of analogues to 
commonsense knowledge: 
Cell membrane This thin skin controls the flow of all the substances which pass in 
and out of the cell... 
Cell wall Plant cells are surrounded by a firm wall of cellulose. Cell walls hold plant 
together and give plants much of their strength. 
(Active Science, p.120,121) 
In this little extract, from a chapter of a textbook which is about living cells, discussed 
earlier in more detail in terms of how language represents the unobservable, we notice 
that the problem of how boundaries and therefore separation is imposed for 
representations of containers at the scale of the invisible (to the human eye), is 
resolved by making use of representations of boundaries found in the everyday world. 
Skin provides a good example of separation which permits regulated inputs and 
outputs between the contained and the outside due to our experience of sweating, and 
walls in building constructions are also a good example of strong boundaries. 
Separation for cells is concerned also with specialisation. Cells are represented as the 
compartments in which certain sorts of jobs are carried out: 
Different kinds of cells do different jobs. The structure of a cell matches the job it has 
to do. 
(Nuffield Science 13 to 16, Study Guide 1, page: 23) 
This is also what the metaphor which resemblances cytoplasm with chemical factories 
represents: 
Cytoplasm This is the chemical factory of the cell. Here, new substances are built up 
from material taken into the cell and energy is released and stored. 
(Active Science, p.120) 
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In other words, a job which presupposes a number of processes dealing with 
quantities of materials cannot be done without some sort of specialisation. 
Furthermore specialisation entails containment relations since not all jobs can be done 
at the same time and at the same place. 
There are plenty of representations of containment relations for which separation and 
closed-ness is not the most important aspect. In these representations what counts 
more is that some entities are places in which others are located: 
Chemicals from the sea 
Some people like to cook with sea salt. The sea is also the source of magnesium and a 
liquid called bromine... 
Chemicals from the air 
About one-fifth of the air is a reactive gas called oxygen... About four-fifths of the air 
is nitrogen... The air also contains small traces of a family of gases that includes 
helium, neon and argon. 
(Nuffield Science for Key stage 3 , p.4) 
We are used to think of sea and air - apart from being the environment of living 
organisms - as single entities. The containment relations here represent these entities 
as sources of many other entities which are part of them. So in a way the containers 
are defined because of their parts and contents rather than by any sort of separation 
imposed by boundaries. This is also the case with how ecological niches are 
represented: 
...niches are filled by ... 
...was partly filled by a bear-like... 
...more successful at filling the niche. 
...the vacant niche. 
Often it fills the niche so successfully that it wipes out the competition... 
(Nuffield Science 13 to 16, Study Guide 1, page: 109,110) 
In these examples there is a strong sense of location of a physical place which is 
represented like a residential area: a niche is a place with the purpose of being filled 
and living organisms are the tenants which can be so successful in their tenancy that 
they can become the occupants or even owners of the places. An organism does not 
just find itself located somewhere, but locations have to be found. Since it has found a 
place for being 'located', then it is involved in a process for keeping that place. 
Therefore, containment relationships and boundaries are imposed by a stressed sense 
of location: an organism can be in or out of a niche. The ideological implications of 
such representations raise questions about how we think about the concept of property 
and location as 'social' beings and how we think about these concepts in relation to 
how we realise our place in nature as 'physical' beings. The next sub-section deals 
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with those kind of containers for which boundaries and separation are imposed 
metaphorically. 
7.4.4 Metaphorical extensions of containment relations: Containers 
without physical boundaries 
7.4.4.1 Sets of relations impose boundaries 
The outcome of metaphorical extensions of containment relations can be an entity 
like a specific kind of environment, say a hostile environment, which is built up as a 
container entity. The container in this case is not defined by its boundaries but in a 
number of different ways which make it look as if it has physical boundaries: 
(19) 
T 	 Ok a jungle. Now then why might a jungle area be natural. LI Your right in 
saying that but why. You want to continue seeing as you started. 
S 	 ...I don't know. 
T 	 Yes. 
S 	 Is it because there's no machines ... 
T 	 Ok it's growing by itself we haven't been out there. We haven't been 
chopping down things we don't want planting things that we do want building 
buildings and so on it's unspoilt. It's unspoilt, untouched by human hands ok, 
a hostile environment. 
S 
T 	 Your house I like it. 
S 	 My garden. 
T 	 It's the same hands...a hostile environment? 
S 	 Is it ... 
T 	 Ooh it's not I wouldn't have said so. What would happen if one of you er, lets 
try and think about a good example. If one of you went up to the north pole ok 
and you didn't have all your coats and goggles and gloves and everything to 
keep warm. Would it be comfortable being there? 
All No. 
T 	 Ok somewhere, good, somewhere where it might be uncomfortable. Where it 
might even be dangerous for you to live. 
(Looking at the Environment, 2nd Lesson, p.2,3) 
Creating a set of relations is one way of imposing boundaries. What one expects to 
find in one set of relations that makes it unique and different from others, one does 
not expect to find in another set of relations. An entity is differentiated by sharing 
some properties in a set of relations along with other entities. So in a way abstract 
boundaries are imposed between entities which share properties within different sets 
of relations. The thing-like and process-like entities that are expected to be found in a 
hostile environment are not the same as the entities that are expected to be found in 
other kinds of environments. An analogy is that between countries, regarded as 
distinct places because different laws and customs obtain in them. 
The instantiation of each type of environment makes the 'abstract' boundaries more 
concrete and real. A jungle or the north pole as examples of hostile environments 
provide a very concrete 'idea' of what is meant by being in a hostile environment. 
Then the containment relationship is elaborated further by making reference to the 
entities that one expects to find in a given instance of a hostile environment, thus 
imposing a within relation between them. 
As a result it is not only the entities which are located in a given place that create a 
`within container' relationship. The relations that connect the entities together is what 
it keeps them differentiated from other entities. So in the end being in a containment 
relation means being part of a certain set of relations; agent structures of various 
kinds, that bind entities together and of which other entities are not part, thus not 
contained. To put it simply, in these representations of containment relations being in 
a container means being in a relation of some kind. The entities that are not supposed 
to be in the container are those that are not related in the same pattern of relations. 
7.4.4.2 Agent structures impose in/out relations 
A containment relation can also be created by various sorts of agent structures which 
impose an in-out orientation. This is how pollution is elaborated. If there is a 
polluting agent somewhere then one way to prevent its unwanted action is by 
removing the affected entity somewhere else, for example when people move away 
from a power station. In that way even if it is not clear whether there are physical 
boundaries which surround the place within which the pollutant acts, the removal of 
an entity to a place that is beyond a pollutant's power defines a sort of containment 
relation. What is within the container is what can be accessible to the agent's agency. 
An entity that is not reached by agent's action is outside of the containment 
relationship: 
(20) 
T:• 	 Living where we do, have we got any choice in what we breathe in? 
S 	 No. 
S 	 No. 
T 	 We've got no choice about it all. I] Unless we move 
S Yes you have you could move. 
T 	 We could move if we want to live here 1] 
S No you could move to ... 
S ...pollution because you don't know 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.2) 
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In the same way it can be the agent which is removed and not the affected, as for 
example in sewage treatment. As we have seen above the latter has many variations, 
such as using an agent (bacteria) to destroy the unwanted agent (certain kinds of 
pollutants). Sewage treatment is an example of physical boundaries as well but this is 
not the only way in which boundaries and within relations are realised. 
In our everyday life too there are metaphorical extensions of containment relations in 
the same way as described above. In various situations, the containment schema is 
extended to elaborate agent structures like love or professional relations as Lakoff and 
Johnson have illustrated (1980). These are often expressed vividly in phrases like "I 
can't get out of it" implying a metaphorical barrier or boundary to do with being under 
the power of somebody else, and metaphorical separation such as keeping away from 
other potential relations. 
7.4.4.3 Nominalized processes afford thinking in terms of categories 
Aspects of metaphorical extension of containment relations arise also with packaged 
agencies referred to by a nominal group or a nominalization. Even if teachers explain 
event-like entities such as photosynthesis in terms of a sequence of agent structures, 
they later refer to a single agent structure as if it is found within the event-like entity. 
For example, a photon being absorbed 'in' photosynthesis. Here 'photosynthesis' is 
represented and treated as a container in which certain agent structures are found. 
These agent structures acquire a very different meaning and become something else if 
they are seen outside the event-like entity. The release of Carbon dioxide for example 
if it is seen outside of the event-like entity 'respiration' is a very different process, for 
example the outcome of burning entities like fossil fuels: 
(21) 
T: 	 What's the connection between respiration and 
photosynthesis? 
S: They go together/ 
T: How do they go together? What's the relationship 
between them / S: ...animals... / T: Animals and plants 
right / S: animals eat the plants and we eat animals or 
we eat the plants / T: Right / S• 
	
 / T: Listen listen 
then, listen / S: .... / T: The plants make food in a 
process called photosynthesis / S: .... / T: Say it / S:.... 
/ T: say it / S: .... / T: Well done, in a process called 
photosynthesis which they use carbon dioxide from the 




Animals eat the plants so now the carbon dioxide that 
was used to make the food has been incorporated into 
that food. Now the carbon's got into us / S:.... / T: Just 
a minute, why do we need food? / S: .to live... / T: Well 
be a bit more specific / S: energy / 
••• 
T: 	 Is that the only way that carbon dioxide gets into the air 
these days? / S: ..No.. / T What other ways / S: From 
factories / T: From factories / S:... / T: Where else / S: 
Cars / T: Cars / S:.... / T: Sorry / S: Houses / T.• From 
houses / S: Burning things / T: Burning things, in 
particular which things? / S: Fossil fuels / 
T: 	 Fossil fuels. Right. What are the fossil fuels / 
(Lesson: Carbon Cycle p11,12) 
Processes, often recalled as nominalizations, like photosynthesis and respiration, 
represented as containers afford thinking about them as conceptual categories. That 
means that other process-like and thing-like entities are classified under these 
categories so the student who studies them knows where to go and look for them. A 
lot of classification is carried out in that way and some very refined meaning relations 
are constructed. As a result entities of the physical world are classified together and 
differentiated at the same time. But what we should notice here is that this 
classification of entities is not based on a number of abstract criteria or properties that 
the entities have to satisfy. Respiration is just the nominalized term which stands for 
the process of releasing Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and energy when digested 
food interacts with oxygen in cells. So when the teacher asks what has happened to 
Carbon during respiration, the answer is not supposed to stand against some abstract 
criteria (or a formula) that are satisfied or not but against representations of image 
schemata in which Carbon is involved. These schemata are in terms of agent 
structures in which an entity is transferred, turned into something else and contained 
within another entity. 
Food webs and cycles of life are also represented as containers in terms of 
deterministic causal connections in relation to process-like and event like entities. 
Such representations afford little or no thinking of a plant or an animal which escapes 
the circulation of matter and energy in the ecosystem. Metaphorical extensions of 
image schemata work also the other way round; containment relationships either 
represent or imply certain kinds of agent structures. Entities like the various sorts of 
ecosystems are represented at first sight as place-like entities which are the containers 
for several kind of entities found in them. But after teaching, ecosystems are 
transformed into containers of a very different kind; they are represented as process-
like entities so the entities which are thought earlier to be contained within them are 
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now thought to be contained within a system of relationships. All these examples 
show also that the way an entity is introduced in the first place does not necessarily 
mean that this is how the entity will be represented later after teaching. 
7.4.5 Conclusion 
In the present chapter it appears - and indeed is the case - that anything or everything 
can be seen as a container. If this is so, the question arises of what meaning there is in 
saying that something is a container. It is a matter of treating an entity as a container 
or not, for a purpose. There is still a choice - to treat as a container, or not. And that 
choice is made so as specific meaning relations are addressed to students. As has been 
illustrated above such meaning relations include fundamental ontological aspects of 
entities, like what the entities are by imposing boundaries on them and where they 
belong by setting up categorical relations. The process of choosing what will be 
represented as a container and how, implies that some aspects of meaning are 
highlighted while others are hidden, so in other words ontological and learning (in 
terms of what is considered as valuable knowledge to be transmitted to students and 
be learnt by them) implications are inevitable. 
7.5 Carriers as transportation systems 
7.5.1 Identifying an entity as a carrier 
In the teaching of environmental science it is often assumed that entities are 
transported from one place to another. Rivers and rain are seen as having the property 
of a carrier, due to our everyday experience of running water which can carry both 
continuous and discrete entities (e.g. silt, sticks). Other entities like the blood stream 
and prevailing winds are also carriers represented as transportation systems. 
In our first example, the teacher introduces students to the idea that quite a lot of 
entities which surround us in our every day life may carry other entities. As one can 
see in the following representations of carriers, the property of carrying requires that 
the carrier is a container or at least a place-like entity for the entity which is carried. 
Entities like the food we eat and the water we drink can be containers of other 
entities. Air is more unlikely to be thought of as a container because of its transparent 
nature; it is more problematic for our commonsense understanding to think of air 
carrying entities (see also chapter 3) if nothing can be seen in it. This is more obvious 
when we think about cigarette smoke, since smoke is observable and indicates that 
something is in the air: 
(22) 
T 	 Hands up those of you shshsh 0 girls 0 hands up those of you who, are 
concerned about what might be in the food you eat the water you drink ok pop 
your hands up [] perhaps if you go to the doctors you might be concerned 
about what's in the tablets the doctor gives you. If that's you, if that's you put 
your hand up, keep them up 0 now then 0 now then keep your hands up if you 
have also wondered from time to time what might be in the air you breathe. 
S 	 I'm frightened there might be little creatures. 
T 	 Good I'm surprised at you because I quite often ask that and 0 you can put 
your hands down now. I quite often ask that and people seem to go through 
their lives worrying about what they eat and so on unless it's something 
about what is in the air. 
(Looking at the environment, 1st Lesson, p.2) 
7.5.2 Non-intelligent systems of transportation found in nature 
The teacher's example above opens up new possibilities about entities. It is not only 
intelligent living organisms which have intentions and desires and can move other 
entities including themselves, but non living, material entities can do so as well. 
Prevailing winds are represented as a system of carriers which have a certain direction 
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in moving entities for most of the time. In that way prevailing winds are represented 
as transportation systems in the same way as lorries carry things from one place to 
another: 
(5) 
T 	 We're not actually, we're not actually [1 putting stuff in lorries and taking it 
up there and dumping it, but when our factories kick out all of this poisonous 
smoke that goes up into the atmosphere where does it get blown to? 
S 	 Scandinavia. 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.4) 
The fact that there are representations of transportation systems which are driven by 
non-intelligent, non-living entities has consequences for what has the power and 
therefore control over what is transferred. If pollution is carried away by the 
prevailing winds then it is not located permanently in one place by being contained 
and static. Entities obtain the potential property of being mobile and being in contact 
with or mixed with other entities; something which cannot happen without the help of 
carriers. The consequences of this interplay between the static and the dynamic are 
represented vividly in textbooks as well: 
All terrestrial organisms depend to some extent on water to transport material around 
their bodies. In general, the larger they are, the more dependent upon this form of 
internal transport they become. 
(Environmental Science, p.68) 
Humans must be very careful over what is introduced into the air system. Water and 
heat are important things carried by the winds around the world, but pollution can 
also be taken with them. 
(Air Ecology, p.14) 
In other words, carriers as transportation systems are represented as essential for 
sustaining life on earth by keeping relations between entities, but on the other hand 
unwanted entities entering systems of carriers can have a devastating effect by 
upsetting these relations. 
Carriers such as streams and prevailing winds are represented as constant 'flow 
movement' regardless if there is any entity to be carried or not. They are also 
represented as if they are 'running effortlessly' by without any agency applied to them 
either to keep them going or to regulate the rate of flow. 
Transported entities are also represented in new ways. Seeds from plants are 
dispersed by wind or by animals in various ways. And this is because seeds have 
properties which make it easier to transfer them in one way rather than another, by the 
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wind for example. Such entities are seen as being adapted to what other entities can 
do for them: 
Dispersal of offspring 
Plants have no control over where their seeds go, but there is usually some method by 
which these are carried away from the parent plant... 
(Nuffield, Co-Ordinated Biology,p.193) 
Dispersal of seeds by wind 
There are two ways in which seeds are dispersed by the wind. Study figures 16.5, 
16.6 and 16.7 to find out more about this. 
(Nuffield, Co-Ordinated Biology,p.194) 
Figure 16.7 
Structures with "wings" are commonly produced by different kinds of trees. The 
"wing" may be formed from a bract (a kind of leaf). Otherwise it is formed from the 
ovary wall, as in the sycamore... 
You can see from these examples that plants with wind dispersal either have a "hairy" 
structure that makes a large surface area or they have some sort of "wing". 
(Nuffield, Co-Ordinated Biology,p.195) 
In these extracts the relation between wind and seeds is represented as similar to the 
relation between birds and air. In both cases the transposed entity is adapted 
accordingly to the medium by which it is transported. But they are different in respect 
to where the agency comes from. In the domain of living animals the birds are the 
agents which make use of the medium through which they fly, in contrast with the 
seeds which depend on the agency of the carrier. 
7.5.3 Carrying discrete or continuous entities 
Entities like plant seeds are discrete and do not interact with their carrier in a way that 
the identity either of the carrier or of the transposed is transformed. Other entities like 
gases are represented as continuous entities. The latter have the property of being 
mixed with the carrier in a way that the carrier itself is represented as an agent. In 
cases like this containment and agency are the schemata which are required in 
constructing a higher structure of image schema such as the carrier. This is the case 
with acid rain. Rain and sulphur dioxide are mixed so at the end the rain itself 
becomes an agent: 
(5) 
T:• 	 When it rains in Scandinavia some of these gases like sulphur dioxide dissolve 
in the rain to form a weak acid sulphurous acid. When it rains it produces 
acid rains it kills the trees it makes the lakes become acidic it affects the life in 
the lakes and so on. 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.4) 
As we can notice in this little extract, rain becomes acid rain from the time when it is 
mixed with the agent, as the term acid rain reveals. As a result if an agency has to be 
dealt with, then one cannot avoid the trouble of dealing not only with the agent but 
with both agent and carrier. 
On the other hand discrete entities like litter in the sea, because they are not mixed 
with their carrier, are easier to detect and remove: 
(23) 
T:• 	 There was a thing on the radio yesterday. They'd been going up and down the 
west coast of Scotland [1 if you've walked; up and down the west coast of 
Scotland it's quite remote it's quite isolated. Beautiful Mrs ...will vouch for 
that it's lovely. One of the best places you can go to to ...as well 11 they have 
been one moment, they've been picking litter up off the beaches there. Guess 
where something like a quarter of that litter has come from? 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.4) 
Continuous entities like sulphur dioxide carried by prevailing winds or rain are 
unobservable in the sense that one cannot say by looking at the carrier whether the 
agent is carried or not. That makes it more difficult to detect whether the carrier is a 
potential agent or not. It is the effect which indicates whether an agent has been 
carried but this is an observation after the agency has taken place. 
Carriers which are represented as 'flow movement' like prevailing winds and rain, 
rivers and sea give the potential power to entities to be released from one container 
and spread into another. So at the end the environment is represented in terms of a 
system of containers and carriers. Agents are seen as transported by various carriers 
from one container to another. Because of carriers, agent and affected are brought into 
contact in order for an agent structure to exist. An agent can now be carried at a 
distance at any scale. Moving the affected away from an agent might not be a solution 
for avoiding the agency since agents can be potentially moved as well. Carriers are 
represented in the end as the entities which break the inclusiveness or exclusiveness 
of containers. In other words they break separation and facilitate or permit 
interactions between entities. In that way long distances between entities cannot 
guarantee immunity, as the teacher frequently insists. Therefore carriers can cause or 
trigger the unexpected to happen. 
Another example of a carrier as a transportation system is the blood stream. As the 
term reveals the carrying of substances is constant, has a certain direction like a 
stream and distributes entities only where the stream gets, therefore being more 
predictable than other systems of carriers like the prevailing wind for example: 
The blood system is a transport system. You can compare it with the London 
Underground which moves people from place to place. To do this, there have to be 
carriages for the people to ride in, and engines to drive the carriages. The trains have a 
route to follow, and there are special places for the passengers to get on and off. You 
can look at the blood system in the same way. Here, the 'passengers' are the food and 
gas molecules that have to be moved from place to place. But what about the rest of 
the system? 
(Nuffield Science Year 9, p.92) 
The blood stream is a transportation system not accessible to us even if the blood 
itself is observable. Moreover the fact that the entities that are contained are 
unobservable makes it difficult to think how this system works. This is what the 
analogy between the blood system and the London Underground does, as it has been 
illustrated in section 6.3.3. It explores the similarities and differences between the two 
systems of carriers and therefore gives us some insight into a system of carriers by 
making it more accessible to commonsense understanding. 
7.5.4 Properties of carriers as transportation systems 
The examples of carriers which are discussed in this section, despite their differences, 
have some common properties as transportation systems. One of these properties is 
the fact that carriers impose a certain directionality on the movement of entities. 
Streams (either natural like rivers or metaphorical extensions of them such as the 
circulation of blood), prevailing winds and rain move entities consistently towards 
one direction. In the same way public transportation like buses and trains follow 
certain directions. 
An entity which is carried by a transportation system away from its source follows a 
route, more or less determined by the carrier. In other words, entities which are in the 
processes of transportation are not expected to turn back to their departure without 
any reasonable cause. To do so an agency must act on these entities which exceeds 
the carrier's agency. For example, since sulphur dioxide is dissolved in rain water and 
enters living systems as acid rain it is not expected that it will get back from where it 
comes from initially. 
Finally, the consecutive character of transpositions of entities, like for example 
prevailing winds giving place to rain in transporting sulphur dioxide is not unusual in 
every day concepts. But what is more interesting here from the point of view of nature 
is the way one system of carriers gives place to another in order to carry entities 
which cannot move by themselves. In the case of the Scandinavian forests the shift 
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from one carrier to another is represented in terms of transformation. Vaporised water 
is transformed into rain therefore sulphur dioxide which is mixed with air will be later 
mixed with rain as well. This is not really like leaving the train and catching the bus, a 
scheme which applies quite remarkably for transpositions of discrete entities like 
pollen grains: 
They [pollen grains] are often carried to the top of the troposphere by rising air 
currents and, if caught by fast-moving winds... 
(Air Ecology, p.22) 
The case is very different where transportation takes place through processes like a 
food chain. In food chains entities like pollutants travel from one trophic level to 
another through agent structures. An affected larva which carries pollutants becomes 
an agent when it is taken as food by a fish and it affects it. Carriers which are realised 
as sequences of agent structures are metaphorical extensions of carriers which are 
realised and represented as 'flow movements'. 
7.5.5 Metaphorical extensions of carriers 
In metaphorical extensions of carriers the job of the container which transposes like a 
'flow movement' entities from one place to another is undertaken by a sequence of 
agent structures. An effect of an initial action is carried through consecutive processes 
or events away from its initial action. A food web is an example of this kind of carrier 
which has not always been thought of as being primarily a carrier. Today it is almost 
taken for granted even in our everyday life, that food webs should be considered as 
carriers, especially in cases of health scares such as mad cow disease, but in the past it 
was rather a shocking discovery that DDT has passed all the way down to the food 
chain and had been detected in penguins which live in Antarctica. In the following 
example discussed in the previous section from the point of view of the containment 
relations involved (see example (17) in section 7.4.2.2) a non-discrete agent is 
represented as having the property of passing from natural systems into living 
systems. When acid chemicals are washed into rivers or ponds, irrespective of where 
they come from, they are carried by one living organism to another. In this case a 
sequence of agent structures such as a food chain is represented as a carrier which 
continues the transportation of chemicals from a natural system into a living system. 
The phenomenon of inheritance in plants and animals in textbooks is represented as 
passing of characteristics from one generation to another. In the context of 
reproduction, inheritance can be seen as a metaphorical extension of carrier in which 
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living organisms are realised as carriers of genetic material. The representation of the 
process of passing genetic material from one individual organism to another requires 
that organisms are realised as entities which are made up of smaller units. That is 
plants and animals are represented as made up of cells and cells contain in their 
nucleus (DNA molecules) the genetic material which is responsible for the way 
organisms are and appear. The mechanism of carrying the genetic material from one 
organism to another starts from when DNA molecules produce exact copies of 
themselves. At this point, as we have seen above in chapter 3 and section 4.5.3, the 
use of two lexical metaphors at the same time to describe the nature of the genetic 
material; as an information-like entity building instructions and as a thing-like entity 
DNA molecules, has been blamed as the main reason why people of all ages are in 
trouble to understand and explain the concept of inheritance. 
While inheritance is realised as passing of genetic material from one generation to 
another, evolution is realised as a variety of organisms carried in long periods of time 
through consecutive generations. Notice that processes of sequences of agent 
structures such as adaptation and the survival of the fittest are realised as a 
nominalized process natural selection which acts as an agent in relation to evolution. 
In other words what is carried in time is species and their characteristics which 
survive out of a number of agent structures. 
Metaphorical extensions of carriers include also cases where things which are not 
normally thought as being transported are seen as being so. For example an effect 
itself can be represented as being carried away by an agent structure or a sequence of 
agent structures: 
(5) 
T: 	 When it rains it produces acid rains it kills the trees it makes the lakes become 
acidic it affects the life in the lakes and so on. 
S And the poor little animals die. 
T 	 Ok n so in lots of ways we're passing our problems onto other countries. 
(Looking at the Environment 1st Lesson, p.4) 
Problems here are thought as being transferred from one country to another due to 
people's actions. The latter are represented as carriers rather than as direct agents. In 
that way an agency is suppressed since it is different to think of an entity as a carrier 
of an agency than an agent which acts directly upon the affected: 
T 	 .. you could live miles away from any cities anybody else but what is 
happening to a lot of the lakes in Scandinavia? What's happening to them 111 
S 
S People are dumping stuff in them. 
T 	 Not quite 11 we 11 we are not dumping stuff in those lakes. 
188 
S 	 Oh dear. 
S 	 What we're doing is trying ...somewhere else we're not 
T 	 We're not actually, we're not actually 11 putting stuff in lorries and taking it 
up there and dumping it, but when our factories kick out all of this poisonous 
smoke that goes up into the atmosphere where does it get blown to? 
S 	 Scandinavia. 
(Looking at the Environment, 1st Lesson, p.4) 
Agency also can be suppressed when a number of processes are described in terms of 
relations between carriers and transferring entities: 
Temperature, sunlight and the winds carrying water vapour and rain are responsible 
for the climate... 
(Air Ecology, p.18) 
7.5.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, carriers break boundaries - mainly imposed by containers - and make 
agent structures possible. Their semantic function is essentially different from 
containers, even if they can be containers by themselves, and from agents, even if a 
sequence of agent structures is seen as carrying something. The concept of carrier is 
about transferring (movement) and at a more abstract generalised level it is the 
realisation of making relations, connections between entities possible. That is why 
carriers have often been seen as the 'mechanism' - often represented as a 
transportation system - which realises and represents interactions in nature. At the 
level of what the entities are, dynamic representations of carriers open up the potential 
of creating or altering entities, thus constructing new entities by working out the 
ontology of pre-existing ones. The extent to which they are used as means of 
representation can promote specific ideological aspects about nature, such as seen it 
as a 'living' organism. 
7.6 Cycles of nature: an example of a multi-modal construction of 
an image schema 
7.6.1 Cycles in the context of teaching environmental science 
Ecology provides descriptions in terms of cyclic patterns for various phenomena, 
either natural ones like the life cycle of an organism, or ones caused by humans like 
the farming cycle. These cyclic patterns can be represented in various ways, either as 
temporal successions of events, like the steps a farmer has to take during a year in 
cultivating crops (Appendix 4.13), or as the transformations through which an entity 
goes in a temporal sequence, like the rock cycle and the life cycle of an organism. 
What makes a cyclic pattern found in nature and represented as cycle different from 
other phenomena is the fact that either a sequence of events returns to its initial event 
from where it begins or an entity is returned back to where it began. That is why a 
cyclic pattern as a whole is represented vividly with the image of a continuous cycle 
to express its closed nature. It should be mentioned here that the experiential basis of 
the cycle image schema is not supposed to be necessarily grounded in our physical 
experience. (e.g. day-night cycle) Social, cyclic patterns as well, such as timetables at 
work (e.g. a school year) provide us with concrete experiences of cycles. 
Even if the closed feature of the cycle makes it different from other schematic 
structures, like agent structures, containment relations and path-link schemata, the 
latter are implemented in the construction of cycles. The Nitrogen cycle for example 
is built up by a path-link schema; dealing with it means that one has to appreciate and 
respect the sequential unfolding of agent structures: 
T: 	 Obviously, the object of growing the grass or putting nitrates into the soil, is 
to get the grass to grow 'cos we need the grass to keep the animals live, so the 
grass, then, is eaten by the animals so the protein, the plant protein, in the 
grass is now taken in by the animal, so our nitrogen atoms have gone through 
the soil, through the plants and the nitrogen atoms now are in the horse's 
body.. body.. body.. body. 
The representation of the Nitrogen cycle in terms of these two schemata transforms it 
into a more accessible entity. Students can work on it in their minds, talk about it and 
draw it on a piece of paper. They begin to trace with confidence (and this is where 
most of the teachers' effort is focused) the intermediate links and paths through which 
Nitrogen is transferred and transformed, and they begin to use the idea that you 
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cannot deal with the entities as separated and removed from the whole cycle. The 
cycle is also built as an accessible unit of study without being too vague to deal with. 
It can be recalled at any time and other entities make sense by making reference to it. 
In teaching environmental science, textbooks and lessons can represent the same 
phenomenon which has a cyclic pattern in different ways, depending on the context 
and the aims of the teaching. For example in the same textbook Nuffield Science 13 to 
16 Study Guide 1 in the same section Looking for patterns in life cycles we notice 
two different representations of a life cycle (Appendix 4.14). The cycle on the top of 
the page represents a life time of an organism as a succession of events: creation of a 
new individual, maturity, reproduction and death. The description of the processes as 
nominalizations in the diagram forces us to read it as a temporal sequence of events. 
But the diagram that follows the one at the top of the page demands a different 
reading. The pictures of an animal frog at three different stages of its life 
accompanied by three different names with which it is called, focus on the 
transformations that happen to it during its life time. The first diagram does not make 
any reference to a particular living organism while the second derives from it as an 
exemplifying instance. 
This section deals with the different representations of some of the most frequently 
found cycles in the teaching of environmental science and the effect these 
representations have on the meaning these cycles convey. These are the Carbon and 
the Nitrogen cycle. In analysing the various representations of the two cycles as many 
as eleven examples of them are used from nine different kind of textbooks addressed 
to students of various ages, together with two examples of cycles taught in two 
secondary schools; one is the Carbon cycle taught to Year 7 students and the other is 
the Nitrogen cycle taught to Year 9 students. 
7.6.2 Features of the cycle schema 
Looking at the sample of cycles collected for the purpose of this analysis the first 
thing we notice apart from their variety is that they are all multi-modal constructions 
of meaning: images and language take part in the construction of each cycle. If for 
other phenomena the role of images or language is silent in the construction of 
meaning this is not the case for the construction of cycles. Cycles are at least one of 
the most explicit cases of multi modal constructions of meaning. Nevertheless, even 
though an image of a cycle is usually elaborated by a text, and linguistic elements are 
found all over the image, the latter has a dominant place both on textbook pages and 
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on classroom white boards. It therefore seems appropriate that analysis of a cycle 
should start from the image without neglecting the linguistic elements and the text 
related to them. 
It is striking what a rich variety of forms are used in making images of cycles. Despite 
their differences forms can only be of two kinds, either nodes or links (Appendix 
4.14). Reading an image as a spatial representation on paper, nodes represent resting 
places while links represent movements. As a result an image of a cycle as a whole 
creates a tension because of the recurring pattern of static and dynamic states of 
affairs. But since the representation on paper is used to describe a phenomenon found 
in nature another sort of tension is created as well due to the differences in meaning 
that the means of the representations impose. For example as we will see later, even if 
nodes represent resting places in an image, linguistic elements referred to them may 
represent processes and not things. 
Nodes can be pictures taken from the real world, usually pictures of animals and 
plants (Appendix 4.15) or picture-like drawings which resemble pictures but are not 
specific instances of entities found in reality (figures of cycles in Appendices 4.2, 
4.16, 4.17, 4.18). For example a picture of a rabbit is a photograph of a real rabbit 
(Appendix 4.15), but a picture-like image of a rabbit (Appendices 4.2 and 4.17) is a 
drawing of a real rabbit indicating that it is just 'a' rabbit. Nodes also can be icons, 
representing categories of entities, like plants and animals, varying to the extent to 
which they are abstracted from real entities (figures in Appendices 4.19, 4.20, 4.5). 
For example the sea can be represented by a crooked line (Appendix 4.21) and a tree 
can be represented by a figure without any detail specifying what kind of tree it is 
(Appendix 4.5). Even for icons which have more detail, often animals, one can just 
sees what sort of animal is involved without being able to say whether it is a goat or a 
deer (Appendix 4.5). Finally, nodes can be just shapes like rectangles or circles 
having no visual relation with the things they represent. In this case, the shapes are 
accompanied by linguistic elements which say what they are supposed to represent 
(figures in Appendices 4.4, 4.22, 4.23). Links are always represented as lines with 
arrows at one end and can vary in how thick the lines and arrows are (Appendix 4.3 
for example). 
Another important aspect of images is the absence or presence of a background and 
up/down dimension. Most of the picture-like images are placed against a background 
that is often the horizon or just the sky (figures in Appendices 4.2, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18). 
Images made by icons or separated pictures are represented without any background 
(figures in Appendices 4.15, 4.19, 4.5). As we will discuss later the absence or 
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presence of a background is related with the image of a cycle as a whole and it affects 
the degree to which the cycle is represented as abstracted from the real world or is 
imposed as a mental construction upon what can be seen in reality. 
The up/down dimension is related with the presence or absence of a background when 
it resembles spatial relations found in nature. While an image with a background 
always has an up/down dimension in which what is at the top represents the sky and 
the atmosphere and what is on the bottom represents the ground (or sea) and the 
underground (see Appendix 4.16 for example) the opposite is not always the case 
(like in Appendices 4.15 and 4.19). Actually most of the images without any 
background have an up/down dimension. Even the most abstract images of a cycle 
made up by rectangles and lines can have an up/down dimension in which nodes like 
atmosphere are located at the top, and nodes like fuels and carbonate rocks are at the 
bottom (Appendix 4.4). On the other hand an image which consists of some icons can 
lack an up/down dimension if priority is given to other features like symmetry for 
example (Appendix 4.5). An up/down dimension can represent a conceptual hierarchy 
rather than realistic aspects of the world. Or the two - conceptual and realistic 
relations - can be implemented at the same time. This is for example in cases where 
there is a hierarchy of events which are numbered (Appendix 4.22) or in cases where 
secondary consumers are located higher than primary consumers and producers 
(Appendix 4.15). 
Even if images dominate in representing either the Carbon or Nitrogen cycle, 
linguistic elements accompany the images in a way that suggests that they provide 
necessary information for the 'proper' reading of the images. Therefore, it is not 
accidental that images which are rich in terms of picture, picture-like and icon forms 
are those which have more linguistic elements in them (Appendix 4.2) than those 
which consist of very few forms, like rectangles and lines (Appendix 4.4). In cases 
where quite a lot of information is given in terms of linguistic elements distributed all 
over the image the text which either follows or precedes the image is not so extensive 
(Appendix 4.2) comparing with the figure in Appendix 4.4. For the latter it is 
inevitable that if few words are used in the image these are more likely to be 
nominalizations, nouns and verbs (Appendices 4.5, 4.21, 4.4, 4.22). On the contrary 
in the former case, phrases are seen instead of nominalizations (Appendices 4.2, 
4.16). We also notice that what images do not represent, language is called on to 
represent, e.g. if things are not pictured in any way that resembles them then they 
should be called by their name (see figures in Appendices 4.21 and 4.4). 
7.6.3 Cycles representing nature 
Four kinds of cycles, represented in the table below, will be discussed: 
Cycles represented as: Images as appear in Appendices 
real events 4.2, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18 
constructed events 4.15, 4.5, 4.4 
selected events 4.19, 4.20, 4.3 
invented events 4.21, 4.22, 4.23 
(Table 3: The four kinds of representations of cycles and the images which more or 
less fit in these types of cycles) 
The first type is that of cycles represented as 'real events' found in nature. Take for 
example the cycle in Appendix 4.2. The cycle as a whole is given as a single picture 
taken from nature, in other words it is represented as a snap-shot of what happens 
daily in the real world. The picture-like forms of the image - except probably the fire 
on the right - do not appear specially selected for the purpose of constructing a cycle. 
The sky on the background and the up/down dimension of the image further represent 
the relations between the forms of the image as 'natural'. The entire image seems to 
say: "we don't need to select anything and put it carefully together like pieces in a 
puzzle, everything we see out there in nature makes sense and is coherent by itself; 
the only thing is left for us to do is just to describe what we see in the world". 
The linguistic elements (many and lengthy) describe what we see in nature. They 
overlap with an image in a way that does not spoil its realistic effect. Since the forms 
of the image are too realistic to be mistaken, observable, thing-like entities do not 
need to be named. Events, like eating, death and burning do not need to be mentioned. 
What we are informed about from the linguistic elements are the unobservable 
process-like and thing-like entities. Even for the latter, where possible picture-like 
images are provided together with their names. 
The second kind of representation, that is 'constructed events', is one step away from 
an image which is supposed to be reality as such. In Appendix 4.15 we notice that all 
of the observable thing-like entities are pictures of 'existing' entities, thus 
photographs. The difference from the first category is that where in the first case the 
whole cycle is given as an instance-like event - in the second case each observable 
element of the image is instantiated. There is an absence of any background but there 
is an up/down dimension which is both presentational and conceptual: entities that are 
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found lower than others in the food pyramid are also found spatially lower in the 
image (e.g. bacteria and fungi). Processes are not represented by pictures but only by 
linguistic elements and arrows. 
Linguistic elements are quite economical when they describe relations among 
observable thing-like entities and are more elaborated when they represent processes 
in which unobservable entities are involved. While the two nodes containing 
linguistic elements represent actions, the arrows represent transfer of substances (N2) 
carried by materials (e.g. food) from one thing-like entity to another. Therefore the 
focus is not on what the pictured entities can do (e.g. foxes eat rabbits), but on where 
substances are conserved and stored. 
Because of these characteristics we can say that this is a category which represents the 
cycle as a 'constructed event'. What counts in this category is how well the 'pieces' of 
the 'puzzle' taken from the real world - which is why they are pictured as far as 
possible - will fit together constructing a 'picture' in a way that does not resemble 
what we can 'see' in nature but what we 'think' about nature. 
Notice also that language takes a step further for decontextualizing the pictured-like 
entities from their realistic representations; each entity is named (e.g. fox, rabbit, 
grass). This is obviously not because the reader is unable to recognise what is pictured 
in each photograph but because the linguistic elements suggest 'reading' the 
photograph not as specific instances of foxes and rabbits - like saying that there is 
nothing really special in choosing these photographs and not others - but as any foxes 
or rabbits. As a result, a rather profound tension is created because of the 
'contradictory' use of the two means of representations (images and language); while 
the pictured-like entities are heading towards to what can be thought of as more 
concrete and specific (exemplified), the absence of the background together with the 
linguistic elements are heading towards a more generalised and abstracted schema of 
a cycle. 
Other examples of this category which are less controversial vary to the extent to 
which they are abstracted and generalised. The figure in Appendix 4.4 for example 
represents a cycle as a 'constructed event'. But here thing-like entities are further 
generalised and abstracted from those that can be found in nature. They are 
represented by their names in nodes which are shaped as rectangles. Their names are 
categories (e.g. land plants, animals). Links between them are events almost all of 
them represented in terms of nominalizations which are far from what can be 
described in what we 'see' (directly) in nature. Despite all these characteristics and the 
absence of any background the image as a whole still sustains an up/down orientation 
similar to that found in reality. 
The next kind of cycle is of images which represent a cycle as a 'selected event' 
abstracted and generalised from nature. Representations of cycles which belong in 
this third category look very much like generalised instances. Observable thing-like 
entities appear as categories of things due to the use of icons representing them. 
Nevertheless, icons are placed together in a way that seems very realistic and natural, 
implying that in nature all the possible things the icons represent are found together in 
exactly the same way - a choice that makes the use of the up/down dimension 
inevitable. Therefore the image as a whole seems to select from nature only what is 
coherent and makes sense in order to represent it (as in Appendix 4.19). Only relevant 
things are chosen which are joined together in such a way that the whole will be just 
one event: the cycle. As a result any background information is irrelevant and it does 
not matter if links overlap with icons. Linguistic elements, depending on how far it is 
intended to represent the cycle as abstracted and generalised, consist of 
nominalizations (Appendix 4.19) or short phrases which represent processes 
(Appendix 4.20). As in the previous category, links have also the effect of 
representing nodes (these are the icons) as locations and containers from which either 
Carbon or Nitrogen is transferred and at the same time transformed. 
Notice in all these three categories above the tension which is created between the 
visible and the invisible simply because if the image is intended to picture in any way 
what can be pictured then unobservable thing-like entities are left with the option of 
being represented as linguistic elements. As a result the homogeneity of the overall 
image is broken since links connect elements which belong in two different systems 
of representations. This tension is resolved in cases where any realistic representation 
is excluded from the image of the cycle (see figure in Appendix 4.4 for example). 
Finally, the fourth kind of cycle represents the cycle as an 'invented event' which is 
better described as a succession of stages. There is nothing pictured which resembles 
anything in reality in Appendices 4.22 and 4.23. The image in Appendix 4.22 is not 
very different in respect to the conventions which are used for nodes and links with 
most of the images in the preceding category. But the fact that the steps through 
which Nitrogen goes are numbered and the discussion of the image in the text that 
follows is structured in terms of these four steps, has the effect that at the end the four 
stages take the status of the nodes in the overall image of the cycle. As a result, 
because of the way the image is elaborated, nodes become stages in which processes 
take place. This effect is very different from what we have seen before in the rest of 
the images in which nodes are thing-like entities most of them realised at the same 
time as containers. 
The image in Appendix 4.23 which was taught in the classroom (a detailed analysis of 
the construction of this image as part of a double lesson can be seen in Appendix 3.2) 
and comes out as an elaboration of another image represented in a textbook 
(Appendix 4.18) is very much like the image in Appendix 4.22. Each node is a stage 
at which Carbon is either stored somewhere carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere or 
transferred animals breathe out carbon dioxide during respiration or transformed 
burning fossil fuels. Stages are not numbered here but links show the way in which 
stages follows one another. In addition, links represent the way in which Carbon is 
transferred around. But again by placing together thing-like entities and event-like 
entities the effect that is created is that event-like entities can be represented as 
containers and agents in the same way as thing-like entities. 
7.6.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the examples of cycles above have illustrated that images have a 
prominent place in representations of cycles. Linguistic elements provide information 
about how one can read the images. In many cases of cycles language and images can 
be seen as co-operating for the creation of the same effect. For example abstraction 
and generalisation can be achieved linguistically by the use of nominalized processes 
and reference to categories of entities instead of referring to instances of entities. The 
same effect can be achieved by the use of images which have little resemblance with 
reality or few elements which are realistic representations of what one can see, such 
as the use of links between nodes which are shaped as rectangles. But in some cases 
tension is created because elements belonging to two different systems of 
representations (language and image) are linked together in representing relations 
between observable and unobservable elements for example. Here, language 
represents what images cannot. But even in this case choices can be made to resolve 
the tension by excluding any image-like representation from the cycle. 
Regarding both images and linguistic elements, different examples of cycles from a 
variety of textbooks have been studied from the point of view of how they realise the 
relation between the phenomenon and its representation. In doing so, four types of 
cycles have emerged, which are not to be understood as strict categories, but as 
varieties in the degree to which a cycle is represented as a mere picture of reality or as 
an entity constructed by scientists. 
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7.7 Discussion 
7.7.1 What is an image schema? 
In section 7.2, schematic realisations of agent structures represent agency in a similar 
way as linguistic realisations such as transitivity patterns, illustrated in the linguistic 
part of the analysis, represent relations of agency. In particular, examples of agency as 
they are applied to plants and animals as well as non-living entities in textbooks and 
in lessons show that the image schema of an agent structure is neither a category nor 
an instance of a category. It is rather a property shared by many instances and realised 
in different ways since the latter do not necessarily belong in the same category. For 
example competition is realised differently among instances of animals and plants 
since both belong in different categories. So schemata such as agent structures are not 
supposed to be only prototypical properties shared by most or all members (instances) 
of the same category only. As a result the ontological implication of the use of the 
image schema of agent structures, is that categorical relations between entities are 
worked out at the level of their instances even across different categories. 
As has been pointed out in the section concerning agency, because of their role 
underlined above, image schematic structures (and in this case agent structures) 
permit shifts of categorical relations from one category to another. To give an 
example, plants are represented as being more active than they were thought of 
before, with concepts such as competition and movement which were primarily 
thought of as being attached to active living entities such as animals being applied to 
them. In that way it seems that metaphorical elaboration of entities in terms of agent 
structures of image schemata are close to Black's (1962) accounts of the interaction 
view of metaphor. 
7.7.2 Path-link schemata or narratives? What is their value in 
teaching? 
Sequences of agent structures show that one should be careful in considering a single 
agent structure as a unit of analysis. An isolated agent structure can have a different 
meaning if is seen among other agent structures. Path-link schemata and narratives 
seem to have the same structure; actions follow one another in a sequence which has a 
beginning and an end. The structure of the story grounded in stories told in our 
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everyday life makes it a useful tool for teaching. Students know that the story is 
expected to have a cast of participants, and a beginning and an end. They are 
motivated because they know that stories are meant to be interesting, and they are 
able to participate by responding with their own stories. All these reasons probably 
explain why stories represented as narratives are so often chosen by teachers in order 
to represent issues and phenomena of environmental science. 
The fact that a story seems to be a valuable tool for representing science means that 
the ontological, epistemological and learning implications of its use should not be 
overlooked. Stories which are represented as being what is at issue to be explained are 
at risk of being misinterpreted by students as being reality themselves. 
Representations of phenomena such as acid rain in terms of narratives can be thought 
of as having a structure identical with the structure of narratives. This narrative-like 
structure imposes boundaries on the phenomenon such as an end and a beginning as 
well as a structure; a selected choice of a sequence of agent structures. If students 
think that this structure is the same as that of the phenomenon, then misconceptions 
are very possible. This implication brings with it an epistemological consequence 
about what should be taken as a scientific way of reasoning. In the absence of 
alternative stories or any accounts of where these stories come from or other ways of 
representing the same phenomenon, it is very likely that science is seen by students as 
working on the basis of 'single', 'true' stories which emerge directly from nature. 
Following from that, both teacher and students are in danger of falling into a naive 
realism which also dictates what learning should be; stories are seen as a window 
looking into nature, revealing nature's plot. 
7.7.3 Containments, carriers, cycles: ontological, epistemological 
and learning implications 
Representations of entities in terms of containment relations are about imposing 
boundaries on entities. These representations have ontological implications about 
what the entities are thought to be, or can or cannot do. Also these constructions 
constitute the ways in which entities are realised since they reflect choices about what 
can be meant and how, with epistemological consequences. Forests and ponds are 
represented as if they are units of study which emerge from the world 'naturally' 
without it being our choice to pick them up as such and study them. But even if the 
reasons which are hidden behind what is apparently seen as obvious choices are 
silent, they not only imply that the scientific way of studying the environment is not 
very alienated from the way 'we perceive' it in our everyday life, but also show how 
the environment is supposed to be studied in schools. 
Metaphorical extensions of containment relations and nominalizations are very 
similar in respect to what they afford and how. They both treat process-like entities as 
thing-like entities and that explains why so often metaphorical extensions of 
containment relations are represented linguistically as nominalized processes (e.g. 
photosynthesis). Things like objects have clear edges and can be touched in a way 
that one has a very good idea of distinguishing them as discrete entities. The same is 
not true of processes. It is usually our action which imposes artificial boundaries on 
processes, so as to speak, knowing when a process stops and another one begins. 
According to Piaget and the main stream of cognitive psychology our early 
interaction with the physical world (called 'sensori-motor' knowledge) seems to have 
a priority in our cognitive development in relation to more abstract domains of 
knowledge. This is more or less what Lakoff (1987) claims: that image schemata have 
an experiential basis grounded in our preconceptual structures of kinesthetic image-
schematic structures. The similarity between the two is vividly reflected in Ogborn 
(1994) and Lee (1992). Therefore, treating our interaction with processes in terms of 
acting on object-like things seems to have an experiential basis which serves a 
fundamental need; to clarify entities to ourselves by representing and realising them 
as discrete as possible. 
As has been illustrated in this chapter imposing boundaries and representing entities 
as discrete objects is widespread. Ironically, even if one expects that these kinds of 
representations make the comprehension of entities easier, it also obscures the 
complexity and artificiality of many of these constructions. 
Finally, we should not pass unnoticed the fact that these representations have a silent 
ideological implication. Imposing boundaries on entities such as the Mediterranean 
sea and keeping them separate from others in order to illustrate pollution probably 
does not work in the same way if environmental science is to be looked as part of an 
interdisciplinary study which includes geography and economics (e.g. the effect of 
industry and economic relations on the sea without the former necessarily being in the 
region of the latter). In particular, economics can provide a view of Mediterranean in 
which boundaries are not realised in terms of a closed sea, but as a part of a wider 
web of economic relations. As a result, representations of entities in terms of 
containment relations which shut off alternative ways of representing entities can 
possible mislead students by reproducing a naive, everyday realism which turns a 
blind eye to the fact that conflicting interests can create different points of view about 
whether one entity is seen as separate from others. 
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The arguments above apply to some extent to all schematic representations. The case 
is clearer with containment relations because they are primarily concerned with 
setting up the ontology of entities; that is making them discrete. The issue of how 
entities are represented schematically and what are the possible consequences such 
representations carry with them applies also to carriers and cycles. 
The extent to which carriers are used as means of representation promotes specific 
ideological aspects about nature (e.g. as a 'living organism'). Notice also that 
representations in terms of carriers depending on the scale at which they are applied 
are heading towards two opposite directions (often mentioned in the literature of 
environmental science): at the scale of whole living systems emphasis is put on 
stability (e.g. 'blood system', 'air system') while at the scale of the parts the possibility 
of dynamic relations carriers can afford is illuminated (e.g. water carrying pollutants 
next to a marshland area). As one can see here choices of where the emphasis is put 
on can highlight and at the same time hide specific aspects of meaning relations. In 
other words, what is chosen to be said carries with it always an aspect of what is, 
deliberately or not, chosen not to be said (or remain silent). 
Different representations of cycles can have different implications both ontological 
and epistemological at the same time. The former are about the nature of the 
represented entity (e.g. carbon cycle) and the latter are about how knowledge about 
cycles can be achieved. In order to show these implications different representations 
have been grouped together in respect to whether and to what extent they represent 
the cycle as a natural entity or as a theoretical entity. 
To give two examples, cycles can be represented as being 'pictures' taken out of 
nature that have to be read in a certain way. Such representations are about relations 
which reflect relations in nature. They also imply that what can be represented is what 
one can see in nature. This naive realism represents cycles as 'natural' entities which 
can be approached by an almost 'photographic' relation between the 'viewer' and the 
object of his/her inquiry. On the other hand cycles represented as 'constructed events' 
imply that they are theoretical entities which are made up by 'real pieces' these are 
entities taken from nature as they are and arranged in a way that fits what we think 
about nature. This view subscribes a more active role to scientists since cycles are not 
simply made by what we see in nature but by how we think about it. At the same time 
the reality of the cycle is grounded in the real status the pieces of the cycle have since 
they are extracted from nature as 'they are'. 
7.7.4 Ideological implications of the use of image schemata 
7.7.4.1 Agency carried at a distance might have an ethical effect 
As it has been discussed in section 7.2 agency in environmental science can raise 
ethical questions. The ethical issue of affecting people or other populations of 
organisms which do not cause environmental damage or pollution is raised quite 
frequently in lessons about environmental catastrophes. The question often implied in 
representations of the latter is why the environment of a certain population has to 
suffer damage for which it is not responsible. 
In the examples given the issue of pollution is looked at from either the biocentric or 
the anthropocentric point of view. The latter presents environments as properties 
which belong to certain populations; the Scandinavian environment belongs to the 
Scandinavian people, who are affected when 'their' environment is affected. The 
biocentric view gives some respect to nature itself, so when a pond is polluted and the 
fishes die it does not mean that this is bad for human beings' interests only (they 
cannot make use of polluted fishes as a source of food). Apart from the fact that life is 
destroyed which is attributed a value more important than that given to inorganic 
matter, the whole balance of a living system - the pond in this case - is seen as being 
upset (see example 17). 
Phenomena like the GHE and damage to the ozone layer which have effects on a 
global scale, are represented as having different effects on different people; countries 
which are below sea level will be flooded and populations living closer to the poles 
are more at risk of developing skin cancer (see example 7). It is also interesting to 
notice that the temporal distance between the causes of these phenomena and their 
effect is stressed in their classroom representations; generations of populations today 
are affected by what other people have done in the past: 
The ethical issue which is raised by agency at a distance, either temporal or spatial, 
implies a rather peculiar mixture of anthropocentricism and biocentricism; causality 
in nature is seen as circular, so it is expected that the agents will pay the cost of their 
action, so that in a way the effect goes back to them and affects them. Agency as an 
ethical issue also raises the question of whether relations between human beings and 
between human beings and nature have to be thought of as competitive or symbiotic. 
7.7.4.2 Deep Ecology: Does nature teach us how should we think 
about it ? 
Various examples of sequences of agent structures given in the classroom are trying 
to modify students' way of thinking about nature and how they think about their role 
in respect to nature. In most of the teachers' examples causes of catastrophes are 
represented as single decisions of humans which were taken without thinking in terms 
of a sequence of agent structures but rather in terms of single agents. Teachers' 
example of the diseases caused by the appearance of bacteria in seas because of 
insufficient sewage works and the appearance of pollutants in water supplies because 
of untreated waste disposals in seas, rivers and lakes are represented as caused by 
single agents such as factories. 
The teaching of the Carbon and Nitrogen cycle seems to aim to reinforce the concept 
of a sequence of agent structures and to promote the idea of the closed-ness of the 
entire ecosystem. At the same time part-whole interdependence is emphasised; a 
faulty part or a removed part causes destruction of the whole. The repeated patterns of 
sequence of agent structures, the frequency with which nesting is used to represent 
various phenomena, the emphasis that is given to the feedback loops of causal 
relations and the fact that what is taken as a unit of study is never an isolated part of a 
whole system, construct a holistic view of nature. In that way what is counted as 
valuable is the contribution of the part to the whole and not the part itself. Thus 
unobservable parts take a very real value because of their participation in the whole, 
in the same way that observable parts participate. The ideological implications of 
almost all textbook and classroom representations of cycles are: to think 
environmentally is to think always in respect to the whole and to take the whole as the 
fundamental unit in the study of the environment. 
7.7.4.3 Ecocentrism versus technocentrism 
Concerning human action, most of the examples one of the teachers provides support 
the argument that new technologies are not the solution for every problem caused by 
pollution or by the exploitation of nature's resources. The teacher states explicitly that 
peoples' attitudes and behaviours have to be changed if we wish to develop a 
sustainable environment. Therefore, following his argument, new policies applied by 
laws must be addressed to that end, for example by forcing industry to install all the 
necessary equipment in order to dispose of toxic waste properly (see example 9). He 
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also claims that domestic waste can be reduced significantly if peoples' consuming 
attitudes change in respect to packaging for example. 
This ecocentric approach to environmental problems has its roots in the holistic view 
of nature which as we have seen above is constructed at various levels in many 
different ways of representing nature. As a result the teacher speaks as if nature 
teaches us how to think about it and our relation with it, and that this way of thinking 
should be the basis on which any approach to environmental problems has to be 
grounded. The previous section (7.7.3) has illustrated that representations of 
environmental science have certain ontological implications about the nature of the 
represented entities. What has also been shown is that ideas about the nature of 
entities carry with them implications about how we can think and learn about them. In 
the present section (7.7.4) what have be seen as ideological positions (e.g. 
ecocentrism) implied in classroom talking have ontological (e.g. environment realised 
as the set of relations between the whole and its parts) and epistemological 
implications (priority of sequences of agent structures over single agent structures) as 
well. 
CHAPTER 8 
WHAT DO THE METAPHORICAL WAY OF TALKING AND 
METAPHORS IN TERMS OF IMAGE SCHEMATA AFFORD 
AND HOW? 
8.1 Introduction 
Two analytic approaches (S.F.L and image schemata) are used in the present thesis 
for the study of metaphor in the teaching of environmental science. Both approaches 
can be looked at from two points of view; how each metaphor works, (that is the first 
and second research question) and what it can afford (that is the third and fourth 
research question). 
8.2.1 What the two approaches: Systemic Functional Linguistics and 
the Image Schema approach, have in common in respect to the 
findings of the present study 
According to Lakoff and Johnson, image-schematic structures are relatively simple 
structures that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience. These structures 
are directly meaningful because they are directly and repeatedly experienced (like 
moving in and out of rooms) in contrast with conceptual, abstract structures (like the 
concept of cell in Biology) which are indirectly meaningful. Conceptual structures 
arise from basic - level and image-schematic structure usually by metaphorical 
projection from the domain of the physical, everyday, bodily experience to the 
abstract domain (Lakoff, 1987, 268). 
But, according to Halliday, grammatical metaphor occurs if the natural 
correspondence between how things are and behave in the world and how these things 
and their behaviours are realised linguistically is violated. So if we talk about an 
action not in terms of a material process but as if it is a participant, realised 
grammatically as a nominalized process, then we have a grammatical metaphor. 
Because of the interrelation between context, semantic form and language, how we 
talk about something has an effect on how we treat it and how we are engaged with it. 
So the action can be treated now not as an action but as a thing which can have 
properties and it can be a participant which is involved in other actions. 
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As has also been discussed in chapter 4, while these two accounts of metaphor seem 
to agree that there are different realms of experience and that metaphor occurs when 
reference to one can be made in terms of another, they are different in respect to what 
they think metaphor is about. For S.F.L nominalizations as well as the rest of the 
grammatical metaphors consist of unusual ways of representing either familiar or 
unfamiliar entities. On the other hand, representations in terms of image schemata 
afford familiarity for abstract concepts since their schematic representations are 
grounded in directly understood concepts. 
But this difference between the two analytic approaches is rather a matter of what is 
accounted as a unit of analysis. Grammatical metaphors as far as they are concerned 
with the ideational metafunction are about representations of process-like and thing-
like entities as they appear in single clauses. Image schemata are multi-modal 
constructions, so they are not meant to be analysed as they appear in single clauses or 
even in the linguistic mean of representation only. Take for example the containment 
schema. Its linguistic representation in the examples discussed in the present thesis 
exceeds the level of a single clause. Representations of containers also are not bound 
to any specific ideational process or to the presence of a circumstance or a participant. 
So while 'photosynthesis' is a nominalization from the point of view of S.F.L because 
a process is represented by a noun, from the point of view of the image schematic 
approach representations (both linguistic and pictorial) of 'photosynthesis' can realise 
the latter as a container in which different things happen or as a path-link schema of 
agent structures in which one agent structure follows another like walking along a 
path from one destination to another. Both kinds of image schemata represent 
'photosynthesis' in relation to what we know or is familiar to us since both 
containment and path-link are grounded in well understood and familiar experiences. 
What constitutes a choice for S.F.L is whether the entity photosynthesis will be 
represented as a thing-like, or as a process-like entity. For the image schema 
approach, choice consists whether first of all photosynthesis will be represented in 
terms of an image schema, and if so of which kind. 
Representations of environmental science in teaching can be looked at from the point 
of view of what we already know about what the world is - in this case the 
environment and issues related with it - and how it can be represented in school 
science. In this case grammatical metaphors are representations of entities against our 
expectations of what the world should look like, while image schemata are rather 
representations of entities which resemble representations of other entities. 
The view adopted in the present thesis is to look at how entities are represented in 
relation to how other entities are represented in the same or different texts or images. 
This view instead of opposing what is represented with what is expected to be 
represented, studies how various representations are at work and then looks at 
similarities and differences in the way in which the same or different entities are 
represented. 
To give an example from the analysis, in some texts entities such as animals or plants 
are represented as being more active than in other texts. The extent to which animals 
or plants are represented as active or not is not only something that can be realised by 
a single representation (e.g. material process or agent structure) of a plant or an 
animal, but from a number of repeated representations of these entities which despite 
their variety are heading in the same direction; to represent them as Actors which are 
doing several things. Furthermore, it is not only that there are several representations 
at work in which in one way or another plants and animals are Actors, but the fact 
that other entities are related to these Actors as Goals. The extent to which such 
representations constitute choices among others is evident when we look at other texts 
in which plant and animal action is suppressed due to the use of passive material 
structures. Also the extent to which animals and plants are represented as similar is 
not because the text says so, but because they belong to the same kind of material 
processes and share the same sort of Goals. 
As has been argued in chapter 4, the focus of the linguistic approach is not on the 
lexicogrammar, namely words and their syntactic relations in clauses, but on how 
semantic forms realised by words and clauses function in making meaning. 
Participants like Actors and Goals are neither mere grammatical forms (like nouns) 
nor sets of meaning. They are semantic forms - that is to say forms which have certain 
functions in a specific context. Actors for example are the participants which are most 
likely to be realised as nouns and have the semantic function of doing, acting. 
The same sort of arguments as above are relevant for the image schema approach. 
Image schemata are neither pure forms, such as slots which can take any value of 
some kind, nor pure meaning relations. Metaphors seen as metaphorical projections of 
image schematic structures are not mere comparisons between concrete, rich images 
or between things. Metaphorical projections of image schematic structures onto 
abstract concepts as the image schema theory claims, create new meaning relations 
between entities. For example when the same agent structures that are used for 
representing animals are metaphorically projected onto representations of bacteria 
which are unobservable, and students have no immediate experience with them, then 
the two entities are brought closer in that bacteria are thought to be more like animals. 
Moreover shifts across various schematic structures at the level of the basic level 
categories build up meaning relations which are very different from mere mappings 
from the source (image schematic) onto the target (abstract) domain. Take for 
example the schematic structures which represent two basic level categories: human 
beings and animals. As discussed in Appendix 5.2, the agent structures that deal with 
the 'self' engage it in very much the same sort of agent structures that represent 
animals. As a result the 'self is objectified since the distance between the subjective 
and the objective 'self' is expanded while the distance between the 'self and the rest 
of the natural world is reduced. 
Much of the work in the classroom is, as stated above, at the basic level of image 
schematic structures. In consequence, the discourse can be analysed as chains (or 
other more complex structures) of related image schemata. 'Abstract concepts' do not 
appear in the discourse as such, but as represented at this basic level. To give one 
more example, the concept of cycle can be represented either as a path between 
intermediate links which are meant to be place-like entities, physical locations in 
which an entity is found (e.g. Carbon) or as a temporal sequence between events 
which are meant to be 'resting' places like physical locations but without having a 
spatial, physical dimension. Both schematic representations are grounded in our 
everyday experience with the spatial and temporal dimensions of the world around us. 
What is interesting here beyond the mere metaphorical projection of the image 
schema of cycle onto the scientific view of cycles of life is to look at the effect on the 
meaning of the latter by choosing either type of schematic representations. 
Therefore, metaphor in the present thesis is seen as a shift of functions at the level of 
the semantic forms which affect how the entities that they represent are realised. This 
view of metaphor is different from those accounts which describe metaphor as only 
an ornament. It is also different from those other approaches which see metaphor as 
only to do with structures of meaning relations, and neglect the linguistic effects of 
substituting one set of terms for another, on fundamental semantic relations (for 
example an action breathe represented like a thing respiration). 
Semantic forms (both linguistic and schematic) impose generic meaning on different 
entities. So for example both cells and human beings are - in different ways -
containers because they are represented as such repeatedly by accounts of 
containment schemata. This is due to the semantic function of the containment 
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relation which the containment schema imposes. Therefore, the same semantic 
functions apply to various sets of meaning. It is a more general level of meaning 
construction but at the same time a very basic one in which certain meanings apart 
from all their differences are grounded. Semantic forms for both approaches are 
relatively few and certainly not infinite; however one can see no upper limit to 
numbers of differences in meaning. 
Differences in the choice and use of semantic forms suggest that shifts of the status of 
entities (within or between domains) can be noticed in the discourse of teaching 
environmental science. For example the extensive use of passive material structures, 
in which cycles of life (Carbon and Nitrogen cycles) are realised linguistically in 
textbooks addressed to older students, suppresses agency significantly in contrast with 
those textbooks which are addressed to younger students and are full of active 
material structures instead of passive ones. 
The choice and use of certain forms and not others entails certain constructions of 
meaning and shuts off others. Going back to the example above the entailed meaning 
for younger students is that agency is needed almost all the time in order to keep the 
cycle going on. On the contrary the entailed meaning of the cycle for older students is 
that little or even no agency at all is needed. Looking at the entailments of the 
schematic structures we notice that for the younger students there is more stress on 
the idea that it is the same entity (CO2) which can be traced everywhere round the 
cycle by travelling from one place-like entity to another. On the contrary the 
entailments of the schematic accounts for the older students suggest that transformed 
entities (Carbohydrates, CO2) are involved in processes which are found at different 
stages of the cycle. Notice here the difference mentioned above, between a cycle as a 
journey in which departure and destination are just intermediate resting places and a 
cycle as a construction of temporally oriented processes in which the spatial 
dimension is suppressed. 
8.2.2 Summary and Conclusion 
In conclusion, the basic means of meaning are not infinite. Choices from the set of 
available means (semantic forms) have an effect on representations of meaning 
relations. Nevertheless meaning and semantic form do not always have a simple 
referential relationship of one to one correspondence. In some cases one semantic 
form can mean what another semantic form is used to mean. For example agency 
sometimes can impose containment relationships as well. The semantic boundaries 
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between the functions of the semantic forms are not clear cut, therefore the latter turn 
to be multi-functional; noun phrases realise thing-like as well as process-like entities 
and agent structures realise actions as well as containment relations. As a 
consequence the same set of form-meaning relation can be open to various semantic, 
interpretations. 
What is considered as metaphor in this study are the cases in which certain choices 
and uses of semantic forms either linguistic or schematic have an effect on meaning in 
a way that something (an entity) is like something else or it behaves in similar ways 
to something else. Differences in the representations of entities in which metaphor is 
involved show the implications of metaphor on how meaning can be further 
constructed. In other words metaphor creates a 'picture' of how to think about an 
entity. In that way a metaphorically constructed meaning has already imposed 
constraints on what can be considered as part of it or not. 
How does meaning meant for a certain purpose; namely the teaching of 
environmental science, have an effect on what the world (social and natural) is 
thought to be. To give two examples from the analysis: 
The world is not only what it looks like, but involves also quite a lot of things that we 
cannot see because they are invisible to us. Metaphor brings the invisible world closer 
to the visible one because it represents the unobservable in the same way as the 
observable: unobservable entities are represented as if they behave in more or less the 
same way the things and processes that we can see behave and function. The 
continuity of the observable to the unobservable bridges the gap between them in our 
understanding of the world. 
The various semantic forms can be used to produce a 'realistic' picture of the world as 
we observe it in our everyday life. In particular the semantic forms that represent the 
Carbon cycle might give some phenomenological accounts of its spatial and temporal 
dimensions. But in other cases they can impose on our phenomenological world a 
conceptual world in which the spatial place is replaced by a conceptual place and in 
which the boundaries of thing-like and process-like entities are not clearly imposed. 
The last two examples above suggest ways of looking at the implications this study 
can have for research in environmental and science education, and also the teaching 
of environmental phenomena, concepts and issues. 
8.3.1 Representing the unfamiliar as familiar and 
the familiar as unfamiliar. 
Two sides of the same process ? 
Image schemata such as agent structures and containers, provide the opportunity of 
representing unfamiliar thing-like and process-like entities as familiar. Entities that 
are less accessible to commonsense reasoning either because they are unknown, or 
unobservable or because they are only manipulated under controlled situations, are 
represented in schematic structures as if they are involved in relations grounded in our 
everyday experiences. This is also what representations in terms of material processes 
do. Unusual entities are talked about in material processes as if they are not 
problematic and are being understood in the same ways familiar entities are 
understood. Both kinds of representations develop gradually a sense of familiarity 
with such entities and as a result the status of the latter as 'real' entities is endorsed 
since they are engaged in everyday experiences and practices which are taken for 
granted as just obvious. Therefore, image schematic and linguistic choices in the 
context of teaching environmental science seem to have an important role in bridging 
the gap between commonsense and scientific knowledge. This role is accomplished 
by representing scientific entities as similar with everyday entities and by 
representing the relation between both as continuous. 
However, the distance between commonsense and scientific knowledge can be 
decreased in order to achieve purposes other than familiarity. Familiar entities can be 
talked of or can be part of metaphorical extensions of image schemata in such a way 
that they are alienated from the commonsense context from which they initially came 
and are now represented as scientific entities. I will now argue that achieving 
familiarity or unfamiliarity with entities should be thought of as two opposite 
directions of the same process. In other words the process of achieving familiarity 
with scientific entities at the same time results - to some degree - that 'alienation' with 
some commonsense entities can be possible. Two aspects: resemblance and 
continuity, of the process of achieving either familiarity or unfamiliarity concerning 
both kinds of representations (grammatical structures and image schemata) are 
discussed below. 
8.3.1.1 Resemblance 
Constructions of image schemata such as agent structures and containment relations 
as well as realisations in terms of material processes can bring entities from different 
domains together by representing them as having similar behaviours and properties. 
This is something that can be achieved either more explicitly or more implicitly. 
While in the former way the presence of the two domains from which the entities 
come are both present, in the latter sometimes not only the presence of the one of the 
two domains is silent but also the presence of the supposedly familiar entity is silent 
too. 
To give few examples, in section 6.3.3 an explicit representation of the blood system 
as a transport system is discussed. As has been argued, in this representation both 
domains (biology and transport) and systems of entities (blood system and 
underground, rail system) are present in the analogy. The analogy, described by 
others as a model or mapping, is analysed here as being worked out by the same kind 
of material processes which apply to the description of both the blood and the 
underground system. It can also be well analysed through showing that the same kind 
of image schemata apply to both systems. Lexical metaphors, such as 'chemical 
passengers' realise the blood system as being bound with the generic entity 'transport 
system'. 
To give another example, the explicit analogy between balloons and cells highlights a 
similarity between the two entities with the prospect of making the latter more 
accessible to students' understanding, in the following piece of a textbook: 
In Unit A3 you learned that molecules are on the move all the time. If there is little 
water on the outside of a plant cell, the water molecules will soon escape and plant 
will wilt (see figure 4a). But if there is a lot of water on the outside, more molecules 
will be trying to get into the cell than are trying to get out (see figure 4b). So the cell 
takes up lots of water and gets hard, like a blown-up balloon. 
(Nuffield Science, Y9) 
Analogies like the one above are grounded in similarities between schematic 
structures which belong to different domains. In this case, what is explored is the 
extent to which one schematic structure, the containment property of changing the 
capacity of what can be contained, applied to cells, is grounded in the experience we 
have with an object taken from everyday world. 
Many approaches to metaphors and analogies which study them based on the way 
they are marked out at the linguistic surface, will pass unnoticed the fact that in the 
extract above agency is stressed to the extent to which unobservable entities such as 
molecules are illustrated in respect to what they look like and how they function: 
molecules: 	 are on the move all the time 
escape from the plant cells 
are trying to get into a cell 
or are trying to get out of a cell 
Molecules are represented as having intentions and as involved in movements like 
familiar living entities (e.g. animals), so a strong sense of agency is attributed to their 
behaviour, analysed either as agent structures or material processes in which 
molecules are the Actors. 
Another example of an implicit resemblance between entities in which more than one 
domain of experience is used for their construction concerns the representation of 
cells as if they are the workplaces in which various jobs have to be done, and as if 
they are the containers in which things are stored and have parts which do several 
jobs (see sections 6.3.2.2.1 and 6.3.2.2.2). In these examples even if lexical metaphors 
are implemented in the representation of entities, the domains from which the 
analogies are drawn are not addressed explicitly. Regardless from which domains the 
analogies come from, resemblance is found between what is observable/accessible 
and what is unobservable/less easily accessible. So the latter are involved in 
schematic structures and in material processes in the same way as the former. 
Representations analysed in terms of image schemata and grammatical structures 
afford representations of the unknown and unobservable in terms of what is known 
and observable, but at the same time familiar entities are seen in unfamiliar ways and 
previous beliefs about the nature and behaviour of entities are challenged. For 
example, entities such as Nitrogen fixing bacteria and decomposers are represented as 
observable living agents: 
T: 	 They need to be broken down and bacteria etc. will break down the waste and 
they will be called the decomposers so waste is broken down by decomposers. 
Aren't we lucky we have the bacteria around the place, otherwise we'd be 
walking to school in the morning knee deep in dead cats, dogs, mice, rats, 
hedgehogs, etc. but you know that if you see a dead animal or whatever it is in 
the hedgerow after a period of time it's only the bones left. 
The fact that decomposers here are represented as agents in a relation of solidarity 
with humans; they do a job for us that we cannot do, without elaborating more the 
way in which the process of breaking down is realised, implies living properties to 
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their nature. This example also shows that both what is said and what is not said about 
the way the entity acts, produce further inferences about how its (nature) ontology is 
understood. 
One should also notice that what the teacher is trying to do is to challenge the 
commonsense belief that all bacteria are of the same kind and that they are all bad for 
humans. Even though the teacher's point of reference is the indeterminate 'we', which 
results in attributing some familiarity with bacteria's behaviour, students are called to 
think of themselves and consequently their lives as being dependent on what 
unobservable entities, which are represented as living, do. What the teacher implies is 
that without the bacteria we would not have been able to cope with a number of 
carcasses around us. He would later challenge more misconceptions about bacteria 
and disintegration by attributing for example the 'terrible' smell of dead animals to the 
release of special chemicals by bacteria in order to break down the dead organisms. 
Resemblance affords here both familiarity and unfamiliarity. The nature of bacteria is 
elaborated in a way that makes them familiar, but at the same time the 'self is seen 
from an unusual angle and prior beliefs about them are challenged. 
Entities which are discussed in the classroom for the first time are introduced by the 
teacher in relation to what students already know about them. For example the 
concept of the environment is introduced by a number of instances of different kinds 
of environment. Every instance of an environment is represented first of all as a 
physical/spatial place in the example (19) discussed in chapter 7.4.4.1 
T 	 What does the word urban mean in the connection with the word 
environment? 
S Is it .... 
T 	 Hands up first. Yes. 
S 	 Is it a type of place. 
T 	 It's a type of place. What type of place though might it be describing? Yes. 
Sorry. 
S 
T 	 I did...it's the water it's the water. Yes? 0 I'm going to have to .... next one 
next one you answer the next question... 
All Towns. 
T 	 Towns and cities and built up areas and so on ok we can refer to as urban 
environments ok 0 now then the next one. 
S 	 Rural. 
T 	 A rural environment ok now then here is your change a rural environment is. 
.1 the countryside ok. Out in the countryside 
S What's urban? 
T 	 Towns and cities. A domestic environment? 
S Dogs and cats. 
There is little thought whether a certain environment like a marshland area or a river 
can be thought of as a single unit or not. Therefore what is implied from the way 
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different kind of environments are talked about is that what is accessible to the human 
scale is seen as an appropriate unit of study and in addition, if necessary, relations 
between units can be addressed. 
But the study of each environment, even if it is identified at a first glance as a familiar 
place-like entity with spatial/physical dimensions, shifts to the sort of place-like entity 
where certain sort of interactions between entities occur. The natural environment for 
example is thought to be the sort of environment in which human agency is not 
involved at all. On the other hand an urban environment is one in which human 
beings intervene in every possible way, therefore it is an affected environment which 
in some cases is highly polluted: 
T 	 Ok a jungle. Now then why might a jungle area be natural. 11 Your right in 
saying that but why. You want to continue seeing as you started. 
S 	 ...I don't know. 
T 	 Yes. 
S 	 Is it because there's no machines ... 
T 	 Ok it's growing by itself we haven't been out there. We haven't been 
chopping down things we don't want planting things that we do want 
building buildings and so on it's unspoilt. It's unspoilt, untouched by 
human hands ok, ... 
T 	 Urban environment. A word or a phrase that would describe that 
environment. Yes. 
S 	 Horrible. 
S 	 Pollution. 
T 	 Pollution polluted ok, it's likely to have quite a lot of pollution there. 
S 	 Very busy. 
T 	 It's very busy LI you might come up with things like densely populated a lot of 
people in a given area. n ok 
The fact that an environment is defined by actions that take place within it and its 
interactions with entities of other environments and not by some intrinsic properties 
of the physical location as such is also supported by the teacher's argument (later in 
the same lesson) that nothing can guarantee that a certain sort of environment will 
remain as it is totally unchanged; a natural environment can cease to be natural if 
people intervene and use it for growing crops for example. What has been talked of 
before as a type of place, a physical location with a sense of closure separated from 
other types of place, has now turned into a set of relations which impose separation 
on the entities involved in them. So what was first represented as a container realised 
as physical location has now been represented as a container realised as a set of 
relations. 
Students are called on to think about different types of environment not on the 
grounds of what they are expected to be from the commonsense point of view; that is 
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physical locations, but as containers of a very different kind; it is the set of actions 
which entities are able to carry out on other entities or which can happen to them that 
define what is 'in' or 'out' of a type of an environment. Inevitably, the new way of 
thinking about types of environment 'alienate' students from the commonsense way of 
viewing an environment. As has been observed in the specific classroom situation, the 
extent to which thinking about environments in a new way is promoted depends not 
on the mere acknowledgement from the teacher that environments can be seen from a 
different point of view, but from a range of discussions and activities carried on with 
students in which the different realisation of the concept of the environment is worked 
out. 
As far as resemblance is concerned, it is noticed that a set of relations even defining 
what a natural environment is has as a point of reference human actions. In that 
respect the metaphorical extension of the containment relation in terms of relations of 
agency is elaborated not from a specific scientific point of view but from a 
commonsense point of view, very much in the same way metaphorical extensions of 
containment relations, in terms for example of people who see themselves as trapped 
in some kind of relation or situation (e.g. drug addiction), are realised in everyday 
life. So in this example as in the previous one it is noticed that resemblance can be 
silently heading towards two opposite directions at the same time; unfamiliar entities 
are made familiar and familiar entities are seen in unusual ways. 
Resemblance brings scientific, abstract entities and commonsense entities together at 
a level where a set of relations are grounded in everyday experience. At this 
intermediate level between what is abstract and what is concrete, described by Piaget 
as an empirical abstraction and by Lakoff and Johnson as basic-level categories and 
image schematic structures, the nature of entities and their relations with other entities 
are worked out most of the time, both in the context of textbook representations and 
classroom talk. From the image schema point of view adopted in the second part of 
the analysis of the present thesis (see chapter 7) resemblance is evident by the fact 
that both scientific and commonsense entities share the same schematic structures. In 
other words the same image schemata (grounded in everyday physical experiences) 
are the hosts for both abstract and concrete entities. As far as Systemic Functional 
Linguistics is concerned (see chapter 6), the same grammatical structures (e.g. 
material processes) are the host semantic structures for representing both abstract and 
concrete entities. One should be careful here not to misconceive this intermediate 
level described above as a domain which consists of mere concrete entities. Neither 
image schemata nor grammatical structures are forms or meaning relations. They are 
also neither abstract nor concrete. They are semantic forms abstracted from the 
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everyday physical experiences in which they are grounded and they are applied as 
representations of meaning to entities which come from various contexts. Therefore a 
description of resemblance as working the abstract within the concrete is rather naive 
since it characterises only one side of what is happening while it ignores how 
commonsense entities are represented. Moreover, this description polarises the 
abstract and the concrete leaving nothing between them while reinforcing us to 
categorise entities and representations in either category . 
In respect to resemblance, metaphor either looked from the point of view of the 
grammar or from the point of view of the image schema, affords both familiarity and 
unfamiliarity in the context of teaching environmental science. To give a final 
example from the representations of cycles, people, animals and plants involved in 
the Carbon cycle are abstracted from the concrete properties and relations which they 
have in our everyday world. They lose their uniqueness by becoming physical objects 
made of tissues and cells connected through circulation of substances. But then the 
discussion of arrangements and functions of parts is grounded in actions and relations 
which are very much the same as the concrete relations and actions in which we are 
involved in our everyday world. The blood stream is described as if it carries 
substances to parts of our body in the same way that goods are transported among 
countries. 
8.3.1.2 Continuity and recurrence 
Another way of representing the unfamiliar as familiar is by engaging the former as a 
participant in schematic or grammatic structures in which the latter is involved as 
well, without drawing a line between the two. Continuity means unnoticed, smooth 
shifts between entities which are found at different scales and are different in terms of 
whether they come from science or from everyday life. In that way continuity as well 
as resemblance affords that the ontological distance between entities is decreased or 
increased accordingly. 
Both in textbooks and in classrooms, continuity between entities, like resemblance, is 
not represented as an exceptional, rare case of representation in contrast with what is 
supposed to be a regular (literal) way of representing entities. On the contrary both 
resemblance and continuity are repeatedly used in transmitting desirable meaning or 
sets of meanings. The same schematic or grammatic structures for the same entities 
are repeated across different contexts and instances, so in a way a viable and 
convincing way of thinking is promoted and gradually established. 
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As discussed in section 6.3.2.2.1, both what is visible and invisible is part in the same 
grammatical structures of material processes in representations of the structure and 
functions of plants. Grammatical choices represent observable entities acting directly 
on unobservable entities. Also circumstances which realise spatial relations represent 
as unproblematic the fact that unobservable entities are located within observable 
entities. These representations which treat the invisible in the same way that we talk 
about the visible in everyday life, make more unlikely the chance of bringing the 
ontological differences between the two realms of experience to a conscious level. 
Therefore, continuity in grammatical structures results in familiarity with entities 
which are less accessible from the commonsense point of view, because the 
represented nature of these entities is based on representations which keep their 
differences with familiar entities silent (see also Appendix 5.1 and 5.2). 
Image schemata provide a set of relations in which what is known, easy to understand 
and/or observable is connected with unknown and unobservable or difficult to 
understand entities. At the end it is not just the fact that in a single image schema one 
unobservable entity is connected with observable entities or that it is involved in those 
kinds of relations which have an experiential basis, but that the same entity is found 
in more than one image schemata which are somehow connected to each other. 
Associations of image schemata like sequences of agent structures afford shifts at the 
level and the scale at which a phenomenon is studied without causing a breakdown 
between realisations of meaning which have an experiential basis and realisations of 
meaning which have a scientific basis. 
It should noticed here that the attribution of real existence to entities is a multi-modal 
construction. In the example of the Carbon cycle it is the classroom talk assisted by 
drawings on the board and in books which does most of the work. But in other 
examples very carefully planned demonstrations or the very detailed setting up of 
experiments in relation to classroom talk, do the same work. The teacher who 
demonstrates the effect sulphuric acid has on marble chips in a test tube, first of all is 
making the process observable and then elaborates it with language; 'eating away', 
'disintegrating' etc. The demonstration becomes later the visual representation which 
stands in place of the unobservable process of weathering. 
Among the means of multi-modal construction of entities representations in terms of 
narratives should be included. Resemblance and continuity often work together at the 
basis of how a narrative-like representation realises a phenomenon. One of the most 
important aspects of the path-link schema - discussed earlier in section 7.3 - is that it 
represents a phenomenon as a narrative of nature rather than as a narrative of science. 
This is realised by the temporal order of agent structures which follow one another as 
if they occur naturally and not hierarchically. 
Nominalization and nominalized processes as grammatical choices which abstract 
agency to some degree, are heading towards the opposite direction. Such 
representations lack any resemblance between how a phenomenon is represented and 
how it can be experienced from a commonsense point of view. Under nominalization 
a number of process-like entities and interactions between entities are silent but they 
can be made explicit if the packaging of information the nominalization entails is 
revealed. 
8.3.2 Conclusion 
In this section certain choices of linguistic and schematic representations have been 
discussed as functioning in the same way and leading to the same realisations of 
meaning. Metaphorical ways of talking analysed either as grammatical structures or 
image schemata afford both familiarity with unfamiliar entities and some sort of 
alienation with or distance from familiar entities. Resemblance and continuity bring 
into a relation of interaction entities which belong into different realms of experience. 
As has already been illustrated, this interaction reflected in entities' representations 
has implications for how the nature of entities is represented and realised, and the 
status that is attached to them, particularly the extent to which they are represented as 
real, and what is it considered as commonsense or scientific knowledge. Before we 
discuss further these implications in the final last chapter, it should be noticed here 
that resemblance and continuity do not impose boundaries between what is supposed 
to be commonsense and what is supposed to be scientific knowledge. On the contrary, 
it is mostly in a silent way that the ontology of both is worked out - in the teaching of 
environmental science - in a way that resemblance and continuity realise the relation 





Two different points of view have been used in the present thesis for the study of 
metaphor, one concerning more with language, that is Systemic Functional 
Linguistics and the other concerning more with cognition, that is the image schema 
approach. Following the two approaches metaphor is seen as a choice of an option for 
representing meaning relations against other options. So for example from the 
linguistic point of view choices such as nominalized processes and their implications 
in constructing meaning are looked at against others such as direct material processes. 
Also from the image schematic point of view the implications of the use of certain 
kinds of schematic structures and their metaphorical extensions are exemplified 
against other possible kinds of representations. 
In answering the first two research questions: 
How do the image schematic and Systemic Functional Linguistics apply as analytic 
approaches in the context of teaching environmental science? and 
What does the application of the schematic and linguistic analysis in the specific 
context suggest for their semantic functions: clause types and image schemata? 
we noticed that both kinds of semantic forms as they are used in both kinds of 
analysis (chapters 6 and 7) seem to be very valuable and powerful in realising entities 
at the ontological level. This is due to the fact that the same semantic form (e.g. 
material process) can realise different entities (e.g. animals and plants), which 
suggests that semantic functions (e.g. agency) work out categorical relations between 
entities (e.g. the category of living organisms). 
The analysis also has shown that in order to understand what the semantic functions 
mean for the entities to which they are applied (e.g. the semantic function of agency, a 
material process, has in realising decomposers' behaviour) the way in which semantic 
forms are looked at is very important. It would have been a very constrained or even 
distorted picture of what the entities are if analysis was restrained at the level of a 
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relation between a single entity and a single semantic form only in a single case of 
representation. On the contrary looking at how an entity is represented for example at 
different places in the same and in different texts, we realise how important it is to 
take into account textual and interpersonal aspects in the construction of meaning as 
well as the relation between language and other means of representations. Thus, in 
answering the third research question: 
How is the content of environmental science realised linguistically and 
schematically? 
it has been argued that entities are not just either concrete or abstract but depending 
on how they are represented they can be seen as being abstracted to a degree. Also 
patterns of transitivity have proved to be a very valuable tool in looking at entities 
since they underlie both implicit and explicit accounts of metaphors, the way in which 
the reader is treated in texts and talking and the way in which unobservable entities 
are realised. From the image schema point of view, agent structures are not only the 
realisations of single actions, but looked at as sequences then they constitute the 
realisations of narratives. 
Considering both approaches, in respect to the second and third research question, it 
should be once more emphasised here that neither linguistic nor schematic choices are 
always apparent at the linguistic surface. It can be easier to identify entities 
represented as containers with physical boundaries, rather than metaphorical 
extensions of containment relations in which agency imposes boundaries. It can also 
be easier to identify nominalizations rather than entities which are represented as 
active in the same way other entities act, due to their persistent appearance as Actors 
in material processes. But what is the case for both 'easily' and 'less easily' identified 
representations is that they constitute semantic functions which contribute decisively 
to the meaning of the represented entities and are not mere words or phrases. 
Therefore, metaphor is not something that can be counted on the basis of a single 
word or phrase. Metaphor is seen here as a discursive property that is the effect on the 
represented meaning by the use of specific semantic forms (either linguistic or 
schematic) which can appear at different places in the text or talk. Because metaphors 
are not signalled as such their presence often becomes silent for the educator, the 
learner and even the investigator in many cases. 
In respect to metaphor, the main purpose of the present study has been to show what 
is the effect on the transmitted meaning in choosing specific linguistic and schematic 
representations of environmental science, in the context of teaching environmental 
science. This purpose, formulated in the fourth research question: 
What is the effect of the choices and use of certain semantic forms on how contents of 
environmental science are represented? 
is investigated at the level of exemplified accounts of teaching which illustrate what 
are the possible implications of adopting specific choices against others. 
In order to accomplish this purpose, the present study has focused on how aspects of 
environmental science are realised in their representations and what implications 
these realisations have for the nature of the represented entities (ontology), how 
knowledge about entities can be made possible (epistemology) and what is supposed 
to be learnt and how (learning). To give an example, treating the unobservable in the 
same way as the observable has an emergent ontological and epistemological 
implication in the sense of how the unobservable entities are realised; that is as 
similar to observable and therefore approaching the unobservable from the point of 
view of the observable is not thought of as problematic but is taken for granted. 
I believe that the epistemological and learning implications should not be seen as if 
the latter are determined by the former. But failure to keep them distinct both in 
textbooks and in classroom representations either because there is a reason to do so or 
not, has the result that what has a learning value is often implied by what is taken as 
epistemologically acceptable and correct. 
From the framework outlined above, and the implications different choices of 
representations can have, discussed in sections 6.4 and 7.7, it appears that this study 
does not support a view that there is only one way of representing environmental 
science either because it is the only or more 'natural' way to talk about such contents 
of science or because there is only one 'correct' (either scientifically or educationally 
or politically) way of representation which is the appropriate one in this context. 
Therefore, metaphors are not seen as deviations from how things are supposed to be 
represented or as additional persuasive elements towards a better and more effective 
representation. On the contrary, metaphor is seen as variety both in the way a 
representation works and what it can afford. That makes problematic any definition 
which sees metaphor as a single phenomenon. 
9.1.1. Representations and metaphors 
Representations of environmental science can be seen as taking part in the 'conflict' 
between the everyday world of commonsense reasoning and the scientific world of 
science. According to Halliday representations which are closer to the former are 
called 'dynamic' (or doric) due to the large extent to which transitivity patterns are 
used to make reference to everyday happenings, while representations which are 
closer to the latter are called 'synoptic' (or attic) because they characterise the 
impersonal and abstract way in which knowledge is reported in a scientific context 
(Halliday, 1985, p.9'7). 
Nominalizations and some metaphorical extensions of image schemata such as 
'photosynthesis' which is seen as a container because it is represented as a single 
entity, that is a 'package' to which entities are seen as either belonging or not, can be 
seen as synoptic representations. On the other hand, image schemata which are 
grounded in everyday experiences such as containers with physical boundaries ('a 
pond') and representations of agent structures with the use of material processes 
unfolded nearer to the way in which actions are supposed to be experienced in reality 
(e.g. one material clause following another without any embedded processes), can be 
thought of as closer to the way things happen and are reported in everyday life, that 
is, the dynamic mode of representation. But notice that in respect to the specific 
examples discussed in the previous chapter, representations are not seen as belonging 
either in one mode or another in an exclusive way which presents the relation between 
the two modes (synoptic and dynamic) as a 'conflict', but most kinds of 
representations discussed in the present thesis, have an effect on representing entities 
which is to some degree dynamic and to some degree synoptic. Also when it comes to 
the question of what sort of implications representations which are nearer to one 
mode or to the other have, that is the fourth research question, then we notice that in 
different ways they come to the same end. 
In particular, dynamic representations have an overall structure similar to the structure 
of stories. A strong element of agency is almost imposed or at least projected on how 
nature is represented. This view implies that what we can see in the natural world is 
patterns of agency which resemble the plot of a story. That sort of representation can 
facilitate learning by reducing the distance between learner and scientific entities by 
putting the latter in the structure of an everyday context. Therefore, how things 
happen comes to be taken for granted because they are grounded in patterns of 
happening and doing which are experienced as obvious in everyday life. The use of 
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nominalization on the other hand works in the opposite way; agency is abstracted 
from the accounts that are attributed to nature which also come to be impersonal, and 
therefore the distance between the 'knower' and the objects of his/her inquiry is now 
increased. As a result knowledge about nature is represented as being objective 
leaving little or no space for questions about how this knowledge can be possible. So 
the implication of the use of nominalizations and story-like representations is the 
same but for different reasons; knowledge about nature is represented as being 
objective either because nature is as obvious as the everyday world is or because the 
process of making knowledge and knowledge itself is implied to be objective. 
These findings are also in accordance with how knowledge about the environment is 
represented in the media. According to Stocking and Holstein (1993), scientific 
claims are reported in the media at face value with relatively little attention to their 
constructed nature nor to their unknowns and uncertainties. So in that respect 
environmental communication is primarily an objectivist scientific discourse. But 
while scientific information is represented as objective knowledge, the environmental 
discourse which carries this information is dramatised in order to represent causes and 
effects as real and important. 
The 'objective' character of linguistic and schematic representations of environmental 
science in the examples of lessons and textbooks discussed in the present thesis, is 
silent for both cases of representations, but for different reasons. Image schemata are 
grounded in everyday experiences so they are taken for granted without any need to 
be justified. Grammatical structures (such as agency patterns) also construct and work 
out relations between entities at the level of semantic functions without being marked 
at the linguistic surface. So they are taken as the natural way in which things are 
talked about. Finally, nominalizations appear as 'packages' of scientific knowledge 
which are too objective to be challenged or further analysed as choices of 
representing science. 
9.1.2 Metaphorical representations of knowledge 
As was shown in chapter 2, definitions which are about the ontology of entities such 
as 'pond' and 'forest' are not the same in ecology and in everyday life. Nevertheless, in 
section 7.4 we have seen that the teaching of these entities often follows a naive 
approach in representing and realising them as if they emerge from commonsense 
thinking alone. Such representations grounded in everyday, containment relations 
impose boundaries on entities and represent them as different and separate from 
others in an oversimplified way. 
One can easily recognise the tendency for entities which have made their way in 
commonsense knowledge to be discussed in textbooks and in classrooms as parts of 
our everyday exchange of meanings in order for students to achieve familiarity with 
them and only a few aspects of these entities are elaborated from the environmental 
science point of view. The fact that entities such as 'pond' or 'forest' are parts of our 
everyday life and vocabulary and should be seen as such does not mean that the way 
these entities can be talked about can be taken as obvious and unproblematic. 
The question about how the nature of entities, that is their ontology, is represented 
and realised in classrooms is related with the acknowledgement that the same entities 
can belong in different categories depending on how they are looked at. It also points 
to the idea that if the reasons for classifying entities in one category rather than 
another remain silent, then it is to be expected that students will bring their own 
reasons for distinguishing categories and as a result misconceptions underlying their 
reasoning are never made explicit. 
The implications of the use of misunderstood categorical relations by students in a 
way that very seldom makes them aware about their underlying patterns of reasoning 
are increased by the fact that categories of entities are often silently shifted towards 
different realisations. These shifts of categorical relations are often due to their 
linguistic representations (e.g. plants represented as 'acting' in a very similar way as 
animals are represented doing things). Metaphorical extensions of image schemata 
also work in the same way (e.g. types of environment defined as containers due to 
agent structures and not because of physically imposed containment relations). 
As discussed from the point of view of metaphor in chapter 8, both linguistic and 
schematic representations work out constructions of entities and their relations at the 
ontological level mostly in a silent way. In respect to how knowledge is represented, 
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representations in terms of grammatical choices are taken for granted as the 'only', 
'natural' ways to talk about things. That propagates a view about language as a 
transparent medium of meaning which overlooks the fact that grammar is a system of 
options. Ironically, representations which use patterns of image schemata grounded in 
commonsense, everyday experience promote a naive objectivism. This is due to the 
fact that even metaphorical extensions are not questioned as such since they are 
grounded in everyday experiences which are taken for granted. Therefore, their 
implementation in reasoning is not considered as a matter of choice but (rather) as a 
matter of natural necessity; in a way that this is how things are. So almost no 
questions are raised in textbooks and in classrooms about why something is 
represented in one way and not in another and therefore what is the effect of its 
representation on its meaning. 
Concerning objectivity, an interpersonal aspect which characterises the relation 
between 'knower' and knowledge is whether nature is objectified or not and to what 
extent, not because it is represented directly as such to the reader/hearer, but because 
the latter is addressed in such a way which implies objectification. This can happen in 
different ways (as has been illustrated in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2), either because the 
reader him/herself is objectified if he/she is represented as being part of nature so the 
latter is taken as an objectified entity, or because the reader's relation to nature is seen 
as an instrumental relation in order to guarantee objectivity. 
Interactions between entities are valued as very important in environmental studies as 
has been discussed in the review of the literature of environmental science (see 
chapter 2). And this is because different views or paradigms in ecology (e.g. 
mechanistic vs. organic) study relations between entities differently and as a result 
different accounts of nature emerge. In section 7.3.3 it has been shown that 
interactions between entities reflected in sequences of agent structures provide a 
picture of nature which looks like having the structure of a story. Interactions between 
entities become reports of stories' plots. The fact that narrative accounts of nature are 
not explicitly stated as such (either in textbooks or in classrooms) and in most cases 
only one unquestioned plot is provided for each phenomenon adds to the effect that 
one way of looking at nature is propagated silently in teaching. 
Also, in the examples of teaching of the present thesis it is hard to find any accounts 
of why an entity treated as a unit of study is chosen to be so. Again commonsense 
understanding dominates and any reasons for making choices are silent. 
Representations of relations between a living entity and its environment in textbooks 
and in classrooms constitute a mixture of approaches towards nature. Take for 
example the representations of cycles. On one hand in such representations there is a 
lot of emphasis on circular systems of cause-effect relations in contrast with linear 
causality. But, on the other hand many of these representations reflect a naive 
objectivist view about nature dressed up as an organic view of nature. This is due to 
the fact that these representations are seen as if they are directly extracted from nature 
itself. Moreover, since no mention is made of the fact that representing patterns of 
relations between entities is part of a specific methodological approach in 
environmental science, they reflect the latter as being theory-free, natural science (not 
only by name but also by method) even if cycles are represented as being constructed 
or invented by scientists. 
The issue of continuity between the observable and unobservable reflected both in 
grammar and in schematic relations as well as the issue of the interaction between the 
two either seen in clauses or within the same schematic structures, while endorsing 
the existence of the unobservable or theoretical entities and making them more 
accessible to the learner, leaves silent the issue of their construction as scientific 
entities (constructed and used within a specific scientific paradigm). 
9.2 Implications 
9.2.1 Teaching and learning 
The present thesis advocates a view about metaphors as parts of representations of 
environmental science which is different from what predominantly has been thought 
about metaphors and their role in an educational context. Exemplified accounts of 
how this different view about metaphors can be seen at work, in real terms, in natural 
and not artificially created situations, have been provided. In analysing these 
examples, an effort has been made to find how one can best describe what is a 
metaphor and how it functions in a specific context while pointing at the same time to 
the possible ontological, epistemological and learning implications choices of certain 
sort of representations can have. The implementation of this sort of thinking about 
metaphors reveals some general current fallacies which are pervasive not only in what 
is considered as the value of the use of metaphor in science and environmental 
education, but also in general accounts about the role of education itself. 
So far as metaphors and analogies are concerned, it is rather unfortunate that from the 
very beginning when metaphor attracted scholars' attention, various pedagogies 
grounded in psychological and educational studies have created the expectation for 
educators and teachers that metaphor and analogy are useful 'tools' for learning. What 
is implied by the use of the term 'tool' is that metaphors are 'tools' of thinking which 
can be 'activated' for additional assistance in the process of teaching outside of the 
'regular' way in which things are represented. This view picks up only explicit 
accounts of metaphors and evaluates them superficially at the level of the linguistic 
surface of mere 'words' or 'concepts', ignoring what lies below the linguistic surface. 
The current difficulty of studies in making convincing any causal connection between 
students' misconceptions, their consequent failures in attainment and what look like 
'peaks of floating icebergs' above the 'sea surface', indicates that one should wonder 
what is hidden below the linguistic 'surface' of 'good' or 'bad' metaphors. 
The 'iceberg' fallacy is closely related with the fallacy - reflected even in early 
Halliday - that there is a 'natural' way of talking about things. The latter view not only 
represents language as a transparent mean of representation but underestimates the 
semantic function of other means of representations (e.g. images) as well. It is 
because of this view that metaphors are seen as deviations against the regular way of 
talking. As far as the latter is concerned, it is not realised as choices among options of 
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means of representation. This view, which propagates a 'naive' realism, since 
according to it, it does not matter how something is represented but has also no 
interest in what is the effect of what is not represented. On the contrary in the view 
adopted here what is represented and what remains silent both have equal value 
because both reflect choices of what is meaningful or not in a specific context. The 
question is not whether there is a natural or direct way to talk (represent) about things, 
but whether a particular situation is encoded as an agentive or as a non-agentive event 
for example. The latter is often a matter of perspective and interpretation, rather than 
an 'objective' property of the situation as Kress has pointed out (1979, p.19-20). In 
other words what we are looking at is a matter of choice in meaning-form relations. 
Another 'myth' which is perpetuated in environmental education is the value that is 
attributed to experience as an effective way of learning. Teachers are advised to 
provide situations in which students can have an immediate experience with entities, 
something that is reflected in the rhetoric 'teaching about and for the environment, 
within the environment'. Curriculum proposals sound naive in suggesting that 
whatever promotes an experiential relation as such is effective and therefore to be 
welcomed in teaching, as if scientific entities can reveal themselves to students 
without any sort of representation intervening between entities and students. Again 
this 'myth' is grounded in the fallacy that representations are 'neutral' in respect to 
what they represent. 
The classical concrete - abstract dichotomy in cognitive studies is also reflected in 
educational studies. The latter due to their denial of the role and value of 
representations, attribute concrete or abstract properties either to mere words or to 
concepts and things. The present thesis argues that it is neither the 'things' which are 
themselves either abstract or concrete nor their representations themselves, but it is 
the way representations are used which realise entities as more abstract or concrete to 
a degree. As has been emphasised, representations such as image schemata and 
certain grammatical structures are semantic forms; representations of entities which 
are abstracted from the experiential basis in which they are grounded. 
Finally, it is now taken as a necessity that both studies and curriculum proposals in 
environmental education should take into account in their frameworks at least the 
basic dimensions of the main theoretical, epistemological positions or stances or 
paradigms which are currently present in debates about the nature of environmental 
science. But most studies fail to show how these paradigms are materialised in the 
actual processes of teaching or how the latter can be constructed in a way that can be 
directed towards one or the other theoretical position. Attempts to illustrate how the 
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latter are reflected in teaching often become anecdotal accounts due to the fact that 
studies lack any systematised and coherent framework, so that the value of their 
isolated examples which exemplify how paradigms can be possibly realised is very 
limited. As a result quite often curriculum proposals suffer from what Napoleon has 
called the 'syndrome of generals'. Curriculum developers insist on the application of 
their proposals like the generals who implement their strategies and act as if their 
strategies really take place, without having a good sense of what actually happens in 
the battlefield. 
The view about representations and metaphors which is worked out in the present 
thesis can be very valuable in teachers' training. In particular, the role of 
representations as a non-transparent medium of meaning relations can be underlined 
concerning real classroom situations. Teachers might re-think their role as educators 
if they realised the possible implications specific ways of representing environmental 
science have, such as the use of material processes or nominalizations. Furthermore, 
their training should aim at a better understanding of how different kinds of 
representations (either schematic or linguistic) at different scales (from an ideational 
process up to a narrative) are co-ordinated towards the transmission of specific 
meaning relations. Studies concerning the effect covert representations of 
environmental science have on what and how students think about the environment 
and issues related with it, could not only underline the importance of representations 
but also make teacher training more effective. 
In addition, the study of written materials such as textbooks, which are either 
available for teaching or as popularised accounts of environmental science, is 
valuable not only for identifying possible causes of misconceptions and difficulties in 
understanding, but also in constructing materials according to the interests of various 
groups of people and suitable to the age range to whom they are addressed. In respect 
to the latter, similarities and differences between texts which are addressed to students 
of different ages, raise questions about the differences in the text structure and the 
linguistic realisations of abstraction, as well as how participants such as Actors and 
Goals are represented and how language can be seen as part of an interactive system 
of relationships between different systems of representations. Studies of text materials 
need to distinguish overt cases of metaphor in which both entities which are 
represented as similar (or different) are present in the text, from covert cases in which 
one of the entities might be presupposed by the text, but because it is not present in it 
we do not know what this entity is. In other words, studies about metaphors in texts 
should not treat them as if all of them are overt cases of metaphor. 
9.2.2 Limitations and further work 
In both kinds of analysis the limitations of studying a single semantic function, let us 
say material process, isolated from others and disengaged from its wider context 
which can be from a piece of text up to a chapter or even an entire textbook or series 
of textbooks - as far as we are concerned with textbooks - have been explored and 
recognised. Further work can provide more detailed accounts of higher structures of 
semantic functions as higher organisations of meaning and their relations with lower 
structures of semantic functions. There are many open questions which can be further 
studied concerning specific contents of environmental science. In particular, a 
question arises about how far a higher semantic function, such as a cycle, is 
determined from the arrangement and the direction to which lower semantic units e.g. 
single agent structures and containers, build up meaning relations, e.g. connections 
between entities in which entities are constantly transferred from one 'place' to 
another. The same question arises from the linguistic point of view since as has been 
pointed out and exemplified in section 6.2.5 and in Appendix 5.1 choices of 
ideational processes depend on decisions made about the text structure (textual 
dimension) and to whom the text is addressed (interpersonal aspects). 
Further analysis based on both kinds of representations (linguistic and schematic) 
about the same contents exploring at the same time differences and similarities in the 
way the two approaches are applied, is interesting specially for cases in which writer's 
or speaker's motivations and intentions are either not clear or are seen as obvious (e.g. 
transmitting pieces of knowledge about cycles to a specific audience). The present 
thesis has been exploratory to the extent to which the two approaches can be applied 
at looking metaphorical aspects of taught environmental science. As a result, the two 
approaches have been seen as rather complementary and their similarities have been 
the primary focus of study. More research on semantic forms such as narratives from 
the point of view which is suggested in this study will be valuable given also the 
extent to which they are used in primary schools and in representations of 
environmental science which are of public concern (e.g. TV documentaries with a 
narrative style about the life of wild animals). 
The present thesis is limited so far as its outcomes are related loosely with the recent 
work of studies in environmental education and the philosophical and epistemological 
aspects of environmental science. Even if where ever it has been possible, causes of 
students' misconceptions due to how specific contents of environmental science are 
represented to them, have been discussed, as well as the limitations of various kinds 
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of studies, there has not been any effort to connect in a systematic way all these areas 
of concern (philosophy, studies and representations) since this has not been the scope 
of the present study. Further work in this area is of special interest because it might be 
expected to illuminate the importance of representations in the realisation of 
knowledge about the environment in a way that issues concerning students and public 
misconceptions will be looked at differently. Furthermore, the study of 
representations can make it possible for investigators and educators to see how wider 
philosophical aspects are 'materialised' in the actual process of teaching. 
The present study can be criticised on the basis that it is grounded in examples -
sometimes used as 'best' examples - to exemplify arguments. Because of that, one can 
argue that the outcomes are of limited value since they depend too much on specific 
contexts and would not be able to be generalised to other contexts. This is true as far 
as context is concerned but one should bear in mind that the aim has not been to 
provide generalised accounts of the teaching of environmental science. The 
exploratory character of the study is attributed to the construction of a point of view 
and the exploration of two approaches as they are applied in a context (teaching of 
environmental science) for the study of which they have not been initially intended. 
So what matters, is not the examples themselves and categories of them but how 
representations work in different examples and what their implications are. Therefore, 
what might be seen as weakness is the potential for new studies for deepening and 
widening the investigation of metaphor not only in the context of environmental 
education but also in the context of science education and public understanding of 
science. 
In respect to the latter, the issue of representation has been the interest of many 
studies (see for example Hannigan, 1995) from mainly a sociological point of view. 
What has been described in the present thesis as an intermediate level of representing 
which is neither concrete or everyday, nor abstract or scientific, has found its way into 
sociological accounts of the public understanding of science as a 'discourse coalition'. 
The latter means that a variety of discourses, some of them nearer to the way things 
are represented in everyday language and others nearer to representations of scientific 
reports, are brought into one and the same text whose ideological task is to provide 
some resolutions to the different interests and points of view the different discourses 
carry with them. 
An interdisciplinary approach to matters of public concern which implements the 
ideological implications representations have along with the ontological and 
epistemological ones would be very valuable. From a sociological point of view what 
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has been underlined not only here but in many other studies is that language is not a 
transparent medium in representing knowledge, but has also another important aspect. 
Representing knowledge to non-experts as experts' knowledge in a way that the 
former have no access to it, implies a greater level of dependence of non-experts on 
experts in making decisions for the interest of both. On the other hand, the attempt to 
represent popularised accounts of knowledge which rely too much on everyday 
knowledge is in danger of providing a distorted picture of reality to non-experts by 
keeping them away from the complicated nature and making of recent knowledge 
about the environment and issues related with it, knowledge on which directly or 
indirectly we rely on even in our everyday life (e.g. mad cow disease and genetically 
modified foods). 
There is not really any straight answer either from a philosophical, epistemological or 
sociological point of view, to the question of whether representations of 
environmental science to the public should be drawn more from scientific or 
commonsense knowledge. But what one can say here is that making people aware 
about the way knowledge is represented has probably equal value to the value of the 
content of that knowledge. People are used to ask what something is (e.g. a cause or 
an effect) and how far it is true or not, but very rarely ask how something has been 
talked about and whether what we know about it is due to the way it has been 
represented to us. A naive realism underlies the false assumption, reflected in 
language and in cognition, that if something is true 'it can speak by itself' irrespective 
of how it will be represented. 
However, it is rather recently that people have become aware about the importance of 
how knowledge is represented since the appearance of global environmental problems 
such as the Greenhouse Effect and the depletion of ozone layer has shown that these 
issues can not be reduced to simple answers and their representation to the public has 
become a real burden for those in whose interests it is to do so - from governments, 
media and non-governmental organisations down to science teachers in classrooms. 
The intense attention which issues, such as CJD and GM-food which apply to the 
immediate interest of the public (what one can eat), have attracted in the media, raise 
serious questions about who is representing what, how and for what purpose. 
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APPENDIX 1 
AN IMAGE FROM A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE 
THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
APPENDIX 2 
EARLY AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO 
METAPHOR 
2.1 Introduction 
There have been two alternative approaches to metaphor in the recent debate in the 
fields of linguistics, philosophy of science and psychology: the constructivist view 
which recognises metaphor as an essential characteristic of the creativity of language 
and scientific thinking and the non-constructivist view which sees metaphor as 
deviant and parasitic upon normal usage (Ortony, 1979, p.2). The latter derives from 
the traditional view which sees reason as literal, as primarily about propositions that 
can be objectively either true or false. The former derives from the view which takes 
imaginative aspects of reason (metaphor, metonymy and mental imagery) as central to 
reason, rather than as a peripheral to the literal. In particular, this view sees metaphor 
as a dynamic cognitive process and as a dynamic cultural process changing the 
language we speak and write, in contrast with the traditional view which takes 
metaphor as a static grammatical category (MacCormac, 1985, p.6). 
In the constructivist view of metaphor, two divergent perspectives can be identified, 
related with what is to be counted as a metaphor. One of them claims that the concept 
of metaphor and the concept of model include within their sense the concept of 
analogy. There is an implicit assumption here that analogy is a more fundamental and 
simple concept than metaphor or model. The second perspective investigates 
metaphor as a phenomenon of its own without any kind of reduction into another 
concept (analogy, model or similarity). The latter approaches vary to the degree to 
which they define and represent metaphor as fundamental to language and reasoning. 
To give an example, some theories argue that the whole language is metaphorical. It 
is very difficult for theories which adopt this position to escape from some kind of 
circularity, such as the assumption that theories of metaphor presume basic 
metaphors. So according to this point of view, it is almost impossible to distinguish 
between the literal and the metaphorical. 
Notice that the term 'constructivist' comes from the relatively new tradition in 
cognitive psychology and education, which stresses the individual as an active 
participant in the process of comprehending and understanding new knowledge. 
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Therefore, the distinction between constructivist and non-constructivist accounts of 
metaphors is raised within that recent tradition which is opposed to the view that 
individuals are passive recipients of knowledge. 
Today, one can say that most of the studies about metaphors recognise the role of the 
latter in understanding and reasoning, so they are in one way or another constructivist 
accounts. But, they still vary in the degree to which they think that: 
- metaphor is either primarily about words or concepts or categories of things 
- there is a metaphorical process which can describe metaphor as a cognitive 
process (e.g. mapping) and can be generalised across various examples of 
metaphors 
- what the metaphor affords is what it is about having ontological, 
epistemological, ideological and learning implications 
- there is a learning value to metaphors which are used in an educational 
context 
In the first section (section 2.2) of this review, issues related with the definition of 
metaphor will be put in their historical context. It is important here to elicit early 
approaches to metaphor and their disputes because they are the bases in which new 
theories are grounded. There is also one more reason to do so. Recent studies of 
metaphors often fail to realise explicitly their influences from early accounts of 
metaphors usually because they take the latter (early accounts) for granted. The next 
section (section 2.3) investigates two divergent theories: comparison and interaction 
theories which although both recognise the cognitive value of metaphor, they use 
different approaches to investigate it. Section 2.3.2 provides also some linguistic, 
pragmatic and semantic accounts of metaphor. Thereafter, the main epistemological 
theories of metaphor and their influence on what place is given to metaphors in 
science are discussed (section 2.4). One can realise here that metaphors, analogies and 
models are seen as closely related with what is counted as scientific explanation. 
Finally, in the last section (2.5), a short review represents the research literature on 
children's ability to comprehend and produce metaphors. 
In the following review about early and contemporary approaches to metaphor, 
Lakoffs and Johnson's accounts, metaphors in Systemic Functional Linguistics, as 
well as recent studies of metaphors in the context of science education are not 
included, but references to them are made wherever is thought appropriate to do so, 
since they are discussed extensively within the main part of the thesis (see chapter 4). 
2.2 The history of metaphors 
2.2.1 Ancient and medieval years 
Early on, it was natural for the pre-Socratic philosophers in ancient Greece to use 
figurative language when they tried to express the insights of myths and poetry for 
their predecessors (Johnson, 1981, p.4). As a result, their philosophic fragments were 
based on a huge network of interrelated metaphors. Plato, well known as the master 
of metaphor, also used figurative language to convey his most important 
philosophical convictions. At the same time, he attacked what he called 'uneducated 
imitated' poets whose misuse of language leads others away from truth (Johnson, 
1981, p.4). It is on similar grounds that he criticised sophists "who care nothing for 
truth and who make trifles seem important and important points trifles by the force of 
their language" (Phaedrus, 267a-b). For Plato, figurative language (and also 
metaphor) was a tool that helps to effect persuasion and puts formidable power in the 
hands of anyone who masters it perfectly. He also believed that figurative language 
should provide true accounts of that to which it refers, otherwise its use is misleading. 
This is why he condemned rhetoric which he saw as belonging to the world of the lie, 
of the 'pseudo'. 
Although from the point of view of Plato, rhetoric is without doubt philosophy's 
enemy, Aristotle's accounts of rhetoric constitute an attempt to establish 
philosophically, the connection between the validity of rhetoric and that of 
philosophy (Ricoeur, 1978, p.11). It could be argued here, that the first definition of 
metaphor was established by Aristotle because of his attempts to institutionalise 
rhetoric from the point of view of philosophy. This shift took place when he 
developed the link between the rhetorical concept of persuasion and the logical 
concept of the probable. According to Aristotle, both in rhetoric and philosophy, the 
kind of proof appropriate to discourse is not the necessary but the probable (Ricoeur, 
1978, p.11). It is at this point, where the power of persuasion and the concept of 
probability meet for the first time, that metaphor is seen both as essential in 
reasoning, (the latter realised not in terms of certainty), and as a representational 
device since metaphor is linked with the power of persuasion. 
Aristotle's well-known definition of metaphor is given in the Poetics: 
"Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; 
the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, 
or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy." 
(Poetics, 1457b, 6-9) 
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As it appears from this definition, metaphor has the following features: first, it seems 
that metaphor is something that happens to the noun, so it is primarily about words. 
Second, its is not surprising that it is defined in terms of movement, a change with 
respect to location, since metaphor 4t.urayoQ6/ in Greek means movement (Ricoeur, 
1978, p.11). And the third characteristic is that metaphor is the transposition of a 
name which Aristotle calls "alien" (allotrios). Allotrios means a name that belongs to 
someone else; in other words, the transfer of a name to some object to which the 
name does not properly belong (Ricoeur, 1978, p.20). According to Aristotle, the 
structure of metaphor is the transfer of the meanings of words and its function has two 
aspects: a rhetorical function and a poetic function. In rhetoric it is the art of inventing 
or finding proofs, but in poetry, its aim is to comprise an essential representation of 
human and its appropriate method is to speak the truth by means of fiction fable, and 
tragic myths (Ricoeur, 1978, p.13). 
In Aristotle's accounts of metaphors, as represented and discussed by Ricoeur (1978), 
one can notice that even if metaphors are associated with words, they are not about 
the words themselves as purely linguistic elements but about shifts in the meaning of 
words. These shifts can take place either as categorical relations - that means 
alternations of the relations between categories and their instances (this is what 
transference from genus to species and from species to genus means) - or shifts of 
meaning at the level of instances which belong into the same category (from one 
instance to another or what Ricoeur has translated as from species to species). Also 
metaphor can take place as a transference in meaning relations from one domain of 
experience or knowledge to another, grounded in analogy. The latter means shifts in 
meaning across categories and their instances which belong in different domains. It is 
remarkable to notice the extent to which our thinking about metaphors in cognitive 
psychology today is based on these early accounts about metaphors. It is not 
accidental that Aristotle was thinking - if we interpret correctly what he wrote - about 
shifts in meaning relations in terms of movement, changes with respect to location 
across and within categories and domains of knowledge and experience. As is well 
known, his thinking was dominated with the task of defining different realms of 
knowledge as separate domains by making detailed taxonomies and categorisations of 
entities in terms of superordinate and subordinate categories. Therefore, changes in 
how things are defined and their meaning relations with other things are realised, 
were thought of - as indeed are realised in more or less the same way today - as re-
locations within and across taxonomies. That also explains why, in Aristotle's 
definition, realising entities as being either of the realm of species or of the realm of 
genus has a prominent place, since in his systematic taxonomies entities are either 
instances or categories. 
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The argument above also explains the element of surprise that the use of metaphor 
entails. ' Allotriosis' - that is seeing things in new ways and not as they are expected to 
be - with entities is the result of transferring them to different categories or domains 
from the ones in which they are thought of as 'naturally' occurring. Finally, Aristotle's 
accounts of how metaphor functions tell us what the metaphor is about, what 
reasoning with metaphors can afford. Interestingly enough, metaphors are devices to 
persuade us about the extent to which things, ideas or beliefs are real. There is a 
cognitive value attached to metaphors since they provide the means of inventing or 
finding proofs, that is representing something as true and consequently real. But these 
means of representations are not to be looked at in any sort of propositional language 
but in the very means with which people communicate with each other in their 
everyday life and pass ideas, beliefs, values and knowledge from one generation to 
another; these are narrative-like kinds of speech (fiction, fable, tragic myths). 
Later on, during the medieval years, metaphor followed two main opposite streams. 
Medieval rhetoricians took it more as an embellishment that gives force, clarity and 
charm to language than a powerful tool which provides proof through persuasion. 
Rhetoric was clearly distinguished from logic and then reduced to a style of speech. 
As a result, metaphor under rhetoric in medieval years became a stylistic device 
without any important cognitive function, separated from serious philosophical 
argument (Johnson, 1981, p.9). 
On the other hand, medieval theology leads to a more favourable appraisal of 
figurative discourse. St. Thomas Aquinas claimed that if human beings grasp many 
intellectual truths through sensible likenesses, then many spiritual truths might be 
known by means of comparisons with material things (Johnson, 1981, p.10,11). Both 
eastern and western theology have always been preoccupied with the almost 
impossible task of defining two very different realms of experience: the material 
world and the world of spiritual entities. Figurative language has often been the only 
available way to express relations between the two worlds. Theologians even today 
are strongly divided between those who believe that what the bible says should be 
taken as a metaphor and those who read it and take the meanings of the words they 
read literally. Finally, comparative religious studies identify sort of structuring 
metaphors which shape believes and values in different religious. 
2.2.2 Post-medieval years 
In the post-medieval years, metaphor was ostracised with the growth of science. 
Empiricists' attack on metaphor took place both on the cognitive and linguistic level. 
Thus it claims that: 
a) The human conceptual system is essentially literal. Therefore, literal language 
is the only adequate vehicle for expressing one's meaning precisely and 
making truth claims which together, make possible correct reasoning by the 
philosopher. 
b) Metaphor is an ornamental deviant use of words, which accounts for its 
tendency to confuse and to deceive and, 
c) The meaning and truth claims of a metaphor (if there are any) are just those of 
its literal paraphrase (Johnson, 1981, p.12). 
It is apparent from these claims that the empiricists struggled to set 'clear' criteria 
about what is 'scientific' and how scientific knowledge can be achieved. But it should 
be noticed that in the first claim the demolition of metaphor did not take place only on 
the grounds of science. Empiricism spoke not only on behalf of science but on behalf 
of 'the human conceptual system' which must be characterised by 'correct reasoning' 
which makes truth claims. It is interesting here to note that the growth of science in 
the post-medieval years until the end of the scientific revolution, made people believe 
that almost every realm of knowledge can be realised in the same way as a science is 
realised. The high value that was given to science and consequently to the ways 
(methods) with which the achievements of science can be made possible has 
influenced the way people perceive human knowledge and understanding in general 
until the present time. The pervasive character of this influence of what is thought of 
as scientific knowledge and reasoning to human knowledge and reasoning in general -
including commonsense reasoning - is best reflected in J. Locke's writings: 
Since wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world than dry truth and real 
knowledge, figurative speeches and allusions in language will hardly be admitted as 
an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure 
and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from 
them can scarce pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we 
must allow that all the art of rhetoric besides order and clearness, all the artificial and 
figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to 
insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions and thereby mislead the judgement, and so 
indeed are perfect cheat; and therefore however handable or allowable oratory may 
render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses 
that pretend to inform or instruct wholly to be avoided and, where truth and 
knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or 
person that makes use of them (Paul de Man 1978 p13). 
In contrast with the empiricist view Kant argues, in his discussion of genius and 
imagination in the Critique of Judgement, that artistic genius is the ability to generate 
aesthetic ideas when there is no set of rules or concepts or algorithm to guide this 
creative activity. By "aesthetic idea" he means 
"that representation of the imagination which induces much thought (viel zu 
denken), yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. 
concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never 
get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible" 
(Critique of the Faculty of Judgement p.175-6). 
While Kant's remarks have opened a view about metaphors 'in thinking from scratch', 
when there is not any solid background knowledge in which one can ground his/her 
efforts in constructing new knowledge, the fact that he opposes 'reliable', well 
established and organised knowledge from knew knowledge which only rests on 
imagination and not on any firm criteria or rules, devalues metaphor from any serious 
cognitive accounts. 
Nevertheless, Kant's accounts of metaphors in terms of 'schemata' are very near to 
what Piaget has described as 'empirical abstraction' and what Lakoff and Johnson 
have described as 'everyday metaphors' and 'image schemata'. Kant has been 
concerned with the distinction between schematic and symbolic hypotyposes. The 
term "hypotyposis" here is used as the iconic element in a representation, that means 
it makes present to the senses something which is not within their reach, not just 
because it does not happen to be there but because it consists, in whole or in part, of 
elements too abstract for sensory representation. In the case of the schematic 
hypotyposis, schemata, are objects of the mind. On the other hand, in the case of the 
symbolic hypotyposis, symbols as objects of reason contain nothing that belongs to 
the representation of the object. That means no sensory representation would be 
appropriate for them (Paul de Man, 1978, p.29). Kant cites several examples of 
metaphorical terms, like those which have to do with grounding and standing e.g. "to 
depend", "ground", "to follow from", used in philosophical discourse. All of them are 
symbolic hypotyposes, according to Kant, because they are a mere translation from a 
reflection upon a represented object into an entirely different concept, to which 
perhaps no representation could ever correspond (Paul de, Man 1978, p.25). This is 
also how everyday metaphors are discussed by Lakoff and Johnson; what Kant sees 
as symbolic hypotyposis, Lakoff and Johnson describe as metaphorical extensions of 
image schemata that turn into pervasive, everyday metaphors. Without having any 
intention here to provide extensive accounts of the similarities and differences 
between Kant, Piaget and Lakoff and Johnson, one should notice a fundamental 
difference that while for Kant basic dimensions of reasoning such as schematic 
246 
hypotyposis are apriori, for Piaget and for Lakoff and Johnson they are experientially 
constructed. 
Nietzsche is the first philosopher of the later post medieval years who breaks down 
the clear distinction between literal and figurative language. He points out that our 
common ways of speaking about things inevitably involve transposition, 
transformations and distortions because the full nature of things is never grasped into 
consciousness rather the manner in which we stand related to them (Cantor, 1982, 
p.71). Thus, all language is a mixture of the literal and the figurative, since every 
linguistic utterance has some element of the customary in it and some element of the 
novel. What is regarded as literal at one moment may become figurative at another 
and vice versa. The interplay between literal and figurative meanings extends the 
range of meanings of words, bringing wider and wider realms of experience. So 
refusing to accept literal and figurative meaning as stable categories, he instead treats 
them as the basic principle of man's historical development (Cantor, 1982, p.75). 
Man's development under Nietzsche's point of view appears to be an unusually 
complex process because he sees two contradictory tendencies at work in history, a 
tendency for man to spiritualize his ideas, and to literalize them. Therefore all 
meaning is a result of human making, of shaping and reshaping his ideas. These are 
some early relativist accounts of metaphor, because according to Nietzsche to claim 
that there is no real knowing apart from metaphor is ultimately to claim that all truth 
is a human creation (Cantor, 1982, p.'78). 
2.3 Theories of metaphors today 
One can discriminate two kinds of arguments in later accounts of metaphor. There are 
those who take metaphor as an elliptical simile without any significant cognitive 
function in it and those who clearly distinguish simile from metaphor, arguing that the 
latter is not cognitively reducible to the former. The first view is the comparison 
theory of metaphor and the second the interaction theory of metaphor. 
2.3.1 Comparison theory 
According to the comparison theory, the meaning of the metaphor is a literal set of 
relevant similarities picked out by the context of the utterance. The simplest and most 
widespread version of this view has been that the nature of metaphor is essentially a 
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comparison between objects that are literally disparate. Obviously, this view sees 
metaphor as an ornamental linguistic devise constructed on the principles of analogy 
and seeming to be concerned primarily with the comparison of similarities between 
two or more objects. The exact nature of how far metaphor depends on similarities 
has varied from author to author. So others have claimed that metaphors are 
comparisons based on analogy or proportions and others have gone beyond this 
position arguing that metaphor is little more than implicit simile (Ortony et al, 1978, 
p.921). 
However, there are three interesting arguments which have come from the 
comparison view and have opened new pathways for the later investigation on 
metaphor. The first is Breal's claims that the use of metaphor is not just a 
characteristic of the genius but a common linguistic tool very important for language 
change. He described the language change through the distinction between "novel" 
and "frozen" metaphors. Every metaphor started as "novel", which means that it is 
original to each person who uses it. Many of the "novel" metaphors become 
integrated into the language overtime and survive as "dead" or "frozen" metaphors or 
what Lakoff and Johnson in their accounts call as 'everyday metaphors' (Ortony et al, 
1978, p.922). 
Embler took Briars ideas and went further to give a more cognitive account of 
metaphor. He asserted that metaphor is not just a linguistic tool useful for language 
change, but it is also important for the creation of new meanings. Thus it has an 
important role between thought and speech where their limits are often fuzzy and 
vague. Then according to his argument if a metaphor is not reducible to the literal 
language it has meaning of its own. 
Finally, Campbell took one step further and he presented a theory of metaphor as 
comparison in which every metaphor is an implicit oxymoron. Oxymoron is defined 
as a juxtaposition of two concepts that have opposite meanings. He insisted that the 
power of metaphor comes from its inability to be paraphrased. Campbell believed in 
the cognitive and linguistic power of metaphor to create new meanings for different 
individuals at different times (Ortony et al, 1978, p.922). 
Although the three arguments above have pointed to new ways of looking at 
metaphor, comparison theories in general suffer at least in two points. They assume 
that because similarity often plays a role in our comprehension of a metaphor, it is 
also the essence of the meaning of the metaphor. Second, they have interpreted 
superficially Aristotle's definition to an extent that they are unable to see other aspects 
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of the act of metaphoric comprehension except similarity and analogy (Johnson, 
1981, p.27). 
2.3.2 Interaction theory 
The interaction view approaches metaphor functionally rather grammatically, so it 
goes beyond the comparison view that although metaphors can be merely substitutes 
for literal discourse and although they can be comparisons between objects, the 
psychological interest of metaphors really involves more (Ortony et al, 1978, p.923). 
The two more distinctive figures who have built and shaped what we call today an 
interaction theory of metaphor are I. A. Richards and M. Black. Their views are 
discussed in the present section. 
From 1936 Richards set the fundamental ideas of the interaction view which has 
criticised both the positivist's account of the use of language and the mere comparison 
view on metaphor. Against the empiricist/positivist objectivism on the appropriate use 
of language in science, Richards claimed first of all that there isn't any objective 
world which could be described by any kind of objective language. He argued that 
our world is a projected world, with the characteristics which we give to it from our 
own life. As he said "we receive (from this world) what we give" (Richards, 1936, 
p.108). Metaphors produce the exchanges between the meanings of words in 
language. These meanings are super-imposed upon a perceived world which is itself a 
product of earlier or unwitting metaphor (Richards, 1936, p.108). 
It cannot be passed unnoticed that in these accounts of metaphors the role of language 
is emphasised as a means of representing the world. According to Richards, we 
cannot possibly have immediate access to reality without a mean of representation 
intervening between us and the world. Therefore, what the world is (for human 
beings) is what can be meant (by us) about it. Richards made reference to language at 
the level of words, so the unit of study which is adopted here is single words. 
Metaphors have a dominant place and role in what is found between us and the world, 
thus in representations. Notice also that metaphor - as in Aristotle - is not about the 
words themselves but about exchanges in the meanings of words. The process of 
referring to the world through language does not start or end in a sort of 'God's eye 
view of reality', therefore, there is not only one referential relation between 
representations and world in terms of a 'single, true and correct' reference. New 
representations transform and replace earlier representations of the world. These early 
20th century accounts show that a view about metaphors often presupposes a view 
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about language and its relation with the world. Richards' view about language is very 
near to what recent sociolinguistic theories (Halliday 1994 and Kress 1979) claim 
against the traditional view which sees language as transparent and neutral to what it 
represents. 
Richards continued the disruption of the traditional cognitive/emotive dichotomy 
(Richards, 1936, p.95) but he took a big step further: he was the first to set up the 
problem profitably for both the later generations of philosophers of science and 
psychologists. He saw the role of metaphor as crucial in the relationship between the 
changes in the meaning of words and the world. 
Against the mere comparison view, he went beyond the oversimplified connection 
between metaphor and similarity, analogy by discussing the operation of metaphor in 
ordinary discourse. His main position, which will be the doctrine of the interaction 
view until today has been that: 
"when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active 
together and supported by a single word or phrase whose meaning is a 
resultant of their interaction". 
(Richards, 1936, p.93) 
Richards called the two ideas which are active together in metaphor the 'tenor' and the 
'vehicle'. The 'tenor' is the underlying idea or principal subject which the 'vehicle' or 
figure means (Richards, 1936, p.97). The 'vehicle' is not normally a mere 
embellishment of a 'tenor'. Both of them - 'vehicle' and 'tenor' - in co-operation give a 
meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed by either meaning which is not 
attainable without their interaction (Richards ,1936, p.100). In some cases, there are 
some common characteristics which belong to the 'vehicle' and 'tenor'. These common 
characteristics Richards defined as the ground of the metaphor. So we can make a 
very broad distinction between metaphors which work through some direct 
resemblance between the 'tenor' and the 'vehicle' and those which work through some 
common attitudes which we may take up towards them both (Richards, 1936, p.118). 
Richards investigated an extreme case of the latter, when we put together two things 
belonging to very different orders of experience. In such cases the mind works as a 
"connecting organ" by connecting any two things in an indefinitely large number of 
different ways. This position reminds us of Campbell's comparison view which 
described the metaphoric operation as an implicit oxymoron which is defined as the 
mind's effort to juxtapose two concepts that have opposite meanings. Moreover 
Richards tried to answer the question, which of these indefinitely large numbers of 
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different ways to connect two concepts or things the mind uses. According to him, 
there might be a larger whole or aim which is used as reference for these choices 
(Richards, 1936, p.125). As the two things put together are more remote the tension 
created is greater. That tension is the spring of what Kant said "more thought". 
Mind's effort to connect the two things is increased and as a result sometimes the 
peculiar modification of the tenor which the vehicle brings about (Richards, 1936, 
p.127). Many years later, Robert Davidson talked about the same thing as the 
cognitive distortion which is the necessary cost each time when metaphors and 
analogies are used in learning (Davidson, 1976, p.138). 
Richards' analysis of how metaphor works, shows that it is not necessary for the 
'tenor' to be present linguistically. The presence of the latter can be implied by the 
'vehicle'. Moreover, the distinction between metaphors worked out on a basis of direct 
resemblance between 'tenor' and 'vehicle' and those which rely on some common 
characteristics between the two, invites us to consider that probably not all metaphors 
are of the same kind, but they can vary in their appearances from less silent to more 
silent metaphors. Also, the fact that 'vehicle' and 'tenor' in some cases can come from 
a very distinct realms of experience, suggests what is identified today (see Ogborn et 
al, 1996) as the possible function that metaphors can have: to bring entities from 
different domains of knowledge and experience together or apart. Richards has gone a 
step further suggesting that entities which come from different realms of experience 
are decontextualised from the context in which they occur initially and are 
recontextualised in a context which can sustain both entities. The latter context can be 
seen as the 'school science' in which both scientific and commonsense entities co-
exist, or, what sociologists and discourse analysts refer to as discourse coalition 
concerning the discourse of representing environmental science to the public. 
Entities are transferred from one domain to another with the potential that in the new 
context in which they are relocated they can be closer to very different kinds of 
entities. This process constitutes a choice and as such is not accidental but is 
motivated from a purpose. In these accounts metaphor is discussed in respect of the 
person who creates it and of what he/she is trying to achieve by its use. It is probably 
the first time that metaphor is seen as a choice in relation to interpersonal aspects of 
making meaning in similar ways Halliday and Kress discuss language in general and 
metaphor in particular. What Richards describes as tension created by bringing two 
remote entities closer to each other is similar to what Aristotle has described using the 
term 'alotrios', the possible effect metaphor can have. In Richards' accounts, 
interaction is the product of that 'tension' created due to the fact that a specific 'tenor' 
cannot be expressed or represented literally by a specific 'vehicle'. The fact that the 
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'tenor' and not only the 'vehicle' can be modified in resolving the tension between 
them does not only justify why Richards' accounts constitute an interaction theory of 
metaphor, but also reminds us of the more recent accounts of metaphors according to 
which (Ogborn et al, 1996) transformations of displaced entities are likely to occur. 
Finally, as Breal claimed, Richards insists that the metaphor is a very common 
phenomenon in language. According to him, we cannot get through three sentences of 
ordinary discourse without it. Even in the rigid language of the sciences, we have 
great difficulty in eliminating or preventing it. Literal language is rare outside the 
central part of the sciences. Any word may be at the same time both literal and 
metaphoric, just as it may simultaneously support many different metaphors, may 
serve to focus into one meaning many different meanings. According to his theory, if 
we cannot distinguish 'tenor' from 'vehicle', then we may provisionally take the word 
to be literal. If we can distinguish at least two co-operating uses, then we have 
metaphor (Richard, 1936, p.119). 
Notice here that for Richards metaphor is neither for poetic language nor for rhetoric 
only but is an inseparable part of everyday language. Even if his linguistic unit is the 
word it is not taken as one correct and true reference of an object in the world, but it 
can carry more than one meaning. He also raises the concept of a context, so words 
are used and take their meaning within a context. Thus he gets away from the 
classical 'dictionary' view about the meaning of words. 
Twenty six years later Max Black's essay, "Metaphor" (1962) is perhaps the 
landmark by which, according to Johnson (1981, p.19), we may orient ourselves in 
attempting to understand recent work on the subject. Black as well as Richards tried 
to answer the question: How do we identify metaphor? At the beginning of his work 
on metaphor, Black pointed out that any adequate theory must explain how we are 
able to recognise metaphors and distinguish them from other types of speech. Black 
seems to adopt Lowenberg's view that because there may be no syntactic or semantic 
deviance at the level of the sentence, an adequate account of metaphor can be given 
only at the level of the utterance in its total context (Johnson, 1981, p.22). 
The main issue which is raised here is that the metaphorical statement as such does 
not involve any rule of violation, because there can be no rules for "creatively" 
violating rules. And that is why there can be no dictionary of metaphors. As he 
pointed out, any attempt to be more precise about the identifying and individuating 
criteria for metaphorical statements will be embarrassed because the same 
metaphorical statement may appropriately receive a number of different and even 
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partially conflicting readings (Black, 1979, p.25). These arguments raise metaphor as 
an issue of interaction between a speaker and a listener so the question how 
something can be identified as a metaphor is strongly related with how a metaphor 
can be interpreted. 
Black replaces the two major components of Richard's interaction view 'tenor' and 
'vehicle' , with the 'primary' and 'secondary' subject of metaphor. The metaphorical 
utterance works by selecting or suppressing features of the 'primary' subject by using 
features from the 'secondary' subject. The main difference from Richards' components 
is that the 'secondary' subject is not merely an individual "thing" or "idea", but a 
system of relationships. Therefore for Black metaphor is neither primarily about 
words nor about single entities but it is about 'relations between relations'. In 
particular the metaphor works by "projecting upon" the 'primary' subject a set of 
associated implications" of the 'secondary' subject in the following three stages: 
"a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the 
secondary subject's properties; and 
b) invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex that can fit the 
primary subject; and 
c) reciprocally induces parallel change in the secondary subject." 
(Black, 1979, p.27) 
It seems that Black with his analysis of how metaphor works attempted to explicate 
Richards' striking image of the "interanimation of words". In other words, Black 
attempted to rationalise metaphor by arguing that we can identify it and it is not an 
unconscious event whenever it appears. So metaphor now is not represented as 'the 
flash of the genius', that means an instant event, but as a process (often called 
metaphorical process in more recent accounts) which consists of stages or steps. 
He also put the interaction of subjects as a creative production in the mind of both the 
hearer and speaker. Both of them are led to engage in selecting, organising and 
projecting. As a result, this kind of interaction involves a shift in the speaker's 
meaning of words belonging to the same family or system and the corresponding 
hearer's meaning (Black, 1979, p.29). The reason for this shift in meaning is the need 
to do so because the available literal resources of the language are not always enough 
to express our sense of the rich correspondences, interrelations and analogies of 
domains conventionally separated. As we saw earlier this is because metaphorical 
thought sometimes embodies insight expressible in no other fashion (Black, 1979, 
p.34). But for Black this does not mean that the metaphor belongs to the realm of 
fiction and is merely being used, as some writers allege, for some mysterious 
aesthetic effect. Black's thesis on metaphor survives any critical argument that 
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metaphor is a device of language which does not belong to the realm of truth because 
he grounded his argument in analogies of structure (partly created, partly discovered), 
the interactions between the two systems of the primary and secondary subject. The 
analogy between the two systems which Black saw as a kind of isomorphism renders 
explicit insight into the systems to which they refer thus generating a view about 
"how things are " in reality (Black, 1979, p.41). 
Epistemological accounts of science today - as will be shown later - give serious 
accounts of what Black refers to as a power of metaphor to generate a view about 
"how things are" in reality. Also, the description of the 'metaphorical projection' is 
near to what Lakoff and Johnson describe as basic-level conceptual structure 
embedded in our everyday bodily experience which is metaphorically projected onto 
abstract conceptual structures in order for us to make sense of the latter. 
Much of the recent literature on how metaphors work consists of attempts to go 
beyond Black's groundwork to explain more fully the mechanism by which a 
metaphor creates new meaning and generates insight (Johnson, 1981, p.28). Black's 
mechanism of how metaphor works and its terminology has met with criticism. That 
is neither fully explanatory nor fully explained. An important point of criticism of the 
interaction view on the linguistic level is that it necessarily involves two nouns so 
inevitably suggests some kind of comparison between them. On the contrary, 
Richards' tenof and 'vehicle' may be co-present in one word, or phrase (Martin et al, 
1982, p.94). 
John Searle (1995) has provided a lot of work from the pragmatics point of view - the 
study of speech acts and the context in which they occur - to give a more complete 
explanation of how relevant knowledge is brought to bear in understanding a 
metaphor. Searle has set again the question of how metaphors work in terms of the 
speech-act distinction between word or sentence meaning (vs. what the word or 
sentence means literally) and speaker's utterance meaning (vs. what the speaker 
means by uttering words or sentences with literal meaning). So, the question is how 
can a speaker utter a sentence of the form "S is P" and means metaphorically "S is 
R"? In this case, three questions arise. The first is how does the hearer know to look 
for a metaphorical interpretation? Second, what categories or principles allow the 
hearer to compute possible values of R and the third and most important, what 
principles guide the restriction of the range of possible Rs to get the precise meaning 
of the metaphor? This issue has been identified as one of the main problems of the 
metaphorical use of language in most of the recent studies on metaphor. If anything is 
connected with anything without any restriction at all, then the cognitive value of 
metaphor is seriously limited and so its educational use is also in doubt. 
Searle offers several principles which are relevant to the three questions above and 
supported by specific examples (Johnson, 1981, p.33). There are two interesting 
points in his principles for our further investigation of metaphor. First, he 
distinguishes metaphors from indirect speech acts by suggesting that whereas in 
indirect speech acts the speaker intends to convey both the sentence meaning and the 
indirect meaning in metaphors the intention can only be to convey the latter. 
Furthermore, the metaphorical utterance is divided into the simple and the open 
ended. In the former, the speaker says "S is P" but means metaphorically that "S is 
R", while in the latter the speaker says "S is P" but means metaphorically an 
indefinite range of meanings, "S is R1", "S is R2", etc. In both cases, utterance 
meaning is arrived at by going through literal meaning (Searle, 1979, p.122). The 
character of some kind of metaphors to have an open ended meaning is discussed by 
Richard Boyd in his analysis based on what he calls theory - constitutive metaphors in 
science, theory which will be discussed in the next section. 
2.4 Metaphors in science 
Richard Boyd gives a central role to metaphor in the scientific enterprise. He 
recognises its task of introducing terminology and modifying usage of existing 
terminology, in such a way that linguistic categories describe significant features of 
the world (Boyd, 1979, p.358). He divides metaphor into two categories. Those 
which, because they are employed often by a variety of authors and in a variety of 
minor variations, become "frozen" into a figure of speech or a new literal expression. 
Literary interaction in metaphors meet what Breal calls "frozen" metaphors or what 
Black refers to as "dormant" metaphors. This kind of metaphor seems to lose its 
insightfulness through overuse. On the other hand, what Boyd has introduced as 
theory-constitutive metaphors have the characteristic to be open-ended. Thus, they 
invite us to explore the similarities and analogies between features of the primary and 
secondary subjects, including features not yet discovered or not yet fully understood 
(Boyd, 1979, p.363). Boyd offers as examples in this category, metaphors in cognitive 
psychology, for example the mind as a computer machine metaphor that is drawn 
from the terminology of computer science, information theory and related disciplines. 
Such metaphors have provided much of the basic theoretical vocabulary of 
contemporary psychology, for example the view that consciousness is a "feedback" 
phenomenon. 
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Theory-constitutive metaphors as their name suggests are useful for a theory 
construction in the relatively young sciences. The metaphorical language of the latter 
is fundamentally pre-theoretical and lacks the explicitness and precision characteristic 
of scientific theories. What Boyd describes under the name theory-constitutive 
metaphors is very close to not yet discovered similarities or analogies between the 
literal subject and its secondary subject. Again, as Black was criticised earlier, for the 
same reasons we could say Boyd's approach is very near to the comparison view 
because he reduces metaphorical processing into an analogy not yet fully constructed 
between the two (primary and secondary) subjects. 
Despite this criticism, Boyd goes further to set the metaphor in scientific realism. 
According to the latter, knowledge of general laws in science is almost impossible 
without some knowledge of unobservable entities or powers. The problem that is 
raised here is how the knowledge of unobservable entities or powers could be 
possible. This knowledge is possible if reference of natural-kind terms (like "water") 
and of theoretical terms in science might be fixed "causally" rather than by 
definitional conventions as naive realism demands. In other words, the aim of science 
is how to accommodate the linguistic usage to as yet undiscovered causal structure of 
the world. Roughly speaking, this is the task of arranging our language so that our 
linguistic categories "cut the world as its joints". The accommodation of the linguistic 
usage above is started whenever we 
"introduce terminology for substances and fundamental magnitudes by 
appealing to situation in which we believe they are exemplified prior to our 
discovery of their fundamental or essential features". 
(Boyd, 1979, p.367) 
Thus, because such accommodation cannot be accomplished by explicit and 
conventional definitions, it appears that nondefinitional procedures for 
accommodating language to the world such as metaphorical comprehension are 
essential to knowledge. The acquisition of new knowledge and also the exploration of 
new areas of inquiry require that linguistic usage be modified so as to mark newly 
discovered causal features of the world. Boyd characterises this modification of 
language as dialectical and he claims that it is essential to the process of 
accommodation of language to (newly discovered features of) the causal structure of 
the world (Boyd, 1979, p.382). 
Thomas Kuhn, the leader of the theory of scientific revolutions agrees with Boyd's 
assertion that the open-endedness of metaphor has an important parallel in the process 
by which scientific terms are introduced and thereafter deployed (Kuhn, 1979, p.409). 
He also claims as both Black and Boyd claimed that the end product of the interaction 
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between the primary and secondary subject of every metaphor is not some kind of 
definition or a list of characteristics shared by the two subjects. This dissatisfaction of 
the criteria that a traditional empiricism and objectivism have required to declare the 
meaningfulness of natural-kind terms, doesn't mean any loss of functional precision 
of the scientific language (Kuhn, 1979, p.413). 
The essential role of metaphor must be seen in his theory of how scientific knowledge 
is processing. The emphasis in his theory is placed on the evolutionary character of 
scientific progress, where a revolution involves the abandonment of one theoretical 
structure and its replacement by another incompatible one. This view gives important 
place to the sociological characteristics of scientific communities. 
Very briefly, the process of the scientific knowledge is described by Kuhn as an 
interchange between periods when scientists articulate and develop theories in their 
attempt to account for and accommodate the behaviour of some relevant aspects of 
the real world - what he calls normal science and periods when scientists try to 
resolve substantial difficulties which make their theories problematic and develop 
crisis in theories main streams. The discontinuous change from one stage of normal 
science to the new stage of normal science constitutes a scientific revolution. Almost 
everything which is involved within a period of normal science is characterised as 
paradigm. Every paradigm corresponds with every stage of normal science and is 
made up of the general theoretical assumptions, laws and techniques for their 
applications that the members of a particular scientific community adopt (Chalmers, 
1982, p.90). 
Kuhn states that scientists who live in different rival paradigms are "living in different 
worlds". They have completely different sets of standards and metaphysical principles 
so there would be no logically compelling demonstration of the superiority of one 
paradigm over another. In Kuhn's words these differences between rival paradigms 
make them "incommensurable" (Kuhn, 1970). There are no inductive procedures for 
arriving at a perfectly adequate paradigm. So theory change between two paradigms 
is accompanied by a change in some of the relevant metaphors in the sense that their 
referents which occur in both are a function of the theory within which those terms 
appear. There is neither any neutral algorithm for theory choice nor any neutral 
language into which both of the theories, as well as the relevant data, may be 
translated for purposes of comparison (Kuhn, 1979, p.416). At this point, one can see 
the main differences between Kuhn's and Boyd's accounts of metaphor. Boyd talks 
about one real world still unknown but toward which science proceeds by successive 
approximation. On the opposite side, Kuhn is very sceptical of a sequence of theories 
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which are getting closer and closer to a true description of what the world is really 
like. He takes as an example, the history of optics where we find that a beam of light 
is described, first as a stream of particles, then as a wave and then as something that is 
neither a stream of particles nor a wave (Chalmers, 1982, p.156). 
Harre's argument about the role of scientific metaphors follows his basic ideas of the 
nature of science which are referred to as referential realism. The principle underlying 
Harres referential realism is that our experience stands over against an independent 
largely unobservable real world. Hanes realistic accounts are also very close to 
Boyd's and Hacking's theories. 
Scientific realism takes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories 
as real. This is also the purpose of the scientific work - to get close to the truth. As it 
appears from the definition above, we talk about the real existence of entities which is 
established through correct theories. Thus, it might seem that if you believe a theory 
is true, then you automatically believe that the entities of the theory exist. According 
to Hacking (1983, p.27) realism can be divided into two categories: realism about 
entities which recognises the existence of some "good" theoretical entities and realism 
about theories which demands scientific theories to be true. 
Scientific realism is often related with causality. In many cases, theoretical entities are 
supposed to have causal powers. For example, the 'direct' proof of the electron derives 
from our ability to manipulate them using well-understood low level causal properties 
(Hacking, 1983, p.24). 
The strongest evidence for scientific realism is the experimental work. And this is 
because, as Hacking pointed out, "entities that in principle cannot be 'observed' are 
regularly manipulated to produce a new phenomena and to investigate other aspects 
of nature. They are tools, instruments not for thinking but for doing" (Hacking, 1983, 
p.262) 
Referential realism according to Harre, constructs a form of scientific realism that 
needs only a weak system of epistemic concepts, but a strong notion of reference. 
This kind of realism is based on the distinction between three epistemic realms which 
briefly are: 
a) the realm of common perception 
b) the realm of beings which could be observed given certain historical and 
technical contingencies (e.g. 'genes' and 'cells') and 
c) the realm of beings which for a variety of reasons is beyond all human 
observational capacity (e.g. cognitive objects with mathematical properties) 
Harre structures his thoughts about the nature of science in what he calls policy 
realism. Policy realism is summarised into the thought that 
"if a substantive term seems to denote a being of a certain natural kind (and 
some special conditions are satisfied by the theory in which that term 
functions) it is worth setting up a search for that being". 
(Hand, 1986, p.59) 
What is interesting in respect to the third epistemic realm, is the adoption of terms 
through the metaphorical trope because of the lack of any literal vocabulary. 
According to what Harre calls as "the displacement theory" a term is taken from a 
well established context of use and is used in a new context to express a belief for 
which there is no existing vocabulary. 
Harre also claims that explaining, in scientific discourse and in any of the three 
epistemic realms described above, is essentially a linguistic activity which does not 
stop at the level of words and phrases, but additional elements are needed for a 
complete analysis, such as sentence connectives (Harre, 1960, p.7). According to 
Harre, there is nothing like one simple type of explanation which can be identified as 
a distinctive genre, generally adopted by science, but a variety of different kinds of 
explanations e.g. linear explanations, explanation in detail, hidden mechanisms, 
explanatory theory, analogical/metaphorical explanations. Explanation is a complex 
activity which involves other kinds of activities like descriptions. Transformations of 
explanations into descriptions and descriptions into explanations is a very common 
phenomenon in science, when, for example, an explanation is used as a description in 
order to support another explanation. For example, the structure of fish is explained in 
terms of the ecology of the sea where the latter is taken as a description in order to 
explain the former (Harre, 1960, p.8). 
Harre is concerned specifically with the role of metaphors and analogies in the 
construction of the generic entities and events which have explanatory power. He 
notes that the connections which establish the relevancy of facts to one another are 
often complex, so that if they are to be of any use in facilitating understanding, which 
is a requirement of an explanation over and above delimiting the area in which we can 
find a cause, some simplification of the relevant facts must be made. The most direct 
way, and that commonly adopted in environmental science is to represent a structure 
or a process or an environment schematically, so that only the most important features 
are brought about (Harre, 1960, p.85). What Harre calls schematic explanations are 
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very near to how image schemata are treated in the present thesis. In particular, 
schematic explanations are based on the concept of the analogy/metaphor in two 
ways: 
1) schematic explanation as an analogue of a complex natural phenomenon. 
So, for example, a particular model of the carbon cycle is an analogue, one of 
the many possible ways to describe the carbon cycle in the environment. 
2) analogies/metaphors facilitate an understanding of a phenomenon which is 
not familiar by the use of the familiar implications of another similar 
phenomenon (for example elaborating pollution at a global scale in terms of a 
well known case of a local pollution). 
But even if Harre addresses the importance of the role of metaphors in schematic 
explanations he does not provide any further accounts of how metaphors facilitate 
schematic explanations. 
The last epistemological theory which will be discussed here that identifies a 
prominent role for metaphors and analogies in science is the theory of "mild realism" 
adopted by Mary Hesse. According to this approach, theories represent real structures, 
not literally, but by means of metaphor and analogy, because no universal literal 
reference of concepts can be defined. In particular, theories can express the relative 
clustering of things and their properties, by picking out the essential properties that 
produce a theoretical classification which best fits present evidence. It is important 
here to draw the distinction that theories have real reference, but the concepts to 
which they refer are family resemblance concepts and the relations referred to are 
based on analogical and metaphorical relations between things and systems of things. 
(Hesse, 1988, p.337) 
Scientific concepts share with linguistic metaphors the property of shifting both 
reference and sense with context. A major problem in such creation of new meaning 
in science is that how meaning change takes place is dependent upon under what 
constraints metaphoric meaning shifts. If everything is to be combined with 
everything without constraints - that means "anything goes", then how can 
communication between scientists become possible? To answer this question, Hesse 
uses Rosch's theory about categories. 
Wittgenstein had speculated that categories were structured by what he called "family 
resemblances". The basic idea of "family resemblances" is that categories may be 
related to each other without all members having any properties in common that 
define the category (Lakoff, 1987, p.16). Rosch first tried to establish the idea above 
by empirical research. According to her results, prototypes are conceptualised in 
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everyday language which is structured by cue-properties. These properties are 
frequent within a category and relatively infrequent outside it, so they are not 
objective in the world independent of any being. She refers to them as interactional 
properties which form clusters in our experience derived from our physical and 
cultural environment. The latter consequently means that the boundaries of a category 
are not uniquely determined and also that any radical change in the perspective of a 
culture or a theory upon the world categories may dissolve and reform, as in an 
ideological or a scientific revolution. (Hesse, 1988, p.323) 
Turning back to Hesse's question: How the meaning variance in science happens in 
such a way that communication becomes possible, the answer is given to what she 
calls a "nearness" of meaning which is a function of a variety of variables e.g. 
similarities and differences between members of basic categories, synonymy, 
inclusion, contrast, structural analogy, paraphrase, empirical association, cause and 
effect relations etc. forming a complex network. This network is not just a "free-
floating" system of socially accepted coherence, but is tied down at various and 
varying points by empirical reference in particular cases, that is, at the reference 
points that permit language to be learnt and communication conducted (Hesse, 1988, 
p.324.) 
Scientific categories are like the family resemblance concepts of cognitive categories. 
Both of them are relatively stable in local contexts, but are not fixed or are their 
boundaries clearly defined so that they are not immune to radical revision in theory 
change. Therefore, in science, the world of theoretical entities and causes as well as 
the everyday observable world is ordered by some clustering of objects and properties 
in the same way as it has been described above, according to Rosch. 
Hesse has argued that the deductive model of explanations should be modified and 
supplemented by a view of theoretical explanation as metaphoric redescription of the 
domain of the explanandum. This model describes explanation by dividing it into two 
parts: the explanans (that which explains) and the explanandum (that which is 
explained). 
M. Hesse uses M. Black's analysis of primary and secondary subject associated with 
the explanandum and the explanans. In her accounts of how a scientific theory is 
constructed, the primary system is the domain of the explanandum, describable in 
observation language and the secondary is the domain of the explanans described 
either in observation language or the language of a familiar theory (Hesse, 1980, 
p.112). She argues that the secondary system cannot be imposed apriori upon any 
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primary, and vice versa that any secondary system cannot be the source of metaphors 
for any primary. This is why the associate's ideas both of the primary and secondary 
system are changed to some extent by the use of the metaphor in a way that the two 
systems are seen as more like each other: they seem to interact and adapt to one 
another. 
The association of the ideas of "metaphor" and of "explanation" doesn't mean that all 
explanations are metaphoric and vice versa, that all metaphors are part of 
explanations. The introduction of a metaphoric terminology is not itself explanatory. 
Metaphor becomes explanatory in the theoretical explanations because the role of the 
latter is the introduction into the explanans of a new vocabulary or even of a new 
language. The touchstone in this view which associates metaphor and explanation is 
that 
"there is one language, the observation language which like all natural 
languages is continually being extended by the metaphoric uses and hence 
yields the terminology of the explanans". 
(Hesse, 1980, p.122) 
Again these accounts, as others before, seem to say in slightly different words what 
Lakoff and Johnson say about the metaphorical extension of everyday-experienced 
image schemata on to abstract concepts and categories. 
2.5 The study of metaphor in cognitive psychology 
The theoretical framework which the researcher uses to define what is to count as a 
metaphor both influences the type and process of the research task. In particular, tasks 
are: 
a) either comprehension or production studies, 
b) either linguistic or extra-linguistic studies. 
The age of the participants is also an important factor as in the hypothesis, whether 
the metaphorical comprehension and production is constructed through age-stages or 
not. 
Although the difficulties and complex character of the research on metaphor, the 
child's ability to comprehend and produce metaphors is not only of theoretical interest 
but of practical importance as well, particularly in reading. If, as Richards pointed 
out, we cannot get through three sentences of ordinary discourse without at least one 
metaphor, then we can see how important the role of metaphor is in the acquisition of 
language. Then it appears that the study of metaphor in cognitive psychology has 
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important consequences in educational psychology. As is well known, the primary 
concern in educational psychology is with the processes underlying the acquisition of 
knowledge. And because what people learn is learned through the medium of 
language, it follows that knowing how metaphors are processed and what constraints 
exist on their comprehensions is bound to contribute to our understanding of the 
learning process (Ortony et al, 1978, p.937). 
The first major problem in the research is that the definition of metaphor influences 
seriously any kind of results. For example, it is a different thing to take metaphor as 
similarities or proportionalities or proverbs. One should bear in mind that 
traditionally, the study of metaphor has been predominantly undertaken by scholars of 
philosophy and literature. And as has been illustrated in the sections above, there is 
more than one theoretical perspective and every perspective derives from more than 
one theory. So the metaphor has been slow to find its way into psychology. One can 
identify, among others, two different theoretical approaches in the research literature. 
In the propositional approach, word meanings are represented as propositions, about 
the core meaning. But in schema theory, what gets represented is knowledge 
associated with the things to which the words refer. As a result, propositional models 
appear to be forced to specify special processes for the comprehension of metaphor, 
whereas schema-based models perhaps need not do so (Ortony et al, 1978, p.936). 
Different theoretical notions about language comprehension are likely to lead to 
different predictions about the comprehension of metaphor. It is important to say how 
much the metaphor is related with language and in particular, if it is just a linguistic 
phenomenon or if it depends on extra-linguistic factors also. There are two directions 
for those who believe the latter. An extreme position comes from D. Gentner (1977) 
whose results weaken the position that young children lack metaphorical ability and 
are compatible with the hypothesis that such ability is present at the outset of 
language. And a more modest position which uses the pragmatics point of view (as 
described by J. Searle in section 2.3.2) tends to see non-simple nominative metaphors 
as context dependent. Gildea and Glucksbert (1983) argue that when the relationship 
between the two subjects of the metaphor is ambiguous or vague, as when either 
several alternative relationships or none at all come to mind, then a context that 
provides information about the relationship can facilitate metaphor comprehension by 
suggesting the ground of metaphor (Gildea et al, 1983, p.587). 
On the other hand, research which investigates metaphor from the semantics point of 
view shows it as a context independent phenomenon. These studies use to relate 
metaphoric understanding with cognitive stages. Pollio and Pollio (1974) suggest that 
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children who are in the stage of concrete operations are able to use frozen and novel 
figurative language within a specific context but may be unable to explicate the use of 
such language in completely abstract terms until they move from the stage of concrete 
operations to the stage of formal operations. Other investigations (Billow 1975, 
Winner et al, 1976) suggested three steps preceding the attainment of mature 
metaphoric understanding. 
In the first step (or stage) a magical world would be invented in which X can be Y. 
For example, the child could take the statement "The prison guard was a hard rock" as 
the transfiguration of person into stone. Such kind of interpretation is called magical. 
During the second stage, older children juxtapose in some respect the two terms of 
metaphor in such a way that the link between them is transformed from one based on 
identity to one based on contiguity. Such shift in the meaning is called metonymy. In 
the example which is given above, the metaphor could come to mean that the guard 
worked in a rock prison. The last step is the primitive metaphoric stage. Children 
might find it easier to draw a similarity between two terms belonging in the same 
realm. 
Winner (1976) also shows the paradox that although the capacity to understand 
metaphoric figures of speech develops only during late childhood and early 
adolescence, studies focusing on the child's ability to produce figurative language 
have repeatedly documented the spontaneous use of metaphors, similes, and other 
figures of speech by preschool-age children (Winner, 1976, p.289). Taken together 
with results of prior research on metaphor, these findings suggest that spontaneous 
production occurs first, followed by comprehension and then by the ability to explain 
the rationale of a metaphor. The spontaneous metaphors produced by young children 
are most often visual comparison prompted by stimuli in the environment. But the 
fact that a child cannot report how he or she understood something does not in itself 
justify the conclusion that it was not understood. On the other hand, in looking at the 
spontaneous production of metaphor in early stages of language acquisition, care has 
to be taken in judging what is and what is not true metaphor. Children at this age 
learning to recognise and correct perceptual, cognitive and conceptual error so they 
produce categorical errors and mistakes that can be taken as metaphorical expressions 
but are not (Matter & Davis, 1975). 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In general, two perspectives can be identified in the intention of the present chapter to 
illustrate various accounts of metaphors. The first derives from a branch of disciplines 
which includes studies of the philosophy of language, linguistics and cognitive 
psychology. Here, the discussion carries the burden of my argument for a variety of 
reasons. The major reason is the fact that the study of metaphor has been 
predominantly undertaken by scholars in the area of philosophy and literature. On this 
level, the shift from the point of view which assumed metaphors to be a mere 
embellishment in the domain of emotions to the view which is dominant until today 
and has broken down the cognitive/emotive dichotomy by recognising serious 
cognitive accounts on metaphor, is represented. Arguments of the latter have been 
divided into two pathways. The first shows metaphor basically as a comparison 
between two objects or ideas (comparison theory) and the second as an interaction 
between two systems of associated ideas (interaction theory). Recent studies have 
been influenced to a large extent either by the comparison or the interaction theory. 
The need to put together studies of the philosophy of language with studies in 
linguistics and cognitive psychology in one branch, derives from the fact that many of 
the theories concerned with the cognitive accounts of metaphor refer to the theories of 
language which are usually influenced by the variety of theories related to the 
philosophy and philosophy of language. 
The second perspective is the epistemological point of view. Metaphor here was 
rejected as a mere embellishment by empiricism and, until recently, logical 
positivism. For these two epistemological approaches metaphor has no place in the 
scientific explanation where language must be precise and deduced to empirical 
statements. On the other hand in Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, metaphor 
plays a crucial role in the shift of meaning between different paradigms. Furthermore, 
metaphor has found its place in science and in particular in what is considered as 
scientific explanation by two epistemological views 'referential' and 'mild' realism, 
presented in section 2.4. Despite their differences, what they share is the basic idea 
that metaphors are inherent in the scientific explanation whenever there is the need to 
suggest new terminology about concepts and their relationships which are concerned 
with unobservable but real entities and their relationships. 
Finally, the difficulties in the research on metaphor from the point of view of the 
cognitive psychology seem to be inherent in the nature of this field (the study of 
metaphor). In addition, this research tradition is incomplete in respect to whether 
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older children's comprehension of abstract scientific concepts is based, through 
metaphorical extensions, on concrete concepts related with their everyday physical 
experience. But one should bear in mind that any serious accounts to answer the 
problems and complications raised by the studies and further research questions, 
demand research work which will consider the arguments from various perspectives 
about the nature of metaphor. The fact that so far most of the attempts to study 
metaphor are anecdotal accounts does not mean that one cannot investigate aspects of 
the problem. 
The present study stands on the side of those theoretical and empirical accounts which 
believe that metaphors are not found exclusively at the linguistic surface but are 
widespread both in the scientific and commonsense discourse without any simple 
correlation between surface linguistic cues and either their presence or type. Thus the 
position which is taken is that metaphors are primarily about things and events, not 
primarily about words and sentences. It is also believed that metaphors have an 
explanatory power both in commonsense and scientific reasoning to provide the 
means to step from the known properties and processes of things and events to those 
which are unknown. 
APPENDIX 3 
NOTATION OF REPRESENTING IMAGE SCHEMATA AND 
AN EXAMPLE OF ANALYSING A LESSON USING IMAGE 
SCHEMATA 
3.1.1 Representing image schemata 
In order to represent metaphorical constructions made by Image schemata in data 
analysis a sort of notation is needed as a way of representing their variety. Therefore 
representations are employed as aids in the description of particular image schemata. 
Such representations are particularly useful for two reasons: 
- they identify the key structural features of the schemata and illustrate their 
internal relationships 
- they are heuristic tools for qualitative data analysis, giving a partial 
representation (and no more) as required for the local interpretation of 
discourse fragments. 
We also need to clarify that the representations of image schemata are only 
representations and are not the schemata themselves. The fact that the image schema 
is neither a set of propositional statements nor a concrete image, prevents us from 
describing it either as a mere theoretical construction or as a mere representation. 
3.1.2 Notation 
To begin with we will start with the representation of participants in image schemata. 
Any participant: Agent, Patient, Container, Interior, Part, Whole is represented as a 
square : 
PATIENT AGEN1 
In the schematic notation of the Containment schema we should be able to recognise 
and name at least two participants: Container and Interior, and their in-out orientation: 
CONTAINER 
INTERIOR 
In order to avoid confusion with the categories of the linguistic analysis, instead of 
using the linguistic terms Actor and Goal the terms Agent and Patient will be 
preferred instead for representing Agent structures. Agents are represented as: 
E-> 
The Agent is the participant from which the vector emanates - the participant which 
'does': 
The agent's action can bring a change at the state of the Patient either by transferring 
(movement) it , e.g. : 
or transforming it, that means the Agent brings some change (transforms) to what the 




or it is the main cause of bringing a new entity into being without always stating 
explicitly whether the new entity is a transformed one or the outcome of the 
interaction of entities: 
PROCESS 
bring into being 
3.2 Analysis of a lesson 
This is an example of analysing a lesson in terms of the image schema approach. The 
analysis shows how the notation of image schemata is used in order to represent them. 
School: 	 A 
Date : 	 25.11.94 
Class : 	 YR 8 
Teacher: 	 Jane 
Topic: 	 Acid Rain and Carbon Cycle (double lesson) 
This double lesson is divided into two parts. The first half is about the phenomenon of 
weathering and how students can plan their experiments in order to study weathering. 
The second part is about the Carbon Cycle. Aspects of the Carbon Cycle were 
discussed in previous lessons in the classroom by making reference to textbook 
materials. In this lesson the Carbon Cycle is constructed as a whole. 
First Part: Acid Rain 
By reading the working sheet, the teacher starts the lesson with a definition of 
weathering [page287, linel-6]: 
When there's material like brick and stone exposed to the effect of wind, rain and 
frost their surfaces can be damaged and loosened. Scientists call this "weathering", 
they think that pollutants, like the acid in rain can speed up weathering. 
The definition of weathering is represented as an Agent structure: materials like brick 
and stone are exposed to the effect of wind, rain and frost. The Agent(s) in this case 
are: rain, wind, and frost and the Patient(s) are materials like brick, and stone. The 
action of the Agent brings about observable changes to the Patient: 
...their surfaces can be damaged and loosened 
The scientific term which is used to describe this process is a nominalization: 
weathering [p287, L4] 
The speed of the Agent's action is increased by entities which are pollutants such as 
acid rain. So the process of weathering consists of three parts: 
AGENT: rain, wind, frost 
ACTION: pollutant speeds up the action 
PATIENT: brick, stone 









By making a meta-textual statement the teacher leaves out some other related 
processes also referred to by their scientific terms: 
erosion and things like that [p287, L8] 
Going back to line 5 we could say that there is also an implicit definition about acid 
rain, because the answer to the question what is acid rain, will be: something that can 
speed up weathering. The teacher is going back to weathering [p287, L1-5] by 
making a resumptive conjunction and recalling its definition [p287, L10]. The entity 
pollutant so far is seen as part (not necessary) of the definition of the entity 
weathering [p287, L17-18]. Then the teacher is focusing on the entity pollutant, 
asking for its definition [p28'7, L19]. The students' answer makes an interesting shift 
from the noun pollutant (introduced so far as a condition which increases action and 
its effect on the Patient) to the verb pollutes (process): 
something that pollutes the atmosphere [p287, L20-22]. 
The teacher's reply to this answer focuses on the meaning of the process pollutes. 








The question can be represented schematically as an Agent structure: 
pollutant 	 I 	 atmosphere 
AGENT 	 PATIENT pollutes 
PROCESS 
The answer which follows the teacher's question: 
Changes that makes it bad... [p287, L22-23], 
replaces the verb pollutes by the verb (with the broader commonsense meaning) 
changes giving at the same time a property to that in order to characterise the kind of 
change. The property bad is being given to the atmosphere because of the action of 
the Agent. This process which is represented schematically below: 
pollutants 	 atmosphere 




is elaborated by an example which is an explicit analogy : 
like put bad fumes into the air or something [p287, L24] 
in a way that causes some kind of problem or damage [p287, L25]. The elaborated 







So far the Agent-structure of weathering has been elaborated in two ways, the 
scientific and the commonsense one which are represented with the schemata above. 
The commonsense one highlights the transformational type of process which takes 
place in this Agent-structure. Notice also that the analogy elaborates the Agent-
structure with one more schema the Containment schema. What is left out (look at the 
schema above) is that we do not know : 
I) where fumes come from 
II) how fumes get into the atmosphere (by transposing themselves, so they are 
Agents in respect to their transposition and at the same time Patients in respect 
to their creation or there was another Agent to put them into the air) 
III) what fumes are made of 
The teacher's question below elaborates the first of the questions above by shifting 
back to the level of the target domain of the analogy: 
And how does that pollution get there? [p28'7, L26] 
The answer is also a partial answer to the question how pollutants are produced. It is 
interesting to notice that as the schematic representation shows in this case the 
process of making things is the Agent which does two things at the same time: 
producing pollutants and sending them into the air [p287,L27-29]: 
transposition air CONTAINER 
AIM pollutants  
people 	 things 
AGEN1 	 PATIENT 
"doing" 




The answer also is elaborated by some examples: 
Factories and cars, in other words, things that we do isn't it? Not 
necessarily natural things, mainly things that people do , like driving 
their cars... 
The teacher's elaboration to the students' answer is at a more general level: 
so pollutants are things in the air,... [p287, L32-33] 
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replaced immediately (corrective clarification) : 
... substances in the air 0 which ... life style . [p287, L32-36]. 
As the definitions of the entities and their processes have been constructed the teacher 
asks students to name some different building materials that can be used in their 
already planned experiments [p288, L1-5]. The purpose of the latter is to investigate 
how the weathering of different building materials is affected by acid rain. For such 
an experiment, a sample of different building materials is needed [p288, L6-23], as 
well as some diluted acid [p289, L2-3]. Bricks, marble, limestone, sandstone blocks, 
and cement are used as instances of building materials. Dilute acid is also used as an 
instance of the Agent pollutant. References to thing-like entities here are at two 
levels: the commonsense level of our everyday experience with thing-like entities 
such as different kind of building materials and the level of scientific knowledge 
which refers to classes of things. The teacher uses instances of the commonsense level 
to make reference to the scientific level which is more abstract and in some cases 
presupposes some kind of generalisation (as it happens with the classes of things). 
Reference to the scientific level is made by giving labels to entities from their 
scientific usage such as weathering, pollutant, building materials, acid rain. 
An interesting question raises the issue of how an entity is identified, in this case 
dilute acid: 
How are we going to know if something is acid? [p288, L23]. 
The teacher's question invites students to recall some information from their memory 
about the differences in the colour of the PH indicator paper. The definition of what 
indicator paper means rests on the meaning of the term: "indicator", so in some sense 
it is a tautological definition: 
indicate means to show something [p289, L6] 
or at least a replacement of the scientific term indicator by the everyday term shows. 
Indicator also in this case is identified by its action: what does it do? Changes its 
colour [p289, L3]. 
Then by reading the work-sheet an elaboration of the property of the natural 
weathering is given by the teacher in terms of a lengthy process using an analogy 
between 'real time' (how long it takes for a natural process to be accomplished) and 
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the concept of time as it is used in everyday life (e.g. duration of a lesson) [p289, 
L17-22]. By comparing the two different kinds of timing (natural process versus 
lesson's time) teacher and students come out with the result that in the laboratory, in 
contrast with real life, they need to speed up the effect of the phenomenon of 
weathering in order to have an answer as soon as possible [p289, L22]. In this case 
there is a shift from the concept of 'natural time' (which takes more than a 'lesson's 
time') to the concept of 'lab's time'. 
Among the different ways to speed up the effect of the process of weathering (such as 
increasing the amount of water used in the process, concentrate the water flow at a 
specific place on the surface of the affected entity, using dilute acid instead of acid 
rain itself e.t.c.) [p289, L26-34] the meaning of the concept dilute acid needs to be 
elaborated. Thus a definition: 
Watered down, that's right, added water ... [p290, Ll] 
in terms of everyday concepts is accompanied by an example (exemplifying the 
definition): 
... like you dilute your orange squash before you drink it. [p290, L1-2]. 
Then the main question of the experiment: 
... how much the acid has affected the weathering of one sample... [p290, L3-4] 
is elaborated with the idea of the comparison between samples, which also rests upon 
the idea of the control sample [p290, L5-7]. The comparison between the control 
variable sample and the other samples demands some measurements. And 
measurements cannot be carried out without observations [p290, L29-32]. 
Observations are given in terms of colour and texture of materials. The latter (texture) 
are observable mainly by touching: rough, smooth, pitted, bits flaking off [p291, L9- 
18] . 
This part of the lesson ends with the teacher's suggestions to students about how they 
would better plan their experiments. 
Second Part: Carbon Cycle 
The next topic is initiated by a meta-textual statement by the teacher: 
what I quickly wanted to go over was the carbon cycle. [p293, L32-33] 
The grammatical past tense reflects the fact that the next topic is continued from the 
last lesson. So the teacher in order to remind students what the last lesson was about, 
makes references to specific pages of the textbook used (Oxford Science Programme) 
[p294, L13-18]. At this stage of the lesson the teaching is full of meta-role statements 
from the teacher who asks for student's attention to various things, such as what she is 
going to write on the board: 
I am going to write carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere. [p294, L21] 
The lesson begins with questions about the location of atmosphere and Carbon 
dioxide in nature ( at the same time as she locates them on the board): 
Where's the atmosphere? 
All around us . [p294, L22-23]. 
The location of the Carbon dioxide gas (in the atmosphere) and the location of its 





which reflects a prior initial question: 
How does carbon dioxide get into the atmosphere? [p1294, L24-25] 
What the question is looking for is the type of the Agent-structure. The answer will 




the Agent is the CO2 by itself) or if the process is Agent-less: 
carbon dioxide 	 atmosphere 
CONTAINER 
The answer given by students: 
We breathe it out [p294, L26] 
can be also represented schematically as a combination of a Containment and an 
Agent Structure. The container acts on its interior by transposing its location (in-out 
orientation) 
environment 	 CONTAINER 
ACTION(causes transposistion) 
The answer is followed by an analogy: 
T: We breathe it out. Just us? 
S: Animals [p294, L27-28] 
which shifts the discussion to a more general level of categories of living things and 
not of specific instances of categories. So from entities we and processes with which 
students have immediate experience such as human breathe there is a shift to entities 
and processes with which we share the same nature such as animals breathe. Trees in 
contrast with animals take carbon dioxide in: 
trees take it in and plants [p294, L30] 
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PATIENT 
the "and" here works as a corrective conjunction at the clause level so the clause: 
trees and plants take it in : 
is represented by a schema which is the same as the one above, only its in/out-




The teacher in her effort to avoid misunderstanding is trying to make clear the 
difference between the two categories: plants and animals, by going back to her 
initial, starting point: how animals breathe out Carbon dioxide. Then the resumptive 
movement is followed by some kind of particularisation [p295, L14-21]: 
T: 	 Where does the carbon dioxide come from? 
S: air ... lungs 	 .... / 
T: From our lungs OK What's it doing in our lungs? 
S: Nothing...what we breathe... / 
T: We breathe out more than we breathe in. We're adding to the 
carbon dioxide in the air every time we breathe out. 
Something's going on in our bodies that's making carbon 
dioxide .. 
The passage above can be represented schematically by a combination of a 











With this last schematic combination the connection between the top and the central 
part of the Carbon cycle as it is represented by teacher's drawing on classroom's 
board has been build up (see figure 1, page 285). 
The insistence on distinguishing animal and plant processes continues by the teacher 
insisting in the use of proper terminology. The 'right terms' are recalled by the 
teacher in order to remind students of processes and to help them to fit these 
processes properly into what has been constructed so far (represented schematically 
above). So photosynthesis is concerned with plants and respiration is concerned with 
animals. Because both concepts above need to be fitted into the cycle, a question of 
clarifying their connection follows: 
What's the connection between respiration and photosynthesis? 
What's the relationship between them? [p295, L25-29] 
followed by an answer: 
Animals eat the plants and we eat animals or we eat the plants [p295,L30-31] 









elaborated by particularising it [p296, L2-4] : 
Well done, in a process called photosynthesis which they use carbon 
dioxide from the air to make that food. 
in terms of an Agent structure: 
AGENT 
carbon dioxide 
AGENT T PATIENT 
plant 
	 I 	 fooc 
make 
photosynthesis 
The food is connected to animals by going back to respiration [p296, L5-7] : 
Animals eat the plants so now the carbon dioxide that was used to make the 
food has been incorporated into that food. 
The whole process is represented as a combination of an Agent structure, 











The process is exemplified at the same time, by the teacher who is using an example 
familiar to students: 
Why do we need food? [p296, L8] 
The question above shifts the discussion from the animal's level to the human level. 
The teacher answers the question by particularising student's response: 
to live... 
using the appropriate terminology: 
...energy. [p296, L8-9] 
and by making reference to properties which are carried on by energy [p296, L10-16]: 
T: 	 How do we release that energy? 
T: 	 For energy is one reason we need food. How do we 
release that energy? / S: ....by breathing in / T: By 
breathing in which gas / S carbon....ox.. / 
T: 	 Oxygen. Right, we breathe in oxygen. The oxygen and 
the food react together and change, releasing energy 
and also releasing the / S: carbon / T: Carbon dioxide 
and we breathe it / S: Out / 
Teacher's elaboration above can be represented schematically as a combination of a 











Later, the teacher goes back to the concept of respiration, which is now elaborated in 
more detail [p296, L23-24 & p297, L1-7]. As the definition of respiration is built up 
the entity Carbon dioxide is elaborated with the property: waste product. [p297,L2-7]. 
The process of how CO2 gets into the atmosphere is seen also in another way [p297, 
L8-13]: 
T: 	 Is that the only way that carbon dioxide gets into the air these days? 
What other ways? 
Where else? 
Burning things , in particular which things? 
What are the fossil fuels? 
The teacher exemplifies the process of burning by providing instances which are 
closer to students' everyday understanding [p297, L20-34 & p298, L1-3]: 
T: 	 What do they use in what we call the developing countries a lot 
for fuel? What do you use if you go camping sometimes? 
S: .... / T: No, what do you use if you go camping 
sometimes / S: Wood / T.• Wood / S:.... / T: I'm sorry, 
I didn't hear it / S:.... / T: OK burning fossil fuels and 
wood puts carbon dioxide into the atmosphere / S: Can 
we.... / T: In a minute. How do how are fossil fuels 
actually produced / S: Over millions of years / T: Over 
millions and millions of years from what / S: ... dead 
animals... / T: Right, dead animals and plants, what 
happens to them / S: they rot / T: They rot, where, they 
disintegrate, they rot / S: ...ground / 
T: Under the ground OK, which sort of bacteria are we talking 
about probably? /S: Oxygen ... nitrogen.. /T: Oxygen hating 
bacteria OK So, the animals, 	 when they die over millions 
of years, turn into / S: Fossils / T: Fossil fuels [ l and then 
when we burn them, we release energy and we release the 
carbon dioxide. 
The various processes and entities in the extract above are represented by a 
combination of a Containment and Agents structures schemata of various types 




dead animals disintegrate 
TRANSFORMATION 




With this schema above the connection between the bottom, left and top part of the 
drawing of the Carbon cycle on the board is made (see figure:1, page 285). By using a 
resumptive procedure, the teacher goes back to the schema above in order to 
particularise on the process of how Carbon dioxide is absorbed by plants [p298, L5-
8]. A process which is represented schematically as a combination of an Agent-








AGE 	 takes it in 
transposition 
CO2 	 PROCESS 
INTERIOR 
Finally, the teacher elaborates the right part of the carbon cycle [p299, L14-22] in 














The analysis of this lesson illustrates that teachers' and students' construction of 
entities can be represented in a convenient way by image schemata. The underlying 
meaning of entities is constructed at the level of image schemata. The teacher often 
refers to entities in terms of their scientific names without violating the basic, image 
schematic relations in which these entities are realised. This is also evident by the fact 
that she often exemplifies scientifically named either process-like or thing-like 
entities using examples familiar to students. Commonsense representations of 
meaning are also realised by the same image schemata used for scientific 
representations. So image schemata are applied both to commonsense and scientific 
entities and in many cases entities from both realms are related within the same image 
schema. 
At the level of image schemata, teacher's and students' contribution to the 
construction of entities is at different scales: either at the scale of a specific part of a 
schema, or at the scale of an entire schema and less often for students at the scale of a 
combination of image schemata. Finally the analysis in terms of image schemata can 
be a useful tool to show the effect various representations of entities might have on 
their meaning (see chapter 7). 
Carbon Cycle 
	  






animals breathe out 
	
trees and other 
fuels and wood 
	
carbon dioxide 	 plants take in 
during respiration 	 carbon dioxide 
/\ 	 during 
photosynthesis 
fossil fuels are found 
over millions of years 
Figure: 1 
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3.3 Transcribed Lesson 
School: 	 A 
Date: 	 25.11.94 
Class: 	 YR 8 
Teacher: 	 Jane 
Topic: 	 Acid Rain & Carbon Cycle 
T 	 Just because [ ] listen and I'll explain what's happening. 
Right, you're not going to be on television (Sounds of 
disappointment), and we're not going to be famous 
(Sounds of disappointment) [ ] What's happening is 
that some of the students at the University in London 
are doing a little bit of research and they just want to 
record some lessons, I'm talking, they just want to 
record some lessons and to take them back to the 
University and look at them in their own good time and 
find out answers to their questions. Right? So all we 
need to do is for everyone to just behave as you 
normally would - perfectly - you know, like you 
normally do! / S• 	  / T: No, perfectly / S:...I've left my 
homework at home...(laughter) I T: You've left it at 
home / S:...and I think I left it there, can I.... / T: Yes, 
go quickly / 
S: (general chatter) 
T: Right, let's get the register done please, Jessica, Angie, 
Deepah, Beverley, Mitch, Kelly - Kelly Smith, Fiona, 
Natasha, Kelly - Kelly Stevens, Charlie, Natura, Kelly, 
Natalie, Venetia, Kieren, Jodi, Helen, Tracy, Odine and 
Chatna ( sounds of answers as each name was called). 
Thank you. Right, let's have a look at the homework 
first can we please? / S....[ ] / T Has anybody got a 
copy of the sheet I could just borrow please [ ] Thank 
you. Right, can everyone else see a copy of the sheets / 
S: No ... Yes... / T: Who said No / S: ... / T Have you 
got one of your own? / S: .... / T: Right thank you very 
much, if you can share then Mitch can borrow this one. 
/ S: Thank you Miss / T: Anyone else that can't see a 
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copy of the sheet [ ] Right. When there's materials like 
brick and stone exposed to the effect of wind, rain and 
frost their surfaces can be damaged and loosened. 
Scientists call this "weathering", they think that 
pollutants, like the acid in rain, can speed up 
weathering. [ ] / S: 	  / T: We will put it in the glossary 
when we come to Module F because Module F goes 
into more detail about weathering and erosion and 
things like that. 
T 	 So, what is weathering, what do we mean by 
weathering? Natalie / S:...effect of the wind and rain... / 
T: Right, not, not necessarily wear it away but / S:.... / 
T: damage it and loosen it so that perhaps the surface 
looks crumbly. Right, so that's damage, [ ] to the 
surface of rocks or buildings, stone brought about by 
things like wind and rain and frost, the different 
weather conditions, which is why it's called weathering. 
Pollutants. Scientists think that pollutants might speed 
up this change, might make it go faster. What do we 
mean by a pollutant? 
S 	 ... / T: Yes? / S: ... something in the atmosphere .. / T: 
Something that pollutes the atmosphere. What do we 
mean by pollutes the atmosphere? / S• 	 Changes. that 
makes it bad like put bad fumes into the air or 
something / T: Something that / S:.... / T: Changes the 
air in a way that causes some kind of problem or 
damage and how does that pollution get there? 
T: 	 Yes? / S: Factories and / T: Factories / S: Cars / T: 
Cars, in other words, things that we do isn't it? Not 
necessarily natural things, mainly things that people do, 
like driving their cars / S: .... / T: Sorry / S: Why is... / 
T: This is a tape recorder. OK? Right, so pollutants are 
things in the air, substances in the air [ ] which cause 
some kind of problem or damage [ ] and generally put 
there as a result of our activities, particularly our 
modern life style. You have to design and carry out an 
experiment to find out how the weathering of different 
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building materials is affected by acid rain. Now what 
you can get is some different building materials, can 
you think of some different building materials? Bev? 
S: Brick / 
T: Brick / 
S: Limestone / 
T: Limestone / 
S: ..Marble.. / 
T: Marble, concrete / 
S:  
T: Charlie? / 
S: Sandstone / 
T: Sandstone blocks, cement / 
S: natural stone / 
T: natural stone, Yes / 
S: / 
T: Ordinary stones like they use in the Cotswolds / 
S: What's that black stuff called that they put on the roads 
(several voices) Tar / 
T: Tarmac, bitumen / 
S: / 
T: Yes asphalt, OK, so we can get samples of different 
building materials and then we want some dilute acid. 
How are we going to know if something's acid, acidic / 
S• 	  / T: or not? Put your hand up, hand up, Mitch / S: 
that red and green kind of.... tells us where acid.... / T: 
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Right, that that paper, that red and green and / 
S• 	 (babble of voices) / T: what do you call red and 
green and blue that changes colour with acid paper / S: 
.... / T: what / S: .... / T: Good, well remembered p h 
paper indicator paper - what does indicate mean? / S: 
To show something / T: To show something that shows 
us 	 The opposite of acid is alkaline, and what's in the 
middle? / S: Green... / T: The green colour / S: Neutral 
/ 
T: 	 Neutral - good well remembered from last lesson. You 
can have some water, maybe access to a freezer, and 
perhaps some running water from a tube attached to the 
tap. Some information to help you. Natural weathering 
is a lengthy process - what does that mean Tracy? 
natural weathering is a lengthy process, [ ] can you 
explain that in your own words. What do you think 
they mean by a lengthy process? [ ] Is it something 
we're going to be able to do in a lesson, if it's a lengthy 
process? / S: ...experiment... 
[ ] An experiment but would we be able to get it 
finished in one lesson if it's a lengthy process? / S: No / 
T: No, so what's a lengthy process mean? / S: ...long 
time / 
T: Takes a long time, that's right. In order to speed up the 
effect in a laboratory, you might like to try soaking 
samples in water for several hours and then placing 
them in a freezer over night. You could also try the 
effects of using a fine, high-speed jet of water from a 
hose or a tap. So whereas natural stone would be 
exposed to pitter patter drops of rain over a long, long 
time, we can speed up the effect of those by having.... a 
jet of water, a fine jet and concentrating it just in one 
place on the stone to see if that has any effect. Instead 
of acid rain, you could use dilute acid. In the labs we 
have bottles of dilute acids and dilute alkalis. What's 
dilute mean? Dilute / S:... water.. / 
T: 	 Watered down, that's right, added water. like you dilute 
your orange squash before you drink it. You won't 
know how much the acid has affected the weathering of 
one sample, unless you have a similar sample which 
hasn't been treated with acid for comparison. So we 
need what we call a control, something that hasn't gone 
through the same process. So that we can compare it at 
the end. How many people actually managed to plan an 
experiment? Even if you didn't get right the way 
through it, how many people did have some ideas? [ ] 
OK, Helen, did you have any ideas? / 
S: .No I have but I didn't... / 
T: You got them from the sheets, well that's fine, that 
sheet was there to give you information. Right Helen, 
can you start us off then? 
S 	 / 
T: 	 What did you think we might do? / S• 	  / T: OK, so 
collect some samples / S: 	 / T: What sort of things 
did you think you might use? / S: ...natural stone 	  
T: There might be some / S: / T: So you're going to 
have a look round and see if you can find some places 
where obviously weathering has had an effect. Right, 
and then what are you going to do? 
S 	 ..samples that have been 	 / 
T: 	 Right, so you're going to get some samples which have 
been exposed and some other samples where it's been 
sheltered. / S: 	 / T and describe them, measure them 
or what? / S: Yeah.. / 
T: 	 Both those things, describe and measure them. What 
sort of measurements would you take or what sort of 
observations would you make, what would you be 
looking for? [ What evidence is there that something 
might have been weathered? / S: ..moss.. / T: moss 
growing on them, yes, plants growing on the surface 
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can have an effect because their roots can get into any 
little cracks and then as the plant grows, their roots can 
force those cracks wider apart. That can be a cause of 
weathering, yes. 
T: 	 Charlie? 
S: 	 .... stones come loose ... / T: Yes, when something's 
been weathered, bits come loose don't they and 
crumble away / S: I was going to say that as well... / T: 
.You were going to say that as well. So what would the 
surface look like? / S: ... rough.. / T: Might look rough / 
S:.... / T: ah ah / S: ....cover it and see if.... / T: Right, 
see if bits break away, Mitch? / S: On my Mum's wall, 
right she's got ... it's bright orange and all the rest of 
that's dark. / T: So a different colour perhaps, there 
might be a colour change. So we're going to make 
some observations [ ] and there might be things like 
colour changes or the texture of the surface, whether it's 
rough or smooth or pitted or bits flaking off. That 
would tell us, might give us some clues as to which 
sorts of stones weather easily and which don't but how 
could we actually find out what caused that? [ ] If we 
look at something that's already been weathered, does 
that help us to find out what really caused it or do we 
need to do something else, Jessica? 
S: You can get a sample of the like material that isn't like 
weathered and then you can like ....you leave it 
somewhere where it's windy and rainy and .... / T: Ah 
ah / S: ... and there's a lot of frost and then after about a 
week, come back and see if it's changed 
T: Do you think a week is long enough if we're just going 
to leave it to the wind and the rain and the frost, 
remember what they said, weathering is a / S: Long 
(several voices) / T: Lengthy process so how could we 
speed that up? 
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S: A jet of water / 
T: A jet of water, or / 
S: ...smaller stones lots of bits.... / 
T: a smaller stone you think will change quicker than a .... 
small pieces / 
S: / T: OK, might help, what else? / S: ... in the rain 
....same process....weathering and then you could add 
the acid and.... / 
T: Right, so we could use acid in the laboratory instead of 
acid rain and see if that has any effect on the stone. So 
what would you do, just leave it soaking in the acid or 
pour acid over it or what? / S: .... some amount.. / T: 
OK and then just brush some acid onto it, yes that's a 
possibility. How many pieces of the brick will you use? 
S: two / 
T: Two, alright / 
S: ..because one that has the acid on ... no, you need more 
than two. / 
T: Tell me why you said two in the first place / 
S: 	 because you have one to go in the acid and all that lot 
and then one with.... / 
T; 	 Right and why do you need one we haven't put in the 
acid. Yes? 
S: 	 Just to compare / T: To compare them at the end and 
see what the change has been / S• 
	 more than two / T: 
Right, why do we need more than two? / S: ...because 
one in the freezer...and one in acid and see which one... 
/ T: Right so that we can have one that we leave 
untreated, one that we put in acid, one that we soak in 
water and put in the freezer and what was the other 
one? / S: ...just put one in the freezer... / 
T: 	 And one in the freezer without soaking it in water. OK 
There's various different combinations but you leave 
one untreated so that you have a comparison and then at 
the end of your experiment, you can look for things like 
colour changes, changes in texture, bits flaking off. Do 
you think the material will be as strong when it's been 
weathered as before hand so you could maybe do some 
sort of test to find the strength of it whether it's easier to 
break now than it was before, things like that. So those 
of you who didn't get very far with your homework, do 
you think you'd be able to get a bit further if I ask you 
to have another go tonight? And those who did make a 
start, do you think you can go into real detail now with 
drawing apparatus and a table maybe for your results 
and things like that? OK, let's leave that for the moment 
then, so can you put that away, now whose did I borrow 
/ S:.... / T: The one at the end here / S:.... / T: We will 
do yes, oh you're going to do it are you? / S: ... / T: 
Well, try it and see / S: .... / T: Yes / S: ..that was on 
the floor.. / T: Thank you / S: .Can you do timetables... 
/ T: What for the parents' evening? / S:.... 
T: 	 Can you come to Room 20 because I've actually got it 
in my register. If you come at registration sometime .... 
/ 
S: ..what day... / 
T: Any registration time because I'm keeping it in my 
register / S: Miss 	  / T: I don't know...Alright, let me 
just get these books out for everyone else. Mitch, can 
you give some books out for me please? 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12 	 17 altogether, alright? / S.... / T: So some 
people will have to share. Something else I quickly 
wanted to go over was the carbon cycle. Remember 
you, I think you've all got to the point now where 
you've drawn pictures of the carbon cycle. You 
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remember, with the chicken, the dead chicken / S.... / T 
And the lightning cloud / S.... / T: Can you find that in 
your books please, find it in your books / S: .... / T: 
Which one / S.... / T Well go and swap it over then 
please Kelly / S:.... / T: Yes, can I borrow your / S:.... 
/ T: It's that one / S: which one?... / T: Kelly, no need / 
S:.... / T: This one / S:.... 
T 	 No that's the nitrogen cycle, sorry, you're right, you're 
right, sorry / S:.... / 
T: 	 Well then can you look at someone else's book, look 
over someone's shoulder sorry, it wasn't the one with 
the dead chicken, that was the nitrogen cycle - I got 
confused. It's the one with the factories and the man 
eating the chicken and the chicken eating the corn / S: 
(laughter and coughing)... / T: If you haven't got it with 
you, just look over someone else's book please / S. 	  
/ T: [ ] You'll also find it in your text book, it's in your 
text book that's where you copied it from on page 109. 
S: [ ] / T. Fine [ ] / S. 	  / 
T: Let's start, you don't have to copy this down yet 'cos it's 
in visible writing anyway [ ] I'm going to write carbon 
dioxide gas in the atmosphere. Where's the atmosphere? 
S 	 All around us / 
T: 	 All around us, OK [ ] How does carbon dioxide get 
into the atmosphere? 
S 	 We breathe it out / 
T: 	 We breathe it out. Just us? / 
S: Animals / 
T: OK animals / 
S. 	 and trees take it in and plants... / 
T: 	 Alright, let's just do one thing at a time Mitch, animals 
breathe out carbon dioxide? / S.... / T ..Mitch, that's 
enough.... [ ] Why do they breathe out carbon dioxide, 
where does the carbon dioxide come from? 
S 
T: 	 No, no the trees are going to do something else in a 
minute, we'll look at that. Where does this carbon 
dioxide coming from that we are breathing out? 
S: the greenhouse effect... / T: We've got little green 
houses inside us? / S: (laughter).... / 
T: Carbon dioxide is one of the gasses that causes the 
greenhouse effect we think. But you just said we 
breathe out carbon dioxide. Animals breathe out carbon 
dioxide. Where's this carbon dioxide coming from? 
S: air ... lungs 
T: From our lungs OK What's it doing in our lungs? / 
S: Nothing. .what we breathe... / 
T: We breathe out more than we breathe in. We're adding 
to the carbon dioxide in the air every time we breathe 
out. Something's going on in our bodies that's making 
carbon dioxide ... Odine?.. / S: .food... / T: It's 
something to do with food / S: .... / T: Good. / S: 
Photosynthesis / T: That's what the plants do / S: 
(laughter) / T: Now, it's not funny that / S: respiration 
/ T: Hey, good, it's not as funny as you think. What's 
the connection between respiration and photosynthesis? 
S: They go together / 
T: How do they go together? What's the relationship 
between them / S: ...animals... / T: Animals and plants 
right / S: animals eat the plants and we eat animals or 
we eat the plants / T: Right / S• 	  / T: Listen listen 
then, listen / S: .... / T: The plants make food in a 
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process called photosynthesis / S:.... / T: Say it / S: .... 
/ T: say it / S: .... / T: Well done, in a process called 
photosynthesis which they use carbon dioxide from the 
air to make that food. 
T 	 Animals eat the plants so now the carbon dioxide that 
was used to make the food has been incorporated into 
that food. Now the carbon's got into us / S:.... / T: Just 
a minute, why do we need food? / S: .to live... / T: Well 
be a bit more specific / S: energy / 
T: 	 For energy is one reason we need food. How do we 
release that energy? / S: ....by breathing in / T: By 
breathing in which gas / S carbon....ox.. / 
T: 	 Oxygen. Right, we breathe in oxygen. The oxygen and 
the food react together and change, releasing energy 
and also releasing the / S: carbon / T: Carbon dioxide 
and we breathe it / S: Out / 
T: 	 Out. That's the atmosphere and what happens then / S 
It goes round / T: It goes round again that's why it's 
called the carbon cycle. 
S: .... / T Just a minute Mitch 'cos Charlie had her hand up 
as well / S: . ..breathe it in as well.... / T: Sorry / S: .... 
is all that happening.... / 
T: : No, the oxygen I just breathed in is probably still 
going round in my blood stream and the carbon dioxide 
I'm breathing out is from some oxygen I breathed in a 
little while ago. Right, OK, so the animals breathe out 
carbon dioxide during the process that we call res / S: 
res... / T: Respiration [ 1 good and that's the process 
where we release energy from the food that we've eaten 
by breathing in the oxygen, the oxygen goes all round 
our bodies in the blood stream. 
T 	 Get's to every little part of us every cell, every brain 
cell, every cell in my big toe down to my finger tips, 
round to my back, up to my shoulders. The oxygen 
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goes all round to every cell and reacts with the food that 
I've digested to release energy. And one of the waste 
products of that Kelly / S• 	  / T: One of the waste 
products of that is / S: 	 / T: What I breathe out, no / 
S: 	 / T: Carbon dioxide, right. That is a waste 
product but from something else OK So animals 
breathe out carbon dioxide. 
T: 	 Is that the only way that carbon dioxide gets into the air 
these days? / S: ..No.. / T What other ways / S: From 
factories / T: From factories / S: / T: Where else / S: 
Cars / T: Cars / S: 	 / T: Sorry / S: Houses / T: From 
houses / S: Burning things / T: Burning things, in 
particular which things? / S: Fossil fuels / 
T: Fossil fuels. Right. What are the fossil fuels / 
S: (babble of answers) 
T: Wow / 
S: 	 (another babble) / T: Is it just fossil fuels, what's the 
other big fuel that's used a lot. Not necessarily in this 
country / S: (babble) / T: Methane - well that's part of 
natural gas isn't it / S (babble) / T: What do they use in 
what we call the developing countries a lot for fuel? 
S: / T: No, what do you use if you go camping 
sometimes / S: Wood / T: Wood / S: / T: I'm sorry, 
I didn't hear it / S: 	 / T: OK burning fossil fuels and 
wood puts carbon dioxide into the atmosphere / S: Can 
we.... / T: In a minute. How do how are fossil fuels 
actually produced / S: Over millions of years / T: Over 
millions and millions of years from what / S: ... dead 
animals... / T: Right, dead animals and plants, what 
happens to them / S: they rot / T: They rot, where, they 
disintegrate, they rot / S: ...ground / 
T: Under the ground OK, which sort of bacteria are we talking 
about probably? / S: Oxygen ... nitrogen.. / T: Oxygen 
hating bacteria OK. So, the animals, when they die 
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over millions of years, turn into / S: Fossils / T: Fossil 
fuels [ I and then when we burn them, we release 
energy and we release the carbon dioxide. Now, how 
does carbon dioxide get used up from the atmosphere? 
S: The trees breathe it in / T: The trees, not breathe it in 
but the trees / S: Take it in / T: Take it in OK during the 
process of / S: ... / T: OK Trees and other plants / 
S:...Miss, oxygen.... / T: [ I take in carbon dioxide / S:... 
/ T: During / S: a process called photosynthesis.... / 
T: Photosynthesis OK Why is it called Photo? Is it 
something to do with cameras? / S: No / 
T: 	 What's it to do with then? / 
S: .Photos... / T Yes / S.... / T Well it is plants that are 
doing this but why do we call it photosynthesis / S.... / 
T: Chatna, no Chatna? What do you need to take a 
photograph apart from a camera? / 
S: Film / 
T: A film and? / 
S: ..oxygen....light / 
T: Light, OK Yes it's a process of making food and it 
gives out oxygen, but what it needs, as well as the 
carbon dioxide and as well as water, it needs / S light / 
T Light. 
S 	 Chlorophyll, what's chlorophyll? / 
T: 	 Chlorophyll is the green substance in plants that traps 
the sun's energy so that the plants can put all these 
things together and make food / S• 	  / T: Natalie / S: 
how does.. / T: OK What does / S: ... oxygen.. / T: Sh 
listen, what does synthetic mean / S .... 
T: 	 We talk about synthetic materials, synthetic fibres, what 
does that tell you? / S: They're made from... / T: They're 
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made from / S: Natural things / T: No, it's the opposite 
of natural things / S: (babble) I 
T: 	 Woah, if you're all just going to shout out, people are 
going to get confused [ ] Think about the question, don't 
just shout out all the words that you remember we've 
used in the past few weeks in any order / S..../ T: 
Synthetic substances are substances that have been put 
together, not natural substances, right, so 
photosynthesis is talking about putting together carbon 
dioxide and water in the presence of light, using light 
energy from the sun / S• 	 / T : Well light is a form of 
energy / S:.... make glucose / T: To make glucose / S: 
/T: That's the food / S: 	 / 
T: and releasing oxygen that's right and then the trees can die 
and the other plants can die and be turned into fossil 
fuels as well, can't they? It's not just dead animals, it's 
dead plants as well and actually we should have put 
plants in here because plants do breathe, well, they do 
respire and give out some carbon dioxide and they take 
in a lot more carbon dioxide during the day time, at 
night time they don't take in carbon dioxide because 
there's no? / S: 	 / 
T: 	 No light so no photosynthesis going on that's right. 
Can you please copy that down. I suggest that the back 
of your / S: 	 / T: Oh good, I suggest that the back of 
your books where you've got your glossary - you've got 
the glossary at the back? / : S Yes / T: OK [ ] / 
S: where do we copy...at the back? / 
T: Yes if you copy this down at the back if you haven't 
already done it. 
T: 	 Copy this down at the back. This is the carbon cycle / 
S: 	 / T: If you've done it in the front, don't worry [ ] 
too late to worry now .. but I didn't actually ask you to 
write it down as I was talking [] alright [ ] if you don't 
understand it, then just ask. 
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S: 	 I don't understand .... / T: You don't understand it 
Kelly - you alright / S: Yes.... / T: That's the one from -
I'll come to you in a minute Kelly, right just....there / S: 
/ T: 	 / 
S: 	 .Miss have you got my book?... / 
T. 	 ...Yes...have I got your book...not that I'm aware of I 
don't think. Didn't I give them back last lesson / 
S: ...I wasn't here....[ 1.... / 
T: I could have taken it over to the office and left it there 
so can you do it on paper for now....yes....[ 	 / S 	  
T: 	 Oh, this is in levels... / S: Here's our one.. / 
T: 	 Good aren't they. Do you actually use them / S: 	 / T: 
And do you have to get them from this address or are 
they on sale in the shops / S: 	 / T: Can you ask him / 
S: Yes / T and if it's from here perhaps you could write 
that down for me [ ] Very good / S: here there at stage 
three...that one. three to six, ... three to seven... 
T 	 How do you find the language in here? / S: / T: Can 
you understand the way it's written or do you find it's a 
bit complicated / S: I'm having... / T: Have a read of 
that sometime and let me know what you think about 
the way it's written and the language / S: .you know 
about the open night... / T: Can you come to my tutor 
room, Room 20, sometime because I've got my sheet of 
appointments there because I've got a Year 8 tutor 
group and I've left it in my tutor room / S: 	  
T 	 Well, any registration time, lunch time or Monday 
morning any registration time / 
S: 	 In my experiment I'm using stones and marble and 
brick ....see what one dissolves and what one doesn't 
dissolve / T Uh uh / S I can't get the marble from 
anywhere and .... / 
T: 	 Well we've got some marble chips, little bits of marble, 
would that do / S Yes / T Haven't got a big slab of 
marble, but some little chips 
S 	 ....little bit / 
T: 	 Yes, I've got some little bits. How are you going to 
make your tests fair / 
S: If you measure the amount of acid.... / T Right / S: in 
the marble and the stone.... / 
T: Right [ ] what else would you have to do to make it 
fair [ ] measure the amount of acid / S: measure the / T: 
measure the amount of stone / S: Weigh the amount of 
stone / T: That's how you'd measure it presumably / S: 
.... / T: OK [ ] / 
S: 	 ...I don't know.... 
T 	 How long are you going to leave it? / S: I'm going to 
leave it for a [ ] I'm going to have to ....Wednesday until 
Friday.... / 
T: 	 OK and you're going to leave it all for exactly the same 
length of time. Is that a way of making it fair? / 
S: Yes / 
T: Right. Anything else you need to do to make it a fair 
test? Supposing Kelly bets you £10 what the answer is 
going to be. How are you going to make sure she 
doesn't cheat. / S: ....her not be there when I do it / T: 
(laugh) No, apart from that, can't exclude her from 
lessons [ ] how are you going to make sure that it's all 
fair and you've got an equal chance of winning? Well, 
think about measuring the acid and measuring the stone 
by weighing it [ ] leaving it for the same length of time, 
is there any other way that she could possibly cheat? / 
S: ... look at it (laughter) / T: No I don't think that / S: 
.... watch her do it 
T: 	 Well for instance, if you did your experiment with.. 
erm.. a small amount of acid and added lots of water to 
it and you did your experiment just with the acid and 
not watered down at all, would that be fair? 
S: No, it's got to be the same / 
T: So the concentration has got to be the same [ 1 OK / S: 
three drops of water and three drops of.. / 
T: 	 Whatever- Right, so the concentration and the amount 
and the amount of stone and the length of time you 
leave it. 
T: 	 Supposing Kelly had hers over by a radiator where it's 
nice and warm and you leave yours by an open window 
where it's cold. Is that fair? / S: No / T: So what will 
you do? / S: .... / T: So that what's the same then what 
are you talking about / S: so that they're both cold 	  / 
T: How do we measure hot and cold what piece of 
apparatus do we use 
S 	 ... thermometer / 
T: 	 A thermometer and what does a thermometer measure? 
/ 
S: Temperature / 
T: That's right, so we need to put them at the same 
temperature to make it fair don't we? [ 1 so that's at least 
5 things you've told me 
S 	 .... / T: Right, well done / S: .... / T: OK do you think 
everybody would? / S: ... / T: It just strikes me that 
some of the words are a bit complicated / S: ....some of 
them are... / S: ...you know the open evening...can I 
come to you.... I've worked it out with Miss S...but I 
have to book it for... 
T 	 Can I just point out to everybody please that if you want 
to make an appointment for open evening, can you 
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come to Room 20 some time which is my tutor room 
because I've got my list in there because I'm a Year 8 
tutor. Could you come to room 20 please, otherwise 
you'll have to wait until Friday's lesson. 
S 	 ....I don't know what that means / T: Yes today's Friday 
isn't it? Sorry, Wednesday [ ] / S: 	 / T: Yes.... You 
can cope with that, can't you? / S: 	 I have.... / 
T: 	 Now you've written everything down one after the 
other right, now is that how I've written it on the board? 
Is that how I've written it on the board? / 
S: No / 
T: No, so let's start again over there and let's do it bit by 
bit / S• 	  / T: You can go into the margin, yes / S: 	  
do I have to write.... / T: What.... / S: 	 I can just copy 
..just do the arrows.... / T: But the arrows will all cross 
over one another and it won't give you some 
information as clearly / S: but I don't want to do it all 
again... 
T: 	 But if you don't do it all again, I don't think you'll 
understand it properly and if you don't understand it, 
then you're not going to be able to answer the questions 
in the test for one thing are you? 
S: What test? / 
T: The test we're going to have very soon when we get to 
the end of this topic. / S: 	 / 
T: 	 Ah, so let's do it again over here. Right, when you've 
finished that, will you please turn to which ever page 
you're on in the text book and you've got just over 20 
minutes of the lesson left so you just carry on from 
wherever you are in the text book. If you need any 
help, I'll try and come round to you, I'm just helping 
Kelly at the moment / S: / 
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T: 	 Yes that's OK [ 1 right Kelly, look, I started in the 
middle, no sorry, I started at the top - carbon dioxide 
gas in the atmosphere. Draw a box - it might be better 
to do the writing first and draw a box around it. Kelly 
do the writing, then draw the box around it then you'll 
know how big a box you'll need. Right, carbon dioxide 
gas in the atmosphere and that stays, more or less the 
same amount all the time because some things put 
carbon dioxide into the air and other things take carbon 
dioxide out of the air / S: ...trees cut down ..and if 
they're not cut down... / T: That's right, two reasons for 
not burning down the rain forest isn't it? 
S 	 ....over here.... go to the library and look up the carbon 
cycle in the next lesson / T: Do you want to go to the 
library now? / S: .... / T: Will you write a note and I 
will sign it / S: Miss can we go to the 6th form library? 
/ 
T: 	 No. / 
S: 	 Why? / T put a box down there. Because it's for the 
6th Form and the type of books they've got in there 
probably wouldn't help you anyway because they tend 
to be A Level books or more advanced books / S 	 / T: 
I use the 6th form library yes, / S.... 
T 	 Just draw a box down there please / S: ... I'm moving... / 
T: 	 Right, now how does the carbon dioxide get into the 
air? / 
S: We breathe it out / 
T: OK, so that's that box that says animals breathe out 
carbon dioxide during respiration. Respiration is, again, 
I would write it first if you know how big a box but 
remember that you've got to get a box over here and a 
box over here and a box in the middle so keep it within 
those sort of limits / S: 	
 / T: Animals breathe / S:.... 
done it wrong again then / T: ....out on the next line / S: 
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.... / T: Carbon dioxide on the next line [ 1 Right, 
during / S:.... / T : On the next line, sorry / S: My Mum 
went ... last night.. / T: Did she? that was very brave [ 
/ S:....[ 1 / T: ....Can we talk about this later and get on 
with what we're supposed to be doing now 
please 	 turn to whichever page you're on in this 
book....tell us / S: ....[ ] / T: That's the sort of thing 
that's best done as homework really, isn't it yes, so do 
that at home, just turn over to there / S: have you got... / 
T: You'll have to come to room 20 and find out 'cos my 
list is there / S: .... / T: Put that into a box, come on.. 
(end of recording) 
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APPENDIX 4 
TEXTS AND IMAGES FROM TEXTBOOKS 
List of textbook material 
4.1: 	 Caring for the soil 	 (Pollock, S. (1991). World in Danger: Earth, Belith 
Press, Unlimited) 
4.2: 	 Soil cycles 	 (Pollock, S. (1991). World in Danger: Earth, Belith 
Press, Unlimited) 
4.3: What happens to carbon during decomposition 	 (Nuffield Co-ordinated 
Science, Biology) 
4.4: 	 The Carbon Cycle 	 (Johnson, M. & Morrell P. (1982). Environmental 
Science, Blackie and Son Limited) 
4.5: A cycle of gases 	 (Cochrane, J. (1987). Air Ecology. Wayland Publishers 
Ltd) 
4.6: The flow of energy in living systems 	 (Johnson, M. & Morrell P. 
(1982). Environmental Science, Blackie and Son Limited) 
4.7: Living organisms 	 (Active Science 2, Key Stage 3) 
4.8: 	 Living cells 
	 (Active Science 2, Key Stage 3) 
4.9: 	 Cells and more cells (Active Science 2, Key Stage 3) 
4.10: Living things 	 (Nuffield Science, Key Stage 3, Year 9) 
4.11: All together, now! 
	 (Nuffield Science, Key Stage 3, Year 9) 
4.12: Organisms in patches (Nuffield Co-ordinated Science, Biology) 
4.13: The farming cycle 	 (Nuffield Science, Key Stage 3, Year 9) 
4.14: Looking for patterns in life cycles (Nuffield Science 13 to 16, Study Guide 1) 
4.15: The nitrogen cycle 	 (Active Science 3, Key Stage 3) 
4.16: The carbon cycle 
	 (Nuffield Science, Key Stage 3, Year 9) 
4.17: The nitrogen cycle 	 (Nuffield Science, Key Stage 3, Year 9) 
4.18: The carbon cycle 	 (Oxford Science, Programme) 
4.19: Carbon cycle in a terrestrial ecosystem (Ecology Unit 9, Cambridge 
University press, 1985) 
4.20: The Nitrogen Cycle (School B, Norman, Year 10) 
4.21: The Carbon Cycle 	 (Active Science 4, Key Stage 4) 
4.22: The Nitrogen Cycle (Ecology Unit 9, Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
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INTERPERSONAL ASPECTS OF IDEATIONAL PROCESSES 
AND IMAGE SCHEMATA 
5.1.1 Readers treated as interactive participants 
Textbooks vary regarding how they are addressed to the reader. This depends on the 
whole structure of the textbook and its purpose for which it is written. In some 
textbooks the text is organised in a structure which is the same for each theme or 
topic. This is the case with the Active Science series in which there are certain 
locations for the contents to be placed. Each new topic begins with the relevant 
information placed on the top of the page and followed by images, such as pictures, 
drawings and graphs. Various sorts of tasks are indicated by a label, like observing, 
planning, investigating and the steps or stages that the task contains are usually 
framed. Questions that seek information or call on students to reflect on the 
knowledge which is available in each topic are usually mixed (conflated) with the 
given information or they are numbered on one side of the page next to the text that 
the questions are about. At the end of each topic some extra work, quite often in terms 
of practical activities, is placed at the bottom of the page (see Appendix 4.15 for 
example). So for a student who is familiar with the Active Science textbook, either 
the physical appearance of some elements on the page or where is he/she reading on 
the page indicates to him/her what sort of relation with the text is involved. 
The Nuffield Science series of textbooks have a different structure. Here it is the kind 
of textual information in each topic which determines how the contents should be 
arranged on each page. Depending on what the text is talking about, certain kinds of 
activities, tasks and questions appear at various places on the page, marked and 
coloured differently in relation to the rest of the text (see Appendix 4.12 for example). 
But we should notice here that neither the number of what the text asks the reader to 
do nor the content of these demands are as massive as they are in the Active Science 
textbooks. Comparing both kinds of textbooks, the impression the Nuffield Science 
textbook gives to the reader is that he/she has got a lot of things to read and less 
things to do. This is also made clear by the overall structure of the textbook which 
gives priority to the text. The latter appears in one column either on the left or on the 
right side of the page depending on where the images are placed. This column of text 
spreads from the top to the bottom of the page giving the impression that what is 
written is like a coherent story rather than pieces of information which are found 
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loosely connected or even isolated all over the page - as it happens with the Active 
Science. In that way textual cohesion appears as an important issue in Nuffield 
Science textbooks since this is what holds each page together as a whole. 
The whole structure of the textbook is consistent with its purpose. The Active Science 
textbook is written in a way that it can be used both as a reference book and 
workbook in the everyday activities of the science classroom. It is also accompanied 
by other sorts of materials like worksheets. The entire timetable of a science lesson 
can be based on the very tightly planned structure of the textbook. For that purpose 
the latter is addressed both to the individual student and to groups of students. The 
structure of the text is the same with little or no change in books addressed to students 
in successive years. 
Nuffield Science textbooks look more like a reference book, almost always addressed 
to the individual student in the second person rather than to a group of students 
working together. In the same way as Active Science, its series of textbooks are 
addressed to a whole range of ages. With the exception of the primary school 
resources, the structure of the textbook is the same regardless of the age range of 
students to whom it is addressed. 
Looking at how the reader (in our case the student) can be possible engaged with the 
text we notice that in Active Science textbooks there are mainly two ways in which 
the reader is addressed. The reader is either addressed in the second person in the part 
of the text which provides the relevant information for the topic or he/she is asked to 
be involved (either in groups or as an individual) in various activities (answering 
questions, investigating, observing, planning, e.t.a.). The former is found more 
frequently in texts written for younger rather than older students. The latter probably 
because it depends on the structure of the text, does not vary in relation to the age 
range. The differences between the two ways in which the reader is addressed have as 
a consequence a different kind of engagement with the text. 
To begin with let us take an example of a text which is addressed to the reader as an 
individual in the second person. The passage below is an extract from the information 
given on the top of the unit under the title New cells from old : 
(1) 	 Your cells are dying all the time. Every day about 200 thousand million of 
your red blood cells die. If you did not make new ones, you would have none 
at all after six weeks.. 
(2) Your skin cells also die. You have about seven layers of skin cells which wear 
away. If new skin cells did not grow, your skin would very quickly disappear. 
In this little extract we notice that the reader is realised linguistically as one of the 
participants which is involved in various material processes. In the beginning the 
reader appears as the classifier in nominal groups which tell us what sort of cells the 
text is talking about. It is not clear whether agency is involved in the first two clauses 
in which the nominal groups Your cells and your blood cells are the MEDIUM(S) 
through which the material processes are realised. But in the next two clauses the 
reader addressed as you is the ACTOR which makes new cells - so in respect to 
ACTORS's action cells are the GOALs which are brought into being - and the 
ATTRIBUTER in relation to it cells are the participants which are either possessed or 
not. The next paragraph of the extract continues in the same way; nominal groups 
define the identities of the participants which are either the agents or the affected or 
the one that are possessed by other participants. 
What this analysis shows is that due to textual choices the reader is treated 
linguistically in the same way as the participants that are supposed to be the object of 
students' study. The reader becomes an interactive participant in the text  involved in 
all sort of processes in which any participant in the text can be involved. This has the 
effect that the reader now is seen as an entity which is built up by other entities, acts 
on entities and is affected by other entities' actions, a property discussed in the next 
section (5.2) as the objectification of the self. The persistent use of the second person 
in nominal groups which define categories of entities makes clear textual choices 
which are in contrast with those addressed to older students. In the latter very rarely 
and in most of the cases marginally only is the reader engaged in the text: 
(3) All animals and plants are made up of tiny living units called cells 
and later in the same textbook we read: 
(4)Advanced organisms (like you and me) are built up from many millions of cells. 
In these examples above we notice the differences between the nominal groups, like 
All animals and plants and Advanced organisms and those which are chosen in the 
extracts discussed earlier. 
Looking at the places in the text in which readers' participation in tasks like 
observing, planning and investigating is demanded, we notice that the reader is 
engaged in a different way with the text. He/she is not now a part of the cast of the 
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participants which are involved in the story the text is providing. Either addressed in 
the second person as an individual or as a group of students who are working on the 
same thing, he/she is involved in processes which create a distance between him/her 
and the entities that are supposed to be studied. If we look at the material processes in 
which the reader is involved at these parts of the text, we notice that in most of the 
cases he/she does not interact directly with the entities which have to be studied but 
through other sort of entities and process-like entities. These are diagrams, drawings, 
written lists of entities, or carefully planned experiments in which still various devices 
intervene between reader's actions and the physical world, like precise measurements 
of entities, procedures which define which entities would interact and under what 
conditions, even the knowledge about something either obtained as information or 
gained through the same procedure (experiment) (see for example How fast does 
yeast reproduce? and What does yeast need to reproduce? , Active Science 1, Key 
stage 1, page:100). 
All these entities above create also a physical distance in the text between the reader 
as an interactive participant and the physical world. His/her distance with the latter is 
realised linguistically in two ways: 
a) through a clause complex in which human's agency gets through several 
steps of processing before it reaches the entities that should be studied and 
b) instrumentally in that the reader interacts with entities through processes 
and participants which become the instruments that carry ACTOR's agency. 
If we look at the Active Science textbooks as a whole we notice that reader's 
interaction with the text as it is described above is the dominant one which surpasses 
the sort of engagement in which the reader is part of the cast of the participants that 
make the 'story' the text is saying. So if we consider the overall effect of the relation 
between the reader and the entities that are supposed to be studied by him/her, we 
notice that at the end this relation is objectified. 'Humans' are involved through certain 
process-like and thing-like entities with the physical world. These entities draw a line 
between the student and its object of study, even if the boundaries of this line are not 
always very clear. But what is clear is that the relation between the two is not blurred 
as in the cases in which the reader is addressed as a part of the physical world, an 
insider rather than an outsider, who is engaged within the natural world and not from 
a distance. At the end what choices about the text do is to invite the reader to create a 
text: 'a story about what the world is and how it behaves' by engaging him/her in an 
'instrumental' world of entities that keeps him/her in a distance and outside of the 
physical world. 
The case is opposite with the Nuffield Science textbooks. In the extensive accounts of 
their textual information - compared with the Active Science - the reader is quite 
often addressed as an individual in the second person. But less often are readers 
addressed in the inclusive first person (plural). In both these ways, the reader is 
engaged as the Agent or the Affected in relation to the cast of the participants which 
are in the story that the text is offering. This relation is realised linguistically in the 
same way as in Active Science in terms of material processes in which the reader is 
either the ACTOR or the GOAL and in terms of identifying or attributive relational 
processes. We also notice that this sort of engagement with what is for the reader the 
object of his/her study appears in various topics regardless of the age range the text is 
addressed to. 
Looking for example in the Environmental Science section which deals with the 
concept of habitat from the Co-Ordinated Science, Biology addressed to those 
students who are at the stage of preparing themselves for the GCSE examinations; we 
notice that the reader is either identified in relation to the participants that are found in 
the text: 
(5) Perhaps the reason we like warm, dry conditions is that we are still in some 
ways tropical animals 
or he/she is actively engaged with them, by doing things on them or affected by them: 
(6) Have you ever weeded a garden? It can be a tedious job but if it is neglected, 
then the garden plants will not grow so well. 
In the Science Year 9 textbook looking at the topic of respiration in living organisms 
we notice that the reader is again actively engaged in a whole range of processes. 
This is not only reflected in the text: 
(7) How fresh is the air you breath? 
The porous membranes lining you lungs are easily clogged up by dust and 
other particles in the air.... 
but in images as well. An image which represents all parts of the lungs of humans is 
labelled as The structure of your lungs. (Which one is whole?). 
Another way in which the reader is involved in the text as one of the members of the 
cast of the participants which has a role to play in relation to other entities is by being 
an entity which is made of other entities and having a size. In respect to the former, 
part-whole relations are identified with the reader being either a place in which other 
entities are located or an entity which is located in other place-like entities. When size 
relations are identified then there is a chance for the reader to become the measure 
which provides accounts of the size of other entities. Therefore, similarities and 
differences between him/herself and other entities are now legitimate. In that way the 
text invites the reader to become an instrument by him/herself which gives him/her an 
access to the physical world. In Active Science we will probably never see the reader 
becoming an instrument through which relations are identified. What is the case there 
as we have seen earlier is that certain processes and measurements which are at a 
distance from the reader are the instruments which engage him/her with the physical 
world. Part-whole relations and size measurements are often come together in 
Nuffield Science making the effect described above more dramatic: 
(8) Your body is made up of millions of tiny packages which are only a fraction 
of a millimetre across 
(9) You were once a cell, a tenth of a millimetre across. This tiny cell divided into 
two and each part divided into two again, and so on, until you were made up 
of millions of cells. A lot of this happened in the nine months before you were 
born. (Key stage 3, Year 9) 
Notice in the second extract above the effect produced by the use of the past tense 
concerning the reader (You were once). It is not only that the reader becomes an 
active participant by being identified as an organism made of cells and being involved 
in various processes; it is also the fact that all these processes are located in a real 
time sequence, in contrast with the timeless verb structures of the first extract. 
For topics in which it is hard to see how the reader can be involved as an active 
participant it is analogies and metaphors which do most of the job of bringing him/her 
in the text. An analogy which shows how water passes through the cell membrane of 
a plant makes use of the reader and his/her first hand experience with the everyday 
commonsense world: 
(10) Here is the theory: imagine that the cell membrane is not a waterproof skin but 
well aware that a thin jersey is not very waterproof - it easily lets the rain 
through. But if you go out in a snowstorm, you can keep quite dry. The 
snowflakes are too big to get through the holes in the jersey. 
The analogy is a very accessible tool for the reader which makes him/her think about 
something that cannot be engaged directly with. This is another sort of useful 
instrumental relation between the reader and the physical world which is found quite 
often in Nuffield Science textbooks but very rarely in Active Science. At the end what 
the analogy does is that it creates a parallel story which has the same script (pattern of 
relations between the participants) with the story which is the object of students' 
study. This parallel story gives the chance to the reader to take part as a participant, 
otherwise he/she could not be involved in any other way. 
Finally, we should not let it pass unnoticed that when the reader is engaged in tasks 
and questions he/she is addressed again in the second person in processes that are 
realised linguistically in terms of mental processes of seeing and thinking. The reader 
is engaged with the entities as the SENSER and the entities are engaged with him/her 
as the PHENOMENON. But the questions and the tasks in which the reader is invited 
to participate are not so extensive (either in number or in length) as in Active Science, 
so as a result SENSER and PHENOMENON are in most of the cases in direct 
contact. 
It is not the intention of this section to say which one of the two series of textbooks is 
better or more appropriate for learning and teaching. Interpersonal aspects in respect 
to how the reader is engaged in the text are discussed by taking into account the 
overall structure of texts and specific semantic functions which are used consistently 
in them. In doing so, the interest of this section lies in the ways in which one textbook 
is more effective than the other in respect to specific linguistic choices. 
The way the Nuffield Science textbooks are written has the opposite effect from the 
way the Active Science textbooks are written. The Nuffield Science text invites the 
reader quite persistently to get involved as an entity among other entities. As a result 
the reader who follows what the 'story' of the text is talking about finds him/herself as 
a participant of that story, an insider rather than an outsider who is engaged only in an 
instrumental way with the participants of the story. By being inside the story the 
reader sometimes becomes him/herself the instrument through which the physical 
world is approached. In all these ways the text is open to the reader in a different way; 
instead of inviting him/her to create a text by being involved in a considerable 
number of activities as the Active Science does, it opens the possibilities to the reader 
to create knowledge about the physical world from his/her direct relationship with it. 
5.1.2 Summary and Conclusion 
The interpersonal aspects of transitivity patterns in two series of textbooks (Active 
Science and Nuffield Science) were the focus of the present section. The role the 
reader is brought into play is studied in relation to the whole structure of the textbook 
and the way the reader is addressed within that structure. We can point here at various 
aspects of the interpersonal metafunction within the framework described above. 
Texts vary to the degree the reader is addressed as one of the participants among other 
participants in the text. This raises the question of whether the reader is treated as an 
interactive participant with the entities represented in texts. Material processes realise 
interaction between entities and the reader; the latter acts directly on other entities or 
he/she is acted upon by them. 
On the opposite end, the individual can be addressed as being involved in processes 
which create a distance between him/her and the entities that are supposed to be the 
object of his/her study. This distance is realised more often by clause complexes of 
mainly material processes in a way that the reader does not find him/herself in direct 
contact with entities but always through others. The latter which can be material 
entities such as scientific instruments or conceptual entities such as theoretical entities 
or methodological processes eventually carry reader's actions to entities. This 
relationship between reader and physical world can be described as an instrumental 
relationship. In rare cases the reader is represented as becoming the instrument by 
him/herself. This is a step towards further objectification of the 'self, since now the 
reader is not only found in direct contact with material entities but he/she is 
represented as being one of them that is a material entity him/herself. 
Finally, explicit accounts of metaphors and analogies put the reader in a situation 
where he/she can be involved directly in the physical world elaborating otherwise 
inaccessible situations (such as unobservable entities). In particular, analogies become 
the 'instrument' in the reader's mind which permits him/her to have access to the 
physical world. 
In each of the cases above interpersonal aspects of the relation between textbook and 
reader have epistemological and learning implications. Knowledge of environmental 
science is either seen as objectified and impersonal, therefore, learning should be 
carried on by a number of processes which realise this instrumental relation between 
the learner and his/her object of study. It is an inevitable consequence that in this case 
what counts as more important is the application of the 'instrumental relationship' as 
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correctly as possible. That is also why texts which promote this interpersonal 
dimension insist in the repetition and correct application of methodological entities 
and the use of instruments. On the contrary where the reader is treated as an 
'interactive participant' emphasis is put on how he/she makes sense of the world by 
realising him/herself as part of it. Action is seen as a valuable learning tool here in 
realising relations between entities. 
5.2 Objectification of the self and personification 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This section is about the interplay of objectification and personification. These 
processes are first discussed separately, and it is then shown how in fact they work 
together, being two related aspects of how teachers can attempt to relate 
commonsense and scientific thinking. 
5.2.2 Objectification 
Teachers' references to students as physical entities involved in what is taught about 
has a double effect. The self is objectified in a way that talks of students themselves 
as objects, and so suggests that they should think in this way. At the same time 
familiarity is built up with other entities in relation to which the 'self is physically 
involved. Objectification is mainly realised in two ways; textbooks and teachers make 
direct reference to students in the second person or in the first person plural, and by 
engaging the 'self as an entity in processes in the same way as other material and non 
material entities are. For example in the chapter Depending on fuels from the 
textbook Oxford Science I, processes like eating and respiration involved in the 
Carbon cycle are represented in relation to human beings addressed as 'we': 
Plants take in carbon dioxide gas from the air. They use the Sun's energy to combine 
this with water and minerals to make new plant material. This process is called 
photosynthesis . We eat plants as food, so our bodies have carbon in them. We get 
energy by 'burning up' our food, but without any flames! This is called respiration. 
When we respire, we make carbon dioxide gas which we breathe into the atmosphere. 
(Oxford Science I, p.108) 
In this extract above the human body is objectified to the extent that it is not 
represented in the same way that we use to know and experience it in everyday life. 
Eating plants is not just food which satisfies our hunger, but it is also the process in 
which carbon is transferred from plants to human bodies. Food also is not just stored 
in our bodies but is burnt up similar to fuel being burnt in machines to make them 
work. The analogy between the human body and machines even if it is implied rather 
than explicitly addressed since no mention of machines is made it is explored whether 
it works or not. The food might be burnt like fuel in order to get the same thing 
machines get ; energy, but the process of burning fuel is not exactly the same as the 
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process of burning food. This is represented by putting the process in inverted 
commas and the clarification being accompanied by an exclamation mark, that there 
are no flames as the result of burning. Then this specific sort of burning which is not 
the same as what we usually know as burning is given a name respiration. Finally 
even if the process of burning now has a name so other thing-like and process-like 
entities related with respiration can be discussed by making reference to it, for 
example by saying that...during respiration carbon dioxide is made which is released 
back into the atmosphere ...this is not an option which has been chosen for the 
specific textbook. Again respiration is seen from the point of view of the objectified 
self which is involved in the process of making and as the maker of the carbon 
dioxide: ... when we respire we make CO2 gas. Notice here the difference between the 
process of making and the process of releasing; in the specific extract carbon dioxide 
is not represented as a waste product of human body, but as the entity which is made -
the action of making directly refer to us as 'we' - and will be used later by plants. 
In sum, the objectification of the human body in this little extract above is the result 
of sustaining its reference to it as we in various sorts of relations with thing-like, e.g. 
plants, food, carbon , carbon dioxide gas and process-like, e.g. eating, burning, 
respiring, making, breathing entities. It is not just 'we' who are objectified but a 
couple of thing-like and process-like entities with which we are related on everyday 
basis. So eating is transformed into a process of getting carbon in the body, food 
turns to be the carrier of carbon, burning is transformed into respiration and 
breathing turns to be as taken carbon dioxide gas out of our body into the 
atmosphere. At the same time familiarity is achieved with scientific entities like 
carbon and respiration, by engaging them with everyday objects and processes. Plants 
are made by carbon so eating plants means taking carbon into our bodies. Respiration 
is not represented as an agentless process remote (which is kept apart) from what we 
are used to think of as acting. It is 'we' who respire acting directly on an unobservable 
entity by making it and removing it out of our bodies. 
The chapter Depending on fuels (Appendix 4.18) was the main source of information 
for the teaching of Carbon cycles in one of the lessons of the Year 8 classrooms 
which was video-recorded. The teacher asks the students to reflect on the diagram of 
the carbon cycle from this chapter which was used in earlier lessons by the students in 
order to draw pictures of the carbon cycle. Before we see how the diagram is 
elaborated in the classroom we should notice that one of the main figures at the centre 
of the diagram is a man connected with arrows with a chicken eating corn on the 
ground and a label up on the sky which says carbon dioxide in air. Both diagram and 
text impose references to humans in relation with the entities involved in the carbon 
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cycle. In the same way as we saw in the analysis of the text extract above, the 
discussion between students and teacher addresses human involvement in the first 
person (either in plural or singular) and the self is represented as objectified after 
being involved in a series of natural processes directly related with physical entities: 
T: 	 Where's the atmosphere? 
S: All around us... 
T: How does carbon dioxide get into the atmosphere? 
S: We breathe it out/ 
T: We breathe it out. Just us? 
S: Animals... 
T: ...What's it[carbon dioxide] doing in our lungs? 
...We breathe out more than we breathe in. We're adding to the carbon dioxide 
in the air every time we breathe out. Something's going on in out bodies that's 
making carbon dioxide... 
(Lesson: Carbon cycle p.9,10) 
In this extract above the location of the atmosphere is given in relation to human 
presence. The latter is represented as an entity which is part of the natural world and 
interacts with other entities. Schematic structures like containment relationships and 
agent structures are the realisations of the objectification of the 'self. Human beings 
are represented as contained within the atmosphere. At the same time they are 
represented as the makers of carbon dioxide, which is brought into being in their 
bodies. They also see themselves as the agents which transfer carbon dioxide from 
one container to another; breathing into the atmosphere more carbon dioxide than 
they breathe in their lungs. All this sequence of agent structures which addresses an 
unbroken continuity between the self and thing-like or/and process-like entities is 
taken as unproblematic. The process of objectification is also represented by the fact 
that both humans and animals are considered in the same way as instances of the 
category of living organisms which release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. At the 
same time and in the same way as we saw above with the piece of textbook, 
familiarity with entities which belong in the realm of scientific knowledge is 
gradually established: 
T: 	 Animals eat the plants so now the carbon dioxide that was used to make the 
food has been incorporated into that food. Now the carbon's got into us / 
S.. 
T: 	 Just a minute, why do we need food? / 
S: to live... / 
T: Well be a bit more specific / 
S: energy / 
T: For energy is one reason we need food. How do we release that energy? / 
S: ....by breathing in / 
T: By breathing in which gas / 
S: carbon....ox.. / 
T: Oxygen. Right, we breathe in oxygen. The oxygen and the food react 
together and change, releasing energy and also releasing the / 
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S: carbon / 
T: Carbon dioxide and we breathe it / 
S: Out / 
T: No, the oxygen I just breathed in is probably still going round in my blood 
stream and the carbon dioxide I'm breathing out is from some oxygen I 
breathed in a little while ago. Right, OK, so the animals breathe out carbon 
dioxide during the process that we call res / 
S: res... / 
T: Respiration [ ] good and that's the process where we release energy from the 
food that we've eaten by breathing in the oxygen, the oxygen goes all round 
our bodies in the blood stream. 
T 	 Get's to every little part of us every cell, every brain cell, every cell in my big 
toe down to my finger tips, round to my back, up to my shoulders. The 
oxygen goes all round to every cell and reacts with the food that I've digested 
to release energy. 
(Lesson: Carbon cycle, p.11,12) 
The human body is not only taken to be the place within which unobservable entities 
interact with each other and chemical processes take place, but it is also the Agent 
which acts directly on unobservable entities like carbon dioxide and controls 
processes like digesting food and releasing energy. It is interesting to notice that in 
this extract human agency is stressed to such an extent that the reality of unobservable 
thing-like and process-like entities is shifted onto the level of the reality of everyday 
entities, like food and therefore becomes unasked and obvious. 
5.2.3 Narratives afford personification 
Personification stands on the opposite side of objectification. It is now the natural 
entities which are represented as closer to 'us'. In that way personification affords 
relationships between entities which cannot occur otherwise, such as attributing living 
properties of intentionality to them and engage them in developmental (evolutionary) 
processes. 
Let us take for example an extract from a lesson, illustrated before ((12) in section 
7.3.5) as an example of a passive blockage where two sequences of agent structures 
meet each other in an opposite direction, during which the teacher represents a 
specific sort of pollution; the devastating effect the excessive amounts of fertilisers 
have on the environment when they are washed into ponds: 
T: 	 The leaves fall off the leaf yeah. The leaves fall off the tree 	  the leaves will 
fall off the tree, what happens they get broken down, the nutrients will go into 
the soil next season all that nutrient will make the tree grow again, all the 
weeds that will die the nutrients will go into the soil so you get that cycle of 
nutrients going round all the time. Here, exactly the same thing happening 
and everybody lives happy ever after, the sun is shining. What effect has that 
got? Er sorry.... 
S: .... the plants .. 
S2: Photosynthesis 
T: Photosynthesis. Right, so the plants now can make food. They can take in 
nutrients, they can grow. What else do they do? 
S: air 
S2: 
T: They release oxygen into the water. What else will they do? 
Ss: 	 Take in the carbon dioxide 
T: 	 Take in the carbon dioxide because its ... will be releasing carbon dioxide into 
the water. Plants will be releasing oxygen into the water. 	 he needs the 
oxygen the plant needs the carbon dioxide so as soon as the carbon dioxide 
level begins to rise ... the plants will take it up. As the oxygen level begins to 
rise the animals in the lake, animals in there will take it up. So there's 
balance all the way through and everybody lives happily ever after, until one 
day 
S: Farmer Bloggs 
S2: 	 and his cattle 
T: Farmer Bloggs comes along 
S:  
S2: 	 yesterday.... 
Ss: 	 .... 
T: He comes along because he decides it's about time he scattered some fertiliser 
on his patch on the side of the river. The sun disappears from the riverbank 
and we've now got a nasty cloud has to climb over the top here the water 
vapour condenses down it comes as rain and that obviously dissolves the 
fertiliser. The fertiliser gets 
S: Leached 
T: Leached from the soil. Some of it will run off etc ...that to go into the pond so 
now we have an increase of nitrates, phosphates 
S. 
T: 	 and potassium in the water. The plants themselves think that this is great, 
because there's nothing better than plenty of food. They've got the best 
conditions they've got plenty of food and they're going to lap it all up. And 
they are going to grow like mad. However, as we mentioned earlier, they are 
these little small green little things that were floating on the surface called 
Ss: Algae 
(Lesson: Nitrogen Cycle, p.2) 
In this extract we notice that the teacher represents what happens around the pond in 
the context of a story. As it has been discussed in section 7.3.2, stories such as the one 
above have a plot and thing-like entities are the active participants which share certain 
roles in this plot. Each participant is not independent in the specific story but its 
action depends on or brings about other participants' actions. In that way agency is 
stressed because each agent's action seems inevitable and there is no place for 
accidental actions. Even an event which might pass unnoticed in the context of 
teaching science the sun is shining, here has a specific effect: plants can make food 
due to photosynthesis. A nasty cloud which can be thought of as an entity which 
should have no place in scientific talk, in the plot of this story is represented as an 
active participant which climbs over the top of the pond and triggers a process - 
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represented as scientific this time the water vapour condenses down it comes as 
rain... So in this story the students are confronted with some thing-like and process-
like entities that might not be expected in a 'scientific story', but are being put in the 
context of talking science. Properties and behaviours of living organisms, like human 
beings and animals, are attached to plants representing them more alive than we 
thought they were. These are intentions: 
T: 	 Take in the carbon dioxide because its ... will be releasing carbon dioxide into 
the water. Plants will be releasing oxygen into the water. 	 he needs the 
oxygen the plant needs the carbon dioxide so as soon as the carbon dioxide 
level begins to rise ... the plants will take it up. 
(Lesson: Nitrogen Cycle, p.2) 
and desires: 
T: 	 and potassium in the water. The plants themselves think that this is great.  
because there's nothing better than plenty of food. They've got the best 
conditions they've got plenty of food and they're going to lap it all up. 
(Lesson: Nitrogen Cycle, p.2) 
Plants also seem to be as active as animals and humans due to the intensive use of 
agent structures in which they are involved as Agents. These agent structures are of 
those kinds that animals and humans are involved too, like making ...so the plants 
now can make food and transferring entities from one place to another They can take 
in nutrients...They release oxygen into the water... Take in the carbon dioxide . The 
cyclic, repetitive character of these actions leaves no doubt how important is all this 
repertoire of roles which the plants have for the story's plot. Plants and animals are 
seen as the agents which keep in balance everything that happens in the pond. 
Nevertheless, the story has prepared the ground in what can be seen as an unexpected 
overturn. The participants are represented as powerful enough so that even a little 
cause which upsets all this well orchestrated balance of actions can have an enormous 
effect. The fertiliser dissolved by rain is washed into the pond and causes plants like 
algae to grow very quickly on the surface of the pond: 
T:• 	 So, in no time at all these plants are all flourishing very well but in not time at 
all so do the algae. And they're growing like mad on the surface of the water, 
and in no time at all they form a blanket over 
S: over the land 
T: the whole pond. And immediately that cuts out the sunlight. No sun? 
S: No photosynthesis 
T: No photosynthesis. The plants down here cannot make food. 
S: They don't .... oxygen 
T: They die, because they've died they don't? 
S: Make oxygen 
T: make oxygen to put back into the water. 
Sl: 
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S: ....chain reaction 
T: No oxygen being put into the water means the fish 
S: 	 die 
T 	 would die. Also added to this, because the amount of dead stuff at the bottom 
will now increase very quickly, so will? 
S: Nitrates 
S2: Nitrates 
T: The bacteria 
S: .... nitrate ...? 
T: Because now there's a lot of food for the bacteria. The bacteria are living 
things so what will the bacteria 
S. 
T: 	 use up? 
S: 	 ... erm 
S: Oxygen 
T: They will use up the oxygen. They will produce? 
Ss: 	 Carbon dioxide 
T: 	 Carbon dioxide and before you know it, you've come across puddles ponds etc 
where you get the weeds across the surface right they can still flourish 
because they've got sunlight on the surface. But you move that and you can 
smell the stench coming up from there. That now is totally dead. 
(Lesson: Nitrogen Cycle, p.4) 
The initial cause leaves no alternative effects. The relationships between Agents and 
the processes that they cause, have been linked so tightly that now if any process is 
disturbed, that disturbance has a definite effect back on other agent or affected 
entities: 
-if the sunlight is cut photosynthesis does not take place 
-therefore plants cannot make food 
-without making food plants die 
-dead plants do not make any oxygen 
-without oxygen being put into water fish die 
-dead stuff at the bottom of the pond means that nitrates are increased 
-more nitrates cause more bacteria to develop 
-more bacteria take in more oxygen and produce more carbon dioxide 
-with most of the oxygen used up without being put back into the pond 
the latter dies 
At the end we notice that the entire pond is represented as a living entity by attaching 
to it a vital property that only living organisms have: it dies. The personification here 
implies that the pond is a living system because it sustains a number of processes 
which are kept in balance. These processes support various forms of life and without 
them these forms of life will cease to exist. So the pond is the superordinate entity and 
the Whole, and its Parts, the subordinated entities, which are nested within it are 
processes of life. The Whole obtains living properties because its Parts are living. It is 
very important that the amounts of some entities in the pond are kept at a certain 
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level, otherwise the balance is upset and processes cannot be sustained any more. So 
in the same way that an organism dies if it is starving from oxygen, the pond dies as 
well, since it cannot support any life process. 
Pond here is realised as a living entity (a living system), rather than a simple 
container. Personification works out the ontology of entity like image schemata. As it 
has been discussed in section 7.4.2.2, containment relations are primarily thought of 
as working out the nature of entities due to their property to impose boundaries and 
represent them as discrete from others. The difference between the pond represented 
as a container and its representation here is that personification transforms the entity 
into a system of relations which sustain it as one whole 'thing'. Like the metaphorical 
extension of containment relations it is because of co-ordinated agent structures that 
the parts are bound together into one whole entity so as the latter can be now 
considered as a living entity separated from others. 
5.2.4 Analogies afford personification 
Personification can be addressed through explicit analogies as well. The teacher who 
introduces new terms to students for living organisms which are seen in a different 
way, as parts of the food chain is assisted with analogies from the realm of labour 
relations in our everyday life: 




T: Produces. So here we have what is actually called within the food chain the 
producers. Right. They produce the food. They make the food it's like 
factories, factories make things so we say factories produce right. Here green 
plants make food using energy from the sun so we've call them producers. 
When something that's been made by a factory they've produced it they will 
take it along and somebody would sell it. You may come along you will buy 
it you are a? 
S: Consumer 
S2: Buyer 
T: A consumer 
S: 	 Consumer .. 
(Lesson: Food chain, p.10) 
Producers thus plants are seen as factories which make things by using raw materials. 
In the same way factories' products are addressed to consumers, other living 
organisms get what the plants made by eating them. The role of plants as producers 
and their contribution to us as consumers is overemphasised to the extent that the 
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former are seen as necessary for the survival of the latter, in a way that plants are 
labourers who 'work' for the benefit of humans: 
T:• 	 The excess oxygen is released back into the atmosphere, the extra oxygen is 
released, the oxygen that's not required is released back into the atmosphere. 
So now you we start looking at green plants in a different light. They provide 
us with food, it doesn't matter what we eat the energy that's in that food will 
have eventually been trapped by green plants, so they provide us with energy 
they also clean up the atmosphere for us they take the carbon dioxide the stuff 
that we produce that we don't want slightly poisonous for us so we get rid of it 
they take it out of the atmosphere so they clean up the atmosphere for us. 
Also, they put oxygen back into the atmosphere oxygen which we cannot live 
without, so not only do they provide us with a means of trapping energy from 
the sun so that we can we use it, they also recycle the gases so we can get rid 
of the carbon dioxide taking oxygen. 
(Lesson: Food chain, p.10,11) 
Agent structures which are usually used to represent activities of people, like they 
provide us with food, they clean up the atmosphere, they recycle gases are now used 
to represent plants' actions. As a result the personification of plants brings them to a 
position equally important to ours. Power relations between plants and humans work 
in both ways, from humans to plants and from plants to humans. We have the power 
of using plants' labour for our survival - even if this is represented here without cost 
from the part of the consumer - but on the other hand if plants stop working then we 
cannot do what they do by replacing them so our survival is seriously threatened. At 
some points this relation is seen as a relation of mutual interdependence and 
solidarity; plants need us in the same way as we need them they also recycle the gases 
so we can rid of the carbon dioxide taking oxygen. Plants' role in the overall food 
chain is overemphasised and their contribution to it is seen as cruelly neglected from 
a human's point of view: 
T.• 	 We do it even ... right you .... plant ... a potato and you pull it up by its roots 
and you nick its food supply, it has worked all the way through the summer to 
store its preserve of food down in the potato underground so that when 
conditions get bad in the winter and it dies it's now got energy stored 
underground so when conditions get favourable next year it can grow again. 
Oh no, we come along and nick the whole lot and we use that as our energy 
supply. 
(Lesson: Food chain, p.11) 
Finally, the whole argument is used back again by the teacher to make an ethical 
point; thinking how cruel is to kill and eat animals does not mean that it is less cruel 
to use plants as our food supplies. 
In section 6.3.2.1 we have seen how material processes of doing and making represent 
and realise plants in the same way animals are realised. In the example above it is 
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noticed that personification moves one step further in plants realisation as animate 
entities. It is not now just the sharing of the same grammatical and schematic 
structures which brings plants and animals, humans nearer to each other, but the fact 
that the two realms of entities exchange goods between them. The latter relation 
draws from the world of everyday exchanges between people, and as a result brings 
with it further implications about how the relation between human beings and plants 
can now be realised. These implications turn to be ideological implications such as 
fair trade, underpaid labour e.t.c. which can raise ethical questions. But it should not 
be underestimated the fact that the personification is able because it is grounded in 
common patterns of agency that both plants and humans share. 
5.2.5 Discussion 
So far mainly three aspects of the exchange of meanings between student and teacher, 
textbook have been discussed. These are: 
a) the process which can be from less to more direct in which the reader/hearer 
addressed as 'you/we' can be seen as part of the same grammatical structures 
which represent scientific knowledge (Appendix 5.1), 
b) the reader/hearer seen as being part of image schemata such as agent 
structures and containment relations and finally 
c) the student being part of a story or/and in a position of saying stories 
(narrator). 
The emphasis in the present section is on the implications the decrease or increase of 
the distance between the 'knower' and entities from the world have on the 
representations of both. 
In this part of the thesis, it is underlined that it is not just the 'self as a single entity 
which is either objectified or personifies other entities, but a whole range of thing-like 
and process-like entities which are part of the self or surrounds it. So at the end it is 
not single entities but a whole range of relations which are objectified or personified. 
This is realised by the same image schemata and grammatical structures which are 
shared by two entities belonging into different realms of experience. It is important to 
notice here that in this process of 'sharing', the ontology of each entity (that is its 
nature) is worked out in a rather silent way. It is also this aspect of 'sharing' which 
brings not one entity against another with a purpose to compare them and see how far 
they are similar or different, but their relation is realised as one of continuity. 
According to the latter, what counts is (due to the extent that the two entities share the 
same schematic and grammatical structures) how far one, starting from one entity, can 
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go in order to reach the other entity. That is why the relation between the two is 
represented here as one of a distance between them. See it in that way personification 
and objectification turn to be two opposite ends of the same process. Both result to 
the reduction of the distance between the self and other entities. So at the end it is a 
matter of point of view really whether a relation will be looked from the point of view 
of the self which is objectified or from the point of view of the entities which are 
personified. This also means that irrespectively from which point of view the relation 
is looked at it is an interaction between the two realms of entities and implications 
occur to how we realise both of them. Again here interaction reminds us of Black's 
view about metaphor who insisted that in metaphor one subject brings a change to 
another without the metaphor being a one way relation between them. Notice that by 
the term 'subjects' (primary and secondary) Black (1962) means 'systems of 
relationships' and not just single thing-like entities, as it has also been pointed 
emphatically in the beginning of this paragraph. 
5.2.6 Summary 
Objectification and personification as they have been discussed above work in 
opposite ways but they are heading at the same direction. While the latter brings 
scientific entities closer to the subjective 'self the former brings the subjective 'self 
nearer to scientific entities. But in both cases the result is the same; the distance 
between the 'self and the object of the inquiry is reduced. As a result, the scientific 
world of entities is represented as more accessible and familiar than it might be 
thought at the first place. Unobservable entities seem more real and less problematic 
for the commonsense thinking. On the other hand some very different aspects of the 
objects of the commonsense knowledge are highlighted when they are looked in a 
different way through the prism of the scientific thinking. 
Thing-like and process-like entities which belong in the realm of scientific knowledge 
can be seen in terms of entities which belong in the world of commonsense 
knowledge, and the other way round; the commonsense can be seen in terms of the 
scientific. This two way process is realised mainly by the fact that both commonsense 
and scientific entities share the same kind of schematic realisations: containment 
relationships and either stressed or suppressed agent structures of bringing something 
into being (making), transforming and transferring. The result of this sharing is that 
both kind of entities are found in continuity where one acts on another or is affected 
by the other or being part of the other. This continuity among entities entails 
relationships between them which could not been permitted otherwise (by holding the 
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two realms apart). Personification and objectification form a safe way to create an 
interplay between science and commonsense understanding, which can both help 
students to understand, and can keep or arouse their interest. 
